MACEDONIAN REFORM AND THE GREAT POWERS

1903-1908

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PREFACE

Standing on what, in many respects, appears to be the threshold of another Great European conflict, it has become increasingly necessary that we acquire a deeper understanding of the fundamental political, economic and nationalistic forces which led us into the last World War. As a result of such understanding it is hoped that international sympathy will be increased and the men of state will profit by the errors of their predecessors.

More specifically, within this brief treatise it is purposed to relate the contribution which the Macedonian Reform Question made to the development of as well as the hostility between the two camps of European alliances. In relating the events connected with this intricate subject no attempt is made to place all the responsibility for bringing about the hostile separation on any one Power, but the idea is to set forth clearly the facts as they were recorded by the men of state. The story is told, as much as possible, by allowing each Foreign Secretary, Foreign Minister or diplomat to speak for himself. Since no one statesman had a priori knowledge of all the concocted schemes of Europe, it is assumed that in most instances each was working for what he thought was the best for the interest of his country at that particular time. It is not expected that this work will represent an altogether new treatment of the question. It is maintained, however, that a much fuller treatment of the subject is given here than exists at present. It is hoped that after perusing these pages the reader will have a more accurate estimation of Macedonia's importance in European politics.
The writer is happy to acknowledge his indebtedness to his Instructor, Dr. Rushton Coulborn, who gave such profound guidance and direction throughout the study. The writer is also indebted to Dr. Coulborn for his very careful reading of the manuscript as well as his helpful suggestions. Further appreciation is expressed to Dr. R. H. Logan who as a result of his many lectures in European History inspired the writer to acquire an ever increasing interest in European Diplomacy.

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Alvin V. Battle
AN INTRODUCTION ON SOURCES

The sources from which the information was obtained for the preparation of this thesis were principally documentary in nature. As the problem of interpreting original documents without some knowledge of the zeitgeist and the thoughts of the writers of such documents is extremely difficult and often confusing as well as misleading, the writer had frequent recourse to material of a different nature. One can gather very readily from the formal bibliography that the material used in the preparation of this work was not by any means an exhaustive list. On the other hand, it will be noticed that the material used was of many varieties including magazines, mémoirs, secondary works, original documents, memoranda and other materials. From this varied group of material it was possible to gather a fairly detailed comprehension of the many cross currents in European politics during the period. As some of the works were so very important, it is deemed necessary to give a brief evaluation of such works.

Documents—Perhaps, the most important source of information was the British Documents. The British Documents afforded an account of the fundamental questions of the period. Since the writer was unable to use the documents in the Die Grosse Politik and the published French Documents did not include the years from 1906-8, the British Documents, which provided ample material for the years 1907-8, constituted the principal source of information for those final years of the study. Next to the British Documents as a source of information were the Documents Diplomatiques Français which contained a very large number of documents
concerning the Macedonian Question. The information obtained from these
documents served in some cases to verify accounts and reports which were
given in the British Documents. In several instances, moreover, the Docu-
ments Diplomatiques Francais proved to be more valuable than the British
Documents. The French diplomats were better informed in regard to the
many Balkan and European complications. Particularly was this true in re-
gard to the reaction of the Balkan States after the Russo-Japanese War
started in 1904. The more accurate knowledge, which the French diplomats
possessed, indicates that the French Diplomatic Service was more efficient
in acquiring information than the British Diplomatic Service. Since the
Letters of Bülow contained many intimate communications between Bülow and
the Kaiser, they proved to be quite valuable in determining the motives
of the German Government. Perhaps, the importance of these letters would
have been lessened had the documents in the Die Grosse Politik been used.

Memoirs—As Edith Durham's Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle was
written by one who was intimately acquainted with the Balkans, its contents
are filled with very valuable information, which in many respects corre-
sponds to what, in the writer's opinion, is a true explanation of the Balkan
situation. In regard to the intricate problem of nationality in the Balkans
Edith Durham possessed a much more complete understanding than was revealed
by the accounts of the British statesmen in the British Documents. The
voluminous Memoirs of Prince von Bülow were of some importance. They added
much to the writer's understanding of the German viewpoint.

Secondary Works—Somewhat more important than the Memoirs of
Bülow in determining the German viewpoint was Brandenburg's From Bismarck
to the World War. Though Brandenburg based his work on documentary material,
he was found to be pro-German in his interpretation. In his account of
Anglo-German trade rivalry the case which he builds against Britain is much too strong. The same is true of his account of German and British connections with Macedonia. He attributes much of the Balkan discontent to Britain's forceful and disrespectful policy toward the Sultan; whereas Austria is held responsible for Germany's forward Balkan policy. The authoritative account of the Bagdad Railway set forth in Earle's Turkey, The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway was invaluable. In revealing the Powers' connection with the Bagdad Railway, Mr. Earle unraveled one of the most important economic connections between the Powers and the Porte. Though few quotations are cited from Gooch's Before the War, it was found to be one of the most helpful secondary works. The many viewpoints which are given within its contents throw much light on the dark spots in European Diplomacy before the War. Apparently, however, Gooch's admiration of Grey kept him from seeing anything other than altruistic motives behind Grey's Macedonian policy. In the preparation of this thesis the writer is very greatly indebted to Mr. Wedel for his book, Austro-German Diplomatic Relations, in which he set forth a profound explanation of the intricate relations between Austria-Hungary and Germany.

Periodical Literature—The periodical literature was to a great extent written at the time the Macedonian Question was concerning the world. This being true, many of the writers were not able to unravel the fundamental underlying facts. The contemporary articles, however, were of some value in determining the trend of international thought. The articles included in the various professional magazines were of more importance.

Acknowledgment is hereby expressed to Fay, Langer, Seymour and other writers of secondary works which were not used directly in the preparation of the thesis, but were read during an earlier period.
ABBREVIATIONS OF DOCUMENTARY TITLES


INTRODUCTION

The question of reform in Macedonia was one of the most involved issues which confronted the European Powers during the early part of the twentieth century. The problem was complicated because Macedonia was a victim of the conflicting interests of the Balkan and Western European States. Macedonia, which was bounded on the north by Bulgaria and Serbia, on the south by Greece and the Aegean Sea, on the west by Albania which was yet under Turkish rule, and on the east by Constantinople and the Straits, was a part of the Turkish Empire. The existence of Turkish rule was, however, the least of the problems which complicated the Macedonian reform question. The country not only had ill defined boundaries, but it was inhabited by a heterogeneous population with different religious, political and ethical motives. All available statistics based on the population, the language and the religion vary with their source. As the statistics were planned according to the desire and fancy of their authors, they were distorted to such a degree that from one extreme exaggeration to the other the population varies from two to five millions. Nevertheless, it is possible to gather a general idea of the heterogeneity of the population from the following figures which indicate the number of schools each nationality had in the vilayet of Salonika during the year 1905: there were 521 Greek schools, 319 Bulgarian schools, 21 Serbian schools, and 10 Roumanian schools. The large number of Greek schools can best be attributed to the

\[1\] Albert Shaw, "Greeks and Their Enemies in Macedonia" Review of Reviews, XXXII (September, 1905), p. 365.
greater amount of interest which the Greeks manifested in education. Of the four nationalities represented in Macedonia, it is generally conceded that the Bulgarian population was the largest, while the Romanian was the smallest. In addition to these four nationalities there were some Moslems, Jews and Albanians.

The Macedonian population was further divided by differences in religious creeds. Opposing the Greek Orthodox Church, to which the Greeks belonged, was not only Islam, but the Bulgar Church, which had been established in 1870 as a separate entity. The Bulgar Church was in turn opposed by the Serbian Church, which had, in 1902, secured the appointment of Firminian as Serbian Archbishop at Ushub.¹ Behind these differences in creed there seems to have been the more fundamental differences in nationality. There was little difference between the doctrine, dogma or ceremony of the Greek Orthodox Church, the Bulgar Church, and the Serbian Church. The Church to a great extent was used by the opposing nationalities as a means of spreading national propaganda.²

As Macedonia and Albania were the only non-autonomous states of European Turkey, they were looked upon by the Balkan States as territory for future expansion. Each Balkan State had its Macedonian aspiration as well as a technique by which it hoped to achieve its aspiration. The Greeks for centuries had been desirous of reviving the ancient Greek State which would include Macedonia as a part of Greece. In order to do this the Government of Greece supposedly financed bands, which were composed of the Greek inhabitants in Macedonia. The revolutionary Greek bands purported to make


²Edith Durham, Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle, London, 1920, pp. 94-95.
Greek influence predominant in Macedonia. Quite instrumental in this same program, as has been previously mentioned, was the Greek Orthodox Church, which, however, had been greatly weakened in this regard by the establishment of the Bulgar Church as a separate entity. The importance of the Greek schools in spreading propaganda is not to be treated as a negligible factor.

More important than the Greek activities was the intricate relation of Bulgaria with Macedonia. The Bulgarians, who were a product of a fusion of the Slavs and the Thraco-Illyrian race, succeeded with the aid of Russia in making Macedonia a part of their domain in 1878. At the Congress of Berlin, which convened in the same year, Macedonia was taken from Bulgaria; and Eastern Roumelia, which had been a part of Bulgaria, was made autonomous, but with political control by the Sultan. The success of the Philippopolis Revolution in 1885 and the subsequent union of Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria again rendered acute the Macedonian situation. Near the end of the century Bulgaria surrendered her hope of political annexation and launched upon a policy of peaceful penetration. In pursuing her policy of peaceful penetration in Macedonia, Bulgaria made use of the Bulgar schools, churches and secret bands to spread the Bulgarian propaganda. Bulgaria, like Greece, intended to increase the Bulgarian influence in Macedonia in order that when the ultimate partition took place she would be able to demand on the basis of the large number of her nationals in Macedonia the greatest portion of the Turkish spoils.

Serbia and Roumania, like Bulgaria and Greece, had their Macedonian claims and hoped to benefit when the spoils were divided. The Serbs based their claim upon the fact that it was from them that Turkey had acquired Macedonia. Roumania saw that by first fostering and then sacrificing the Koutz-Wallachs in Macedonia, she would be able to claim compensations nearer
home—in Dobrudja.¹

Not only did each Balkan State have political and economic aspirations in Macedonia, but the European Powers had their spheres of interest in the Turkish spoils. Germany's interest was primarily economic in nature. In 1888, after the refusal of an Anglo-American syndicate to undertake the construction of a railway from Constantinople to Bagdad, the Sultan made a proposal to a German syndicate to construct a railway from Haidar Pasha to Angora. The Turks were so well pleased with the construction of this railway, which was placed in operation in early 1893, that they granted a second concession for a railway from Eski Shehr to Konia in February of the same year. Simultaneously with the granting of the second Anatolian concession the Sultan authorized an important extension to the French-owned Smyrna-Cassaba Railway. In 1899, the German capitalists were able to secure another concession from the Sultan. Little was done toward the construction of the railway under that concession, as late as 1903.

The chief difficulties of the concessionaires seems not to have been political, but financial and administrative. The desire on the part of Germany to obtain finance from the Sultan for the continuation of the project made it necessary that she maintain a friendly attitude toward the Porte.²

Albania was Italy's sphere of interest in European Turkey.³ In order to increase Italian influence in Albania, the Italians established a number of schools. Each time that Austria would make moves to increase her

¹William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors 1801-1927, New York, 1927, p. 442.


influence in Albania the Italians would become uneasy.

France, Turkey's eighteenth century ally, was not as much interested in the affairs of the Balkans as she was in other questions. It is to be remembered, however, that France had interest in the railway projects of the Ottoman Empire\(^1\) and was quite ready to share the Turkish spoils, in case they were divided.

Britain, according to Lord Lansdowne writing in January, 1903, attached great importance to the situation in Macedonia,\(^2\) but she had no direct important economic or political interest in Macedonia at this time. Later, however, British attitude toward the Turkish possessions changed. As early as 1906, after Grey became Secretary of State For Foreign Affairs, Britain attached great importance to the economic development of Turkey. Grey was determined that Germany, who with the Sultan's aid was constructing a railway in Turkey, should not gain additional concessions from the Porte.\(^3\)

Russia's traditional aim was to bring the Balkan Slavs under her dominion. Because of her position on the Black Sea, Russia, also, was desirous of gaining control of Constantinople and the Straits.

Austria, who had acquired a privileged position in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the right to maintain garrisons in Novi-Bazar by the Treaty of Berlin (1878), was eager to extend her railways to Salonika. Austria's trade could have been carried by the way of the Adriatic, but the strong economic bond between Hungary and Austria would have been broken. The

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\(^1\) B. D., Vol. V, pp. 175-180. Here a very detailed account of French and German investments in Turkish Railways is given.

\(^2\) Ibid., Lansdowne to Plunkett. No. 1, p. 50.

\(^3\) See infra, chap. III, p. 54.
commercial tie, which the trade afforded, served to keep Hungary within the Austrian Empire; whereas Hungary would have resented the policy of carrying the trade by the way of the Adriatic through Slav Territory because the Hungarians were anxious to keep the Slavs poor. Perhaps, Austria’s trading interest in the Balkans was of more vital importance than Russia’s Balkan interest.

The policy of intervention in Turkey on the part of the foreign Powers goes back as far as 1535, when Francis I obtained from Suleiman the Magnificent considerable trading privileges in Egypt. During the eighteenth century, Russia was the principal intervening Power. By the Treaty of Kainardži Russia purported to have obtained from the Porte the right to protect the religious independence of the Christians in Turkey as well as the right to protect the Danubian principalities. In the nineteenth century the question of the Near East was greatly influenced by the growth of the nationalistic spirit in the suppressed Balkan States. The continued revolts of the Greeks moved France, Russia, and Great Britain, in May 1832, to arrange the Treaty of London, which gave the Greeks their independence. In the following year Russia was able to impose the Treaty of Unkia Skolossi upon Turkey: nevertheless, Russia’s Near Eastern aggression was checked by Britain in the Crimean War (1854-1856). Russia again in 1877, after an arduous but decisive campaign, dictated to the Porte the Treaty of San Stefano. As a result of the unsatisfactory terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, the Six Powers (England, France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany) met in the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The many detailed regulations of the Treaty of Berlin, which is sometimes

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considered as the Charter of the Near East, made the six signatory Powers of the Treaty virtual supervisors of the Balkans.
CHAPTER I
EARLY MACEDONIAN REFORMS

The early reforms of the period, which were primarily initiated by Austria and Russia, were characterized by Moderation. Such reforms did not bring about an adequate solution of the Macedonian question, but they did succeed in preventing any European conflict.

In order to understand fully Austria's and Russia's preponderance in the Balkans, it is necessary to consider the Austro-Russian Agreement of 1897. These two Powers, according to the terms of the agreement, were to maintain the status quo in the Balkans as long as circumstances would permit; to reconcile the interest of the two Empires by means of frank and loyal explanations; to discard all ideas of conquests in the Balkans; and Austria recognized the legitimacy of the principle that the Straits were not to be closed, as had been outlined and sanctioned by previous treaties. On the other hand, in case disturbances did occur and the establishment of a new order, in territory outside of Constantinople and the Straits, became necessary, Austria and Russia were to act with the following stipulations as the bases of their understanding:

(a) The right of military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be accorded to Austria-Hungary as stated in the Treaty of Berlin (1878). "The annexation of these two provinces would raise a more extensive question, which would require the scrutiny at the proper times and places. As to the Sanjak of Novibazar, there would also be the necessity to specify its boundaries, which, indeed, have never been sufficiently defined."
(b) The territory between Janina to the south and the Lake Scutari to the north should comprise an independent state of Albania, to the exclusion of every foreign domination.
(c) "The rest of the territory (Macedonia) to be disposed of shall be the object of an equitable partition between the different small existing Balkan States, a partition on the subject of which Austria-Hungary and Russia reserve the right of being heard in good time."

Though Austria-Hungary and Russia promised to maintain the status quo in the Balkans, they secretly planned the general manner in which the Turkish spoils were to be divided. Such was the understanding between the Powers when they began negotiating a series of proposals for reform in Macedonia.

An increased demand for Macedonian reforms began in 1901, when various disturbances took place in January of that year. As no improvement took place in the situation either in 1901 or in the early part of 1902, the necessity for foreign intervention became urgent. Russia and Austria-Hungary agreed, in 1902, to make strong representations at Constantinople and Sofia for the prevention of any serious outbreak of trouble in Macedonia. Strong representations were made in July to the Porte by the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors which resulted in the despatch of special instructions to the Valis and the appointment of a Financial Commission to consider reforms. These measures, if ever actually carried out, were entirely without effect and in November the Russian Ambassador made a strong representation to the Sultan. He called his attention to the disorder in Albania and the unsatisfactory situation in Macedonia, which, unless the Turkish Government removed the grounds of discontent, would be prolonged or would bring about interference on the part of the foreign Powers. The Sultan replied that a scheme of reforms was already under consideration. The moderate scheme as outlined by the Porte provided for the appointment of a commission which was to sit permanently at the Porte during the winter

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to supervise the reform, and two Inspectors—one of whom was to be Hilmi Pasha—to be sent to Macedonia to furnish reports to the commission at Constantinople.\footnote{M. Bapst, Chargé D’Affaires of France at Constantinople, was not far from right when he wrote Delcassé, in December 1902, that: “Il semble que ces décisions aient été prises pour éloigner les demandes de l’Ambassadeur de Russie....”}\footnote{B. D., Vol. V., pp. 49-50.}

As the reforms outlined by the Porte were totally inadequate, further steps were taken by the Powers in 1903. The occasion came for the first proposals when the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Lamsdorff, paid a visit to Vienna, Sofia and Belgrade. The outcome of his visit with Count Goluchowski, the Austrian Foreign Minister, was the “Vienna Scheme” which provided that the Inspector General, Hilmi Pasha, was not to be recalled without the consent of the Powers, until after the expiration of three years; that the Gendarmerie and the police were to be assisted by foreign specialists; that a Christian element was to be introduced into both these forces, as well as the rural guards; that an amnesty for political offenses was to be granted; that the revenue of the three vilayets was to be applied, in the first instance, to local requirements under the control of the Ottoman Bank; and that the tithe system was to be reformed.\footnote{D. D. F., 2eme Série, Vol. II, No. 508. The Sultan at this time, as reported by O’Conor, British Ambassador at Constantinople, was not in favor of reforms. He was afraid they would weaken his influence and strengthen the position of the liberals in the Ottoman Empire. (B. D., Vol. I, No. 374, p. 303.)} As can be readily seen, these proposals differed from those outlined by the Porte in that they were designed to place the control of the reforms in the hands of foreign

\footnote{Complete texts of the Vienna Scheme are available in the B. D., Vol. V, pp. 51-53, as well as in the D. D. F., Vol. III, No. 87.}
Powers, and further they attempted to relieve the suppressed Christians in Macedonia. The provision, which made the removal of the Inspector General impossible without the consent of the Powers, released Hilmi Pasha from the Sultan's domination and subjected him to the will of the Powers.

The Signatory Powers, which had been discussing the possible outcome of the visit of Lamsdorff, were presented with the final draft of the Vienna Scheme on February 17, 1903. How did the Powers react to these propositions? The Italians, according to the remarks made by the Italian ambassador in England, M. Pansa, were a bit suspicious of the provision of the scheme, which makes the removal of the Inspector General subject to the consent of Austria and Russia; M. Pansa stated: "C'est la première fois... qu'une situation privilégiée est attribuée à deux Puissances à l'exclusion de toutes les autres dans les affaires intérieures de la Turquie."¹ In January, while Lamsdorff and Goluchowski were outlining the Vienna Scheme, Italy had apparently approved of the initial draft with the hope of being included in the Austro-Russian Balkan Entente.² Though Italy failed to be included in the Austro-Russian Balkan Entente, she was able to obtain an assurance from Count Goluchowski, on the 3rd of February, that: Austria "ne tendait pour le présent qu'au maintien de la domination ottomane, et pour l'avenir, en cas de désagrégation de la Turquie, à l'établissement de l'autonomie de l'Albanie, où aucune des nationalités de l'Autriche et de


²Ibid., No. 41. Barrère, French Ambassador to Rome, reported on January 26th, that the initial drafts of the Austro-Russian proposals had been communicated to and accepted by M. Prinetti, Italian Foreign Minister; Barrère also reported that: "Rien à mon sens ne serait plus fâcheux que de faire croire, comme certains, s'appliquent à le faire, a une entente à trois Russie, Autriche [sic], Italie, dans la question macédonienne..."
la Hongrie n'étaient représentée. 1 In spite of Italy's suspicion which was not wiped out by Goluchowski's explanation, Italy gave her approval to the Vienna Scheme on the 17th of February.

Germany had shown a very cordial attitude toward the Austro-Russian proposals throughout the negotiations, as was indicated, on January 6th, by the report of Bihourd, Ambassador of France to Berlin, that: "Le voyage que vient d'effectuer le comte Lamsdorff dans les États slaves des Balkans a été suivi avec assez de calme dans les cercles politiques de ma résidence." 2 In conformity with the report of January 6th, Bihourd wrote on the 13th of January that: "Le comte de Bülow, portant ses regards sur la Macédoine, s'est félicité du voyage du comte Lamsdorff, qui a fait entendre à Sofia et à Belgrade des conseils énergiques. Il compte sur les heureux effets d'une politique, la seule efficace à ses yeux, qui consiste d'un côté à contenir les ambitions des petits États balkaniques, et de l'autre, à imposer au Sultan les réformes réelles dans lesquelles les vices de l'administration turque perpétueront l'agitation toujours latente de cette province singulière." 3

The most plausible explanation of the cordial attitude which the German Government revealed toward the Austro-Russian proposals is to be gathered from a consideration of Germany's connection with the Bagdad Railway project. It will be recalled that in 1902 the construction of the Bagdad Railway was checked because Germany was unable to finance the undertaking. Finding itself in this predicament, in early 1903 the German

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2 Ibid., No. 9.
3 Ibid., No. 24.
Government opened the way for British capital to enter the project. Count Metternich, German Ambassador to London, observed that, so far as he was aware, "the door was open," and there was no reason why any amount of British capital should not be invested in the line. Moreover, the British Foreign Office was in favor of supporting the undertaking. On February 24th, the British Foreign Office addressed a letter to Baring Brothers and Company. In this letter it was stated that: "His Majesty's Government view the project with favor, and they would regard it as most undesirable that it should be carried out without their concurrence and without a sufficient participation on the part of their country in the construction, administration, and control of the line." The goodwill of the British Government was to be shown in the following ways: by the grant of a subsidy for the carriage of mails to India; by facilitating the introduction of the new Turkish Customs Tariff; and by aiding the promoters to obtain a terminus at or near Koweit, on the Persian Gulf. With the understanding that the British Government would support the undertaking under those conditions, the British capitalists were ready for negotiation with the German Company. These negotiations and discussions, which were taking place at the time the Vienna Scheme was being proposed, were, however, later broken off because the British public would not support cooperation with Germany. Not only was the German Government hopeful of securing the aid of British capital, but it was conducting similar negotiations with France.

In addition to Germany's hope of securing French and English aid in the Bagdad Railway project, there were other reasons for the cordial

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2Ibid., No. 208.
German attitude toward the Austro-Russian proposals. As Bülow judged, during the first days of February, the anti-German elements would resent the solidarity of Austria and Russia in the Balkans. Such resentment would then give the German diplomat at Constantinople a chance to pose as the friend of the Sultan in suppressing the revolts which would inevitably take place in the Balkans. The German ambassador at Constantinople, Marschall, was to contend to the dissatisfied elements of the Balkans that the Sultan, who was the mere docile executor of the reforms, was not responsible for the reforms. Now Germany, without a doubt, was playing a double hand. On the one hand French and English capitalists would be induced to continue their negotiations for investment in the Bagdad Railway project; while, on the other hand, Germany was maintaining her friendship with the Sultan from whom she hoped to obtain further concessions for her railway undertaking.

Differing somewhat from Germany, who accepted the Vienna Scheme without hesitation, Britain showed a great deal of reserve in her acceptance of the reforms. Though Britain, like the other Powers, had made previous communications in regard to the Vienna Scheme, her views are very well summarized in a conversation of Lansdowne with Count Deyn. In this conversation, which took place in London on the 17th of February, Lansdowne accepted the Vienna Scheme with the following observations:

1. His Majesty's Government have for a long time past been deeply convinced of the necessity for the introduction of measures of practical reform in Macedonia. They have constantly urged the adoption of such reforms upon the Turkish Government.

2. The present situation in the Balkan Peninsula is such that any further delay in the introduction of such reforms might be fraught with the most disastrous consequences.

\[1\text{Ibid., Serie 2ème, Vol. II, p. 134. Footnote.}\]
3. His Majesty’s Government had obviously not had time in which to examine with the care it deserves the scheme put forward by the two Powers. If however they were to put forward an alternative scheme of their own the discussion which would arise would certainly involve delay for which His Majesty’s Government would, in some measure in all events be responsible.

4. The scheme of the two Powers, so far as we understand it, contains some features which would probably find a place in any scheme of reform which the Powers would be likely to support.

5. His Majesty’s Government are therefore prepared to accept it in principle and, subject to the reservations which follow, to recommend it to the Sultan for his acceptance.

6. They reserve however to themselves the right of recommending to the Powers any modifications which may suggest themselves after the scheme has been further examined and discussed.

7. They desire in particular to have it understood that their provisional acceptance of the scheme will not, in the event of its disappointing the expectations of its framers and proving inadequate as a remedy be regarded by His Majesty’s Government as precluding them from putting forward or supporting, either during the three year tenure of the Inspector-General, or at any future time alternative proposals with the same object.\footnote{B. D., Vol. V, No. 4, p. 53.}

France, being eager to cooperate with Russia as well as England, accepted the proposals without hesitation, on February 17, 1903.\footnote{D. D. F., 2ème Série, Vol. III, No. 88.}

The Sultan accepted the programme of reforms on February 22nd because it was moderate. He had expected, according to O’Conor, British Ambassador at Constantinople, the Powers to make heavier requirements with united action which would have made resistance useless. O’Conor continues in his letter of February 23rd: "He has shewn his usual cleverness in accepting them without waiting for the expiration of the three or four days' delay accorded, but whether he is acting from fear, or in the hope of being
able to stultify them subsequently, it is difficult to say.1

These proposals, which came into force in February 1905, were not far-reaching enough to satisfy public opinion in Bulgaria. The Vienna Scheme made no provision whatsoever to improve the position of the literate and middle classes, and further, the Bulgarians believed there was hardly any chance of the Sultan putting them, such as they were, into execution.2 The Bulgarians were of the opinion that the institution of an autonomous regime in Macedonia, of one sort or another, was the only solution of the Macedonian difficulty. The Bulgarian Government was in a precarious position. The Government had with the support of the Russians, who were then posing as the friends of the Bulgarians, secretly aided the Bulgarian bands in Macedonia. Now that Russia was advising Bulgaria to suppress the bands, she was faced with the alternative of either suppressing the bands in order to maintain friendly relations, or secretly aiding the bands which were fighting for the annexation of a part of Macedonia to Bulgaria.3 This being true, the Bulgarian Government decided to follow a compromising policy—one of secretly aiding the bands, but agreeing outwardly with the Austrian and Russian reforms.

As a result of Bulgarian opposition and Albanian resentment of the reforms, there occurred, in April 1905, serious disturbances in Albania and at Salonica. The Russian Consul at Mitrovitsa was attacked and subsequently died of his wounds. No progress was made in carrying out reforms notably.

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in regard to the establishment of a Gendarmerie under European officers. The Austrian Ambassador consequently made fresh representations to the Porte demanding some action on the part of the Turkish Government to prove the sincerity of their promises.¹

In May, June and July no improvement whatever was made and the situation became more critical. A new Bulgarian Ministry came into office at the end of May under General Petroff who made an attempt to come to terms with the Porte, but the mission of Monsieur Natchowitz, who was sent to Constantinople for this purpose, ended in failure. Serious outrages by the Turkish troops took place at Smyrdred in the vilayet of Monastir and the alleged concentration of Turkish troops on the frontiers of Bulgaria caused very strained relations between Bulgaria and the Porte and formed the subject of a Bulgarian Circular to the Powers, which was sent on September 14, 1903. The Bulgarian Government urged the Powers to use their influence at Constantinople to prevent the extermination of the Bulgarian population and the mobilization of the Turkish army on the Bulgarian frontier. It concluded by the statement that if Bulgaria did not receive satisfactory assurances she would be obliged to take the measures necessary to prepare herself for every eventuality and to secure herself from every surprise. This Circular together with the many atrocities moved the Powers to consider other plans of reforms.² On September 24th, after receiving the Bulgarian Circular, Lansdowne informed Elliot, British Agent and Consul-General in Bulgaria, that Britain was pressing, "and will continue to press the Turkish Government for the more effective application of these reforms and are consulting the


²Ibid., pp. 61-62, See also pp. 104-106.
other Powers as to the possibility of further remedial measures.1

After Britain had taken the lead in initiating action, the
Russian and Austrian Foreign Ministers met at Mürzsteg, near Vienna, in
October 1903. The proposals, which were drawn up at Mürzsteg and were
known as the Mürzsteg programme, contained the following provisions:

1. Civil Agents of Austria and Russia were to accompany the
Inspector General, call his attention to the needs of
the Christians and the misdoings of the local authorities,
watch the introduction of reforms and the pacification
of the country, and report to their respective Govern-
ments.
2. A foreign General, with foreign officers, should be ap-
pointed to the Gendarmerie, dividing up the country for
the supervision, instruction and organization.
3. After the pacification of the country, Turkey should
modify the boundaries of the administrative units, with
a view to the more regular grouping of the nationalities.
4. The administrative and judicial institutions should be
reorganized, and Christians be admitted to the public
service.
5. Mixed Committees, with an equal number of the Christians
and Mohammedans, should inquire into the crimes committed
during the recent troubles.
6. Turkey should pay for the repatriation of Christian
refugees, and the rebuilding of houses, churches and
schools destroyed by the Turks. The money should be
distributed by Committees on which Christian notables
would sit, under supervision of Austrian and Russian
Consuls.
7. A year's taxes should be remitted to Christians in the
burnt villages.
8. Turkey should undertake to introduce the reforms of the
February and the Mürzsteg programme without delay.
9. The irregulars should be disbanded.2

One can easily see that the Mürzsteg programme was an improvement upon the
Vienna Scheme. Nevertheless, the Mürzsteg programme contained within its

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1 E. D., Vol. V, Lansdowne to Elliot, No. 79.
2 Ward & Gooch, Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, London,
1923, p. 376. For complete text of Mürzsteg programme see E. D., Vol. V,
No. 3, pp. 51-53.
provisions certain elements of weakness. In the first place, Article III of the programme served to stimulate the activity of the bands rather than make for peace. The attempt on the part of each Balkan State to increase its number of nationals in Macedonia, in order to be assured of more territory when the regrouping of the nationals took place, produced conflicts in Macedonia.\textsuperscript{1} Secondly, the programme contained no financial measures which were without a doubt necessary.

With the possible exceptions of Britain and Bulgaria the Powers accepted the轮廓 programme more favorably than they had accepted the Vienna Scheme. Britain's reluctance in accepting the reforms can best be attributed to the fact that she had, on September 29, ordered her Ambassador at Vienna, Plunkett, to make the following suggestions to the Austrian and Russian Ministers:

1. Whether the original scheme of the reforms should not now be placed upon a broader basis. As to this, Count Lamsdorff's language to Sir C. Scott shows that it does not exclude the idea of expanding the scheme. In our view no scheme is likely to produce satisfactory results which depends for its execution upon a Mussulman Governor entirely subservient to the Turkish Government and completely independent of foreign control. We suggest for consideration two alternatives.

(a) appointment of a Christian Governor unconnected with the Balkan Peninsula or with the Powers signatory of the Treaty of Berlin, or (b) retention of a Mussulman Governor assisted by European Assessors. We should be content that these should be selected by the two Powers.

2. Whether Turkey should not be required to proceed at once to the appointment of European officers and non-commissioned officers in adequate numbers to take charge of the reorganization of the Gendarmerie. If, as is to be hoped, some diminution of the prevailing disorder is to be expected, advantage is to be taken of this period to proceed at once with the proposed reorganization.

\textsuperscript{1} B. D., Vol. V, No. 265, p. 210. This view of Article III, which was expressed by Aehrenthal in August 1907, seems to have been accepted by the other Powers.
3. Whether the Turkish Government should not be required to withdraw from Macedonia the undisciplined troops, whether Redifs or Illyachs, now employed there, and to retain only the regular troops. If this were done, the latter might be transferred from position at which this concentration has led to the apprehension of the invasions of Bulgaria by Turkey. The two Powers might, in this case, undertaker that Bulgaria shall not send troops across the frontier, or allow bands to cross it.

4. We heard with regret that the two Powers do not regard favourably our proposal that the Powers should send their military attache to accompany the Turkish forces. We adhere to this proposal, which has received the conditional support of the Italian Government and we propose that each of the Powers should depute—say 6 officers for this purpose with the object of exercising a restraining influence upon the Turkish troops and obtaining trustworthy information.

5. We trust that the Powers will unanimously agree to obtain facilities for the distribution of relief to the persons, now numbering many thousands, who have been deprived of their homes in consequence of the recent operations and are now scattered over the country in a condition of the greatest misery....

Though these suggestions went a bit further than the proposals which were included in the Mürzsteg programme, they did not prevent Britain from joining the other Powers in approving of the Mürzsteg programme in principle, on October 25th.

In spite of the fact that the Mürzsteg programme was accepted, little was done to reduce the outrages in Macedonia. These continued outrages proved to the Powers that the Mürzsteg programme had not solved the Macedonian question.

With the failure of the Mürzsteg programme the preponderance of Russia and Austria in the joint supervision of Macedonia was greatly lessened. The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in the early part of the following


2*Ibid., No. 21, Lansdowne to O'Conor, pp. 66-67.*
year was to make possible a great change. The cooperation of Austria and Russia in maintaining the status quo in the Balkans does not by any means prove that they did not have political and economic aspirations in the Balkans. The two Powers had worked together in that part of the world because they thought the time was not ripe for the division of the Turkish spoils. The problem of working out a suitable division carried with it many possible conflicts. Russia was being threatened by the Japanese aggression in the Far East; whereas Austria was being held in check by Italy. Austria also was afraid to increase the Slav element in her dominions because she would meet with resistance from Hungary. Without the support of Hungary, Austria's execution of Balkan plans was inconceivable.

Even though no thoroughgoing reforms had been brought about and the cooperation of the Powers was not supported by the very best intentions, there had been few signs of intense hostility between the Powers over the Macedonian question, such as that which characterized their relationship in later years. Neither did the prevailing hostility in regard to Macedonia proceed along the lines of the two camps of alliances. Italy's and Austria's conflicting interest in Albania and the failure of Austria to accept Italy's participation in the Austro-Russian Balkan Entente had moved Italy in June 1905 to ask for Russia's support against Austria in Albania. This action on the part of Italy was an indication of disloyalty to the Triple

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2Letters of Bülow, translated by Frederick Hyte, p. 47.

3D. d. F., 2ème Série, Vol. III, No. 278.
Alliance.\textsuperscript{1} Further, Germany and Austria were hopeful of reviving the Three Emperors' League.\textsuperscript{2} In the following pages the Macedonian reform question, which had tended to bring the two camps of alliances together in 1903, will be analyzed in connection with its contribution to the separation of the Dual Alliance and the developing Triple Entente.

\textsuperscript{1}The Triple Alliance was first formed in 1882, and it had been renewed every 5 years. According to the terms of the alliance Austria and Italy were "to communicate to one another all information of a nature to enlighten each other mutually concerning their own dispositions, as well as those of the other Powers." See, Alfred Francis Pribram, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. I, p. 225, Article VII.

\textsuperscript{2}Erich Brandenburg, \textit{From Bismarck to the World War}, London, 1927, p. 196.
CHAPTER II

FINANCIAL REFORMS AND THE GREAT POWERS (1904-1905)

Varying somewhat from the general policies of moderation and the preponderance of Austria and Russia, which had characterized the first series of reforms, the second series placed emphasis upon finance and were supervised by all the Powers.

One of the most important events affecting Macedonian reforms at this stage was the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war on February 9, 1904. Almost immediately following the outbreak of war was the decisive defeat of Russia in Manchuria. When the Bulgarians heard of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, which was followed by the Russian defeats, they were disturbed. The Bulgarian Government had cherished the comforting conviction that Russia would come to its assistance should a crushing disaster befall it in a war with Turkey. With the defeat of Russia the Bulgarian Government lost this conviction. Apart, moreover, from this fear of finding themselves isolated in the hour of defeat, the Bulgarians were preoccupied by the idea that Austria was about to take advantage of Russia's embarrassments to occupy the northern districts of Macedonia. In order, therefore, to deprive Turkey of any pretext for interfering in their own Principality, the Bulgarian Government instructed the Bulgarian representative at Constantinople to press on the conclusion of an arrangement which would place the relations between vassal and suzerain on a more friendly footing. Such an agreement was signed on the 8th of April, 1904. ¹

According to the terms of the Turco-Bulgarian Agreement, Bulgaria agreed to prevent the formation of bands on her territory, to punish severely all those who, after committing acts of a nature to disturb public order in the neighboring provinces had taken refuge in the Principality, and to prevent the introduction into those provinces of arms and explosives. Turkey on her side undertook to carry out the reforms agreed on under the Mürzsteg programme, to grant a general amnesty for offences, to repatriate the refugees who during the past two years had fled to Bulgaria, to restore their lands and to assist them in rebuilding their houses. Further, a mixed Turco-Bulgarian Commission was appointed to examine various questions, and to provide for a better supervision of the frontier. Special clauses, moreover, provided for the abrogation of the restrictions on Bulgarians in Macedonia.\(^1\) The Turco-Bulgarian Agreement, in accordance with the expectations of the French and Russians as expressed by Lansdowne,\(^2\) did prevent any serious outbreaks in the Balkans during the year 1904.

In addition to producing fear in Bulgaria, the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war produced a great deal of uneasiness in Italy. The Italians were afraid that Austria was going to take advantage of Russia's Far Eastern conflict to enhance her prestige in the Balkans. On February 12, 1904, M. Balasquina, Vice-Consul of France at Janina, sent the following message to Delcassé, French Minister for Foreign Affairs:

...Les agents autrichiens trouvent d'ailleurs dans le clergé catholique et dans les agences du Lloyd de précieux auxiliaires de leur politique. Contrairement à ce qui se passe dans le reste de la Turquie, c'est l'autriche qui détient en Albanie et en Macédoine la protection des intérêts catholiques;

\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)Ibid., Lansdowne to Monson. No. 27, p. 70.
elle se sort de cette situation privilégiée, surtout dans
la Haute-Albanie où les catholiques sont très nombreux,
pour se faire une clientèle, étendre son prestige et com-
battre la propagation de l'influence italienne.

In addition to the above account of Austria's Balkan schemes, a few days
later Barrère, French Ambassador to Rome, reported that "Des nouvelles sûres
arrivées jusqu'à moi portent que la mobilisation des troupes autrichiennes
aux frontières de Turquie se complète rapidement par l'adjonction régulière
des nouveaux contingents et le maintien sous les drapeaux des soldats qui
devraient être remplacés." Barrère not only made note of the news of
Austria's mobilization, but stated "Aussi l'alarme est-elle grande ici...
On est convaincu que l'Autriche va profiter à la première occasion, de
l'affaiblissement des forces de l'action russe dans les Balkans."

In order to check the possible advances of Austria in the Balkans,
the Italian Government sought French and British assistance. The following
account of Italy's desire for French assistance was sent by Barrère, French
Ambassador in Rome, to Delcassé on February 14, 1904:

Le Popolo Romano publie un article inspiré par la Consulta
et où, sous des dehors courtois, se trahit la méfiance
qu'inspire ici la politique autrichienne dans les Balkans.
Je crois utile à ce propos de compléter, par les nouveaux
propos que M. Tittoni m'a tenus, ceux que je vous ai déjà
rapportés. En insistant de nouveau sur la nécessité d'une
entente franco-italienne, appuyée par l'Angleterre, en vue
de ce qui pourrait surgir en Orient, il m'a dit: Dans mon
esprit, cette action commune est devenue d'autant plus
nécessaire depuis que la Russie est engagée en Extrême-
Orient. Mais elle n'aurait nullement pour but de travailler
contre elle ou de la supplanter dans les Balkans; sa raison


2 Ibid., No. 284.
This Italian plea for French support in the Balkans seems to have been accepted by the French Government, for on February 19, 1904, Bertie, the British Ambassador to Italy, in a letter to Lansdowne stated that "French Ambassador has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that M. Delcasse concurs in desire of Italian Government for the maintenance of status quo in the East and in their view that, if it cannot be preserved, a settlement should be decided upon by a European congress, and not by any isolated action in Macedonia by Russia and Austria-Hungary, or either of them."²

In Italy's attempt to restrain Austria in the Balkans, she not only obtained French friendship, but she promoted French and British cooperation in the Balkans. Such cooperation, perhaps, would not have been otherwise obtained, for France had shown some hesitation in cooperation with Britain in the Balkans. Britain and France were allies of the two belligerents, Japan and Russia, respectively.

Britain had shown interest in the question of Macedonian reform for a very long time. Throughout 1903 the British public as well as the British Government had shown an increasing interest in Macedonia.³ When the Russo-Japanese conflict started in February, 1904, Britain, like Italy, was moved by the fear that Austria would disturb the status quo in the Balkans. On February 18, 1904 Lansdowne, British Secretary of State for

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Foreign Affairs, asked Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to London, "si, par
suit de la crise en Extrême-Orient, l'équilibre d'influence établi entre la
Russie et l'Autriche dans les Balkans ne pouvait pas être compromis, et si
le Gouvernement autrichien, amène par la force des choses à jouer un rôle
prépondérant n'éveillerait par certaines susceptibilités."¹ In the meantime,
Lansdowne was attempting to solicit the cooperation of France in the Balkans.
As previously mentioned, Britain with the aid of Italy obtained the coopera-
tion of France in this regard.

Britain, having obtained the French and Italian concurrence, pro-
ceeded to suggest to these Powers a possible scheme of reforms for Macedonia.
Lansdowne suggested to France, on February 20, 1904, that "Macedonia might
either be joined to Bulgaria, or given an autonomous regime under a Governor
virtually independent under the Sultan."² Delcassé, being a bit afraid of
going too far without the consent of France's ally, Russia, decided to notify
Russia of Britain's suggestion. A few days later, Bompard, French Am-
bassador to Russia, stated in a letter to Delcassé that "Quant à la propo-
sition faite par Lorde Lansdowne, à M. Paul Cambon, et dont celui-ci a in-
formé aussitôt le comte de Benckendorff..., j'ai acquis la certitude que
le Gouvernement russe ne verrait pas avec plaisir, ainsi que d'ailleurs il
était facile de le prévoir, des pourparlers engagés entre les Puissances
de l'Europe occidentale, en vue d'arrêter une ligne de conduite commune,
pour le cas où le programme de Mürzsteg viendrait à échouer."³ Russia's
refusal, which was in keeping with Austria's views, checked further

advancement toward immediate reforms. Though Britain had failed in her
eager attempt to bring about far-reaching reforms, she had been thrown into
closer friendship with France and Italy in regard to Balkan policies.

Nevertheless, Britain continued to advocate reforms throughout
the year 1904. Russia wished to maintain the Mürzsteg programme, while
Britain by January 25, 1905 was thoroughly convinced of the necessity of
going beyond it; for now the Sultan had too much control over finances, and
experience had shown that he was not likely to use the revenue for purposes
of reform.¹

In May, 1905 the Powers agreed upon a scheme of financial reforms.
The proposals as finally accepted on May 8, 1905, provided for the appoint-
ment of the four Delegates, nominated by France, Germany, Great Britain and
Italy, to cooperate with the Civil Agents and the Inspector General, which
had been provided for in the Mürzsteg programme. No reply was returned by the
Sultan, and a new joint request for an answer was therefore presented on the
24th of June. The Porte, on July the 12th, returned an evasive reply, which
the Ambassadors of Britain and Italy declared to be unacceptable. The Italian
and British Ambassadors then made an appeal to their Governments "d'agir
pour les délégués financiers de la même manière que pour les officiers de
gendarmerie et par suit d'envoyer d'office in Macédoine les agents qui seront
chargés d'assurer le fonctionnement régulier des services financiers des
vilayets de Salonique, de Kossovo et de Monastir."² In keeping with the
request of the British Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Lansdowne, on
July 19, approved of the suggestion; that, "dans ce cas, il conviendrait

¹ R. D., Vol. V, No. 36.
de remettre à la Porte une nouvelle note fixant un délai pour l'acceptation de leurs propositions et déclarant qu'à l'expiration de ce délai les Puissances procéderaient à la désignation de leurs délégués. Si la Porte persistait encore dans son refus, les délégués seraient envoyés en Macédoine et le Sultan serait averti des conséquences sérieuses que pourrait entraîner l'échec des projects de réformes.1 A bit more moderate than this suggestion, which Lansdowne reported to Paul Cambon, the Six Powers, on the 31st of July, transmitted a Joint Note which merely insisted on compliance. The Porte did not reply; consequently on the 26th and 27th of August the actual names of the four Financial Delegates were communicated to the Porte in Joint Notes. Finally in a Note dated the 29th of August delivered the 1st of September the Sultan gave the following response:

Le Gouvernement impérial a pris connaissance des memorandums de Leur Excellences les représentants d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Allemagne, de Russie, d'Angleterre, d'Italie et de France, en date du 31 juillet et 26 août 1905.

Il regrette de constater que Leurs Excellences insistent sur leur proposition malgré les justes observations auxquelles avait donné lieu de son part. Elles se rappellent avec quel empressement amical il avait accueilli le mémoire de février 1903, et lorsque, sans même attendre que ses clauses eussent donné tous leurs effets, le programme de Mürzsteg lui a été proposé, il y a également adhéré dans un sentiment loyal qui a été hautement apprécié par les Puissances sous la réserve expresse toutefois que le statu quo serait maintenu, et que l'indépendance, les droits souverains et le prestige du Gouvernement impérial serait respecté.

Or les dispositions dudit mémoire relatif à l'administration financière dont il est question ayant été mises entièrement à exécution et ayant produit leurs effets, la nécessité d'y introduire les additions suggérées par Leurs Excellences ne se fait pas sentir en fait; elles vont même à l'encontre des droits et de l'indépendance du Gouvernement impérial qu'il a toujours eu soin de sauvegarder, et des intentions pacifiques des cabinets.

Aussi fait-il encore appel aux dispositions bienveillantes des Puissances, fermement persuadé qu'elles voudront bien renoncer à toutes additions au règlement financier qui répond à tous les besoins des trois provinces, auxquelles le Gouvernement impérial se trouve dans l'imperial possibilité absolue d'adhérer.  

The Porte was yet determined that it would not accept the much hated financial reforms which made no provisions for contributions to the Sultan's coffers.

The Powers answered the Porte's Note by having their Ambassadors at Constantinople make strong individual representations to the Porte.  

Strong individual representations having failed, the Powers on the 6th of October instructed the four Financial Delegates, who had arrived at Salonica, to proceed to Uskub to take up their duties, and informed the Porte of their decision in a Collective Note. The decision on the part of the Powers to send the Delegates to their post was very definitely in keeping with the suggestion which the Italian and British Ambassadors had proposed in July. This being true, it seems that the Italian and British Ambassadors were playing the leading role in urging reforms for Macedonia.

The persistence of Britain was maintained; for on the 18th of October Lansdowne asked Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to London, "si la France serait disposée à s'associer à une nouvelle démarche auprès du Sultan et à lui annoncer que, s'il persistait dans sa résistance, les Puissances auraient recours à des mesures comminatoires, par exemple à une démonstration navale."

Lansdowne further stated that he would contact other nations on the same issue.

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2 Ibid., No. 442.
3 Ibid., No. 22.
In accordance with these suggestions the Ambassadors of the Six Powers presented a Draft Note to the Sultan on October 25th which stated that a Board of Audit had been formed; and "Cette audience aura pour objet de représenter personnellement à Sa Majesté l'absolue nécessité de l'acceptation par la Sublime Porte de la proposition des Six Puissances relative à l'établissement de la Commission financière pour les trois Vilayets, attendu que dans le cas contraire les Puissances se verrait obligées d'avoir recours aux mesures commandées par la situation."\(^1\)

In the meantime, the Porte had addressed a note to the Six Powers stating that it could not accept the Financial Delegates who had been ordered to proceed to Uskub. This reply was immediately followed by a similar note which contained the Porte's refusal of the Board of Audit.

The text of the Porte's reply was as follows:

Minister for Foreign Affairs regrets all the more not to be able to comply with the desire of the Ambassadors, in as much as there exists no precedent for a collective audience being granted to the foreign representatives on a question of internal policy, and inasmuch as subject mentioned by their Excellencies refers to a decision of the Government which has been taken after mature deliberation by the Sublime Porte, to whom it alone appertains to treat the question.

The decision is based on sovereign rights and independence of Imperial Government, which the Powers have always declared their intention to preserve from all attack, and it is on these principles that the Porte bases its refusal to accept the establishment of a Commission which constitutes a direct interference in administration of the country, and which, as they have more than once stated, does not form part of programme which they have accepted, or of the Agreement come to.

This programme and these Agreements have been faithfully executed by the Imperial Government, and it was in order to comply with them that they put into force the financial

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\(^1\) B. D., Vol. V, No. 48, p. 84.
Reglement which they had been careful to communicate to Ambassadors, and which insures the proper development of this important branch of Administration.

In view of results of (?) programme) and the consideration which they have adduced, the Porte remain convinced that Powers, inspier by their high sense of justice, will allow them loyally to carry out work begun, which any proposal other than is implied in existing understanding can only compromise in a manner unfavorable to solution desired by all parties.¹

The tenor of the above Note is, as one can easily perceive, of a very determined and negative character and the promptitude of the reply was somewhat surprising. The hurried decision of the Government, as stated by O’Conor, British Ambassador at Constantinople, may have been due to the fact that the feast of Ramadan commenced on the following Sunday and that the Sultan was not unwilling to gain the popularity which a refusal would acquire for him at a time when the fanatical spirit of his Moslem subjects seemed very high;² whereas the determined resistance of the Sultan, as formerly explained, was primarily due to his resentment of foreign financial control.

In addition to the above primary reason, the Sultan’s determination probably was supported by his reliance upon German friendship. The German Government at this time was posing as the friend of the Sultan in Morocco.³ Germany was also attempting to gain concessions for the Bagdad Railway project. After the suggestion for a naval demonstration was agreed upon in the early part of November the German Government hesitated in cooperating with the other Powers. O’Conor, British Ambassador at Constantinople, reported

²Ibid., No. 51, p. 86.
that he gathered from remarks made by the German Ambassador at Constantinople that the German Government would not send a ship to the Piraeus or Mitylene with the other Powers.\(^1\) Similar accounts were reported by the German Ambassador in London on November 15, 1905. In the meantime Bülow after considering the situation addressed a letter to the Emperor on November 13th asking that he grant permission for the German ship, the Lorley, to participate in the demonstration with ships of the other Powers.\(^2\) The Emperor's decision, which was in favor of Germany giving moral support to the naval demonstration, was communicated to the German Ambassadors on the 16th of November.

The moral support which Germany gave the naval demonstration is quite illustrative of the incompatibility of Germany's European and Turkish policies. Though Germany did want to maintain the friendship of the Porte, she was not desirous of doing so at the expense of bringing about a complete break with the European Powers. The embarrassing position in which Germany was placed in regard to the European Powers forced her to persuade the Porte to accept the financial measures.\(^3\) The failure of the Porte to obtain the complete support of Germany together with the united action of the other five Powers in pressing financial reforms forced the Sultan to accept the whole Allied demands for financial reforms on the 5th of December,\(^4\) after the naval demonstration had taken place on the 25th of November. Much

\(^{1E. D., Vol. V, No. 65, p. 93.}\) 
\(^{2Bülow, op. cit., p. 186.}\) 
\(^{3D. D. F., 2ème Série, Vol. VIII, No. 100.}\) 
\(^{4Ibid., No. 191.}\)
further tedious haggling about details followed, but in principle the Porte
accepted defeat.¹

The Porte’s acceptance, which was mainly brought about as a result
of the efforts of Britain and Italy, ended the long struggle of the Powers
for financial reforms in Macedonia. Russia, who had been the moving power
behind the Macedonian insurrection of 1903² as well as approving of the
Serbian assassination of the last Obrenovitch king,³ was preoccupied with
the Russo-Japanese war. Russia’s Far Eastern preoccupation made it neces-
sary that the Bulgarian Government make peace with the Sultan rather than
antagonize him by inciting the Bulgarian bands to rebel in Macedonia. The
signing of the agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey made it possible for
peace to be maintained in Macedonia during the year 1904. Further, the pre-
occupation of Russia in the Far East weakened Russian influence in the Bal-
kans, thereby upsetting the equilibrium which had been established between
Russia and Austria in the Balkans. Austria, being relieved of her greatest
Balkan rival, made moves to take advantage of Russia’s Far Eastern distrac-
tion to strengthen her influence in the Balkans. When the Italians heard

¹These details may be found in D. D. F., 2eme Série, Vol. VIII, Nos. 213,
³This view of Russia’s close association with the events which brought
about the assassination of the last Obrenovitch king was gathered from a
very critical reading of the communications recorded in B. D., Vol. V, Nos.
86-113, pp. 124-137. On June 18, 1903 Plumkett, British Ambassador to
Austria, wrote Lansdowne that it appeared to him that Austria had no fore-
knowledge of the assassination plot, and that when the plot occurred Austria-
Hungary was found entirely unprepared for any immediate action. On the
other hand, Russia immediately accepted the new dynasty with great con-
gratulations and indicated that she knew of the plans. Additional evi-
dence was gained from Edith Durham, op. cit., pp. 73-100
of the rumors of Austria's moves in the Balkans as well as Austria's interest in Albania they became more determined to secure the aid of France and Britain in checking Austria. As Britain had been interested in the Balkans for some time, she readily joined Italy in soliciting the cooperation of France. The French interest in the Balkans, having been increased as a result of Austria's new Balkan position, made it possible for Italy and Britain to secure French cooperation in the Balkans.

With the support of Italy and France, Britain proceeded in 1905 to advocate financial reforms for Macedonia. The Powers, with the exception of Germany, cooperated in bringing about financial reforms. Since the Sultan realized that financial reforms, such as the Powers were eager to bring about in Macedonia, would reduce his income from that province, he consistently resisted the financial proposals. Germany, who had taken advantage of Russia's Far Eastern preoccupation to strengthen her friendship with the Porte, was desirous of maintaining the friendship of the Porte in order to gain additional concessions for her railway interests. The Sultan's reliance upon Germany's friendship together with his resentment of financial reforms prompted him to refuse the reforms during the larger portion of 1905. The persistence of the other five Powers in advocating reforms placed Germany in an embarrassing position. In view of making her position in Europe more compatible with her position in Turkey, Germany asked the Sultan in November to submit to the demands of the Powers. As Germany did not give the Sultan full support in resisting the reforms, the Porte accepted the financial reforms in principle on December 5, 1905. The failure of Germany to give full support to the naval demonstration broadened the breach between Britain and Germany; whereas the cooperation of France and Britain had promoted friendly relations between those two Powers. Though France cooperated with Britain
in the Balkans she pursued a rather conservative outward policy which kept
the lines between France, Britain and Russia from breaking. Thus the
separation of the two camps of alliances was becoming more apparent.
CHAPTER III
THE BREAK-UP OF THE CONCERT

During the years of 1906-8 the most important matters engaging
the attention of the Powers in regard to Macedonia were judicial reforms,
the three per cent increase of customs duties, and the penetration of the
Sanjak of Novi-Bazar by Austria-Hungary.

As early as February, 1905, the Sublime Porte had sent a proposal
to Britain asking that customs duties be increased from 8 to 11% ad valorem
in order to meet the deficit in the Budget which had been proposed for the
three Macedonian vilayets. Lord Lansdowne a few days later had replied
that Britain would consent to an increase in the customs duties on the
following conditions: "that His Majesty's Government should be satisfied
that the financial needs of the Macedonian provinces had been correctly
computed by the Turkish Officials, that the local revenues were collected
to the best advantage, that the expenditure, both civil and military, was
adjusted to the real needs of the administration; that the customs general-
ly would be administered in such a manner as to secure honest and efficient
collection of the duties, and there should be a definite assignment of the
proceeds of the increased tariff to some competent authority entrusted with
the collection and control not only of these funds, but of the local rev-
enues which they are intended to supplement."\(^1\) Though similar communications
were made by the Sublime Porte to the other Powers, no decisive steps were
taken in 1905.

\(^1\) E. D., Vol. V, No. 52, p. 87.
Again on April 30th, 1906 the Porte addressed a note to the Powers stating "that it found itself compelled to proceed at an early date to levying the additional 3 per cent, and expressing its confidence that the Powers would consent."\(^1\) After conferring upon the Porte's Note, on the 28th of May, the Powers' Ambassadors at Constantinople informed the Sultan of the conditions on which the Powers would consent to an increase in customs duties for a period of seven years. The most important of these conditions were: "(1) compliance with the demands which had already been made regarding amendments in the Mining Law and the Regulations for the Chemical Analysis in the Customs; and (2) an effective guarantee was to be given that the proceeds of the increased duties accruing to the Ottoman Government should be exclusively devoted to meeting the deficit in the Macedonian Budget, and that the Porte would meet any further deficit which might occur."\(^2\) On the 21st of June the Sultan gave his response to the Joint Note of the 28th of May. "While stating that the Customs Regulations, the Mining Law and the Chemical Analysis Regulations had been amended, it was unsatisfactory in that it failed to give the effective guarantee demanded as regards the exclusive employment of the proceeds of the surtax for Macedonia." And the Porte merely undertook to make good the deficit so far as its share in the proceeds of the increased duties would enable it to do so; whereas it was already bound, under Article 12 of its arrangement with the Ottoman Bank of March 1905 to make good any deficit which might occur in the Macedonian Budget. The Porte also objected to the limitation of the surtax to seven years, proposing that it should continue to be levied until Treaties of

\(^1\)B. D., Vol V, No. 52, p. 168.

\(^2\)Ibid.
Commerce had been concluded with the Powers.\textsuperscript{1}

The memorandum, which Britain addressed to Austria and Russia on July 10th, expressed the opinion that it was time to reconsider the terms upon which the assent of the Powers might be given to the proposed increase in customs duties. This was considered necessary because the Porte had failed to carry out its engagement to make good the deficit in the Macedonian Budget. The conditions upon which the Powers agreed at this time were as follows:

1. The Porte was to fulfil its engagements as regards customs improvements, and the texts of the amended Mining Law and Chemical Analysis Regulations were to be communicated officially to the Powers.
2. An effective guarantee was to be given that the portion of the surtax accruing to the Government would be properly collected and exclusively applied to Macedonia; the obligation of the Porte to provide for the whole of the deficit was to be reaffirmed; and it was to be made clear that, in the event of there being an excess of revenue over expenditures in any one year, the surplus was to form a reserve not to be applied to other purposes without the consent of the Powers.
3. The surtax was not to be put into force without two months notice.
4. The time was to be limited to seven years.
5. No increase was to be made in the amount of military expenditure chargeable to the Macedonian Budget.
6. Certain demands relating to the gendarmerie in Macedonia which had already been presented to the Porte by the Powers in March, but which had so far solicited no reply, were to be complied with, the chief amongst these being that the gendarmerie should be armed with repeating rifles and have the right to intervene in the case of offences committed by the troops.\textsuperscript{2}

After some demur the Ambassadors at Constantinople were able to agree as to the terms of the reply. The reply, which was presented to the

\textsuperscript{1}B. D., Vol. V, p. 169.
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.
Porte on the 30th of September, contained all the essentials of the memorandum which had been presented by Britain on the 10th of July. Nevertheless, the stipulation that any surplus of revenue over expenditures in any one year should form a reserve earmarked for Macedonia was left out, and the provision for the limitation of the military expenditure chargeable to the Macedonian Budget was replaced by a stipulation which provided that the Financial Commission should have the last word in fixing the civil expenditures. In more than one respect the Joint Note went further than the memorandum of the 10th of July, for a most salutary stipulation for a regular supply of recruits in the gendarmerie was inserted. Besides a general demand for the fulfilment of the Porte's promise as regards reforms, the note demanded that a sum of £T.100,000 should be appropriated for the reconstruction and improvement of the custom-house depots, and that the question of the custom-house porters should be satisfactorily settled.\(^1\)

When the Porte replied to this communication, on the 9th of November, it gave the effective guarantee demanded by notifying the Powers of an arrangement with the Ottoman Debt Council, by which the Council had undertaken to pay over to the Budget of the three vilayets the whole of the proceeds accruing to the Government. In principle the note was a complete acceptance of the terms of the Powers.\(^2\) Nevertheless, the British Government did not accept it as being final because of its objection to minor issues. Such objection and disagreement over minor issues kept the Powers from giving their final consent to an increase in the customs duties during the year 1906. Finally, on April 25, 1907, O'Connor, British Ambassador at

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\(^1\) _B. D., Vol. V, p. 170._

\(^2\) _Ibid., p. 171._
Constantinople, "signed the protocol by which, in common with the Governments of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, Britain gave her consent on certain conditions, to which the Sublime Porte had agreed, to the increase of the Turkish customs duties from 8% to 11% for a period of seven years."¹

In the course of Britain's insistence upon the previously mentioned conditions for the acceptance of the 3% increase in duties, she had received the consistent support only of the Russian Ambassador. In spite of the Entente Cordiale the French Ambassador had given little support. Austria was annoyed by Britain taking the leading part in the matter.² As Britain had expected, Germany had shown tenderness toward Turkish susceptibilities. Germany was primarily interested in the Baghdad Railway undertaking, as was expressed by Bülow (Feb. 9, 1907): that if Britain would not raise any new difficulty as to the 3 per cent rise in customs duties, on the ground of the additional 250,000£ Turkish, we would have under these circumstances no need whatever to appeal to other nations for the financing of the Baghdad Railway undertaking.³

The next big issue confronting the Powers in regard to Macedonia was judicial reforms. In October 1906 Isvolsky stated that "there was one question which he considered should at once engage the attention of the Great Powers, and that was the reform of the Judiciary in Macedonia."⁴

³Bülow, op. cit., p. 209.
He believed that, if this were done, the Civil Agents and the Financial Commission would be able to effect a real improvement in the conditions of the country. As expressed by Goschen, British Ambassador to Austria, in a letter dated December 25, 1906, Austria was in favor of judicial reforms by Austria and Russia, the originators of the Mürzsteg programme. On the other hand Goschen reports that Russia was not so particularly devoted to the Mürzsteg agreement; similarly Italy was quite in favor of the judicial reforms being undertaken by all the Powers and not by the Austrian and Russian Governments alone. From these reports it seems that Austria is beginning to act with Germany in opposing Britain’s insistence upon reforms, while Russia is becoming more desirous of working with Britain and the other Powers in bringing about reforms.

In order to understand fully the reaction of the Powers at this time, it is necessary to consider other events which were affecting their Balkan policies. According to a report sent by Buchanan, British Consul-General in Bulgaria, to Grey on April 18, 1906, Germany’s Balkan policy was undergoing a change. Buchanan’s report included the following explanation:

...M. Simitich informed me that during the negotiations conducted at Berlin in 1904 for the conclusion of a new Commercial Treaty, the Servian Delegates had received the formal assurance that, in the event of difficulties being raised by Austria-Hungary with regard to the transit of Servian produce through her territory, Servia could count on the intervention and good offices of Germany. A similar promise had at the same time been given to the Servian Government through the German Minister at Belgrade. When however the time had come for giving effect to it, during the crisis which occurred at the commencement of the present year in Servia’s commercial relations with the Dual Empire, the attitude of Germany underwent a complete change and the

influence of the German Representative both at Belgrade and Sofia was always at the service of the Austro-Hungarian Government. The reason for this change was not, he continued, far to seek. The Conference on the Moroccan Question was at that moment on the eve of assembling, and Germany was fully aware that unless she could secure the support of Austria-Hungary, she would find herself completely isolated. The Dual Empire, however, in view of the analogous position in which it was placed with regard to the Balkan States, was inclined to favour the French pretension that special privileges accrue to [sic] in all such cases to the limitrophe Power. Germany, therefore, could only purchase that Empire's support at Algeciras by engaging to support its claims to a privileged position in Balkan affairs. This, M. Simitch concluded, was the price paid by Germany for the services rendered her by the Austro-Hungarian Representative at the Conference.

Though M. Simitch's explanation may not be an exact interpretation of Germany's Balkan policy, it is in keeping with other events. Meanwhile, on April 14, 1907, Goschen, British Ambassador in Vienna, had written Grey a letter in which he gave the following translation of a telegram which the German Emperor had addressed to Count Goluchowski:

At this moment when, with the consent of your august Sovereign, I am sending to Count Weloersheimb the Grand Cross of my order of the Red Eagle in recognition of his successful efforts at Algeciras, I feel compelled to offer to you from the bottom of my heart sincere thanks for the unswerving support you gave to my Representative at the Conference, an act indeed worthy of a true ally. As our second in this encounter you rendered the most brilliant service and in similar circumstances you can always count on a similar service from me.

The German Emperor seems to have been much desirous of maintaining Austrian friendship.


News of this telegram was not received with the greatest amount of enthusiasm by the Austrian public. The Austrian public complained that this telegram made their Government appear as a mere fellow of its ally, Germany. Whether there was a secret agreement made between Austria and Germany in regard to the Balkans is a question which cannot be answered from the available material. It must be kept in mind, however, that the diplomacy between Austria and Germany was carried on very secretly. "Inasmuch as Slav territory added to the monarchy must be joined to Hungary (save along the Adriatic), Austrian aggression in the Balkans such as Pan-Germanism predicated must be conducted with the utmost secrecy and finesse." This being true, such an agreement probably was discussed between the two Monarchies. If there was no such agreement outlined, there seems to have been at least a tacit understanding, such as was indicated in the German Emperor's Note to Count Goluchowski in April. This view is substantiated by the fact that the German Emperor revealed rather a hostile attitude toward Bulgaria. The German Emperor, in conversing, in September, with Lascelles, British Ambassador to Berlin, referred to Prince Ferdinand as being "the cleverest and most unscrupulous Prince who reigned in Europe." Furthermore, after 1906, as will be shown later, Germany gave almost complete support to Austria's forward steps in the Balkans.

In analysing Austro-German relations it is necessary to consider as being important the change which took place in October, 1906, when the

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1 As was mentioned in the Introduction on Sources the documents included in the Die Grosse Politik were not used.

2 Roland G. Usher, "Austro-German Relations Since 1866", American Historical Review, XXIII (April, 1918), p. 593.

leading Austrian statesman, Count Goluchowski, resigned and was replaced by the former Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Baron Von Aehrenthal. As pointed out by Brandenburg, "the selection of this man was the work of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, when for the first time he made his influence felt in the Danube State. Aehrenthal acted upon the principle of being as conciliatory as possible toward the Slav elements in the Monarchy. From his (Archduke Francis Ferdinand) remarks at various times it is doubtful if his plans went so far and assumed a clearly defined form. In any case, once he himself had made his influence felt and his nominee, Aehrenthal, controlled the foreign policy Austria took a more definite line on the Balkan problem. On Aehrenthal's own admission it was inspired by a strong political motive in home affairs. The aim was to counteract the growing tension among the various nationalities within the Monarchy by the means of successful foreign policy. Baron Aehrenthal was far from being an opponent of Russia.... But he was acting on the assumption that Russia's policy would even in after years remain focussed on the Far East and be non-committal on the Balkan question."  

After having analyzed some of the most significant cross currents in German and Austrian diplomacy, one can clearly understand the reason for Austria's objection to Britain advocating the internationalization of the Hürlsteg programme. Aehrenthal, being a bit Russophil, was desirous of working only with Russia in bringing about judicial reforms.  

One of the first moves made by Aehrenthal was to propose a scheme for a Quadruple Entente designed to exclude Britain and Italy from the Balkans. The Quadruple Entente, which was discussed in May, 1907, seems to  

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1 Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 304.
have been so planned that France should be compensated for her support of
Germany at Constantinople by the withdrawal of German opposition to French
expansion in Morocco; and that Austria-Hungary should be compensated for
similar support by German help in extracting from the Sultan a concession
for an Austro-Hungarian railway from the Bosnian frontier through the
Saljak of Novi-Bazar as far as the main line of the Salonica Railway. Thus
the Bosnian Railways would become part of an Austro-Hungarian through-route
to Salonica, and a direct strategic connection with Macedonia would be
created outside Serbian territory. What advantages were to accrue to Russia
is not clear. Eventual running rights over a section of the Bagdad Railway;
the placing of a large Russian loan in France, Germany and Austria-Hungary,
and a revision in favor of Russia of the stipulations of the Berlin Treaty
in regard to the Dardanelles were among the compensations suggested. They
were all largely hypothetical.\(^1\)

The whole scheme failed when France and Russia refused to cooperate
with Germany and Austria and reported the proposed scheme to Britain in the
latter part of May and early days of June, 1907. Grey's already rapidly
increasing uneasiness in regard to Austria's action developed into anger.\(^2\)

In the meantime the once antagonistic relationship of Britain
and Russia was becoming much more cordial. A conversation with Chamberlain
during Delcassé's visit to London in July, 1903 may be taken as the starting
of the friendly discussions which were interrupted by the outbreak of the
Russo-Japanese war. Shortly after the Russo-Japanese war, October 3, 1905,

\(^1\) Bülow, op. cit., pp. 205-220.

\(^2\) B. D., Vol. V, Nos. 152, 158, 161, pp. 201-205.
the ice was broken when the Russian ambassador asked Lansdowne his views on the possibility of an understanding.\(^1\) The new treaty, which Britain had negotiated with Japan, had been a shock; but the Russian Government was not unfriendly, and Lansdownoff was ready for discussion. Lansdownoff feared, however, that the matter could not be much advanced at that time because the resentment of the Russian public was yet too strong.

To some extent British and Russian cooperation in the Balkans served as a basis for bringing the two Powers together. In January, 1907 Benckendorff stated that "Count Lansdownoff had spoken with very great satisfaction of the common action taken by the two Governments in Crete and in the Near East. Russia had had difficulties with every country but England, who acted loyally and cordially with Russia.\(^2\) A similar explanation was read to Grey by Count Benckendorff in March, 1906. "This was to the effect that the Russian Government had noticed with much satisfaction, how without any anterior arrangement, England had gradually shown a tendency to cooperate with Russia. He instanced our (British) cooperation in Crete and in Macedonian Reforms, where he had observed that, even when Lord Lansdowne had wished to make a proposal which was not entirely in accord with Russian views, it had been done in such a way as to make the Russian Government feel that cooperation with them was desired. He furthered instanced the Algeciras Conference as evidence of our (Britain and Russia) working together.\(^3\) Discussions of this nature continued throughout 1906, and in

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\(^1\) E. D., Vol. IV, pp. 204-208.

\(^2\) Ibid., No. 208, p. 222.

\(^3\) Ibid., No. 212, p. 227.
August, 1907 the Anglo-Russian Convention was signed. This Convention settled all the outstanding differences between the two Powers in Afghanistan, Tibet and Persia.

The completion of the Anglo-Russian Convention meant that Britain had succeeded where Austria had failed. The failure of Austria and Russia to come together in the Quadruple Entente, as pointed out by Wedel, "was unquestionably due in part to the personality of the two men, Aehrenthal and Isvolsky". Nevertheless, Britain attempted to keep the two Powers together in spite of the fact that Austria had betrayed her. On August, 19, 1907 King Edward VII, who was accompanied by Hardinge, met the Emperor of Austria and Baron Aehrenthal at Ischl where they discussed British and Austrian relations. According to the report of Hardinge, Aehrenthal denied the fact that he had attempted to bring the four Powers together for the settlement of the Balkan question without the cooperation of Britain and Italy. Aehrenthal proceeded to state further "Great Britain's isolated action in withholding for several months her consent to the increase in Turkish customs duties had jeopardized the concert of the Powers, in Macedonia, and had had the appearance of a selfish policy dictated by the advantages to be obtained for English trade in the Near East." Similarly, Hardinge pointed out the unfriendly attitude assumed by Aehrenthal in this discussion with Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Vienna, on the Turkish 3 per cent increase in customs. Later Hardinge acquainted Aehrenthal with the views of Grey upon the actual situation in Macedonia, "dwelling upon the improvement which had been actually made in the Turkish administration of the provinces, but which had not achieved the restoration of order and

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tranquillity owing to the disastrous action of the bands of the various nationalities, and more particularly of the Greek bands, who endeavor to extend the area of settlement of their coreligionists in Macedonia by the expulsion and ruthless extermination of their rivals."¹ In addition to expressing his agreement with British views on the imperative necessity of at once putting an end to the activity of the bands, Aehrenthal stated that "he had already been considering the best means to the end and, in view of the terms of Article 3 of the Mürzsteg programme, which by its unfortunate wording, had encouraged the nationalities in Macedonia to believe that they could extend the scope of their national aspirations by the destruction of their rivals, he had decided to propose to the Russian Government that the two Governments should publicly announce their interpretation of this Article as implying the maintenance of the status quo at the date of the Agreement and as ignoring all changes introduced since that date through the activity of the various bands."² Aehrenthal wished to persevere in the course which he had proposed, "but if, as was probable, it appeared after short time that this announcement had failed to secure the desired result and to mitigate the activity of the bands, he would gladly accept Sir E. Grey's suggestion to make a determined and combined effort by the joint and simultaneous representations at Sophia, Belgrade and Athens."³

Immediately before the visit to Ischl, King Edward VII and Hardinge had visited the German Emperor and had had discussions with Bülow as well as the Emperor. In the course of these discussions Bülow said "that he

² Ibid.
³ Ibid., p. 211.
thought the (Grey's) proposal was a good one and that the German Government
would always support a policy which met with the general approval of the
Powers, and more particularly with that of Austria and Russia in the Balkans.\footnote{B. D., Vol. VI, No. 25, p. 44.}

Again, after a long delay, Grey had secured the consent of the
Powers to bring about reforms in Macedonia. Early in October the Governments
of Austria-Hungary and Russia addressed a Note to the cabinets of Athens,
Belgrade and Sofia on the subject of the interpretation to be placed on
Article 3 of the Mürzsteg programme. On December the 13, 1907 Grey, writing
to Goschen, British Ambassador to Austria, stated "instructions had been
sent to Sir Nicholas O'Conor to sign the Joint Note about Judicial Reforms
in Macedonia."\footnote{B. D., Vol. V, No. 173, p. 219.} Even though Grey understood that an advisor ought to have
been chosen who would have been of European nationality, he was willing for
Britain to give her consent to the Judicial Reform proposal. A few days
later Grey in a letter to O'Conor stated that "judicial reforms be now, as
I understand, settled, and there being nothing to do but to wait for the reply
of the Porte, which will no doubt be unsatisfactory. I shall not press for
coercive measures with regard to judicial reforms alone, seeing that they
will not cure the chief evils of Macedonia. Nor am I prepared, as regards
Macedonia, to resort to coercive measures without the consent of the other
Powers."\footnote{Ibid., No. 174, p. 220.} Grey was determined to bring the Macedonian question to a head
"by asking the Powers whether they would consent to press for executive con-
trol and increase the Gendarmerie." On the 21st of December, Grey again
informed O'Conor of the imperative necessity of increasing the Gendarmerie
and his intention of addressing a Circular Note to the Powers on the question.1

Though Grey was moved by a desire to better conditions in Turkey, Britain's apparent altruism is questionable. The British Government had refused to participate in the Bagdad Railway undertaking in 1903, not so much because it was not desirous of sharing in the possible profits of the undertaking, but in view of the fact that anti-German sentiment was too widespread in Britain.2 If Britain had participated in the construction of the railway, Grey's views, perhaps, would have more nearly approached those of Germany. O'Connor believed that the reforms in Macedonia would strengthen the hand of the liberal group in Turkey, and incidentally strengthen the British position, as this group was pro-British in sympathy. This point of view was gathered from the reports of O'Connor during these years.3 On the one hand O'Connor was attempting to prove to the Sultan that Britain was not interested in economic concessions, while on the other hand O'Connor was trying to persuade British capitalists to invest in the Bagdad Railway. Aehrenthal detected the inconsistency in British policy during the last months of 1907. In addition to being convinced that Britain was making trouble for him, Aehrenthal was encountering pressure from Berlin.4 Consequently, Aehrenthal, who had, in August, promised to cooperate with Britain in Macedonia, changed his mind in December. With this in mind, while Grey and O'Connor were discussing new plans to bring about judicial reforms, in January, 1908 Aehrenthal was securing the privilege from the Sultan for a

1B. D., Vol. V, No. 175, p. 220.


4Wiedel, op. cit., p. 50.
preliminary survey of the projected Sanjak Railway.

When the Trade for the preliminary survey of the projected Sanjak Railway was issued, on February 5, 1903, Russia was aroused to great indignation. The newspapers in Russia were filled with anti-Austrian propaganda. Isvolsky sought to discuss with Italy the matter of construction of a railway through Serbia. The Italians readily joined Russia in putting forth plans for such railway construction. Grey upon receiving the news of Austria's action stated "that Austria had played the mean game of driving a bargain with the Porte in favour of her railway scheme at the expense of Macedonian Reform." He added "it seems, now, that we are to be in the position of having all the odium at Constantinople of pressing reform, while other members of the concert curry favour with the Porte by obstructing them."¹

Discussion of reform continued throughout March, and in April preparations were made for a visit by the King to the Czar of Russia at Reval. Russia, having broken relations with Austria, in the meeting at Reval, June 10, 1903, came definitely into the British camp. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 developed into an Entente, in which the question of Macedonian reforms was one of the primary concerns. During the meeting at Reval the representatives of the Powers agreed upon reform proposals, but they were never executed because the Young Turk Revolution followed a few weeks later. As the Young Turk Revolution was an attempt on the part of the Turks to bring about reform from within, the long struggle for Turkish reform from without was brought to an end.

In the course of the Powers' struggle for the acceptance of the conditions for the 3% increase in customs duties and for the institution of

judicial reforms, without a doubt Britain played the leading role. Britain, having refused to participate in the Bagdad Railway in 1903, when she was asked to consent to an increase in customs duties, would not give the Sultan permission to increase the customs duties in 1905 unless she was assured that the funds from the increase in customs duties would be used to better conditions in Macedonia. By 1906 the financial conditions of the Turkish Empire were of such nature that the Sultan's demand for increase in customs duties became more urgent. Britain, who had stated the terms upon which she would consent to an increase in 1905, was determined in 1906 that all these conditions be carried out. Russia was the only Power to give Britain consistent support in insisting upon the conditions for acceptance of the 3% increase in customs duties. Though France and Italy gave moderate support, Austria and Germany definitely resented Britain's action. While Austria resented the idea of Britain taking the lead in the matter, Germany was hoping that the funds from the increase in customs duties would be used to further her railway interest in Turkey. After being assured that the funds from the increase in customs duties would be used to better the conditions in Macedonia, Britain along with the other Powers consented to the 3% increase in customs duties, in April, 1907.

Britain and Russian, having worked together in insisting upon conditions for an increase in customs duties, were brought closer together in their struggle for judicial reforms. After Isvolsky, in the latter part of 1906, made it known that Russia was in favor of judicial reforms, Austria made it known that she was not in favor of working with all the Powers in bringing about reforms. Austria's change in attitude at this time can best be attributed to the change in Austrian Foreign Ministers as well as Austria's greater assurance of Germany's support in the Balkans. Lehrenthal, the Austrian Foreign Minister who replaced Count Goluchowski in 1906, was
not able to work with Isvolsky, the new Russian Minister, in the Balkans. Austria's aggressive Balkan policy led her to detest the more or less disguised policy of Britain in Macedonia. Being assured of Germany's support and having lost faith in Britain's apparent altruism, Aehrenthal was led to secure from the Sultan the privilege for the construction of a railway through the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar. This move on the part of Austria made Russia, who had entered into the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, fall definitely in line with Britain. Thus the separation of Austria and Russia was complete and the Six Powers were divided into two hostile camps, with the exception of Italy who was yet supporting the Anglo-Russian Balkan plans.
CHAPTER IV

GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It will have been seen from the foregoing discussion that Macedonia, which was in 1903 under Turkish rule and was inhabited by nationals of the various surrounding Balkans States, was an apple of discord in Balkan as well as European politics. Each Balkan State, being supported in many instances by some European Power, attempted to increase its influence in Macedonia with the hope of acquiring the larger portion of that province when the division of the Turkish spoils took place. The two Balkan rivals, Austria and Russia, being the most interested in Balkan affairs, were recognized by the other Powers as having pre-eminence in maintaining peace in the Balkans. The Austro-Russian plans for maintaining peace in the Balkan Peninsula were set forth in the Austro-Russian Agreement of 1897, which indicated by its wording that the two Powers expected some disaster to upset Balkan peace.

When, in 1903, the Macedonian disturbances occurred Russia and Austria, having recognized pre-eminence, proceeded to outline reform proposals. The Vienna Scheme which was the first important series of proposals was designed to place ultimate control of reforms in the hands of Austria and Russia. As Italy was interested in the acquisition of Albania, the preponderance of Russia and Austria, which was recognized in the Vienna Scheme, made the Italians a bit uneasy. In Spite of Italian uneasiness, they accepted the reform proposals. Germany, on the other hand, was interested in obtaining aid for her Bagdad Railway plans; consequently the German Government
accepted the proposals very favorably. The German Government was of the opinion that immediate acceptance of the proposals would entice French and British capitalists to invest in the railway undertaking. Further, the German Government saw within the proposal a chance to strengthen its friendship with the Sultan from whom it expected to gain additional concessions for its Bagdad Railway undertaking. Though Britain accepted the scheme, she made a number of reservations. France’s eagerness to cooperate with her ally Russia, as well as Britain, led her to accept the proposals without hesitation. Italy was not alone in her protestation against the preponderance of Austria and Russia in the Balkans, for Bulgaria was quite suspicious of Austria’s and Russia’s reform proposals. Bulgaria’s dissatisfaction led her to foment an insurrection in the summer of 1903. The Macedonian insurrection in the year 1903 proved to the Powers that the Macedonian question had not been solved. Again, in October 1903, Russia and Austria took the lead in drafting a list of proposals which were known as the Mürsteg programme. The Mürsteg programme was quite an improvement upon the Vienna Scheme, but it did not by any means solve the reform problem in Macedonia. The failure of the Mürsteg programme brought to an end the preponderance of Austria and Russia in Macedonia.

The relations of the Powers to Macedonia were completely changed by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in the early part of 1904. The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, which was followed by Russian defeats, made it possible to secure peace in the Balkans and allowed Britain, France and Italy to rush in and play a more important part in controlling the affairs of Macedonia. As the Bulgarians looked to Russia for protection in case there was war in the Balkans, they were led to make peace with the Sultan. The Bulgarian Agreement with the Sultan made it possible for peace to be maintained in Macedonia. The fear that Austria would take advantage
of Russia's far Eastern preoccupation to enhance her prestige in the Balkans enabled Italy and Britain to secure the cooperation of France in checking Austria's advances in the Balkans. Since Britain was able to strengthen her position in regard to Macedonia, she was soon in a position to take the leading part in advocating reforms for Macedonia. Quite to the contrary during the years from 1904-5, Germany, who had once outwardly favored reforms, refused to cooperate with the Powers in pressing reforms. The primary reason for Germany's refusal to cooperate with the other Powers was that she wanted to maintain her friendship with the Sultan from whom she wanted to obtain additional concessions for her Turkish railway projects. Britain, having refused to participate in the Bagdad Railway project in 1903, was determined that Germany should not profit at the expense of reform in Macedonia.

During 1906 there was a change in Austria's Foreign Ministry. The change in the ministry, which effected a change in Austria's foreign policy, contributed much toward the breach between Austria and Russia over the Balkan issue. In the meantime, Austria was able to obtain a greater assurance of Germany's support for an aggressive Balkan policy. The aggressive Balkan policy of Austria together with Russian and British cooperation in the Balkans brought Russia much closer to Britain. In the latter part of 1907, when Austria became suspicious of Britain's apparent altruistic Balkan policy, she proceeded to make plans for her penetration of the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar. Austria's penetration of the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar brought Russia, who had entered into the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, definitely in line with Britain; thereby making for almost complete separation of the Powers into hostile camps of alliances.

It would be far too much to say that the Macedonian reform question was entirely responsible for the development of hostility between the
two groups of Powers. There were other problems which contributed to the separation of the Powers, such as the question of Morocco, the Bagdad Railway which was closely connected with the Macedonian question, naval rivalry, Alsace-Lorraine, and many other colonial and European differences. Without a doubt, however, the Macedonian reform question made its contribution, one which should not be overlooked in analyzing the causes of the World War.

In this connection it is quite important to remember that both Austria and Russia had definite Balkan interests. Russia's two closely related aims were to bring all the Balkan Slavs under her dominion and to gain control of Constantinople and the Straits. In order to bring all the Slavs under her dominion, Russia in the Treaty of San Stefano supported the idea of establishing a Big Bulgaria. Bulgaria as established by the Treaty of San Stefano included the larger portion of European Turkey. Russia's plans were defeated in the Congress of Berlin (1878), when Bulgaria was divided into two parts. As the spirit of nationalism became so intense in Bulgaria during the years following the Congress of Berlin, Russia became afraid that Bulgaria would dominate the Balkans without being submissive to her will; consequently Russia changed her policy of supporting a Big Bulgaria and solicited the friendship of the other Balkan Slavs. Russia hoped to use the Pan-Slav idea to check the Central European movement of Pan-Germanism. The Russian Pan-Slav movement was given new impetus by the assassination of the last Obrenovitch king, with which Russia was apparently connected. Along with Russia's program of Pan-Slavism was included the program to dominate Constantinople and the Straits. Since Russia's northern ports were frozen during the winter months it was quite important that Russia gain control of Constantinople and the Straits which provided an all year round outlet to the sea.
Austria, who was Russia's greatest Balkan rival, was interested in extending her influence into the Balkans in order to promote her trading interest through this section. Austria's trade could have been carried by the way of the Adriatic, but, as Austria was a Polyglot Empire, it was necessary for her to carry her trade through the Balkans. The Balkan trade, which went through Hungary, served as a strong commercial tie between Austria and Hungary. The vast amount of power which Hungary had acquired in the Dual Monarchy made it quite necessary that such a tie be maintained. The Hungarians resented the policy of carrying the trade by the way of the Adriatic through Slav territory because they were anxious to keep the Slavs poor.

Austria's and Russia's opposing Balkan interests, which were one of the principal underlying causes for complications in Macedonia, led straight to the War of 1914. The Tripolitan War and the Young Turkish Revolution offered the opportune time for the Balkan States to expel Turkey completely from Macedonia. Eleutherios Venizelos organized the Balkan League of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria, and successfully launched the First Balkan War. The Second Balkan War was occasioned by the Balkan States quarrelling among themselves over the spoils—European Turkey which included Macedonia. In order to maintain the commercial tie with Hungary after the expulsion of Turkey from Europe, it was necessary for the Austrians to send their trade through Serbia. The Serbs, partially as a result of the change in dynasties in 1903, had become strong supporters of Russia. Furthermore Serbia, having grown in size and having increased its population as a result of the Balkan War, was more hostile toward Austria and was in a better position to resist Austria's encroachments. In this manner the Balkan Wars, which were primarily concerned with Macedonia, added to the hostility of the
dispute between Serbia and Austria and served as a prelude to the Sarajevo assassination of 1914.

The European hostility to which the Macedonian question had contributed much made it difficult to settle the issues arising from the Sarajevo assassination. In those respects the Macedonian question contributed much to both the immediate and underlying causes of the World War. This is the true measure of Macedonia's importance in pre-war politics.
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