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Education and Religion

WILLIAM HOLMES BORDERS

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I'm overwhelmingly honored to be in your presence today, and God bless you from the bottom of my heart. This is a marvelous, a wonderful, even a terrific experiment in Christian education, having problems and perhaps minor disappointments, but terrific nevertheless. If you can get the denominations among us, even at the Ph.D. level, to come together on one campus and reflect on God and religion at its highest, it's terrific. It's headed the right direction. God bless this great experiment. I entertain profound respect for this place, for Harry Richardson, and all the persons who work with him.

"Education and Religion, the greater of these is which?" In the broader sense education may be considered as every quest after truth, made by all people everywhere, under all conditions throughout all time. Every intellectual exposure, every desire reaching for fulfillment, systematic and unsystematic, in all times for all people. In a more strict sense, education may be confined to intellectual exposures made in schools: high schools, colleges, universities. Scholarship is indispensable. It may not be in balance a supreme end, but it is so important in the discovery of truth that discovery without it might almost be impossible.

I don't know any place in the world you can get, not even to heaven, without some brains. It takes a lot of brains to be good, and something in addition, but it takes sense to know what value really is at its rib-rock bottom, foundation stone. Let me illustrate. I was out here on the Westside one night purchasing some groceries for my family. I took this little cart and rolled it around and picked first one commodity off the shelf and then another. I went by the butcher and asked him for three pounds of brains wrapped in separate packages. While he wrapped the brains I continued to shop on the other side of the market. When I had gone to the cash register, paid for my commodities and started out of the market, the butcher hollered from the rear, "Tell that man don't go off from here without his brains." Very promptly and very quickly I went back and got my

brains, and I was better off.

Now education sharpens a man's mind. It makes it possible for him to think more accurately and more quickly. It makes it possible for him to sense a problem, bringing into the equation the most minute iota, giving it due meaning and reaching a conclusion that outside intelligence is bound to respect. No substitute for that. There is no man in this world who will ever be a successful preacher who doesn't have brains, and it's going to be increasingly difficult for a man to succeed without trained brains.

We live in a magnificent age; it's terrific, it's marvelous. Scientific technical intelligence is taxing the most daring imagination. When you begin to reflect on what has been done from savages to civilization, and giving training its due credit, you will begin to suspect how terrific education is and how important and indispensable brains are. We have men traveling 17,000 miles an hour, 150 miles out, circumnavigating the globe, staying out there four days, coming back safely. That's marvelous, that's wonderful. We have surgeons who are successfully operating on both the brain and the heart. It's perfectly possible to take off at the international dateline in the Pacific, go around the world and arrive the night before you left. Typewriter, brains; radio, brains; television, brains; automobile, brains; tractor, brains; these man-made machines that calculate more accurately than the mind, brains! Producing a machine that is more accurate than the producer, terrific.

Now religion has got to be interpreted in a world where people think and the preacher's got to out-think everybody in the world on every subject. As impossible as that sounds, he has got to do it. If he can't do it he had better do some good bluffing. I congratulate these persons who are outstanding, God bless you. You ought to feel proud of yourself but don't weary in well-doing, and remember that you are living in a world where you never get good until you get better.

Now religion in its cry for help is a prayer; in its worship it's inspiration; in its offering it's a sacrifice, in its ethics it's a good life; in its life after death it is immortality; in its upward reach it is God. It is more than these, but these are references which will serve our purpose temporarily. There is no substitute for religion; there is absolutely no substitute for religion. It is impossible for any mind

however massive to define it so successfully that everything inside of the definition is religion, and everything outside is not. However dangerous it is to try to define religion, it is even more dangerous to leave it undefined. At its rib-rock bottom foundation stone, for me religion is an experience. It is something that happens to the soul of man with God in charge. In the broad open day-time at high noon and when God ever really deals with you, it doesn't leave you a fool, you've got sense enough to know it thereafter. But you have to have a conviction with reference to it, and the different ways to dress it up are different ways to drive it, and you have got to drive it according to the gift of your own particular personality. Don't ever try to preach anything in this world that you don't believe. Be absolutely sincere about it, and any time you pray a prayer that you are not sincere about, any time you preach a sermon that is not all in your blood and bones and in your spirit, any time you preach something that you don't feel, nobody out there is going to feel it either. It is just as important to be emotionally stirred up as it is to be mentally accurate.

Now some people can be so educated till they are so educated, till they are so educated, till they are so educated! So what? The best doctor in the world isn't worth that much if he can't get to the patient; and the best preacher in the world has got to get beyond the footlights, and he has got to get beyond those pews. He has got to get to the hearts of the people, and people throughout the length and breadth of the world from the beginning have been partly emotional. Even love itself is emotional, so is intuition, so is music, so is poetry. So he who believes that he can be so intellectually accurate to keep religion reduced to an electric frigidaire all the time is in error, for indeed a kitchen needs a gas stove just as it needs an electric frigidaire.

I for one, just for myself, believe in the torch of religion, lighted at the high altar of the Eternal, and I believe in that prophetic fervor. I believe that the prophet's heart ought to blaze with the power of God and his head ought to be intellectually clear so he can see where his emotions are driving. Religion is the prolific mother of human culture and we need not apologize to anybody in the world. I'm not much but I'm God's errand boy, and that's pretty good for a rookie like me coming from the country, and I feel proud of that.

If I were to give you a personal testimony this morning, I would say that God has honored me and I'm taking that honor, handling it sacredly, and driving with all I know, with all the power of my existence. A preacher has got to be educated. Don't you underestimate that.

And then there must be religion also. A preacher's head must be a library and his heart must be a sanctuary. Paul comes to my aid. You recall that his name at first was not Paul but Saul, that he was a Pharisee. You recall that he went to kindergarten at his mother's knee, and went to Boys' Academy in the streets of Tarsus, a little city where he was born, and went to the synagogue. You recall further that he got an A.B. degree, and then got a Master's in Jerusalem, and Gamaliel directed his research. He was trained. For me, Paul wrote fourteen of the twenty-seven books in the New Testament, and he wrote well and with a terrific understanding. He wasn't writing to get his books in the Bible, but he wrote so well that the Catholic Church decided that the Bible wouldn't be complete without some of what he had written.

The three great streams of culture in the Graeco-Roman world were Roman law, Greek philosophy and Hebrew religion. In his great ode on love, Paul summed up all three in four verses. "Though I speak with the tongues of men, (the Roman Cicero), and of angels, though I have the gift of prophecy (Hebrew prophets), and understand all mystery (Greek philosophy), and have not love, it is nothing." Do you know any ode better than that? Then you know plenty. That man's mind was massive.

Moreover Paul was a great preacher and went to Corinth. He set his education aside and left it burning and went to Philippi where he preached his way into jail and prayed his way out. But before that education, before that praying mind was really at its best, Paul had to be converted. I believe in conversion, and I believe it may be gradual according to Bushnell, and I believe it may be cataclysmic according to Paul. Something happened to him, and when he was in the presence of Agrippa he didn't fall back on his education, he didn't talk supremely and mainly about being a Pharisee, nor being a Jew. I tell you what he talked about. When the jailer unlocked that door and told him that Agrippa had decided to hear his case, Paul followed the sheriff to the courtroom and Agrippa said to the clerk,

"Read the charges against him." The clerk turned to page 14 and read the charges, "Saul of Tarsus alias Paul the missionary, charged with stirring up the people, claiming that some Jesus of Nazareth rose from the dead."

Agrippa said, "Now you are permitted to speak for yourself." Paul said, "You mean to tell me that you are going to give me a chance to defend myself." He said, "Yes, go ahead." Paul said, "All I want is standing room and elbow space and talking time. I was a Pharisee and I defended this legalistic position. I entertained profound respect for Moses, the greatest leader that Israel had ever produced. I was determined to stop this new religion of the spirit and I persecuted Christians in Jerusalem, some of them scattered to Damascus, and I went to the high sheriff and asked him for a written document to go down and complete a task so nobly begun. As I traveled this dusty highway at high noon in the broad open daytime I was in my right mind, something happened to me. A light lit up every dark nook and corner in my heart and I heard a voice, distinct and clear. Even the animal that I rode stood up on its hind legs and pawed his front hoofs in midair and tried to dance out of the ray of the light; even the animal knew that something strange and mysterious was happening. And since that day, I have not been disobedient to the heavenly vision."

That was Paul the missionary. Some very advanced fellows take the position that Paul was beyond Jesus. They had better be careful but I tell you this: for me Paul was the most terrific character in Christendom other than Jesus. You remember those three missionary journeys, you've read about in the New Testament. After the Old Testament had said, "Somebody is coming," the New Testament said, "Somebody is here," and Paul capped the climax and said, "This somebody is Jesus." And he said it with power, he said it with authority, he said it with intelligence. He said it in the civilized world, he said it before kings, he said it before queens, he said it everywhere he went. He said it with all the power of his existence, without apologies to anybody, and whenever he got in a close place he told the world "This thing happened to me in the broad open daytime. I was in my right mind." For me, preaching sermons is telling the world with power what God has done for you.

"Education and Religion, the greater of these is which?" The

ideal is a perfect balance of the two, for indeed education removes cobwebs from our minds so that we can think more accurately. Religion removes prejudices from our hearts in order that we may be moral giants and with that morality and power drive in the direction that truth points. Education and Religion, the greater of these is which?" Perfect blending of the two is ideal.

Address at I.T.C. Honor's Day, May 15, 1964.

The Meaning of Transcendence in Barth's Religious Epistemology

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*Introduction: A Current Need for Reconsideration
of the Barthian Epistemology of Transcendence*

No doubt the readers of *The Center* are well aware of Westminster Press's recent paperback¹ which has made its author probably the most frequently discussed of the current theological "gadflies." The Anglican Bishop of Woolwich's approach reflects a certain ambiguous movement back and forth between contemporary redefinition² and radical reconstruction.³ But his basic aim is clear.

Our concern will not be simply to substitute an immanent for a transcendent Deity, . . . On the contrary, the task is to validate the idea of transcendence for modern man.⁴

The means for such validation is the Tillichian category of God as 'Ultimate Ground of all being.' God is discovered as the underlying depth *between* persons they are related in love.⁵

However, the problem with such a structural concept is how to do justice to the divine initiative. How does this understanding of transcendence give meaning to the root Hebrew-Christian emphasis that Yahweh is the God who mercifully comes to man in redeeming grace, who offers himself to man in reconciling love? Robinson is quite adept at showing the inappropriateness of theology's trying to communicate today in terms of a God 'up there' or 'out there.' But he is almost equally imprecise in discerning what may well be the basic function for Christian theology of the category of transcendence, the centrality of grace. Moreover, virtually nothing is said about the thought of Karl Barth, the one who has done more than any other

to restore transcendence to an important role in theology today. Such would seem to be a strange omission, and perhaps one worth correcting.

At this point, we will leave the efforts of the good bishop. Our intention is to take a rather different look at transcendence by examining its meaning in Barth's religious epistemology. Since comparison and contrast are often an aid to clarity, and the topic lends itself well to such, our approach will be to highlight Barth's position in relation to the history of doctrine. He treats the subject in one very full chapter,⁶ which is divided into three sections: "The fulfillment of the knowledge of God," "The knowability of God," and "The limits of the knowledge of God." The main problem discussed in the first section is objectivity and subjectivity in man's knowledge of God, in the second that of natural theology, and in the third the nature of analogy and religious language. All three sections understand man's knowledge of God as dynamic and event-centered. Therefore, they follow the same twofold pattern of treatment, each understanding the essence of this unique knowledge relationship as the result of the Word of God, and devoting one part to the divine side, the other part to the human side of the resultant relationship.

On the divine side the completion of this revelational action gives the theme of God's hiddenness; on the human side it gives the theme of God's openness or veracity. And the divine transcendence in Barth is not properly understood until it takes account of both themes. By all means it must not be simply identified with God's hiddenness, for such would only reduce itself to an impossible, ultimate paradox. The accompanying demand to maintain *both* transcendence *and* immanence would fall out to a choice between *either* transcendence *or* immanence, which was the state in which he found theology as it entered the twentieth century. His aim is to destroy the need for such a choice, to make a more fundamental penetration (cf. pp. 302-303 ff.), and so to secure both God's hiddenness and his openness. God's transcendence, then, must be understood as his freedom in grace and mercy both to be veracious in his openness for us, and yet to be equally veracious in maintaining his hiddenness for himself.

Transcendence and the Church Fathers: The Incomprehensibility of God as a Guarantee of the Divine Freedom

It is not coincidental that, although Augustine has something to say in each of Barth's three sections of the chapter under discussion, the remainder of the Church Fathers are cited relative to his third section only. The point is that very early the *incomprehensibilitas Dei* entered the history of dogma as a central element of the article on God. Already with the second century apologists the recognition was clear that, in contrast to his relation to the creatures, man was unable to give God a name (p. 187). Augustine saw well that for man to comprehend God would be for God to cease to be God (p. 185). The problem is whether this insight got beyond the assertion of Plato and Plotinus that the supreme being simply is inaccessible to man. A man like Hilary could affirm, "Perfect knowledge is so to know God that, although it is not the unknown, still it is the indescribable that you know" (p. 192). But yet there stands the Pseudo-Dionysian tradition for which the *Deus definiri nequit* simply means that, by "a revocation or relativising of all the definiteness of the divine nature" (p. 193) through the formulating of negative statements, a true knowledge of God can after all be obtained.

The answer emerges in an uneven but real recognition by the Fathers that the centrality of the divine incomprehensibility means that God alone can unveil his hiddenness (p. 194), while the given words as human witness to revelation remain under the limitation of this fundamental hiddenness. They "are not in themselves and as such identical with the ineffable name by which God calls Himself and which therefore expresses His truth" (p. 195). However, their Christo-centricity is not strong enough (pp. 198-9), while their appeal to God's visibility in the creatures tends too much to be "simply of the creation as such, and therefore of a relative knowability of God in it" (p. 200). Nevertheless, their attempt to avoid a fundamental skepticism in interpreting the divine incomprehensibility, Barth regards as commendable.

The fact that we understand God otherwise than He understands Himself, must not mean that we understand Him falsely (*pseudos*) and distortedly (*diestrammenos*). (p. 202).

This statement illustrates the need to move from the No of the dialectic to the Yes, and so Barth's discussion in this third section

makes its transition from "1. The Hiddenness of God," to "2. The Veracity of Man's Knowledge of God." Only it is important to note that the Fathers speak but rarely in these concluding fifty pages, and where they do speak it is to illustrate the need of a corrective. They tend to evaluate anthropomorphisms in terms of "impropriety," abstract concepts in terms of "moderate impropriety," and negative concepts in terms of "genuine propriety" (p. 222).

We must, however, give the fathers due credit for their attention to the biblical passages about the inadequacy of all human language about God and its Divine overcoming, and also for their emphasis on the fact to which these passages refer. And there is no doubt that they did aim to interpret this truth of revelation as attested in the Bible. But while we acknowledge this fact, we shall have to underline at any rate more clearly than they did the basic character of the incongruence and the revelational character of the congruence reconstituted when it is overcome (p. 223).

*Transcendence and Scholasticism: Natural Theology
as a Threat to God's Knowability*

In this chapter one would expect to find heavy reference to Thomas Aquinas in the second section where natural theology is so much on the horizon, but actually his is rather a subordinate place in section three illustrating the continuation of the partially adequate understanding of the Fathers on the *incomprehensibilitas Dei*. However, the ubiquitous, Christianized Aristotle is not really absent from this section, but appears in a garb particularly odious to Barth; namely that of the Vatican Council of 1870⁷ with its elevation to the level of dogma of natural theology built on an *analogia entis*, and its accompanying anathema of all those who would reject such a position (p. 79). The charge, therefore, is that Rome puts the fundamental question of God's knowability in a pagan, anti-Christian way.

Quite apart from grace and miracle, has not man always had what is in relation to the being of the world the very 'natural' capacity to persuade himself and others of a higher and divine being? All idols spring from this capacity. And the really wicked and

damnable thing in the Roman Catholic doctrine is that it equates the Lord of the Church with that idol and says of Him therefore the very thing that would naturally be said of it. This is the decisive difference between them and us (p. 84).

Thus Rome, following the Thomistic tradition, partitions our knowledge of God and so fails to take the divine unity seriously; she dares to equate the vague and general idea of an origin and goal of all things, with the very particular reality of the God who reconciles and redeems in Christ Jesus (pp. 79ff.). And secondly, with this approach the knowability of God is handled non-existentially, in an abstract and "convenient" way; it loses all touch with the God of the Bible, the God who in His gracious work and activity lays hold upon man (pp. 80ff.). Hence, natural theology is not asking about the knowability of God; it is rather asking about the knowability of an idol.

But at this point a false claim regarding Anselm of Canterbury, usually tagged as "the father of scholasticism," is dealt with; i.e. the interpretation that, because he sought to develop theological proofs *sola ratione* which were satisfying even to Jews and heathen, he offers an early precedent for the method of natural theology. The issue reduces itself to the meaning for Anselm of a theological proof.

But the *ratio* as well as the *necessitas* of which Anselm speaks is that of the *veritas* of God, which is for him identical with the divine Word and with the content of the Christian creed. Since he believes it, he wants to know it and prove it; he wants *ratione* (by means of his human reason) to make clear its *rationem* (its divine reasonableness); or necessitate (thinking fundamentally) to make clear its *necessitatem* (its divine basis)—*in concreto* the reasonableness and the basis of this or that article of faith (p. 92).

Anselm, then, does not proceed by arguing from a body of general truths accepted by all men to the particular truths of revelation (the procedure of natural theology). Rather, he proceeds by isolating one particular truth of revelation and then showing its fundamental consistency with the whole spectrum of revealed *veritates*. Although the process of theological proof makes a very real, indeed, the most

real, use of reason, still from beginning to end it works only with materials which are particularly given by revelation. Even to consider using reason to move from that which is generally known to that which is particularly given would be immediately an illegitimate use of reason for the theologian. Barth's discovery of this in the early 30's as Anselm's approach to the question of theological *ratio* has, by his plain declaration (cf. p. 4), had a significant influence upon his own understanding of theological method, including his refusal to allow reason the role of effecting a transition from philosophy to theology.

In this book on Anselm I am working with a vital key, if not the key, to an understanding of that whole process of thought that has impressed me more and more in my *Church Dogmatics* as the only one proper to theology.⁸

*Transcendence and the Reformers: Divine
Initiative as God's Secondary Objectivity*

Working forwards through the chronology of the history of dogma and backwards through Barth's three sections in the chapter under discussion, it is interesting that upon coming to his first section, where the problem of subjectivity and objectivity is to the fore, we find the voice of the Reformers to be at its weightiest. For here the epistemology of faith is under consideration. Yet, since "faith is the total positive relationship of man to the God who gives Himself to be known in His Word" (p. 12), it is necessary to go to an earlier volume and briefly look at an aspect of his concept of the Word of God.

This phrase, whether as the Preached, the Written, or the Revealed Word, is interpreted rather literally and pregnantly by Barth: "'God's Word' means 'God speaks,' and all further statements about it must be regarded as exegesis, not as limitation or negation of this proposition."⁹ Thus, as God's language, it carries a spiritual, personal, purposive directness unknown to mere human language; it comes to man as God's affirmative and decisive act of judgment which always remains God's own unique mystery.¹⁰ This ought to be clear

to those claiming to belong to the Reformation heritage, but for the villainous influence of another formidable, historical figure, the so-called 'father of modern philosophy.'

The modernist view against which we have to fix our limits goes back to the Renaissance and particularly to the Renaissance philosopher Cartesius with his proof of God from man's certainty of himself.¹¹

It is suggested that even on its own plane Cartesianism, with its famous *cogito ergo sum*, may well be a highly inadequate methodology. It may not only be unable to effect the transition from man's self-certainty to his certainty of God, but its radically egocentric starting-point may lead to an epistemological catastrophe. Man, by defining himself simply as knowing subject, may find himself unable to guarantee an epistemological relationship to any real object; he may find himself the helpless victim of a hopeless subject/object split. However, Barth will not even allow theology on its own philosophical grounds. He simply, with bold consistency, attacks Descartes by affirming as a clear declarative the only way of a genuine theology.

The procedure in theology therefore is to base self-certainty upon God-certainty and to measure it by God-certainty and so to begin with God-certainty without waiting for this beginning to be legitimized by self-certainty. . . . In other words, in the real knowledge of the Word of God in which that beginning alone will be made, there is also the event that it is possible, that that beginning can be made.¹²

Real certainty can be found only by beginning with the divine initiative. And so the knowability of the Word of God is not open to a *discovery by man*; indeed by definition it cannot be. Rather, the knowability of the Word of God is *discovered to man* by God in faith, and as such constitutes the revelatory event. Herein occurs "The fulfilment of the knowledge of God," as Barth entitles his first section of the chapter this paper is examining; and so we have returned to the subject of the epistemology of faith as clarified by the Reformers.

It is Calvin's cognitive approach to faith as knowledge which Barth enthusiastically acclaims. God gives himself as an object to

faith, that is the thing; for objectivity is irremovable from knowledge. Indeed, when the Heidelberg Catechism adds to Calvin's definition of faith as certain knowledge, 'hearty trust,' this is regarded as a weakening (p. 13). Yet there must be a distinction between God's primary objectivity (as he is known to himself) and his secondary objectivity (as he gives himself to be known by man in the event of revelation).

It is distinguished from the primary objectivity, not by a lesser degree of truth, but by its particular form suitable for us, the creature. God is objectively immediate to Himself, but to us He is objectively mediate (p. 16).

This is the point of Luther's emphasis upon seeking God not in his *nuda essentia* but in this *larvae*. "We must seek Him where He Himself has sought us—in those veils and under those signs of His Godhead. Elsewhere He is not to be found" (p. 18). It is in his mercy that God presents himself in his secondary objectivity, else we would be struck dead by his glorious holiness.

Luther clarifies the danger of man's seeking out God unaided, for thus he would stumble upon the divine wrath and be beaten down into despair. Calvin shows the impossibility of such a venture, for man in his pride is dishonest about his true self and erects less discomforting idols. Therefore, God must point in revelation to where his secondary objectivity lies. The knowledge of God is by free grace alone.

The *divina benevolentia* now, so to speak, rends the veil of human non-understanding and misunderstanding, and the rule of all real knowledge of God now comes into force—and this is the subjectively new thing which takes place on the basis of revelation (p. 28).

Man's subjectivity in the experience of faith is the knowledge of God's secondary objectivity, a given objectivity; a knowledge event wherein, directly opposite to Descartes, not the knowing subject but the known object is definitive for the completion of the event (cf. p. 44). And what other could be the case with an epistemological event so fundamental as the knowledge of God?

*Transcendence and Protestant Orthodoxy: A
Proper Concept of Analogy as Basic for the
Meaningfulness of Theological Language*

Although we have now traversed the three sections of this chapter in relation to the history of dogma through the Reformation, the post-Reformation period plays a significant role too, though primarily that of the loss of those dimensions Barth has been shown trying to recover. And, not without reason, these critical judgments occur primarily in the third section of his chapter.

His blows of criticism do not fall as heavily against the period of Protestant orthodoxy as one might expect. He notes appreciatively: "As the older theology used the word, the 'incomprehensibility' of God is something very far-reaching" (p. 186). Only, he cannot avoid the conclusion that for those theologians the divine hiddenness ceases to perform its limiting role at the point of revelation (p. 191), especially at that of the words of the Bible (p. 195). "A very basic indication was given. But it was as if they had not entirely understood the indication itself" (p. 185).

Yet beyond the observation that Protestant orthodoxy was not fully enough aware of the scope of the divine No, there remains the question of how adequately it dealt with the divine Yes. Attention is focused upon how A. Quenstedt clarifies and summarizes the problem of analogy with his threefold distinction on the nature of predication.

We speak *univoce* when the same term, applied to two different objects in the same way, designates the same thing in both of them. . . . We speak *aequivoce* when the same term, applied to two different objects, designates a different thing in the one and the other. . . . We speak *analogice* when the same term, applied to two different objects, designates the same thing in both but in different ways (p. 237).

And Barth follows Quenstedt in his conclusion that language about God is neither univocal nor equivocal, but analogical. Further-

more, there is agreement as to the nature of what is common within this analogical predication: "what is common to them exists first and properly within the one [i.e. God as Creator], and then, because a second is dependent upon it, in the second [i.e. man as creature]" (p. 238). Only he does not think Quenstedt realized that this kind of analogy is absolutely unique; i.e., that it owes the intense degree of its inter-relation of *analogans* and *analogata* to the Creator/creature relationship, and therefore "that the concept is no longer a general, but a specifically and expressly theological concept" (p. 238). It is not available to man in general, and so cannot become a basis for any program of natural theology. Nor does Barth mean only that the knowledge of this analogical relationship is unavailable to man in general; rather, for the man without faith this analogical relationship does not even exist. It is not an *analogia entis*, but an *analogia gratiae*; it becomes an existent reality for the individual man only in faith (p. 239). Yet this carries the implication that for any other than the man of faith theological language is nonsense, because no undergirding analogy exists to give it meaning. Here is a genuinely fundamental issue, the development of which lies beyond the scope of this more general and introductory article. A separate discussion limited to the problem of the meaning of language about God in Barth would be necessary.

Transcendence and Nineteenth Century Theology: The Loss of a Whole Dimension

At this point the intent is a clarification of how radical was the loss in nineteenth century theology: the critique is familiar. The plea to give heed to the degree of aesthetic, religious, and theological truth possessed by the world in the interest of the world's accepting the claims of Jesus Christ was a request for an 'also' when "it really meant an 'only'. . . . A natural theology which does not strive to be the only master is not a natural theology" (p. 173). What began as an apologetic appeal to religion's 'cultured despisers,'¹³ ended in a wedding by the 'German Christians' of the Church with culture as defined by Hitler's German *Reich* (p. 174). Nor has Schleiermacher in any sense transcended this anthropocentric line of thinking in his claim to show loyalty to the divine incomprehensibility by pointing

theology away from the 'beyond' of God, and inward upon man's subjective feelings of 'absolute dependence' (p. 193). Ritschl worked an even more severe reduction of the role of the Creator God in theology by trying to overcome Schleiermacher's subjectivism with a mere idea, even if that of a "supreme value or good" (p. 228). By contrast, "there was at least agreement in the Early Church that to know God means 'to conceive Him in His incomprehensibility'" (p. 192); not for theology to take flight from him as with Schleiermacher, or to substitute for him an idea as with Ritschl.

At this point a rejoinder must be made to those who would read Barth's emphasis upon the divine hiddenness in terms of a Neo-Kantian epistemological skepticism.¹⁴

Nothing can be more misleading than the opinion that the theological statement of the hiddenness of God says roughly the same thing as the Platonic or Kantian statement, according to which the supreme being is to be understood as a rational idea withdrawn from all perception and understanding (p. 183).

For Barth criticizes such a skepticism on two counts: 1) it overstates the divine hiddenness by making it a complete denial of all objectivity to God, and so 2) it understates the divine presence by making it merely a rational idea.

The God who encounters man in His revelation is never a non-objective entity, or one who is objective only in intention. He is the substance of all objectivity (p. 183).

Summary and Conclusion

The Kantian position is the result of applying a general philosophy of metaphysics and epistemology to the concept of God; Barth's position is an attempt to erect a pure (non-philosophical) theology upon the basis of the particular reality of Christianity's unique divine revelation event. He is less comfortable with the reference to God as 'totally other' than he once was, because it is too susceptible to being misinterpreted in terms of such a general epistemology of skepticism. His strong assertion of God's transcendence has its roots, not in the philosophical, but in the biblical tradition. In contrast to a limitation or encroachment, it intends to be a forthright declaration of the *freedom* of God's grace, his freedom even to be *objectively*

'for us' in his redeeming and reconciling revelation, and still to remain fully and totally God. This is a very particular concrete understanding of transcendence; it has become a properly theological category. Any less revelational approach would be forced to adopt a general, abstract understanding of transcendence; it would remain a merely philosophical category. And this is the danger involved in an effort, such as that of Bishop Robinson, to structure a concept of God in terms of the 'Ultimate Ground of all being.'

Thus, theology has need to recover a fundamental dimension in its understanding of "the Knowledge of God," namely the dimension of transcendence. The Reformers developed an epistemology of faith wherein the priority of the divine initiative prevented any subject/object split in "The fulfilment of the knowledge of God." Relative to "The knowability of God," Anselm developed a theological methodology in radical contradiction to that of the proponents of natural theology who falsely claimed to be his followers. And most basically, the Church Fathers developed an awareness of the centrality of God's incomprehensibility which must be recaptured and sharpened in consideration of "The limits of the knowledge of God." Barth's aim, then, is to effect this recovery in at least these three ways, and to this degree he seeks to conserve certain historical emphases. But as well he intends to clarify, make even more basic and consistent, and indeed redefine this dimension, and to this degree he must be seen as a creative dogmatician.

¹I refer to John A. T. Robinson, *Honest to God* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963).

²Cf. *ibid.*, p. 132.

³*Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 49-53.

⁶This study is based primarily upon a close analysis of Barth's *Church Dogmatics II: The Doctrine of God*, ed. by G. W. Bromiley & T. F. Torrance, 1st half-volume, Ch. 5, "The Knowledge of God," tr. by T. H. L. Parker (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), pp. 3-254. References to this portion of Barth's text will appear in the body of the paper according to the pages of this edition, while all other citations will be more fully acknowledged by footnote.

⁷Thus he speaks of "the formulae of the *Vaticanum* (which canonises the supreme achievement of Thomas Aquinas)" p. 127.

⁸"Preface to the Second Edition," *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum*, (Cleveland: Meridian Living Age Books, 1962), p. 11.

⁹*Church Dogmatics I: The Doctrine of the Word of God*, 1st half-volume, tr. by G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936), p. 150.

¹⁰Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 150-212.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 222.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 223.

¹³Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, tr. by John Oman (New York: Harper & Bros., 1958).

¹⁴E.g. Cornelius Van Til, *The New Modernism* (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publ. Co., 1946); *Christianity and Barthianism* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1962).

The Source of Christian Ethics

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The sciences of human behavior and society have taught us much in recent years about the processes and dynamisms of ethics. We are making progress in the knowledge of the inner and outer circumstances which gives us clearer insights and brighter outlooks for understanding why we behave as we do. But psychology and sociology are concerned chiefly with the occasions and processes of our mores, hardly with the "springs of action," as Kant called them. It is with these roots or basic principles of Christian ethics that we are now primarily concerned.

The usual account of the source of Christian morality runs something like this: the Christian is one who seeks to achieve and enhance goodness and value in his own life and in the lives of others. This he does by devotion to high, ethical ideals as defined in the life and teachings of Jesus, e.g., in the Sermon on the Mount or the Golden Rule, and by personal efforts and cooperation with other men of good will. In this great moral endeavor he has "faith" that God will help him, if he will do his best.

This is excellent in many ways and must never be discounted. Yet it is open to serious question whether or not this represents the true source of Christian ethics. It is good, but is it good enough? We believe it is not. Rather, this idealistic ethic is Christian only in a way that is secondary and far from unique or distinctive. The view stated above, with only slight change of detail, would be an accurate statement of Platonic, Stoic or Kantian ethics. In common with these and other moral philosophies, the source of ethics is found in the *nature of the self*. There's the rub, for it is the self which is most at fault in our failure to realize the ideal. After the behavioral sciences have clarified my problems, they remain *my* problems. The lofty ideals to which I aspire remain *my* ideals, and the power to reach them are ultimately mine. But if I know myself, any ethic which finds its source in *me* is doomed to failure before it starts.

In his book, *The Divine Imperative*, Emil Brunner makes a startling statement, "Since the time of the Reformation, no single work on

ethics has been produced which makes the evangelical Christian faith its center." (p. 10). It is the implications of this statement which we wish to suggest now. These will find their focus, not in the nature of man only, but also, and primarily, in his *relationship* to God.

1. The Fact of Sin

Doubtless all ethical systems take account of evil or wrong. Indeed, the gap between what man is and what he ought to be is the basic problem of ethics. Yet it seems strange that so few moral philosophers have taken seriously the problem of *sin*. Only Kant seems to have confronted what he calls "radical evil." This is concerned not merely with wrongdoing, but with the more deadly fact of *being* wrong. Not only does man do evil deeds, knowing that they are evil, (Socrates notwithstanding!), but he is the evil kind of being who could do such things.

A review of Kant's critique of radical evil would be too technical and pointless for our consideration here. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that he probed with remarkable insight into bitter truth and faced courageously this threat to the very heart of his moral philosophy. In man's rational nature, his supreme will and source of all goodness, he found a fatal flaw, the taproot of evil. How a good will could possibly will evil is a great mystery and Kant admits that he does not know the answer. In the end he retreats into his optimistic view that the knowledge of one's duty implies the ability to do it.

Nor is it necessary to work through the thorny problem of the various views of "original sin" to be found in the history of theology. Probably all of them leave much to be desired as explanations, but they agree in their witness to the fact that all men find themselves in a state of estrangement, even rebellion against their Creator. Whether we accept the traditional view of Augustine and Calvin or the most dynamic and freedomistic account of existentialism, the fact of sin is found to be basic.

Ethics based solely on natural sources is seriously deficient because it glosses over this primary fact of man's wrong relationship to God. Every psychological and social aspect of our existence is

preconditioned by the a priori rejection of the status of a creature absolutely dependent upon God. As a result we resort to desperate attempts to establish our independence from God by seeking the sources of our lives in the nature of self or society. We try to live in our own light and rest in our own shade.

We may illustrate this type of ethics by a modern parable. The passengers on an airliner became tired of their cramped quarters, strapped in their seats. Seeking freedom, they jumped from the door of the plane thousands of feet above the earth. Immediately they discovered an exhilarating experience which they called "freedom." Since they were all falling in a group together, they had no fixed point of reference from which to observe the fact that they were falling at all, much less could they see that in choosing to fly on their own, they had really chosen certain, terrible destruction.

Associated together in this exciting adventure of "freedom," they developed standards and relationships befitting a free-falling society. They organized into various clubs and denominations with appropriate officers and committees. They even found considerable satisfaction in developing a fine, new brotherhood of equally falling people. With remarkable skill they came to understand the psychological and social needs of such people and develop from these principles a system of morality. Yet occasionally they were disturbed by vague feelings of uneasiness, even panic, for dependent beings find independence rather upsetting and they were unable to escape a sense that a basic and essential relationship had been destroyed by their own primary choice.

If this ironic parable seems too severe, we may think for a moment of Paul's account of the sinner's predicament in the seventh chapter of Romans. Doubtless depicting his own experience, Paul describes the conflict which makes impossible his obedience to the law of God to which he had been devoted with fanatical zeal. He confesses, "I can will what is right, but I cannot do it" (Vs. 18). Probing beyond his own nature and determination, Paul discovers an a priori, elemental source of his moral impasse which he calls "sin." He writes, "So I find it to be a law that when I want to do right, evil lies close at hand. For I delight in the law of God, in my inmost self, but I see another law at war with the law of my mind and mak-

ing me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members" (21-23). With full allowance for Paul's dramatic account, it seems clear that he recognizes sin, wrong relationship to God, as the determining precondition to his moral failure which results in "sins."

Probably no one ever tried with more determination and ability to obey the moral law than did Paul. Yet he failed because his basic wrongness of relation to God remained unresolved. He found, as we all must, that every attempt of man in sin to re-establish fellowship with God is necessarily one more expression of sin, i.e., his false independence, like a man who tries to leap back up to the airplane from which he has just jumped. Or the attempt to achieve reconciliation with God by one's own effort is like a man in the quicksand. Every move in his struggles simply provides the law of gravity and slow, sinking death, the opportunity to destroy him. Neither is there hope in any other man, nor in society as a whole, for all men share the fatal descent. Either our righteousness will find its source above and beyond "the law of sin and death" or we shall be compelled to cry out with Paul, "Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death?" (Rom. 7:24).

2. Reconciliation By The Cross

This cry of despair, wrung from the heart of every man who honestly confronts the fact of sin as fundamental in his own life, points up the second aspect of the Gospel which we take to be the only adequate source of Christian morality. The cross is God's answer to man's proper despair. At the extremity of man's moral defeat and bankruptcy of his resources, the Christian Gospel makes the astounding declaration that "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself" (II Cor. 5:19). All systems point out to man what he *should* be: only the Christian evangel proclaims that God accepts man as he *is*, and suffers all the consequences of his sin in order to *make* him what he ought to be.

It is not easy to see why Christian moralists have so often neglected or even rejected the cross as the absolute source of our ethics. Perhaps the bewildering array of unsatisfactory theories of atonement developed by theology has turned many away. "Cheap grace," which makes salvation consist in a mere assent to the proposition

that "Christ died for our sins," without regard to a total response for every area of life, has been preached by some with the result that practical ethics has been divorced from the Gospel of redemption in Christ. It is likely that naturalistic and rationalistic ethics have developed from this unfortunate situation. For example, Kant's rigid formalism was largely a reaction against what he considered the hypocrisy of the Pietism in which he had grown up. However we explain it, the fact remains that German Idealism, Stoicism, Personalism and many other moral systems have been presented as Christian in spite of the fact that the cross has no central place, and often no place at all, in their source of morality.

Modern psychological studies have pointed out that a sense of guilt frequently lies at the bottom of a man's failure to achieve mental health and an adequate ethic. Freud has made it difficult to ignore the dark depths of our guilty fear. Probably we are correct in saying that neither Freud nor any of his followers or critics has found the answer to the problem of guilt, simply because they lack the divine dimension in their analysis of our situation. But they represent various attempts to take guilt seriously and seek the answer, while professedly Christian systems of ethics have often blithely ignored it.

But approaching the problem theologically, what can we understand about the cross in the face of the many traditional theories of the atonement? Probably each of them deserves more serious restudy than is commonly given to them. For example, Bishop Aulen did much to clarify and redeem the "classical theory" of Irenaeus and Luther. Probably each of these theories has some value in spite of the tendency to take metaphors of atonement literally.

Perhaps the most fruitful suggestion for understanding God's redeeming act in Christ is that of the dynamic transformation of meaning through creative suffering.¹ Psychiatry has shown us that past events, lost even to conscious memory, may still exert enormous influence upon us through their meaning. We may also be redeemed from their power through a present reappraisal and mature relationship to them. The actuality of past events is apparently permanent, but their *meaning* remains present and is therefore subject to renewal.

The creative power to transform evil meaning into good belongs

ultimately to God alone. This he does, not by any magical power, nor by any bookkeeping of moral vices and virtues or merits of Christ credited to our account. Rather he transforms evil meaning personally by taking it to his own holy nature as suffering and bearing it in self-giving love.² When Jesus was crucified, the cross meant punishment, shame, torture and death. But he refused to accept the evil intent of his enemies and the diabolical significance of the cross. Rather he graciously bore all its hatred and evil, praying with his dying breath that those who hounded him to death might be forgiven. It was *his* meaning, not theirs, which won, and the cross today is the world's supreme symbol of redeeming love and hope set down in the very depths of our guilty despair. Thus the ultimate expression of man's sin has been transformed by the suffering creativity of God into the divine act of holy love in our history which becomes the "mercy seat" of reconciliation for guilty sinners.

Such a view of the grace of God is "costly grace" indeed. At infinite cost the God of holy love has come to us in our sin to reconcile our alienation and resolve our fatal schizophrenia of sin which renders all our moral strivings impotent. Confronted by such grace, the primary option of Eden is opened to us anew, the option of life in God or of death in sin. The Creator himself offers to sinners the gift of new life and being. In the response of faith, the new being is made actual and becomes the absolute source of the newness of life which is Christian ethics. On the basis of this transformation, so radical that Paul calls it a "new creation," the impossible Christian ethic becomes possible.

We may now venture a definition of Christian ethics as living in right relation with God and man based on the reconciliation and lordship of Jesus Christ. "He died for all, that those who live might live no longer for themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised" (II Cor. 5:15). Such living is no legalistic obedience to the teachings of Jesus or even an idealistic attempt to copy his virtues. Rather the source of this life is an assurance of reconciliation or freedom from guilt coupled with a total commitment to Jesus Christ as living Lord. In every ethical situation the Christian asks not merely, "What did Jesus say about this?" but rather, "What shall I do, Lord?" In a word, from the side of man's experience, the source of Christian morality is vital, total faith. "For in Christ Jesus

neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is of any avail, but faith working through love" (Gal. 5:6).

3. *The Holy Spirit*

We have noted above the danger of emphasizing faith as the experiential basis for ethics. Some have taken faith to be only an intellectual assent to the proposition that "Jesus paid it all" or an emotional release from guilt feelings with no sense of the great moral imperative under which the Christian stands. This is known as anti-nomianism, always a libel on the Gospel of grace.

But surely Christianity is nothing if not ethical. It is true that we are not saved by our good works, yet it is equally true that "we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand, that we should walk in them" (Eph. 2:10). Indeed the Christian is "not under law but under grace," (Rom. 6:14) yet he is not lawless, but rather "under the law of Christ," (I Cor. 9:21) the "perfect law, the law of liberty" (Jas. 1:25). The moral responsibility of living daily in the conscious fellowship with the Lord of life, the absolute source of the moral law, is infinitely *greater*, never less, than the most meticulous legalism.

Wherein then does Christian ethics differ from all others with regard to the practical principles for living the good life? The answer is found in the ministry of the Holy Spirit, God himself, the living Christ, present to the Christian's immediate consciousness and active in every moral situation he confronts. Perhaps the best hint of the nature of Spirit as the personal self-awareness of God is given by Paul on the analogy of man's experience of self-knowledge. Regarding the revelation of God to man through the Holy Spirit, he writes,

For what person knows a man's thoughts except the spirit of the man which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is from God, that we might understand the gifts bestowed on us by God (I Cor. 2:11, 12).

Thus when Paul speaks of the Christian's receiving the Holy Spirit, he does not mean a power or influence, but he clearly implies that God himself, in his self-conscious, subjective personality, comes into

such immediate fellowship with the believer that he is said to dwell within him. In the same letter he writes, "He who is united to the Lord becomes one Spirit with him . . . Do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, which you have from God?" (I Cor. 6:17, 19, 20).

Right relation with God is here no "legal fiction," but a living, personal reality. Man is at-one with God because God himself has come into conscious fellowship with him in the inmost center of his being and life. It is the Spirit who makes actual in the experience of the sinner the atonement of Christ and thus renders the righteousness of faith a living actuality.

Paul develops this theme in Romans 8. In marked contrast with the defeat of the man under the law depicted in chapter 7, the deliverance and victory of the man of faith through Christ by the Spirit is summarized in the first four verses.

There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me free from the law of sin and death. For God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do: sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin in the flesh, in order that the just requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit (Rom. 8:1-4).

The vital "law (or principle) of the Spirit," viz., "life in Christ Jesus," has broken the impasse of the moral law, delivered from "the law of sin and death," and made "the righteousness of God" a glorious reality in the life of the erstwhile sinner.

But how does this theological answer work out in practical ethics? The answer is that the characteristic and qualities of Christ-like living are made actual in our experience only from the divine source of the Spirit of God living in conscious fellowship with each individual Christian. Let us illustrate this principle with the characteristic most commonly taken as the hallmark of Christian ethics, viz, love.

Jesus himself called the law of love the supreme principle of righteous living. Paul declared that "love is the fulfilling of the law." (Rom 13:10; Gal. 5:14). Yet we all know that such love is not realized simply by being commanded. We *try* to love the unlovely

and our enemies, but the very effort bespeaks the sad fact that there is a perversity and/or recalcitrance in our nature which "is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." Brotherhood is a noble ideal, but one which seems difficult to achieve, even in the Christian Church. Probably we fail because we are too prone to love ourselves selfishly. Christian ethics seems to founder on the same rock which has wrecked others, viz., practical realization.

But instead of seeking the source of love in ourselves, let us inquire if the Gospel does not offer a more adequate provision for this central Christian virtue. The First Epistle of John sets forth this divine source with simple clarity.

Beloved, let us love one another; for love is of God, and he who loves is born of God and knows God. He who does not love does not know God; for God is love. In this the love of God was made manifest among us, that God sent his only Son into the world, so that we might live through him. In this is love, not that we loved God but that he loved us and sent his Son to be the expiation for our sins. Beloved, if God so loved us, we also ought to love one another. No man has ever seen God; if we love one another, God abides in us and his love is perfected in us (I Jn. 4:7-12).

Have we forgotten the first lesson we learned as children in Sunday School that "God is love," while we wonder why we have failed to find the source of divine love in ourselves?

In the matter of loving our neighbors, or even our enemies, the situation is quite different from that which depends on our own likes and dislikes or even our determination. When we see any man through God's eyes, so to speak, we see one for whom God is infinitely concerned, one for whom Christ died. Standing as we do at the foot of the cross, we see our neighbor in the light of divine, self-giving love. To respond in faith to God's love for us necessarily brings us to God's viewpoint concerning ourselves and our neighbors. Even if there are natural barriers between us as neighbors, the divine triangle of God's love for each of us is completed through every obstacle. It is the Spirit's work to bring us into the *divine* significance of our relationship to each other, viz., a brotherhood in Christ, which is unknown otherwise. "We love because he first loved us" (I Jn. 4:19).

As with love, so all the qualities of Christ-likeness are produced

spontaneously and vitally in the life of each believer by the Spirit of God. In contrast to the "works of the flesh," i.e., our own best efforts and resources, "the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control" (Gal. 5:22, 23). Christian ethics is not a matter of cultivating natural fruit or of trying to tie good fruit to the branches of a bad tree, but rather grafting a new nature, receiving into the springs of our attitudes and actions the source of all goodness, the Spirit of God.

Surely guidance, as well as motivation, is an important aspect of our search for the sources of morality. Kant pointed out the fact that heteronomy, guidance from an external source, cannot be accepted if man is to be morally free and responsible. Rather he insisted that the source of the moral law must be in man's own, rational will, i.e., autonomy. Kant's argument here seems true enough, but we have already noted that radical evil or sin renders autonomy inadequate as an alternative to heteronomy. He is correct in saying that the maxims of action must spring from within the moral consciousness of the individual, but wrong in supposing that the individual is capable of being an infallible guide to right conduct. Clearly a third alternative is needed.

According to the Fourth Gospel, Jesus told the disciples, "When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all truth" (Jn. 16:13). In the ministry of the Spirit in our practical, daily lives we have the very source of the moral law, God himself, speaking with regard to each moral situation concretely and, through the mystery of his indwelling, speaking from within the consciousness of each individual Christian. His personal presence in our lives provides a vital answer to the dilemma of transcendence and immanence, or, speaking ethically, the dilemma of the heteronomy of divine law outside us and the sinful independence of autonomy. Theonomy is the Christian alternative to heteronomy and autonomy.

Perhaps we may illustrate this principle by the guidance systems of our space missiles. Some of the earlier missiles were guided by radio control from stations on the ground, (heteronomy). This method is quite successful, but there is one serious flaw in it. Since radio signals may be jammed by interference or enemy action, inertial guidance controls have been devised. These operate from a platform

which is maintained in a given position by gyroscopes within the missile. Once the platform is oriented by reference to the Pole Star, e.g., the guidance becomes entirely an internal matter. The missile is autonomous, albeit with an absolute, celestial reference.

The final test of a missile's guidance and power systems is whether or not it hits the target. So the final test of any system of ethics, including Christian ethics, is whether or not a truly divine character is produced. Precisely here the unique ethic of the fruit of the Spirit is supreme. Its method is that of vital transformation through divine fellowship, in contrast with all others which must rely upon self-effort to achieve an ideal.

This difference of method and result may be illustrated by two ways of making a picture of a friend. One method is to copy his features as we see them with paper and pencil. All of us know how difficult this is. Success depends upon the skill of the artist, but probably no one is able to make a perfect likeness. But there is another way in which anyone may be expert. We may expose the sensitive film in our camera to the face of the friend. Then the light from his face imprints its image on the film. When it is developed, a chemical transformation produces the miracle of the finished picture.

Long before the invention of the camera, Paul wrote to the Christians at Corinth, contrasting the "letter" of the law with the Spirit of Christ. He wrote,

Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit (II Cor. 3:17, 18).

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1. See H. Wheeler Robinson, *Redemption and Revelation*, N. Y. and London, Harper and Brothers, 1942.
 2. Rom. 5:6-8; II Cor. 8:9, I Pet. 2:24.

The Distinction Between Sacred And Secular Music

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This subject is a bit ambiguous because the art of music includes an immense variety of forms, innovations, styles and techniques within both the sacred and secular realms. Furthermore, we must define what we consider to be sacred and what we consider to be secular music. Some ethnic groups consider an arrangement of sounds similar to those in so-called jazz as being sacred. Others consider these sounds to be of worldly and sinful natures. Due to the fact that there exists such a wide variety of musical forms within the particular sacred and secular categories, it is difficult actually to pinpoint a definite distinction between the two, even if it is practical to do so. Nevertheless, for purposes consistent with our views and those of the world, and with regard for the technical formulas of musical composition, let us distinguish as sacred that music which has as its object a deity or a religious concern, and as secular that music which is focused upon a worldly interest or object.

The music of both these particular qualities is formed in similar fashion. The basis of any musical composition is first the original concept, whether it is a dramatic scene fused upon one's imagination, the projection of a thought or message, the account of a drama or an event, or the development of a thematic statement, melodic or rhythmic figure. Secondly, it is the interpretation of that idea through the medium of expression. melody, as typical of very early times, or of the expression of that idea through music as characteristic of today. One seeks those sacred or secular forms or styles of music which will serve to provide the most authentic interpretation of his idea. On the other hand, he may desire to create a musical composition which does not adhere to any specific form.

The above points emphasize the fact that the essence of music is expression, the verbalizing of the non-verbal in some instances, and the re-creation of a "concept" in others. Sometimes both occur simultaneously. It is a language within its own right which is capable

of expressing the inaudible utterances of the spirit and the emotions. Expression and emotion play important roles in the structure and design of a piece of music. Along this line Albert Schweitzer, one of the foremost authorities on Bach, says that the composer must be at once painter, poet and musician. In other words, these roles must be blended into a creative, artistic personality. The composer attempts to captivate the innermost sentiments of the human soul and give release and form to these passions by transmuting them into music. Therefore the expression used in a composition is directly related to the emotional undertones upon which the piece is created as well as to the specific idea which the composer has in mind.

In this case as with all others, the nature of the composition itself defines its dimensions of interpretation and expression. Bruno Walter says:

"Bach, Handel, Haydn, Mozart, etc., offer, . . . music of the deepest feeling in overwhelming profusion; all of their vocal music, . . . can be considered 'pure' music, though it has been composed in every case for the sake of the expression indicated by the text, and though its inspiration has therefore been influenced, or even engendered by expression."¹

Furthermore, with the advent of Beethoven's style, the emphasis does not appear to be on the expression in music, but on self-expression and subjectivity. I concur with Mr. Walter that there is evidence of contrast between the constituents of the two different schools of thought, and suggest that the distinction which he has made is significant for our present discussion, however, for the sake of appropriateness I must temporarily postpone the development of this topic.

The term, "pure" music, was used in the above quotation and it would perhaps be wise to define what is meant. Music is considered pure or absolute by the way it stands on its own grounds; it is not dependent on the lyrics or large amounts of subjectivity for its merits. The words should complement the transcendental nature and beauty of the music through the process of transmutation, wherein the meanings of the lyrics are converted into musical ones, the words blending unobtrusively into the musical context. In other words, the lyrics facilitate the interpretation of the music's expression

and further clarify the meaning of the music. The human mind is thereby assisted in grasping the main nucleus of thought.

Sacred music has traditionally had its place in the rites and ceremonies of men. The ancient chants and the most complex oratorios have the elements of religion and music in common. Schopenhauer says that music has a consolatory effect on suffering humanity. It gives to the groping mind by melody a meaningful interpretation to the painful, uncertain texts of life.² Hence the matters of ultimate concern in human life appear to be the common grounds on which sacred music and religion stand and are united. Compositions such as the "Gregorian Chants," Handel's "Messiah," and Beethoven's "Missa Solemnis" point up the relation of religion and music. The popular solo version of "The Lord's Prayer," and well-composed hymns complement the wedding of music and religion.

In sacred and secular music, the same elements which make up music are blended into an ultimate whole. We have such interdependent entities as melody, rhythm, chord structure, progression, and so on. These are governed by the composer's choice of instrumental or vocal forms or styles and the sacred or secular category under which they are classified. The basic distinction between a sacred and a secular composition depends on the manner in which the elements mentioned above are combined into the total structure. The entire design is associated with what we feel to be of sacred or secular character. If we can compare the preparation of cup cakes with that of corn muffins, we should be able to employ this analogy in our understanding of the creation of sacred and secular compositions. The same ingredients are used in the preparation of both pastries, but not the same proportion and arrangement. Greater prominence is given some items at various times in sacred music than those same items in secular music, and vice-versa.

Sacred music usually adheres closer to tonality than does secular music. Its texture is more unified and it is more dependent on the clarity of its melodic line than its secular counterpart. Contrasts of chord colors, mood variations and the wide use of sharp dissonances are subdued. Of course we may expect sharp dissonances where they tend to dramatize a point or reinforce a mood, but their use seems at times to be more tasteful. These factors are partially the

results of the aesthetic appeal of music along with a religious motive which incorporates unity of thought. We also observe the use of terraced dynamics stemming from the Baroque Period. Both areas share use of "polyphony" and the "contrapuntal" technique. The first term has reference to the employment of more than one independent melody and the latter refers to the engagement of independent melodies simultaneously and with some regard for harmonization, although the homophonic design is excluded. In regard to homophonic structure which is predominantly characteristic of hymns, sacred music relies upon this design probably more than does secular.

On the other hand, secular music appears to possess more of the properties of self-projection and expression which Mr. Walter feels are reflected or at least seem to be evident in the style of Beethoven. This varies from the innate, poignant emissions of expression and beauty represented in the styles of Mozart, Bach and Handel. There also seems to be the desire to release non-religious feelings and the development of expression which is not intrinsic in the music itself. Secular music enhances man's capacity for personal and emotional expression which would be greatly limited by verbal language alone. Secular music is without religious concerns as such, and it possesses qualities which are more or less indifferent to that which is sacred.

In comparison with sacred forms, secular music is more free from formal restraints and provides outlet for more varied emotional, personal expression. There are also greater contrasts between moods, chord colors and the use of consonant and dissonant tones. Melody is more likely to be subordinated at times to chord colors in some of the modern compositions typical of the Impressionists era, for example. Key modulations are used more often and are more obvious. Rhythm is probably more evident in that it tends to increase the accentuation of emotion and expression. It also provides a foundation for the various patterns of the dance.

Nevertheless, it appears as if the sacred or secular nature of a composition is determined at the point of its origin. If the "idea" and essential emotion of a composition emanates from the innermost depths of the human soul, and if the musical score, and the expression within the music itself have germinated, received shape in a

purely spontaneous fashion, would the results constitute sacred music? On the other hand let us suppose that in secular music the essential substances of music (emotions and ideas) do not dictate the nature and amount of expression employed, but that the "self-thrust" of the composer does. Here we have pronounced projections of the self which are aimed at self expression and subjectivity. Herein the conscious emotions determine the nature and amount of expression in the music. This "expression" supercedes that which is germinated by the shape of musical tone and its inherent emotional content. Thus we arrive at our distinction.

In closing, I have attempted to give one approach to the problem by going back to the very core of music. Some general characteristics of music in both categories have been presented also. I am aware of the limitations involved in an endeavor of this nature. A study of the immense varieties of musical forms and styles has not been undertaken; the present continuum of new periods of music and their respective idioms must be considered, and the brevity of these present reflections also. It is hoped, however, that some insight on the subject has been presented.

¹Bruno Walter, *Of Music And Music Making*, New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1957, p. 68.

²*Ibid.*, p. 17.

Reflections of My Experiences at The Interdenominational Theological Center

WALTER PAETKAU

Mennonite Biblical Seminary Exchange Student

The Decision to Come

Early in the fall term of my Junior year I became aware that an exchange program had been worked out by The Interdenominational Theological Center and The Mennonite Biblical Seminary. In talking with our President and our Dean and comparing the I.T.C. and M.B.S. calendars, I was assured that I would be able to transfer all my credits without difficulty, but that I would have to pick up some of my required courses upon my return for the Senior year. In addition, we talked with friends about such an experience and were encouraged to apply. During the year we had also chatted with Leslie Norris, the I.T.C. exchange student at M.B.S., who became a good friend of ours, and was able to give us a good account of his experiences at I.T.C.

With this kind asking and searching behind us, we had worked up a real enthusiasm to come to Atlanta. With our acceptance granted at M.B.S., we made the necessary arrangements with I.T.C. The administration courteously acknowledged our application and assured us a warm welcome to the school.

Once it became public knowledge that we would be here, along with congratulations, the inevitable question was asked, "What made you decide to go?" Basically, there was no one real answer. What makes any student want to study in another country or in other parts of his own? It is largely because of the new experience that awaits one. It is also because one wants to be able to gain new insights, to see how others live and think. If one finds that others also face problems and tensions similar to his own—or even different—this binds him closer to mankind. It also makes him less critical and more at ease in coping with his own localized situation at home.

The question was also raised whether I was coming to Atlanta because of the integration situation and with the idea that I was coming to the South to "kind of" help out. Frankly speaking, when

one reads about situations from some 3,000 miles away (Alberta) or even 700 or less (Indiana), as a rule he doesn't get a sense of urgency to come to the situation to help out. For example I would suspect that not many of you have a desire to go to the Congo, Panama or East Harlem just because you have read about the situations. If you did go for a short period it would be primarily as a learner, unless you were given a service or work assignment. This factor of learning was also a great part of our thinking in coming to Atlanta. We were impressed with the integration movement, to be sure, and knew there was a lot in store for us to think about and to learn about. In that sense we were attracted to I.T.C. by the social revolution because it presented to us a real opportunity to live for a short while a little closer to where significant things were happening.

First Impressions

It was the warmth of the people, both students and faculty, that impressed us most. I believe that we have never done so much visiting between apartments as we did during our first month on campus. It didn't take long to get accustomed to the "you all," the "fine" and the "alright." This kind of hospitality was also evident in the different Negro churches that we visited over the months. In fact, during our first Sunday at church an elderly gentleman invited us to join the mid-week choir practice. He said he would have us croon'n in no time. Unfortunately it has been impossible to get to know well all the students on campus, but the friendships that we have been able to establish in our limited time will always serve to remind us of the friendliness and sincerity given to us while in Atlanta. At the heart of all my experience there is a deep appreciation for I.T.C. and a close identity with it that I will never forget.

For many students there seemed to be a general problem of neglecting opportunities, I have wondered several times why I.T.C. students make such little use of interseminary activities right here in Atlanta where doors are wide open for such participation. For this reason I would not only encourage students to apply as exchange students but also to make more use of interseminary opportunities in the Atlanta area.

As with the students, my impressions of the faculty were very favorable and I was pleased with the direction that they gave to my studies. I found them easy to talk to and cordial and willing to be of help in any way.

Learning Areas

Earlier when talking about my decision to come to Atlanta I mentioned that one of the major reasons in my coming was to be placed in a new learning situation. You could well ask, "Well what have you learned, that is beyond the normal learning experiences of student friendships, academic work and related school activity?" The question is a difficult one to answer, for experience can't always be put in words even though it so often changes a person. I would, however, like to talk about four of my learning areas.

One of them has to do with getting to know persons as persons. When I first arrived on campus I suddenly realized how color conscious I was. For a brief while I knew that I was conspicuously white. I felt this not only on the campus but in other places. When I opened my account at the Citizen's Trust branch on Hunter Street I felt as if the customers were wondering, "Why is that white man there"? I felt out of place. I had the same feeling when I went into predominantly Negro grocery stores, and sometimes even in churches. But an interesting development took place fairly soon. Within a few weeks I no longer recognized color unless I was in a strange place. It seemed as if I were studying and going to classes as normally as if I were in a school back home. Now the student as a person became dominant. In return visits to the bank I no longer felt conspicuous in a predominantly Negro line as we waited together for the same services. A reversal in reaction almost took place. Being on campus helped us identify ourselves with the situation so normally that we soon became I.T.C. loyalists and felt right at home. This had its amusing effects. When we were with guests whether in another's home or in our own I would suddenly notice how pale my wife looked, and after the visit she would say how anemic I had looked. It seemed as if somehow I was expecting my wife to be darker than she was and she was expecting me to be darker than I was—perhaps because we seemed such a part of I.T.C.

Feeling at home here had its other amusements. My wife cares for the Joel Miles' little boy four days a week while Mrs. Miles is away teaching. One day we went to the airport to be with an Alberta friend while he waited for a change of planes. We took both boys with us. Watching the deliberate curiosity of people as they first looked at one boy and then the other and then at us was as interesting a show as watching top entertainment on T.V. Then just a week ago or so I was showing several Indiana friends the Atlanta University Center, after which we went to Paschal's. Almost the first comment my friends made when they entered the restaurant was, "We feel conspicuous and a little uncomfortable." On the other hand this thought, which would have entered my mind last fall, never occurred to me.

Now, what am I getting at? Namely this, that when a degree of harmony and security within the situation exists, persons can be understood as persons and not as colors, denominations, or some other label. But this idea of getting to know persons as persons is not altogether easy to achieve. Although I have grown in this respect, I am still not sure how well I would do if pressures and tensions were placed on me from many directions. It is because of this that I feel the Negro has a more difficult time accepting me than I as a white Canadian, who has never seriously dealt with the segregation dilemma, have in accepting him. Basically, however, I have been more than pleased with the cordiality and sincerity with which we have been accepted at I.T.C.

I have firm faith in students that greater unity can be attained by head-on, united Christian responsibility in concrete situations. Let me illustrate what I mean by unity. A flock of birds had the habit of feeding on a farmer's corn patch and after they had eaten they would fly to a grove of trees for a rest. Time after time the farmer shot at them but to no avail. However, he observed that after eating in the corn patch the birds always rested in the grove of trees near the field. This gave him the idea that if he placed a net over the bushes he could frighten the birds into the net and capture them. The first time he tried he managed to catch a goodly number of the birds. One wise bird, however, caught on to what was happening so she rallied the other birds together and told them of her plan should they be caught next. When on the following day these birds were

caught she gave the signal and all the birds rose in one accord and with their united strength pulled the net away with them and were able to escape from it. This happened again and again, until one day a number of birds were tired of pulling in the same direction. Consequently the next time they were caught and the leader gave the signal the discontented birds pulled in a dozen different directions only to entangle the net worse than it was. Disunity and the pulling into opposite directions led to their death. Class, denominational, Student Christian League, and administration unity could keep us from death and lead us into a witnessing community, that is, if we do more than hold good intentions. On this issue of good intentions William James wrote: "No matter how full a reservoir of maxims one may possess, and no matter how good one's sentiments might be, if one has not taken advantage of every concrete opportunity to act, one's character may remain entirely unaffected for the better. With mere good intentions, hell is proverbially paved."

A third area of learning has to do with integration in general. In following the struggle for justice, dignity, employment, human rights and the like, it has become rather clear to me that no one people or country has a monopoly on social ills, although a particular area may be under greater pressures than another. Rather than look at Canada as a land of peace and quiet, the South has been suggesting to me that I also have dirty courts to sweep, exploited poor to care for, and the Indian and the Eskimo to give full Canadian participation.

Further on integration. Observing the racism of the South I can't help but think that the Wallaces, the Barnetts, the Maddoxes, the KKK and the White Citizens Council need far more to be pitied and considered as slaves and inferiors than does the Negro. In this connection I pray frequently that the Negroes' use of love and non-violence may endure through the tense times ahead. Unfortunately I cannot expect this from most of the whites. I am afraid that if the white man had to struggle for his rights, violence would be his first weapon.

The fourth area that has stimulated my thinking has to do with the Church. In times when the witnessing Church is most needed our "white churches" are of least help, as they have been ever since they took their stand for slavery and segregation during ante-bellum days and since. However, the Church may not always be blind

to love. Some day she will see that love is all-inclusive and that this inclusiveness has its radical implication. Would to God that the Church would stand up to what is Christian now rather than wait until the winds of truth blow the inevitable into unrepenting hearts. Perhaps some day as Christians we will not have to vote whether it is becoming of Christians to be Christians, as did the First Baptist Church, and as do Christians over and over in many devious ways. But instead, we will accept the facts of Christ's imperative of Christian responsibility as the only way and not as something which has a comfortable alternative.

PROSPECTUS

We shall not grant that transient flesh is all,
Nor cringe before the grave's malignant gloom.
We shall not drink the skeptic's cup of gall
To dull our spirits for a rendezvous with doom.
Nor shall we fear when our frail craft sets sail
That it must sink in death's uncharted deep.
For we believe in Him who will not fail,
Whose wondrous pow'r the grave could never keep.
We shall emerge into a dawn of wondrous light!
Made stronger by our ordeal in the night.

HOMER C. McEWEN

PRESIDENT'S NEWSLETTER

TO THE ALUMNI AND FRIENDS OF I. T. C.

When we ended the Baccalaureate-Commencement service on Sunday, May 24, we also ended the first five years of school at I.T.C. Those five years, which have passed so quickly, have been busy, historic years.

First, we began teaching in September, 1959. Then through the year that followed we watched the construction of the new plant on the new site. We moved in in June, 1960. The new plant, though not fully finished, was at once acclaimed as one of the outstanding seminary plants in the nation.

Among other major developments, the endowment has been raised to \$1,125,000. The enrollment has steadily grown. It now stands at 125 an increase of seven percent over the previous year, and constituting about one-third of the total number of Negro theological students in America. A fine faculty has been formed consisting of twenty-two persons, twelve full-time, ten part-time, all well trained for their various duties.

A most important development is the fact that the cooperative plan represented by The Center is being appreciated increasingly not only by the constituent denominations, but also by other schools that would be helped by educational cooperation. In these first five years many details of organization and operation have been worked out and made parts of our established procedures. The curriculum has been thoroughly revised to make it relevant to the times and the needs of the Church. The sponsoring denominations are showing increasing interest and are making increasing investments in the training of their ministers. As we look back, the first five years have been busy, progressive, historic years.

But with The Center, as with most things, while much has been done, much still remains to be done. In some very essential ways we have not yet reached our goals.

In enrollment, for example, we had 125 students, but by this time we had hoped to have at least 150. We are built for 300. We still have very much to do here. We have found, too, that more students call for more money to be used in student aid and to meet the steadily rising costs of education. The answer, of course, is more endowment. We now have one million, we need three million if we are to get more students and keep up our standards. We are starting on the endowment drive now.

Then the campus needs to be completed. We have eight buildings fully erected, and we have one, the Morehouse (Baptist) dormitory now under construction. The A.M.E. Church in its recent General Conference appropriated funds which should see the Turner Seminary building starting soon. To complete the campus, we need a Chapel, we need more apartments for married students, we need more landscaping of the grounds, and we need a President's home. This is all included in the additional funds we are seeking.

Also, we need additions to the faculty, especially since we are looking forward to a joint program of graduate study between Candler School of Theology at Emory, Columbia Theological Seminary, and I.T.C.


In short, there is much yet to be done if we are to continue our task of providing a better ministry for a greater Church.

The first five years have been busy and progressive, but the second five must be more so. In our second "five-year plan," we must get more students, more funds, and give more intensive training. The modern world has crucial spiritual needs. It is calling for the utmost that we can do.

In the next five years our hope for success rests more than ever with the alumni and friends of I.T.C. We are all called into service.

You have our prayers for continued success in your work.

Sincerely,


President

BOOK REVIEWS

THE BIRTH OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By C. F. D. Moule. New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1962. xii, 252 pp., \$5.00.

This volume by the eminent Professor of Divinity at Cambridge University has been designed as a general introduction to *Harper's New Testament Commentaries*. Its approach to the study of the New Testament is not in terms of individual documents, but from the point of view of the life, worship, needs, problems, and goals of the early Christian movement in many parts of the ancient Roman world. As stated on the jacket, the volume is "A vivid re-creation of the challenge and response that led to the making of the New Testament."

The major chapters are:

The Church at Worship

The Church Explains Itself

(1) Stages of self-awareness

(2) The Use of the Jewish Scriptures

(3) The Gospels and Acts

(4) The Reign of Christ

The Church Under Attack

Building the Superstructure and Consolidating

Variety and Uniformity in the Church
Collecting and Sifting the Documents
Conclusion

Four Excursuses

Indexes of Proper Names; Biblical and Other References

The author's basic point of view is set forth as follows:

"Throughout this book the general standpoint of 'form criticism' has been adopted, namely, that it is to the circumstances and needs of the worshipping, working, suffering community that one must look if one is to explain the genesis of Christian literature. Probably at no stage within the New Testament period did a writer put pen to paper without the incentive of a pressing need. Seldom was the writing consciously adorned; never was adornment an end in itself. Accordingly different aspects of the community's life have been successively considered, with a view to illuminating how various types of Christian literature grew up in response to these circumstances and needs and can only

be adequately understood against this setting" (p. 210).

But the author has not surrendered to the extreme conclusions of some from critics. The reader is not "pressured" to accept one limited theory or system of interpretation. Rather, he is led by an experienced and resourceful guide to survey a wide range of issues and situations in the life of the early Christian communities. Professor Moule seems equally at home in dealing with linguistic, historical, theological and other aspects of New Testament study. His familiarity with significant modern scholarship in many areas is reflected in extensive bibliographical citations in footnotes.

An adequate understanding of the issues involved in this volume calls for intensive study of hundreds of New Testament passages, and other early Christian writings, in addition to many volumes cited as references. In a word, this book calls for long and careful study. The thoughtful reader will turn to it many times, and find it a continuing source of information and stimulation. He will be challenged to share in the unfinished quest presented by the book.

Two major conclusions are set forth. "One is the primacy of the divine initiative, the other is the urgent need today for what might be called the 'ethical translation of the Gospel'" (p. 211). The first emphasis is so familiar in current theology as to need no development. But the second calls for further consideration.

"Perhaps nothing is more urgently needed than a concerted effort to hammer out Christian ethics for the present day. But that requires the 'ethical translation of the Gospel'. . . . Indeed one of the most important lessons of this book is that the guidance of the Spirit of God was granted in the form not of a code of behaviour nor of any written deposit of direction, but of inspired insight. . . . the congregation exercises discernment. That is how Christian ethical decisions were reached: informed discussion, prophetic insight, ecstatic fire—all in the context of the

worshipping, and also discriminating assembly, met with the good news in Jesus Christ behind them, the Spirit among them, and before them the expectation of being led forward into the will of God. And if there is one lesson of outstanding importance to be gleaned from all this, it is that only along similar lines, translated into terms of our present circumstances, can we hope for an informed Christian ethic for the present day. It will probably be different in different areas of the world: each Christian Church has its peculiar problems and opportunities and its unique conditions" (pp. 212-213).

Professor Moule does not attempt to develop the dynamic implications of this creative interpretation of Christianity. It is to be hoped that he will do so at a later time.

William V Roosa
Professor, History of Christianity

A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY.
VOL. I. READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE EARLY AND MEDIEVAL CHURCH. By Ray C. Petry (ed.), Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962. 561 pp., \$13.25.

A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY.
VOL. II. READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH FROM THE REFORMATION TO THE PRESENT. By Clyde L. Manschreck (ed.), Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 564 pp., \$13.25.

READINGS IN CHURCH HISTORY.
VOL. I. FROM PENTECOST TO THE PROTESTANT REVOLT. By Colman J. Barry (ed.), Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1960. 633 pp., \$7.50, paperback \$2.95.

It is perhaps a sign of the growing ecumenical spirit of our day that the two most recent survey textbooks in general church history, one Protestant and the other Roman Catholic, have both chosen the documentary form. In these carefully selected primary sources the student is introduced to many of the most significant issues and creative personalities in the history of the Church. The editors have done their work well, always citing their sources clearly and

amply, and referring to a wealth of additional documentary material.

The Prentice-Hall volumes attain a very high degree of printing excellence and beauty, although the accompanying price, unfortunately, is almost beyond reach. The Newman Press is to be commended for overcoming this problem with its inclusion of a very reasonably priced paperback edition. Nevertheless, the lasting value of this type of book has much to say for the wisdom of investing in the more permanent hardback edition.

Particularly is this the case with the Petry volume, an outstanding example of breadth and depth in historical scholarship. The documentation is illustrative as well as literary, with 172 photographs not only of cathedrals, paintings, and sculpture, but also of block prints, line drawings, and manuscript illustrations, often gathered from rare books, museums, and galleries throughout Europe. The editor gathers over 500 readings not only from the usual standard collections of translations, but also from inaccessible out-of-print monographs. On occasion sources previously found only in the scholarly journals appear, and not infrequently the editor translates materials hitherto unavailable to the reader restricted to English.

On the whole Petry's balance of the various sections is excellent. Unit nine on "Medieval Education, the Arts and Christian Iconography; Symbolism, the Liturgy, and the Common Life," is given more than twice its mathematical share of space, but the disproportion is fully justified. The present reviewer found this study in medieval social history by far the most exciting unit in the book. Its bibliography of recordings of medieval music is especially notable. It serves well one of the editor's main intentions, i.e., the stimulation of a more balanced appreciation of the authenticity of medieval Christianity.

Petry's introductions to each unit and carefully chosen headings for each selection do not wholly overcome the tendency of the very number and brevity of most of his excerpts to leave the reader with a somewhat disjointed impression. Barry meets this problem by including fewer (ca. 160) and therefore longer citations. Consequently the introductions

are much briefer and the headings less descriptive of the content. It is somewhat disconcerting to have the author of I Clement introduced as Pope St. Clement. But in these days of Vatican II the Protestant minister needs to examine the historical documents considered most significant by a Roman Catholic educator. Barry's documentation is not at all pictorial but wholly literary. In contrast with Petry, his primary emphasis is on ideas rather than life. Therefore, there is surprisingly little duplication between the two publications. Strangely, I could find no reference in either work to John of Damascus, both giving the impression that the Eastern, Greek Orthodox tradition hardly even existed.

Since the second volume of the Newman Press edition has not yet been published, the interesting possibility of comparing the two treatments of the Protestant Reformation or Revolt does not yet exist. Like the first Prentice-Hall volume, the second concludes each unit with additional suggested readings, primarily secondary sources, and with a very helpful chronology of the most significant events. Manschreck includes far fewer pictures than Petry, and much longer citations. He includes general introductions to each unit, but instead of topical headings for each selection he, like Barry, usually identifies only author and/or occasion. He then goes on to clarify briefly the setting and significance. It is almost an impossible task to treat these 450 years in a documentary manner; but Manschreck's volume is a noble attempt.

The emphasis falls primarily upon ideas as the key to the meaning of Christianity in this period, with an attempt to focus upon predominant trends and movements. The editor consciously omits American Christianity and contemporary theology, because of the unique need of each for separate, individual attention. But there is some duplication of documents included in the second volume of Scribner's *American Christianity* which should have been avoidable. A special unit, number six, devoted to Pietism, indicates a healthy corrective of the excessive negative judgments of the Ritschlian historiography, similar to recent re-evaluations of Puritanism in the history of the American church. The treatment in unit ten of ecumenicity

within the context of missions is commendable. The title for unit eight of "Roman Catholic Reaction to Modernism" appears rather too negative for the period after World War I.

Alan D. Jacobs
Visiting Instructor,
History of Christianity

FOURTEEN AFRICANS VS. ONE AMERICAN. By Frederic Fox, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962. 371 pp., \$3.95.

The author of this fascinating book is a minister of the Congregational Church, who served for five months as an instructor in the Africa Literacy and Writing Center, which is situated near Kitwe, Northern Rhodesia in Central Africa. During this period, the author's class consisted of fourteen African students, who were from Basutoland, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland (Malawi) and Tanganyika.

The title of the book might easily suggest a conflict. To be sure, there are conflicts between the American teacher and his African students. Skirmishes of misunderstanding resulting from differing traditions do appear. On the other hand, the dominant note of the book is a delineation of fifteen different personalities—fourteen Africans and one American. The American teacher tells what he thinks of his fourteen African students, who range in educational level from the tenth grade to college. The students tell what they think of their teacher.

A chapter is devoted to each student and also one to the teacher. Each chapter consists of a brief autobiography, a description and critical analysis of the person named. The teacher describes the physical characteristics, intellectual habits and ability, and emotional disposition of his students. In the final chapter they do the same for him.

Although there was formal class room work in which the teacher introduced various forms of writing, the learning experiences were two-way processes. Teacher and students learned from each other at meals, games, religious services and in political discussions.

The book presents interesting insights into African personality; sheds light on the diverse types of environmental factors that helped to shape the lives of the students; reveals surviving, yet waning, indigenous customs and traditions; shows the impact of modern forces such as Christianity, education, trade and modern administration; pictures the Africans' struggles for education, their desire for freedom, their aspirations to serve their church and their nation; and exhibits what Africans think about themselves and Westerners.

One outstanding merit of the book is the author's portrayal of his African students as products of traditional African cultures and those of the imported West. The portraits are shining examples of cultural compromise resulting from contact and changes about which ethnologists tell us.

Another merit is the revelation of the growth of an idea. The idea of the African Writing Center was born in 1958 at the All-African Church Conference in Ibadan, Nigeria. The new Center was established as a service to "the church in changing Africa." It arose out of the need for African editors of church papers and magazines, African writers of school curricula, hymnals and "books on every subject from citizenship to marriage, business to labor, science to art."

Still another merit of the book is the fact that it brings to light the historic and current role of Christian missions in education. Each student in the class at the Writing Center received a major part, if not all, of his education from mission schools. The Writing School, which, since its beginning in 1959, has trained over a hundred students from more than twenty different African countries, is a new pattern of missionary service. As such, it is an example of the new trend in the world mission of the Christian Church.

It would be unfair to end this review without pointing out at least one shortcoming. From the standpoint of this reviewer, a glaring weakness is the author's constant reference to "black" and "white" categories. Actually the differences which he describes are cultural in nature. A more accurate categoriza-

tion would be "African" and "American" or "European."

Josephus R. Coan
Professor, Christian
Education and Mission

CAN CHRISTIANS LEARN FROM OTHER RELIGIONS? By Robert Lawson Slater. New York: Seabury Press, 1963. 94 pp., Paper, \$1.95.

Can a Christian learn from other religions and remain loyal to his own faith? This vital question is the theme of a small volume by the Professor of World Religions at Harvard Divinity School, and Director for the study of World Religions. Professor Slater approaches the question by comparing, not religious systems, but the personal faith of believers. In fact the author presents his own personal religious experience in the study of two non-Christian devotional classics: the Hindu *Bhagavad Gita* and the Buddhist *Lotus of the Wonderful Law*.

The introductory chapter stresses the relevance and the urgency of the central theme in our global age. The author notes the constant intermingling of many faiths all over our world, the persistent rejection of much of our 'Christian' culture by other peoples, the recession of many Christian mission programs, the powerful resurgence of ancient religions, and the emergence of new faiths. Today there are fourteen centers of the Ramakrishna Mission in North America. In Ceylon a gigantic flood-lit statue of the Buddha bears the illuminated sign "The True Light of the World." The eminent missionary scholar, Dr. Hendrik Kraemer, sees in the current interfaith contacts the most formidable challenge that Christianity has faced in her whole history.

In considering the *Bhagavad Gita*, the author's interest centers about answering the question, "How much truth can a man stand?" His study of the *Gita* has helped him to clearer insight into part of the answer. He says of the *Gita*: ". . . it has helped me to understand better why I must be content to live by faith, seeing but a part of the scheme of things, and that part only through a glass darkly. It is true that apart from

this word of the Gita I could understand readily enough why finite mortals can expect no more. What I did not understand so clearly is that it is a divine mercy that they cannot do so. For if we ask how much truth a man can stand, the answer is surely not all that he may ask for. Human shoulders are not broad enough. The greater the knowledge, the greater the responsibility, and there is an ultimate responsibility which belongs to God alone. Hence, the merciful God is not only the God made known to man but the hidden God" (p. 55). Man is not capable of grasping the full light of divine truth. He is "too small for such high vision. He must live within the world, not beyond it" (p. 56).

In studying *The Lotus of the Wonderful Law* the author considers a related question, "How much truth can a man grasp?" This calls for consideration of various aspects of faith as presented in the *Lotus*. Some of the major emphases are on faith as vital, personal trust in the eternal, all-compassionate, all-wise Buddha; as response of the individual to the all-loving Buddha who constantly leads each person to ultimate sonship to Him; as a passionate devotion to the Buddha; as genuine humility, tolerance and reverence toward his fellowmen; and as an eternal striving toward the attainment of his own true destiny.

Can a Christian learn from other religions and remain loyal to his own faith? It depends on the kind of person and the kind of faith. If the meeting of religions is "not just of religions in the abstract, but of believers, each with his own partial testimony to that which constrains man to pursue the adventure of faith, he may be led to consider more deeply the terms of this same adventure in his own case, the strength of its call, the invitation to life in all its fullness, life bordered and invaded by Eternity and constantly challenged thereby to new vision, new resolution, new courage" (p. 85).

If you already have all truth in a final and complete system, don't "waste" your time on this volume. But if you have a vital, daring, adventurous faith that still seeks broader and deeper insights into God's boundless truth, the book should be very rewarding to you.

William V Roosa

HANDBOOK OF CHURCH CORRESPONDENCE. By G. Curtis Jones. New York: Macmillan, 1962. 218 pp., \$5.00.

Handbooks are convenient source books, free of verbose material. They go to the point with quick, helpful information. This is especially true of G. Curtis Jones' recent volume.

Dr. Jones sees church correspondence as a "ministry of writing." This is good, for a well-composed letter can be of tremendous value to parishioners. Church letters that have impact upon readers must be composed by church leaders who have insights and new techniques in this delicate art.

The author discusses briefly the fundamentals and skills of correspondence. He then divides church correspondence into various areas, and gives most interesting examples of letters under each category. Chapter titles are: Letters of Administration; Within the Church Family; Appreciation and Praise; Congratulations, Comfort, Condolence; Invitations, Acceptances, Regrets, Resignations; Inquiries, Recommendations, Employment.

The author has used illustrative letters from over a hundred persons in the preparation of this book. Students, pastors, directors of religious education, church secretaries, and all persons interested in a dynamic and stimulating ministry will appreciate the volume.

Carrie L. George
Christian Education

TEACH ME TO TEACH. By Dorothy G. Swain. Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson Press, 1964, 127 pp., \$1.50.

The growing emphasis on development of leadership in the Christian community demands a continuous production of suitable materials. Dorothy G. Swain has contributed to the supply of this demand by writing the helpful textbook, which bears the above captivating title. At the same time she has placed leadership education workers in her debt. She is, by training and experience, well qualified for the task she has undertaken. In this volume, her concern is to present the teaching process as "an open door" where the teacher stands with the learner, calls his "attention to fields of knowledge and experience

which lie beyond," and invites him "to exploration and discovery."

A distinctive feature of the book is the role-playing method of presentation. The subject-matter is presented as a leadership training class in six weekly sessions. The book dramatizes what is done by the teacher and the class in each session, and the home-work engaged in between the sessions.

The class is composed of "a group of church school teachers of varying backgrounds and experiences, each with specific problems and needs he hopes can be met in the training class he is attending." The teacher is a man of wide knowledge, experience and understanding. He guides his pupil-teachers in their search for new knowledge and experiences. He helps them find answers to their questions. He challenges them "to explore new ways of making their teaching more effective and relevant."

One is struck by the emergence of fundamental principles of the learning process in the dialogues of the class sessions. The application of the theories of "learning tasks" and "developmental tasks" can be seen. Various techniques and methods of teaching are brought out. Problem-solving as a type of learning stands out prominently.

The main problems with which the class grapples are: facing up to oneself as a teacher, coming to grips with the *why* of teaching in the church school, understanding pupils, finding the best means of communication, developing lesson plans and making honest evaluations. Through mutual sharing of ideas and insights, members of the class mutually help each other. Teacher and pupils become learners.

Not only do the sessions display the application of educational theories and principles, but significant findings are listed. During the first session the group discovers eight "signs of a good class." In the second session, it finds an adequate philosophy of Christian education, the biblical basis for teaching, and six teaching tasks of the Church. During the third session, the group uncovers ways by which a teacher learns about students, the importance of a teacher's knowing each pupil's name and his spiritual needs. From the fourth session come ten ways of leading pupils to develop awareness of God's self-disclosure and redeeming love in Jesus Christ. During the fifth session the group brings to light some steps to be taken in lesson planning. During the final session it lists and discusses various types of evaluations, and evaluates the training class itself.

The book is a significant contribution to the literature of leadership education in the local church. Its use for this purpose will bring rewarding results. Its dramatic style is fascinating. It will command the reader's attention throughout.

The dramatic style of presentation has commendable features and shows a high degree of creative ability on the part of the author. Yet one defect in the author's treatment is noticed. She states that the class is composed of eighteen church school teachers, but only seven of them are shown as participants in the class activities. This raises the question of whether or not the silent majority of the class was actually involved. This defect, however, will hardly detract from the vitality and richness of the book as a text for leadership education.

Josephus R. Coan



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