DIPLOMACY THROUGH PROXIES?
THE SUPERPOWERS' INVOLVEMENT
IN ANGOLA

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ABSTRACT

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DIPLOMACY THROUGH PROXIES? THE SUPERPOWERS'
IN Volvement IN ANGOLA

Chairperson: Professor Ku-Ntima Makidi
Thesis dated: December 1989

This research is an attempt to introduce and operationalize a new concept of proxy diplomacy by exploring how some nations, in this fast changing world, are evolving some effective ways of enhancing their interests and foreign policy objectives in areas in which they do not have vital interests, but which are worth intervening in. To do this, the researcher established Angola as the theatre of the practice of proxy diplomacy, and the United States, the Soviet Union, South Africa and Cuba as actors. It is further established that the United States and the Soviet Union actually practice proxy diplomacy by deputizing South Africa and Cuba, respectively, to enhance their interests in Angola.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Some people have said that some things should not have been. Reflecting on this, I wonder whether this thesis is one of those things. From 1986 (when this thesis was formally completed) to the present, its resilience is a classic testimony of human endurance, perseverance and self-determination to overwhelm frustrations, discouragements and disappointments.

Notwithstanding, there are people to whom I will forever remain indebted for their immeasurable, invaluable and generous ways - financial, moral, intellectual and physical. Although it is difficult to mention them all by name, it would be most ungrateful not to mention Professors Mack Jones, Makidi Ku-Ntima, Hashim Gibrill, and John Baker for their intellectual contributions. Also, I would like to thank Judy Marcouiller, whose dedication made this final product possible after the original draft was charred in a fire. Lastly, but not least, I thank my beloved family, who not only supported me materially, but inspired me, cared for me, sacrificed, nurtured, urged, encouraged, and always reminded me that every worthy effort or cause has a reward and that a man's pursuit of knowledge, truth and justice knows no bounds.
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<td>NATO</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

This research examines the increasing incidence of proxy diplomacy in international relations. To do so, the researcher tries to show how some nations are using other nations to achieve their own foreign policy objectives. To this end, the researcher places particular emphasis on the use of proxy diplomacy by the United States and the Soviet Union in Angola.

Literature Review

The literature on proxy diplomacy is scanty. The amount of research that has been done on the subject is even smaller in the case of Angola. However, the researcher first attempted a review and a critique of the existing literature on proxy relations in international relations, in an effort to refine the major theoretical currents on the issue. Secondly, the researcher reviewed the methodologies used in these previous works. Thirdly, the findings of these studies were scrutinized to reveal their consistency to the methodology and their empirical validity. And fourth, the researcher looked at their
significance and contributions to the understanding of the field of study.

In addition, the research explored two other bodies of literature — on the instruments of foreign policy; and on the types of diplomacy. For reasons of consistency, these bodies of literature were not considered as "islands." These are just a few areas of concern in this exercise of reviewing the relevant literature, but in their entirety, they spotlight the crucial areas of this research.

(1) **On Proxy:**

The concept "proxy" suffers from a cloud of simplistic emotionalism which obscures some salient facts essential to developing a genuinely rational scholastic approach to a phenomenon which is rapidly developing in international relations — proxy diplomacy. This point is illustrated particularly in the discussions on Cuba's role in the Third World.

There are three distinct viewpoints in the debate over whether Cuba is a proxy of the Soviet Union. The first camp is composed of the supporters of the proxy thesis, who argue that Cuba is "a helpless pawn of the Russian bear supplying stock troops to advance Soviet imperial design."

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This position has been subscribed to by Henry Kissinger, Z. Bresinski, Alexander Haig, Chester Crocker, and other strong opponents of Cuban revolution. Supporters of this thesis argue that:

Cuban troops in Africa assisted the Soviets in achieving their ambitions in Africa. In so doing they have helped the Soviets to advance toward the larger revolutionary and ideological goals of communism.... In recent years, Africa has become a high priority 'target of opportunity' as conditions there invited Soviet attention, whetted their appetite for expanding Soviet influence, and created expectations of strategic and political gains. Acting on Russia's behalf, the Cubans have been able to act as 'point men' in stimulating revolutionary forces already active in Africa. They have also been able to deflect some of the criticism directed at Moscow by the U.S. and its Western European allies....

These proponents emphasize Cuba's dependence on Soviet economic assistance as a reason for Cuba's surrogate position. Richard B. Foster, in his contribution, says that the Angolan Civil War was "decided by the open and direct infusion of Soviet war material manned by the proxy army of Cubans." Foster does not explain the nature of this relationship although he goes further to mention that the Carter Administration had "promulgated an African version of the Nixon Doctrine" to fill the "power vacuum" created by withdrawing colonial imperial powers in Southern Africa.

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The fact of the matter is that Foster's proposition misses two aspects. First, he assumes that proxy diplomacy is an exclusive Soviet practice, and secondly, he does not put into consideration the fact that the "Nixon Doctrine" was not Africanized during Carter's presidency, but during the Ford/Kissinger time, as will be seen later.

Another proponent of this thesis is Joseph Whelan, who sees Cuba as "an instrument of Soviet policy" in the Third World and that the presence of the Cubans in the Third World has enhanced "Soviet political influence." Whelan accepts the fact that Cuba has its own objectives and uses Soviet dependence on her "to achieve her goals regionally and internationally." Nevertheless, Whelan sees this relationship as being "uneven" and more that of "patron/client" because "Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union is so complete that Castro's regime could not pursue an aggressive Third World policy without Soviet support." In fact, Whelan says the "Soviets have effectively used Cuban troops... to conceal involvement, in pursuit of their Third World goals." Whelan, however, fails to acknowledge the element of *quid pro quo* involved in this relationship in that the Soviets will find it extremely difficult to exercise their "political influence" in any part of the Third World without the Cuban input.

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Another subscriber to this thesis is Richard E. Bissell, who refers to Cuba as a proxy of the Soviet Union. But his inference is contradictory because he subsequently modifies it when he accepts the fact that both parties committed resources in their involvements.\(^5\)

Dennis Chaplin, like other adherents of this thesis, sees Cuba as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.\(^6\) Chaplin's reason for Soviet use of Cubans as "deputies to carry out the dirty work" will be reviewed in a latter part of this research. Vernon V. Aspaturian bluntly points out that the 40,000 Cuban troops in Angola were organized, equipped and transported by the Soviet Union.\(^7\) This position completely rules out Cuba's own initiative and interests. In general, this camp sees Cuba as having marched into Angola on Moscow's orders.

The second camp subscribes to the thesis that Cuba's actions in the Third World, and particularly in Angola, were undertaken solely on her own initiative. This camp sees Cuba as carrying out her own ambitions, which are seen as being quite different from those of the Soviet Union.


In their substantiations most subscribers to this thesis end up pointing out Cuba as being an opportunist. They see Castro as capitalizing on cultural and ethnic ties binding Africa and Cuba to enhance his ambitions in Africa. They also see these African successes as boosting Castro's stature in the Non-aligned Movement. They contend further that these exploits in Africa have, in fact, benefited Cuba at home, in terms of increased Soviet military and economic assistance. Thus Castro's opportunism extends to the level where he uses his exploits in Africa to increase the flow of assistance from Moscow. However, no reason is given why Havana should be handsomely rewarded by Moscow.

Refuting Ramon L. Bonachea's view that Cubans are "mercenaries of the Russian social imperialists," George Volsky's view that Castro was "pursued to dispatch troops to Angola by the Kremlin" by cultural and racial reasons, and Edward Gonzalez's view that Cuba responded to Soviet pressure to dispatch troops to Angola, Nelson Valdes says these views overlook Cuba's interests, in enhancing the principle of international solidarity and support of national liberation movements fighting against imperialism.8

Martin Weinstein argues that "to see Cubans as pawns or mercenaries of the Russians is to deny this history of

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Cuban solidarity and sacrifice in various areas of the world." Weinstein argues further that Moscow did not give "...Havana its marching orders, even though Russia obviously approved of the activity and supplied the Cubans with their heavy arms and equipment." This argument, like others in the same vein, hinges on locating the source of decision-making. Whoever makes the decision is the master of the events and other actors have to dance to the tune of the master. Wolf Grabendorff also shares this view when he says:

It would be very difficult to prove Cuba actually acts as a proxy for the Soviet Union in Africa. On the contrary, there are several indications that, at least in the case of Angola, it was Cuba which urged the Soviet Union to act instead of vice versa.

Grabendorff's position is that "the often quoted 'proxy theory' can hardly be corroborated given the multifaceted nature of Cuban-Soviet relations," and that it was the U.S. administration which developed this theory as a critique of Cuba which "had to be interpreted as being directed by the Soviet Union." To explain why the Soviet Union was not prepared to use Cuba to "pull chestnuts out

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9 Weinstein, Revolutionary Cuba in the World Arena, p. 4.
10 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 18
of the fire" in Angola, Grabendorff argues that this would
have hardly served the Soviets' desire to "pursue a policy
of detente." He further argues that the idea may have been
tempting "for logistical reasons."

One of the strongest proponents of this thesis,
Gabriel Garcia Marquez, contends that, contrary to the
numerous assertions, Cuban intervention in Angola "was a
sovereign and independent act by Cuba, the Soviet Union was
informed not before, but after the decision had been
made."\textsuperscript{13}

Another subscriber to this thesis, Abraham F.
Lowenthal, sees Cuba's Angolan foreign policy as based on
"consistent, hard-headed and realistic calculations of
(her) national interests."\textsuperscript{14}

Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert Harkavy contend that
the sending of troops, volunteers and training personnel
abroad by some less developed countries is "sometimes uti-
лизed on behalf of a major power" although "in other cases
less developed countries' interests and purposes may be
central."\textsuperscript{15} Kolodziej and Harkavy argue that this case

\textsuperscript{13}G.G. Marquez, "Operation Carlotta," New Left

\textsuperscript{14}Abraham F. Lowenthal "Why Cuba is in Angola (and
What's Next?)," in Weinstein, Revolutionary Cuba in the

\textsuperscript{15}Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert Harkavy, "Developing
States and International Security Systems," in John
Stremlau, (ed.), The Foreign Policy Priorities of Third
differs from earlier British use of Gurka and Fijian troops to combat colonial insurgencies, and France's use of Arab and African colonial troops against Germany, in that the Cubans are "perceived as acting somewhat under their own impetus and as animated by their own designs."

Kenneth L. Adelman, after claiming that the huge Soviet Union exploits a neat convergence of interests in Africa with tiny Cuba which is motivated by old-fashioned Marxist missionary zeal and that "Cuba poses as the adoring and faithful ally any great power would cherish," backs off from the "first camp" assertion and adds:

This is not to say, however, that Cuba conceded to the cannon fodder of Communist power in Africa. They have not. Nor can they be dismissed as 'mere mercenaries' in that term's normal derogatory definition: a hired hand with a pistol.  

He dismisses the use of the term "mercenary" on the grounds that Cuba had her own strong reasons for her involvement.

David Ronfeldt, in contending that Cuba is not a puppet or a pawn of the Soviet Union opines that "Cuba has a special status in its relations with the USSR and hence more independence than other Soviet clients and allies."

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17 Ibid., p. 41. Nonetheless, Adelman's subsequent analysis automatically grants him membership into the first camp.

Ronfelt's contention brings us to the third camp, which subscribes to the thesis that Cuba is not a pawn, a mercenary, a surrogate, or a proxy of the Soviet Union. It is, in fact, a partner. Jiri Valenta argues that Cuba is neither "a surrogate of the USSR, simply implementing Soviet orders," nor is it "a totally unconstrained, autonomous actor." 19 For Valenta, the claim that Cuba is subservient to the Soviet Union is unsophisticated and obscures the fact that there exists mutual constraints and leverage in the Cuban-Soviet alliance.

More precisely, Valenta sees Cuba's role in Ethiopia as that of a proxy while in Angola it is not, because this role was not subordinate and "during the original stage of this operation, the Cubans temporarily functioned as an autonomous actor." 20 Thus, Valenta concludes, "it would be misleading to view Cuban policy on Angola as subservient to Soviet policy" for the reason that "the Cubans were not ordered into the war by the Soviets." 21 On the other hand, Cuba should not be seen as the main actor, since she depended on the Soviets for logistics, politico-strategic cover, and economic and military assistance. 22

19 Ibid., p. 141.
20 Ibid., p. 144.
22 Ibid.
Nonetheless, Valenta points out that Cuba and the Soviet Union were, in fact, allies. Although he marshalled enough evidence to support Domínguez's claim that there existed a "mutual dependence" in the relationship even though the Soviet plays a dominant role, he greatly compromises this position by accepting the notion that

...the Soviet Union exercises great influence upon Cuban foreign policy in general, and Cuban policy in Africa in particular, with Cuba enjoying only a small degree of relative autonomy...23

Basically, Jorge Domínguez's argument is that there exists an asymmetric relationship between these two partners, whereby Moscow is plainly the dominant power. However, there is a "mutual dependence" in this relationship which has allowed Havana to formulate her own foreign policy.24

One of the few works which makes a serious attempt in defining the concept under study is that of Cole Blasier, who distinguishes "proxy" from "surrogate," the former meaning an agent authorized to act for another while the latter refers to a substitute. According to this author, confusion still lingers as to the nature of this relationship. Clarifying this confusion, he says it is wrong to label Castro as a Soviet Satellite or pawn as Cuba can be more "accurately described as partner to the USSR, than

23Mesa-Lago and Belkin, Cuba in Africa, p. 141.

pawn, surrogate or proxy."\(^{25}\)

Whereas Blasier attempted to define the concept, William Leo Grande sought to explain the nature of the relationship when he stated that Cuban policies developed independently "despite their compatibility and increasing coordination with the Soviet policies" and hence "they were different both in concept and application."\(^{26}\) On this basis, Leo Grande says "Cuba is not a Soviet proxy in Africa," the "two are partners." He adds further that although this "partnership is asymmetrical, it is reciprocal nonetheless." Such cooperation permits each partner the opportunity "to obtain policy objectives which neither could attain if acting alone."\(^{27}\)

Elsewhere Leo Grande stresses that:

The internal dynamics of such a partnership tend to impel it toward even closer cooperation. So long as joint ventures are successful, each partner has an incentive to perpetuate and extend the partnership by reducing areas of policy conflict, which enables each partner to exercise some influence over the policies of the other. (e.g. in Angola and Ethiopia). . . . However, the prospects for joint ventures are limited by the degree of congruence between the policies of the two partners. Thus far, the partnership has also been limited in scope by the reactive character of the two major interventions (in Angola and Ethiopia). . . .\(^{28}\)

\(^{25}\) Cole Blasier, "Consequences of Military Initiatives" in Mesa Lago and Belkin, Cuba in Africa, p. 53.


\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) Ibid.
Arguing along the same line, William Cooper opines that,

    Whether Cuba has been a surrogate for the Soviet Union is debatable. The most important point to be made here is that Cuba...has served the purposes of both Cuba and Soviet Union in a convergence of interests. 29

After presenting both sides of the debate, Cooper concludes that:

    Cuba is not a surrogate of Moscow's foreign policy, but additionally a competent partner: the partnership involves the Soviets providing military equipment and Cubans providing troops. 30

Michael Dixon, although he points out Cuba as a proxy or surrogate of Soviet policy in Angola, agrees that the relationship between these two is "more complex" because Cuba's dependence on "Soviet sponsorship" enables her to operate "within limits that coincide with Soviet interest" in Angola. 31 He contends further that "the two countries have similar policies" even if sometimes they pursue objectives which are different from each other's."

It is perhaps appropriate at this juncture to focus the discussion on the above described camps. Although some of the inherent and glaring weaknesses in the works


presented have been pointed out, there is more to be said.

The first camp's use of the concepts proxy, pawn, mercenary and surrogate suffers from ideological biases, and its perjorative use of the term proxy has definitely compromised its empirical utility. Further, this camp does not offer a definition of the concept, and this further compromises its position.

The gene of this camp's position arises from its proponents' fondness for distorting the Third World realities by viewing them in an East-West context. Definitely, it is fallacious to view Cuba's involvement in the Third World in terms of East-West confrontation, as it borders on the thinly veiled argument that small powers in the international system have no national goals, interests, or objectives to pursue, and that whenever they pursue a goal, an interest, or an objective, they are serving a greater power. Surprisingly, this argument only applies to those small powers which are socialist or have closer links with the Soviet Union. Israel, South Africa, Iran (during the Shah's time), and such other nations are never seen in the same light as Cuba, North Korea, Czechoslovakia and East Germany whose involvements have been interpreted as serving the interests of the Soviet Union.

From the tone of their writings, these authors do not seriously expect their readers to heed their views. They claim that Havana was ordered by Moscow to get involved in Angola, without proving how it was done. In short, they do
not provide persuasive testimony to support their theory. Thus, works in their camp lack empirical validity since they are oblivious in discussing South Africa's role in Angola in the same vein as Cuba's. In fact, if we use their criteria, South Africa will congruently qualify as a proxy, mercenary, surrogate or pawn of the U.S.

As a result of these glaring shortcomings, this camp makes very little, if any, contribution to this field of study. Its nemesis is abstractness and arbitrary usage of concepts.

Scholars in the second camp, in indulging in the exercise of defending Cuba as an independent actor, arrive at the conclusion that Cuba made an independent decision as she was enhancing her own interests without defining their concepts. Thus, the end result of their position is the unconvincing proposition that the proxy relationship is defined in terms of decision-making. As hinted earlier on, the contention that Havana did not march into Angola on Moscow's orders since the decision to intervene was made in Havana, is not sustainable because the overall relationship does not depend on decision-making in Havana, Moscow or wherever.

"Consistent, hard-headed and realistic calculations of (her) national interest," as Lowenthal puts it, do not preclude the existence or development of a proxy relationship. Some would even argue that this, in fact, serves as the basis. Grabendorff's fear that if the Soviet Union could
have used Cuba as a proxy, this would have jeopardized its "policy of detente," is also contestable on the grounds that the Soviet Union would rather use Cuba so as to hide her direct involvement, since direct involvement would seriously impinge on the policy of detente.

Valdes' and Weinstein's view that Cuba had her own interests and was merely fulfilling these interests is contestable on the grounds that in carrying out her own interests, the chance or possibility of fulfilling the interests of another party is not ruled out. Secondly, this does not rule out the fact that another party can or might have interest similar to hers.

Similarly, Ronfelt's argument, according to which Cuba and the Soviet Union have a special relationship does not rule out proxy relationship, and is thus, inadequate.

Thus, this camp's method of proving that Moscow did not give Havana orders to march into Angola by providing evidence alluding to Havana's self-interest and independent decision-making is not adequate or convincing enough to substantiate their thesis. By over-emphasizing the decision-making and self-interest argument, they overlook other factors which might have been equally crucial in determining whether or not there is a proxy relationship. Such spurious or conditional factors will be reviewed in depth in the subsequent chapter.

32This camp's overindulgence in the defense of Cuba is done at the expense of identifying U.S. and South African involvement in Angola.
On these grounds, it is not objectionable to dismiss this camp's methodology which appears inadequate to the task of unearthing enough evidence to support its findings and conclusions. Hence, these findings have no empirical validity and cannot be applauded as being significant or a major contribution to the understanding of the field of study.

Of the three camps, only the third one attempts a serious definition of the concepts and the relationship existing between the two actors. As seen earlier on, a concerted effort was made by Blasier to define and distinguish the differences between the terms proxy and surrogate, while Leo Grande tried to explain the nature of the relationship.

However, as we shall see later, there exists little or no major difference between the terms proxy and surrogate; in fact, in many cases they have been used interchangeably or to define each other. Even after defining them and resorting to the term partner rather than proxy or surrogate, Blasier's new-found term is problematic since the partnership is asymmetrical and calls for a lot of skepticism.

Before defining the nature of the partnership, Leo Grande accepts the asymmetrical nature of this partnership but his usage of the term partner instead of proxy suffers from the second camp's self-interested rationalization. He contends that Cuba is not a proxy of the Soviet Union.
Notwithstanding their independent evolution, the Cuban and Soviet policies became increasingly compatible and coordinated over time in their application, so that by 1976 it was becoming increasingly hard to distinguish them.

Leo Grande, like Valenta, argues that Cuba's involvement in Angola was independent of the Soviet Union's because she preceded Moscow and functioned in the initial stages as an autonomous actor and did not play a subordinate role as she did in Ethiopia. This argument provides us with three points as referents to be tested. A casual glance at these referents reveals that they cannot withstand a test.

First, as pointed out earlier, this relationship cannot be determined on decision-making and self-interest alone. Second, if we consider Cuba's intervention as determined by Moscow's decision, preceding Moscow's decision, autonomous from Moscow's decision, or not subordinate to Moscow's decision, then it will be very hard to prove that Moscow made or did not make the decision. History has now proved that Moscow preceded Havana in Angola and that by 1976, Cuba's involvement was no longer autonomous. The last point of subordination is sustainable only to a certain point in history.

Notwithstanding these flaws, Blasier's and Leo Grande's works are important in that they provide a point of departure for improving our understanding of the frameworks involved. Compared to other works, these have at
least a basis for building their arguments and this helps a great deal in understanding the significance of the proxy concept in international relationships. Although other members of this camp make little or no effort in engaging in the same exercise as Blasier and Leo Grande, they mainly see Cuban-Soviet relationships in the same vein - a partnership.

Nevertheless, Blasier and Leo Grande aside, their contribution to the understanding of proxy relationship in international relations is negligible. By not defining their concepts adequately, they also fall into the same abyss of confusion as the proponents of the other camps.

On the whole, two distinct features are discernible from all these studies: they are either overtly emotional or nervous when applying the concept of proxy in their analysis. Because of this, little is expected of them in terms of analyzing the nature and dynamics of proxy diplomacy, particularly in the Angolan context.

(2) On Instruments of Foreign Policy:

There is a wide variety of instruments, tangible and intangible, which may be employed to enhance a nation's interests, convey its hopes, wishes, or threats to other nations. The intangible instruments are:

(a) Diplomatic bargaining, which is used primarily, according to K. J. Holsti,
...to reach agreements, compromises and settlements where government objectives conflict. It involves, whether in private meetings or publicized conferences, the attempt to change the policies, actions, objectives and attitudes of other governments and their diplomats by persuasion, offering rewards, exchanging concessions, or making threats.

(b) Propaganda, which is a systematic and deliberately planned and organized dissemination of information by governments "to influence the attitudes, and behaviors of foreign populations, or of specific ethnic, class, religious, economic, or language groups within those populations," in order to alter and control their opinions, ideas, values and actions in a certain way.

The tangible instruments are mainly economic and military in nature.

(a) Economic policies are a viable instrument of foreign policy when they are used to influence the political behavior of another country by manipulating them in ways which bring about a desired political result in the target country. According to Holsti, there are specific techniques that can be used to reward or punish a target country, and these mainly constitute various controls over the flow of goods between countries: tariffs, quotas, boycotts and embargoes. Loans, credits, and currency

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manipulation can be used for rewards as well. 35

When, on various occasions, foreign aid, an important foreign policy instrument for centuries, has carried an economic tinge, it has been christened pound diplomacy, dollar diplomacy, franc diplomacy or ruble diplomacy. 36 Such aid is usually in the form of grants, commodity import programs or development loans.

(b) The military, as a major instrument of foreign policy takes various forms. It might be through intervention, the sending of large quantities of troops and arms "either to stabilize a regime against rebels, or to help rebels overthrow an established set of authorities..." 37 or it might take over forms such as demonstrations of force, which threaten to use force with the aim of either hindering or helping a rebellion in the target country, subversion 38 or guerilla warfare. Other forms of intervention are diplo-


37Holsti, International Politics, p. 244-271. See also Cohen, Realpolitik Theory and Practice, p. 59; and Wendzel, International Relations, pp. 137-151.

matic interference in the internal affairs, and clandestine political action,\textsuperscript{39} which involves offering bribes, infiltrating foreign voluntary organizations and trade unions, sponsoring strikes and riots, creating political scandals, attempting coup d'etats, or organizing, training and arming dissidents to conduct subversive or guerilla warfare.

While a nation has a choice of any of these instruments, all of them can be applied to achieve its objectives or goals. But this is dependent on calculations of costs. According to Ira Cohen, budgetary limitations, to some extent, "will dictate which methods may be used."\textsuperscript{40} While "at other times, choices will be limited by the political situation" nationally and internationally.

(3) \textbf{Types of Diplomacy}

The evolution of diplomacy has been dependent on technological, socio-economic and political changes (for example, ideologies such as Nazism, Fascism, Capitalism, Communism, et cetera) in the international community, the development of nuclear warfare capabilities, unprecedented growth in the number of international actors, threats posed to the sanctity, integrity and independence of the nation, state, et cetera.

\textsuperscript{39}See also Herbert K. Tilema, \textit{Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention In The Era of Containment}. (New York: Crowell, 1973) for a detailed discussion of covert and clandestine political operations.

\textsuperscript{40}Cohen, \textit{Realpolitik-Theory and Practice}, p. 56.
As a result of these changes in the international system, the types of diplomatic practices have also adapted. Although Morgenthau feels that diplomacy since the end of World War Two "has lost its vitality and its functions have withered away to an extent without precedent in the history of the modern state system," G. A. Craig and A. L. George feel diplomacy has remained more or less an instrument for protecting and advancing national interests, and more than that it is to the great powers a weapon in the unremitting antagonism between the East and the West. Craig's and George's view is also echoed by Stephen D. Kertesz, who claims that "only the instruments of diplomacy, properly understood and carefully used, can protect mankind against devastating wars."

However, several types of diplomacy have emerged in consonance with the changing international system. Classical or traditional diplomacy, which operated among few political units, was carried out mainly through set procedures of bilateral negotiations and through agents. Holsti says that as a result of economic, scientific and technological development, this bilateral diplomacy first

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42Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, p. 87.

gave way to multilateral diplomacy, which was practiced in multilateral conferences. Today, multilateral diplomacy is institutionalized in the U.N. and in its specialized agencies, and also occurs constantly in thousands of ad hoc conferences and less formal meetings between diplomats or government officials.

But this does not mean that traditional bilateral diplomacy has disappeared. In fact, it is now supplemented, although in some degree replaced

...by personal diplomacy by foreign ministers, by summit diplomacy in which heads of governments meet, by conference diplomacy in which issues are discussed multilaterally, and by what may be called parliamentary diplomacy through public debates in U.N. or regional assemblies.

S. D. Kertesz distinguishes parliamentary diplomacy from diplomacy of parliamentarians, which he says appear in some international assemblies, for example, the consultative assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the Nordic Council, et cetera.

Kertesz enumerates other forms of diplomacy, namely, consultative diplomacy of permanent collective bodies, for example NATO; cultural diplomacy, which takes place through informational activities but in another word commonly

44 Holsti, International Politics, p. 185.


46 Kertesz, The Quest For Peace, p. 6.
called propaganda; and economic diplomacy, which is practiced through economic activities, such as aid, investments and trade agreements, but christened, as we saw earlier on, dollar diplomacy, pound diplomacy, yen diplomacy, ruble diplomacy, naira diplomacy, et cetera.

Alliance diplomacy has been in use since 1815, and it ensures the maintenance of the balance of power in a polarized international system, so as to secure the response and independence of the various powers and prevent the invasion of one by another. Contemporary examples of alliance diplomacy are seen in the NATO and Warsaw Pact Arrangements. 47

Regional diplomacy involves complex efforts of a nation using various forms of aid to strengthen regional powers which will then ensure the protection of her interests. Such regional allies are also prepared to ensure peace and stability in the region. Regional diplomacy is also noticeable in regional economic or military arrangements like the former East African Community; Francophone bloc countries' arrangements under the tutelage of France; South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), et cetera.

Coercive diplomacy "relies upon the threat of inflicting harm to convince an opponent to revise his/her calculations and agree to a virtually acceptable termination of a

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dispute."\textsuperscript{48} It simply "seeks to persuade the opponent to do something, instead of bludgeoning him into doing it, or physically preventing him from doing it."\textsuperscript{49} Specific examples are the 1962 Cuban missile crisis when J.F. Kennedy threatened to use force and U.S. physical threats to Libya.

Other forms of diplomacy are shuttle diplomacy and gunboat diplomacy. Since the purpose of diplomacy "is to assist in the achievement of goals," P. A. Reynolds opines that "the method (type) used for the conduct of diplomacy is often not a matter of free choice, but the method chosen will affect the results achieved."\textsuperscript{50} In other words, the type of diplomacy employed in any situation is determined by the nature and importance of the situation.

Methodology

The method employed for gathering the required information primarily involved a survey of the available literature on Angola, Cuban-Soviet relations, South African-U.S. relations and the involvement of these countries in Angola. This involved a critical analysis of the relevant information in sources such as textbooks, newspaper articles, journals, and magazines.

The information extracted from these sources helped to

\textsuperscript{48}Craig and George, \textit{Force and Statecraft}, p. 189.

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50}Reynolds, \textit{An Introduction to International Relations}, p. 126.
refine the conceptual constructs of proxy diplomacy and its practice in international relations; to identify the significance and importance of Angola in Southern Africa and the vested interests that external actors have in the region; the relationship between South Africa and the U.S., and Cuba and the Soviet Union; the policies of these powers towards Angola; and their involvement in Angola.

Thus, the research applied the methodology of categorizing, collecting, analyzing and communicating evidence ferreted out of these sources. These efforts were aimed at testing the hypotheses that the superpowers were using proxies in their involvement in Angola, and that South Africa and Cuba were acting as proxies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, respectively, in Angola.

Having identified the information necessary for testing our hypotheses, the next task involved identifying the technique(s) used in ferreting out the required information. Since the existing literature is the core source of the information, critical analysis of this literature's content is the basic tool used. After the information had been analyzed according to the categories in which it fell, deductive and inductive reasonings were used to arrive at the findings and conclusion(s).

Variables tested in this research included: proxy diplomacy, which is a dependent variable whose occurrence depends on many other variables which are economic, military, strategic and ideological; declared interest of the
powers acting as proxies (A); past experiences; and prestige of power (B).

In this case, special relations existing between A and B in the economic, military, strategic and ideological spheres were established. Secondly, A's declared interest or vested interests in a third situation are also established. Thirdly, past experiences which might have been damaging to B's prestige and resources, were also established so as to enhance the position that B needs A in the third area to cater for her interests. A thorough and far-searching discussion of these variables is the object of the subsequent chapter.

Significance of the Research

This research is definitely a major contribution to the study of international relations, particularly in this era when nations have improved their military capabilities and other instruments of attaining their foreign policy objectives. As interactions between international actors increase, the more conscious nations become of safeguarding or enhancing their interests.

How to safeguard or enhance these interests at minimum costs determines the types of instruments and diplomacy used. Consequently, some nations have increasingly come to depend on other nations for fulfillment of their foreign policy objectives and, thus, to camouflage their vested interests and intentions.

Thus, this research's major contribution arises from
the fact that it is devoted to introducing a new type of diplomacy in international relations by operationalizing the concept of proxy diplomacy, which is becoming increasingly significant in international relations.

On the whole, the research makes a concerted effort in conceptualizing and operationalizing proxy diplomacy.

**Limitations of the Research**

Despite the fact that this research immensely benefited from secondary sources of information easily accessible in libraries, the efforts of gathering information from primary sources were, to a very significant extent, hampered. First, there was the problem of getting first-hand information and views on various issues, particularly on Cuban and Soviet involvement, from the Angolan Permanent Representation at the United Nations.

Surprisingly, some of the information the researcher was denied by the Angolan Permanent Representation at the United Nations was easily obtained from other sources, like the Library of Congress. The researcher could not understand why the Representation refused or was reluctant to release such information when it was replete in libraries. Our main intention was to cross-check some of the facts or dates, but since the Angolan Representation proved to be uncooperative, we could not use the information at hand with authority.

The second problem arose from the fact that some of the vital information, particularly in the initial days of
the Civil War, is written in Portuguese and since the researcher has no knowledge of Portuguese, this reservoir remained untapped.
CHAPTER TWO

PROXY DIPLOMACY

As we have seen, proxy is a concept which has been widely used, but generally ill-defined or never defined. Our definition of this concept starts from the premise that there is

...no essentially correct definition of a concept; there is no logical limit to the choice of what may be included in the class of empirical referents which serve to define a concept... Concepts come to have imprecise meanings which are widely understood and accepted....

However, the definition of a concept outside of these "imprecise meanings" limits not only its applicability, but also creates confusion.

It is this lack of a "precise meaning" to the term proxy, when operationalized to apply in international relations, which has led to wide misunderstandings and created confusion among scholars and observers. It has become a rule and a point of argument among radical or progressive scholars not to use the term proxy when

discussing Cuba's involvement in Africa. They find it dis-
tasteful and unsemantic. But these same scholars have
found it much easier to apply the term in regard to such
situations like Israel and South Africa in the Middle East
and Southern Africa respectively. On the other hand,
liberal and conservative scholars find it appropriate to
use the term in regard to Cuba and Syria, but not to South
Africa nor Israel.

Thus used, the term is not an analytical or a descrip-
tive concept but a mere accusation based on a limited con-
ception of reality. Used as such, it is a reduction of the
whole range of understanding of the reality, and the inten-
tions and interests of the parties. Used in this crude and
narrow sense, its real meaning is concealed as it attains a
bigotry interpretation. It is quite obvious that this con-
cept has attained this use partly because of the strength
of a phalanx of the Western news media, policy makers and
mainstream scholars who are hostile and allergic to revolu-
tionary change, communism (socialism) and the Soviet Union.

In the absence of an agreed definition as the basis of
debate, the users of the concept, particularly in relation
to Cuba, seem to be trying to borrow the respectability
that the concept proxy carries without meeting the obliga-
tions of being a proxy. Those who oppose its use find it
strange and contradictory to use this term in relation to
Cuba. Thus the debate goes nowhere and does not even
assume the characteristics of a debate, since no
definitions or points (referents) are examined for validity. In short, the discussion does not proceed beyond assertions.

The concept proxy seems to have been coined in international relations derogatorily. For example, the American officials and news media, interpreted all Cuban activities as being carried on orders and on behalf of the Soviet Union. Thus, they gave Cuba the names of a Soviet "puppet," "pawn," "satellite" or "surrogate." 2 Their opponents, on the other hand, have not bothered to use it euphemistically.

It would take us too far afield to explore in depth the significance or roots of this concept, and its relation to international relations. Suffice it to say, for our purpose, that its use and development over time can be summarized as follows: Proxy, short for procuration (Latin) or procureur (French), was used in the Roman times to mean one who maintained or defended an action on behalf of another, thus performing functions similar to those of a modern time attorney. In the period through the Middle Ages, the term was used to describe various officials who performed functions on behalf of their rulers or kingdoms. Sometimes it was even applied to a regent acting for a king.

during his absence. In recent times, the term has come to mean one who acts for another. That is a manager, steward, agent, deputy or substitute, who exercises a general discretion throughout the matter in hand or it might be just for a special purpose only, for another.³

The concept of Proxy Diplomacy has never been defined nor used. The researcher will define it as that form of diplomacy in which one party (A) carries out a mission, ostensibly for its own interest, but overall serves another party's (B) interest. The authority for A to act for B may be, and usually is, tacit, and since arrangements accompanying the relationship are made with very high secrecy, outsiders can not easily discern and scrutinize this relationship. However, this relationship can best be identified on the basis of what is said in public or observed³

in the activities of both A and B in a third situation. For example, A's involvement in a situation might only be possible with tangible and intangible support of B. In this case, B's presence is lacking, but B provides A with material and/or moral support. For reasons to be explained later, B can not participate in the situation and its interests are best served by A's involvement.

Since A's participation or presence in a third area also serves or represents the interests of B, this makes them partners. This undermines the general assumption that a proxy is a servant. This partnership exists so long as each party has vested interests in a third situation. But when these interests wane, for example in the case of B, then A ceases to be a proxy of B and vice versa. In some cases, A's continued involvement in the third situation becomes exceedingly difficult with B's withdrawn support. The fact that A cannot fulfil its interests without the support of the withdrawn B serves to strengthen, but not prove, that A was acting as a proxy for B. In other words, the proxy may be useful to B only to a particular or certain level. As soon as B finds other ways of enhancing her interests, then A's importance to B significantly diminishes.

In many cases, for reasons to be explained later, B does not openly identify itself. This makes it very hard to establish the proxy relationship between A and B. All
the same, by scrutinizing how B renders support to A, and B's policies towards a third situation in which A is involved, and in considering how B consistently renders material and moral support to A, all serve as good pointers in identifying this complex relationship.

Alternative causes for these relationships are economic, military and strategic interests of both A and B in a third area. That is, A and B have to establish a commonality of interests in an area where A is openly involved. In other words, B's interests in a third area, a region or A itself might be economic, military or strategic or any of these so that it uses A to protect these interests. But then both parties' interests or some of them have to coincide in one way or another in the situation where they are at stake.

But when the military interests are scrutinized further the ideological and economic links between A and B are identified as being determinants of the way and the level of the military ties between the parties. For example, B's economic investments and interests in A or the region in which A is situated or is intervening, and A's professed ideological orientation acts to determine the level and sophistication of B - A military links. Without these two factors, and particularly the economic one, B will have little to bother about the importance and significance of an occurrence in an area or region.

On the other hand, A's commitment in upholding a
government or regime with identical ideological orientation like its own and B's compels B to supply A with arms so as to sustain this government or regime.

Other intervening variables are past experiences and prestige of B. Past experiences influence B not to intervene directly. Consequently, this past experience is linked to the prestige of B. B actually fears fighting a war which will stalemate and lead to an imbroglio and perhaps eventually to a defeat. Thus, to safeguard its prestige, B may be aware of past experiences where she or powers of her calibre were nearly or actually humiliated by minor powers.

For instance, one of the lessons Washington has learned from Vietnam is that sustained intervention abroad can cause strains on its political system and its status as a superpower in world politics. Thus, it would rather camouflage its intervention in such a way that it may not be understood by the American public. Vietnam showed that when the public understands what intervention in other peoples' lives means to them, their youth refuse induction and as Congress grows restive, the intervention becomes bogged down in an imbroglio and America ends up damaging her credibility among allies and foes alike.

Thus, according to David Fromkin and James Chance, Vietnam had taught America not to intervene directly in situations she cannot win easily, like the Dominican
Republic in 1965. George Ball, President L. B. Johnson's Undersecretary of State, contends that the

...Vietnam experience also showed another reason for prudence; as a great power, (U.S.) should avoid putting (her) troops in an untenable position, since (she) would then have to pay a political price to extricate them....

After Vietnam, the American people were not prepared at all to throw down another gauntlet in another major war where the end results would be untold suffering, uncountable casualties and losses, particularly in areas where the America has remote national interests. Trevor Taylor notes that interventions by great powers are expensive in financial terms; for example, at its height the Vietnam war cost the U.S. $1 million per day. "But the (exact) cost... will never be known," he contends. An estimate made in 1956 of the Korean War assessed its cost to the U.S. at hundreds of millions. Thus, such interventions, notes Taylor, "have a direct effect on the domestic economy." For example, "the Vietnam conflict was a persistent drain on American balance of payments." These interventions are also costly in political terms


5Quoted by Idem, p. 744.


7Ibid., pp. 148-149.
if the intervention is prolonged since the results are damaging to the great powers' relations with the Third World and its allies.

Past experiences have also shown that local populations loathe "the presence of alien troops with different customs and little respect for local ways...."  

This is made worse when these troops do what Americans did in Vietnam: "Concentrate excessively on killing suspected communists at the expense of trying to win popular support in rural areas."  

One of the overriding reasons why the U.S. restrained itself from sending its troops to Angola was the fact that the Angolans had been psychologically conditioned to resist Portuguese colonialism and imperialism and since the U.S. had stood by Portugal's side to the hilt in her anti-nationalist wars, the people of Angola would definitely have seen the U.S. troops as a replacement and perpetuation of Portuguese Colonialism.

Another overriding reason, deriving from past experience, is that troop dispatch to the Third World in a

...more or less bipolar environment has led to a constant danger that intervention in a conflict could coincide with intervention by the rival powers on the other side of the conflict.  

Escalation could lead to a global war and:

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8Ibid., p. 150.  
9Ibid.  
10Ibid., p. 151.
...given the destructive force of present day weapons and second-strike capabilities of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, in any major nuclear exchange between the superpowers there could be no victor in any meaningful sense.\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, the superpowers have remained like "scorpions in a bottle; if one attacks the other, it can do so only at the price of its own destruction."\textsuperscript{12} It is now obvious that despite the gigantic build-up of destructive arsenals, neither superpower is eager to lock horns with the other.

The factor of direct intervention, which is moderated by a fear of a hazardous counteraction by the other, has apparently forced the superpowers into proxy diplomacy, and some other forms of irregular warfare and subversion:

...Where the possibility of uncontrolled military escalation is slight. Blatant military aggression to achieve external objectives may face both universal diplomatic condemnation in the UN and instant nuclear retaliation, whereas...(proxy diplomacy) may be sufficient to achieve some objectives at a minimal cost of national capabilities and resources, and with much lower costs.\textsuperscript{13}

In other words, the superpowers have established a sort of tacit constraint with regard to intervention, particularly in areas which do not touch on their vital nerve (or national interest) in this nuclear age. This further explains why neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union is in

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 146.


\textsuperscript{13} Holsti, \textit{International Politics}, p. 279.
any haste to openly venture into an area where both have continued interest, thus leading to a direct confrontation. For direct intervention in such areas is drastic action which might jeopardize other aspects of peace, such as detente (in the 1970's) and SALT, between them.

Hence, by evolving an indirect method of intervention through the distribution of weapons (besides providing moral support and carrying out covert activities) to other nations to cater to their interests, these superpowers have limited or eliminated their chances of going to war, even against relatively minor powers (and history is replete of examples where minor powers have been gallant and obstinate enough to hold superpowers at bay).

By use of proxies, the superpowers not only avoid direct confrontation between themselves, but also preserve their vanity of being superpowers. In other words, a defeat of a superpower by another, or a minor power, undresses its prestige, but even if its proxy loses, that superpower faces little, or no humiliation at all.

Declared interests of A must also be identified since they play a very significant role. For example, A must have shown her interests in a third area before it is picked on to enhance B's interests. In the same vein, A must also fulfill other criteria like having military capability in the use of arms and conventional war maneuvers. Since A has vested interests in a third area, these interests are most likely to coincide with B's so that when
A is carrying out its own interests, it is very hard to identify them as being B's – there has to be a commonality of interests between A and B in the third area.

The strategic variable is a spurious one since it is determined by the economic and military variables to a very significant level. That is, the economic and the military factors determine the strategic importance attached to a third area. Once these have been established or identified, then it is easy to determine why both parties attach such significance to a third area. The strategic interests are insignificant without there being the military and economic interests; although the military and the economic interests alone can combine to create a proxy relationship in a direct covariance.

Last, but not least, is the conditional variable which is observable whenever B uses A not because of anything else, but simply because of their common ideological orientation. By subscribing to a same ideology, A and B are closely tied to each other.

This stratagem of the U.S. using other nations to achieve her foreign policy objectives was ingrained in the Nixon and the Reagan Doctrines, which sought to check Soviet expansionism without risking American lives, and avoiding direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Nixon Doctrine, which was enunciated in Guam during the summer of 1969, embraced the limitationist position as a core of U.S. policy. Henceforth, the U.S. was no longer
going to shoulder the burden of policing the world alone, but would be the supplier. In doing so, the U.S. was restricting the involvement of its men to areas of "primary interest."\textsuperscript{14}

On its promulgation this Doctrine called for a gradual withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Asia and the assumption of a "forward defense role by the ground forces of (U.S.) clients...."\textsuperscript{15} In his 1970 "State of the World" address, Nixon noted that the Doctrine's operative phrase held that in cases of non-nuclear conflict, the U.S.

...shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate, but (she) shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing manpower for its defense.\textsuperscript{16}

However, notes Michael Klare, by 1973,

...the Doctrine had been given a much wider interpretation: instead of applying merely to Asia, it has been extended to the entire globe; and instead of referring exclusively to military resources and options, it encompasses the whole spectrum of foreign policy operations.... Stated in more pragmatic terms, the revised Doctrine envisions the U.S. at the center of a whole new galaxy of power relationships and alliances in which armed combat will be delegated insofar as possible - to the weaker and poorer nations while detente and collaborations will govern relations (including those in the communist block).... In most Third World areas, the primary


\textsuperscript{16}Ibid. Emphasis is mine.
defense responsibility will be delegated to indigenous military and para-military forces (assisted by the U.S. military advisors, police, and intelligence specialists and U.S. civilian technicians and other white collar mercenaries working for the CIA and defense contractors and to the interventionary troops of selected regional powers) ... 17

In the case of the Soviet Union "this policy of using its allies" helps Moscow in a variety of ways. According to Dennis Chaplin, it is "a means of relieving itself of training and financing burdens." 18

Furthermore,

...since the Russians are still keen to convince the West that coexistence and relaxation of tensions remain pillars of Soviet diplomacy, it is essential to safeguard the desired public relations image by using deputies to carry out the dirty work. In this way, accusing the Soviet Union of resorting to imperialist activities itself is not so simple. 19

Chaplin explains further that this is the reason why Cubans have been used in Africa "and why East Germans rather than Russians are becoming increasingly prominent in military aid projects around the world. . . ." 20 According to


19 Ibid., p. 376.

20 Ibid.
Christopher Stevens, the Soviet Union has been using

...the nationals of sympathetic countries else-
where in Africa. Czechoslovakia had long been
used to supplying arms and instructors in places
where Russians feared to tread. During the
Nigerian Civil War, Egyptian pilots were used to
fly Soviet planes....

Chaplin points out that because of this stratagem,

...the Soviet Union is developing greater flexi-
bility and freedom of action in diplomatic ex-
changes and disputes, and it is becoming frustrat-
ingly difficult to point fingers (at her).  

However, Professor J.L. Taulbee of Emory University
warns:

From a pragmatic view... using proxies may make
tactical sense, but sponsors need to realize that
in these situations the proxy... will have its own
priorities and reasons for actions. The agenda of
the surrogates may differ markedly from that of
their sponsors.... Indeed, the circumstances that
mandated the use of proxies will also tend to
militate against effective control once operation
is underway.  

All the same, proxy diplomacy remains a viable instru-
ment of foreign policy and an important type of diplomacy
when cost-benefit calculations are put into consideration
during or before an intervention.


CHAPTER THREE

ANGOLA - ITS SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPORTANCE

Angola, like many other young African countries, suffered and continues to suffer from external interventions because of it's rich resources and strategic significance in Southern Africa. In fact, it is Angola's wealth which financed Portugal's anti-guerrilla operations in Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and in Angola itself.¹ Since 1960, Angola enjoyed an economic boom which saw it's exports in 1962-63 valued at $135,440,000 and imports at $112,240,000.

But the importance of Angola to the superpowers lies not in its separate characteristics, but in the place it occupies in the superpowers' Southern African regional strategy in particular, and in their global strategy in general. This is compounded by the fact that these external powers have capitalized on Angola's weak political structures, which were imposed on her for more than 500 years of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism, and which were

¹ This funding came mainly from "the surface rents, bonuses, taxes, royalties, and concession payments Lisbon received from Gulf Oil Company's operations..." say Ernest Harsh and Tony Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976), p. 19.
abruptly brought to an end in 1975. This chapter endeavors to show how Angola, a country of seven million, is endowed with a vast mineral and agricultural wealth, and secondly, her importance and significance to the powers involved/interested in her by exploring these powers' specific interests. Angola's ecology permits production of such agricultural products as coffee, cotton, sisal, manioc, bananas, palm oil products, sugar, wheat, rice, millet, sorghum, tropical fruits, cocoa and groundnuts to name just a few. Coffee, which until the Civil War had a large market in the U.S., is the main export crop. In 1973, the value of coffee exports stood at $203,000,000 and, with a production of 220,000 metric tons in 1974, Angola became the second most important coffee grower in Africa and the third largest in the world.² "Most of these coffee plantations... were owned by three companies, all of which were controlled by the Rallet Bank of France. Exports were handled by the South African Company, Inexcafe," say Harsch and Thomas.³

According to Rene Pelissier,⁴ in 1974 Angola exported 66,719 metric tons of sisal, making her the second most important sisal producer in Africa. Cotton exports for the

year 1974 stood at 12,963 metric tons, while sugar's tonnage of about 10,000, was exported in 1973. Pelissier opines that, "because of its large area and a variety of climate, Angola is one of the most promising farming countries of Southern Africa."

Forestry is also an important industry, which in 1974 realized 110,407 metric tons of timber which was exported. Fisheries are also a thriving industry - in 1973 catches totaled 467,270 metric tons.

According to Pelissier, "geologists hold the view that Angola is one of the richest countries of Southern Africa." Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol add that Angola is

...an immensely wealthy country; with huge offshore oil reserves...which earned it a mention on CIA world oil reserve charts, even though production was still very low by world standards. Enough foreign mining surveys had been undertaken to prove that Angola was a promising source of a range of strategic minerals as comprehensive as those in South Africa: Uranium, Cobalt, Chrome, fusing quartz and many others....

Cabinda's extensive oil deposits were discovered in 1966 by Cabinda Oil Company, a subsidiary of the U.S. Gulf Oil Company. Harsch contends that,

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5Ibid., p. 145.
6Ibid.
By the early 1970's the Cabindan oil fields, over which Gulf had a monopoly concession, were producing about 10 million tons of oil per year, ranking Angola as the fourth largest oil producer in Africa, after Libya, Algeria and Nigeria. It is established that the oil deposits in Cabinda could produce between 100 million tons per year by the turn of the century.8

In 1974, when oil exports stood at 7.4 million tons, American, French, South African and Portuguese interests were feverishly prospecting for oil in Angola. Angola's oil reserves are estimated at 300 million tons, or 1.2 billion barrels.9

Diamonds, which are Angola's third most valuable export, are mined in North-Eastern Angola by the powerful "Companhia de Diamantes de Angola (Diamang), which is controlled by De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. (a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa) together with Belgian, British and American interests."10 In 1974, exports of diamonds stood at 2,093,410 carats, contributing between 5-8% of world diamond production.11

Although Angola exported 5.2 million tons of iron in 1974, she has proven deposits of more than one billion tons

8Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, p. 19. Cabinda is an enclave on the north of River Zaire and borders Congo (Brazzaville) and Zaire, but it is a province of Angola.


10Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, p. 20.

of high-grade haematite. "Iron mines in the Cassinga area of Huila district are owned by the Campanhia Mineira de Lobito, which is controlled by the West German Krepp enterprise."\(^{12}\) Other important minerals found in Angola are copper, manganese ore, phosphate, gold, mica, bituminous slate, coal, sulphur, silicate, beryl, kaolin, granite, marble, sea salt, asphalt rock and gypsum. The world's largest titanium deposit may be in Angola.

There is no doubt that "Angola has a truly astonishing wealth of minerals...,"\(^{13}\) as Pelissier puts it, Angola may have "the greatest economic potential of any African country south of the Sahara, with the exception of South Africa,"\(^{14}\) note Harsch and Thomas. In the words of the Financial Mail, "Angola, with oil reserves equal to those of Kuwait and total exports that exceed by far those of either Zaire or Zambia, is a rich prize."\(^{15}\)

Angola's importance in the region is further enhanced by the geographical position that it occupies. It lies between 4° 22' and 18° 03' latitude South, and 24° 05' and 11° 41' longitude East. While the west of the country has

\(^{12}\)Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, pp. 45-46.

\(^{13}\)Pelissier, "Economy," p. 146.

\(^{14}\)Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, p. 20.

\(^{15}\)Quoted in The African Communist, No. 64 (1st Quarter 1976), p. 6. See also the third issue of the British Quarterly Economic Review, (1973), passim.
a natural frontier, the Atlantic Ocean, to the north she shares a common border with the Peoples' Republic of the Congo and Zaire, with Zambia to the east, and Namibia to the south.

Zaire is an important country to Western interests since it possesses strategic minerals which are of value to the West. Copper production in 1976 stood at 460,000 tons, and cobalt, of which Zaire is the largest producer, was 17,532 tons in 1974. Diamonds are also mined in Zaire. Zambia also is a main exporter of copper and utilizes the Benguela railway, like Zaire, in the export of her copper and other vital exports to the Western markets. Namibia, which is illegally occupied by the racist minority regime of South Africa, possesses a vast reserve of such strategic minerals as uranium and vanadium, in addition to tungsten, cadmium, tin, lead, copper, silver, zinc and a host of other minerals.

Angola's ports of Luanda, Benguela and Mossamedes (formerly Lobito) are strategically located on the Atlantic coast and can be utilized for military and fishing purposes.

This broadly laid picture of the importance and significance of Angola is best understood in the context of specific countries' interests in Angola. On this basis we delve into a discussion of the strategic (in terms of military and naval), economic and ideological/political

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16Zambia's copper exports stood at 829,500 metric tons in 1974.
interests of the superpowers, and those of South Africa and Cuba in Angola.

The United States of America

When Kissinger attacked Soviet and Cuban intervention (in Angola) on the grounds that they had never had any historic interest there, many Americans probably wondered, conversely, what their own historic interest in Angola might be. 17

It is a well-known fact that the U.S. had no historic interest in Angola, except that Angola was at one time a source of slaves to the plantations in the South. According to James Burnham, Angola's importance to the U.S. national interest should be seen in the light of geopolitics in that the Soviet presence in Angola can affect U.S. security interests. 18 The Angolan ports and airfields are critical supply lines of the NATO allies and the control of the South Atlantic. The U.S. formed an opinion that what was happening in Angola in 1975 and thereafter might, in time, determine the course of events in Southern Africa. This fear was imbedded in the perception that the Soviet Union had a grand strategy (as a result of a magnificent

17 John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 54, No. 3 (April 1976), p. 408. To Kissinger, Angola was unique in several respects and had global significance that transcended its regional content. See his testimony before the U.S. Senate's African Affairs Subcommittee on January 29, 1976.

transformation of her navy, air and missile arms from a
traditional to a modern force) which will make her a true
global force. In this strategy, Africa was carefully in-
cluded and, in fact, Angola represented the first major
offensive. After Angola, the Soviets were to launch an-
other "assault on the mineral base and industrial power-
house of South Africa." This would mean turning this
"rich and strategic (region) away from its western orien-
tation" and eventually "control... the bulk of the world's
most important raw materials and food...."

According to Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol,

A long-term factor worrying NATO was the strategic
domination by the West of the South Atlantic. The
Indian Ocean was covered. Diego Garcia, Kenya,
and South Africa were all available for NATO
fleets, but the South Atlantic was becoming a prob-
lem... Walvis Bay in Namibia was already an inter-
national issue at the UN. The Angolan ports of
Luanda and Lobito had to be secured so that U.S.
Navy vessels could continue to call there.

Luanda's value to the United States is best illustrated by
Alvin J. Cottrell, who notes that:

19Anthony Harrigan, "South Africa the Ultimate
Target," The National Review Vol. 18, No. 17 (May 14,
1976), p. 496.

20Ibid.

21Wolfers and Bergerol, Angola: In The Frontline,
p. 2. Wolfers and Bergerol point out that, "by 1973 the
U.S. was heading a NATO special group dedicated to building
a South Atlantic Treaty Organization involving countries of
the Southern Cone of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil,
Uruguay...), with a secret option of a South African
contribution, as well as a direct participation by the NATO
powers themselves."
When the Suez Canal was closed as a result of the June, 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the use of the port of Luanda and Lourenco Marques (now Maputo) became very important in terms of the U.S. naval deployments to the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. These two ports were important in planning U.S. naval operations, especially in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean regions. Luanda was a replenishment port for Persian Gulf-bound naval vessels from either Norfolk (Virginia) or Charleston.22

Thus, the Angolan struggle pricked concern over the strategic importance of South Africa, which henceforth became a stake in global politics. This region's strategic position, importance and significance in geopolitics is critical for the Indian Ocean and naval passage around the Cape.23 The Cape route is of immense commercial importance and military utility. With the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 and political instability in the Middle East, the Cape route has become "the most crowded shipping lane in the world."24 According to Adelman, the flow of oil in the lane has increased 20-fold over the past decade alone. In 1975 some 24,000 ocean going vessels passed the cape, and 9,476 of them docked in the adjoining South African


ports.  

According to Senator James McClure,

> The Cape route is currently Western Europe's - and NATO's - most important supply route for oil; 57% of Western Europe's oil requirements are transported along it. Already 20% of the U.S. oil requirements from abroad are routed via the Cape route and this figure is expected to rise to 60% by the 1980's....

Michael J. Dixon adds that this route "is a vital artery for the deployment of U.S. forces to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf." It is also "the key to travel between the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean." In explaining this strategic importance more succinctly, Edgar Lockwood contends that:

> The possibility of the Middle East Conflict and the acquisition of a piece of strategic turf in the Indian Ocean both make it more probable and plausible to argue that Southern African ports are more strategic than they were in 1969. Conventional U.S. naval warfare in the area would necessarily involve the use of drydock and repair facilities... (in the region).

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According to the CIA, Angola was "strategically important" not only for its internal wealth, but most of all for its location adjacent to Namibia, from which a radical regime could support an insurgency against South Africa.¹⁰ U.S. officials repeatedly argued that, in the wrong hands, Angola could be a base for violent subversion against Western Capitalist interests. Consequently, U.S. strategic interests came to be "viewed through the prism of East-West antagonisms."³¹

U.S. economic interests are located in Angola and in the rest of the Southern African region. According to John Marcum, American coffee drinkers consume more than $100 million worth of Angolan robusta coffee each year, while Gulf Oil Company interests in Cabinda are immense as it increases oil production.³² By 1975, Gulf Oil Company and the Anglo-American Diamond Company had firmly entrenched themselves in the Angolan economy.

Oleg Ignatyev notes that the U.S. monopolies, particularly in the oil industry, "perceptibly strengthened their position" after 1961.³³ Revealing Western economic


interests in general, Ignatyev says,

Gulf Oil, a branch of U.S. Texaco Company, controlled the oil fields of Cabinda. A second oil company, Petrangol, was a multinational corporation, 28% of whose shares were owned by General Mining, the Anglo-American Corporation and other South African companies. The U.S., the biggest consumer of Angolan oil, shipped out 50% of the output.

The development of iron ore deposits, estimated at 2,350 million tons near Kassina was in the hands of the West German Krupp concern and two U.S. concerns - Bethlehem Steel and General Electric...."\(^{34}\)

At the time of the demise of Portuguese Colonialism, U.S. capital had

...managed to make considerable inroads not only at expense of West German, French, and Japanese but also British monopolies which until then held dominating positions in the Angolan economy.\(^{35}\)

In view of this "it would have been naive to think that foreign monoplies would stand idly by and leave it to the Angolans themselves to decide their country's future."\(^{36}\) Because of the strategic importance attached to Angola vis-a-vis the Southern African region, it follows that the economic interests of the U.S. transcended the Angolan borders. This will be analyzed further in the subsequent chapters.

In terms of ideological/political interests, it is now quite obvious that Angola, like Indo-China, was of much

\(^{34}\)Ibid.

\(^{35}\)Ibid.

\(^{36}\)Ibid.
interest to American leaders as a battlefield on which to defeat communist aggression/expansionism.

Putting it more bluntly, Africa magazine points out that the U.S. political interests in Angola lie in the fact that it "wants to maintain the region (in which Angola is situated) as the 'killing fields' in the East-West confrontation."\(^{37}\)

As we saw earlier, Washington's perception of Angola's strategic significance in the region led her to the position that "if the communists...take over Angola...they will have a large chunk of Africa, and the world will be different in the aftermath if they succeed."\(^{38}\)

Applying a variant of the domino theory, Kissinger argued his case before the Congress for increased U.S. involvement in Angola, pointing out that the dominoes bordering on Angola - Zaire, Zambia and South Africa (including Namibia) would fall if Washington did not stop Moscow's involvement in Angola. If the U.S. "failed to halt Soviet military activities in Angola, the Soviet Union and others might not take American warnings seriously in the future."\(^{39}\) The Wall Street Journal of December 19,

\(^{37}\)Africa No. 175 (March 1986), p. 34.

\(^{38}\)Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, p. 101. This statement is attributed to D. Patrick Moynihan, then U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.

1975 warned that "if the U.S. publicly declares itself unwilling to take even small risks to limit Soviet expansionism, it will be an open invitation to an even bolder challenge throughout the world."\textsuperscript{40}

Besides the fear of Communist expansion in the region, the U.S. also feared the success of the liberation struggle in Angola, which could radically alter the very nature of the regimes in Southern Africa. Angola, under good political leadership, could affect both the military situation in Southern Africa and the economic welfare of central African states of Zambia and Zaire. This was given weight by the fact that Angola, strategically located in the region and rich in resources, could influence regional politics by acting as a socialist model and a sponsor of liberation struggles against apartheid South Africa, then Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Namibia, and capitalist-controlled Zaire and Zambia, all possessing minerals valuable to the West. Furthermore, the threat to the latter two was enhanced by the fact that the Benguela Railway, which is a major and cheap means of transporting the vital minerals from Zaire and Zambia, was likely to fall under the control of a Marxist oriented government. Such government could disrupt Zaire's and Zambia's use of this vital export route. Lastly, it was strongly felt

\textsuperscript{40}Quoted in Harsch and Thomas, \textit{Angola: The Hidden History}, p. 102.
that if the U.S. - allied South African forces were defeated in Angola, this would definitely give encouragement, inspiration and morale to the struggles inside Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa itself. Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol note that Angola, unlike Mozambique, whose hands the West felt

...could be satisfactorily tied by dependence on South Africa for foreign exchange, trade, transport and investments... (was different and) came to be seen as the main, immediate threat to continuing Western domination of Southern Africa.\(^{41}\)

Thus, it is in the interest of the United States and its allies to maintain a status quo in Angola and in Southern Africa, in general. The so-called stability and tranquility were solely for the purpose of assuring continued access to strategic and vital minerals, and safe passage of commercial and military shipping along the sensitive routes. However, according to Kissinger, America's most direct strategic and economic interests in Angola are not the central issue. The question here was whether America still maintained the resolve to act responsibly as a great power in the face of a challenge from her arch-rival, the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union

Moscow's interests in Angola have been elusive to determine. For instance, Michael Dixon, like Kissinger, 

\(^{41}\)Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola-In The Frontline*, p. 2.
sees Angola and Southern Africa as having "little strategic
value to the Soviet Union." The little strategic value
which might be there may be in two areas: (a) this area
lies beside a major transit route between the Indian and
the Atlantic Oceans, which are important for commercial and
naval navigations; and (b) this region is a major source of
four strategic minerals - platinum, chromium, vanadium and
manganese. On the whole, Dixon is uncertain as to whether

...the Soviet Union has immediate strategic am-
bition in Southern Africa. Nor is it clear that
the Soviets can threaten Western interests there
in the near future. Nonetheless, Moscow appears
ready to take advantage of opportunities in the
region as they present themselves.

This view is countered by James Burham, who categorically
states that the

...use of Angola ports and airfields are of great
strategic importance to the Soviet Union. (The
implication of the Soviet presence in the region)
would be a permanent threat to oil supply route
from the Gulf, and more generally to the Southern
Atlantic.

Jiri Valenta adds that the Soviet leaders hope to gain

...strategic benefits, mainly by generating local
support for use of port facilities by naval units.
The Soviet Navy, as repeatedly stressed by its
Commander in Chief, Admiral S. Gorshkhov, is one of
the most important instruments of state policies.
It is aimed at countering U.S. and other Western
naval forces, at supporting Soviet policy offshore,

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42 Congressional Research Service Report, The Soviet
Union In The Third World, p. 236.

43 Ibid., p. 237.

44 James Burham, "Angola: What's Moscow Up To?"
and at offsetting the military and political presence of the Americans.\textsuperscript{45}

This view, like Burham's, sees Moscow's strategic interests in Angola as revolving around gaining port and airfield rights in Angola. But this argument sounds more like emotional rhetoric than reality, since Moscow has not sought any of these rights. However, as a superpower, Moscow sees these ports as valuable. The argument that Moscow seeks to use these ports to undermine the capitalist world will be dealt with in the following chapter.

As of 1975, Moscow had no known vested economic interests in Angola, like the U.S. and her allies. Furthermore, one is hard pressed to defend the view that she sought to establish such interests in the future. At this juncture, economic ties between Moscow and Luanda remain insignificant. Moscow has possession of such minerals as petroleum, uranium, and gold, and is not in acute shortage or need for any of them. Thus, Burham's argument that

Moscow seeks "to prevent Western access to them..." cannot be sustained.

If the Soviet's strategic and economic interests can be said to have been insignificant, the same judgement cannot be made about her ideological/political interests in Angola. These interests are embedded in Lenin's prediction that capitalism would be dismantled when the capitalists' resources and markets (colonies) are severed from them. This follows a strategy of extending solidarity through material and moral support to national liberation movements seeking independence from capitalist/imperialist domination. But Kenneth Adelman and Milene Charles view this strategy as involving a denial of strategic minerals to the West.

Soviet's ideological/political interests are best illustrated in her support of the MPLA, a leftist-oriented nationalist movement which sought to establish a social formation based on the Marxist - Leninist line. Since Moscow's interest was to support nationalist movements which seek total emancipation from capitalist control, the MPLA aptly qualified for this support by virtue of its ideology.

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Moreover, adds Valenta,

The Angolan crisis provided the Soviets with an opportunity to weaken the presence of their two main rivals - China and the U.S. - by checking the growth of Chinese influence in Africa and by preventing the victory of the Chinese - U.S. - backed forces of FNLA and UNITA.49

Another aim was to assure her African friends of her capabilities to support them. Since the Soviet Union lost friends in Ghana, Mali, the Congo and elsewhere, she diverted her interests to the Middle East and Southeast Asia and more or less remained in the background as other powers devoured Africa's resources. The triumph of American interests in the Congo (now Zaire) was a bitter pill to swallow. Thus, Angola presented an excellent chance for her to establish her credibility among her friends as "a friend in need."

Valenta contends that:

Angola, because of its strategic position, mattered politically to the Soviets, who hoped to acquire a voice in Southern Africa affairs. The Soviet leadership no doubt recognized as early as April 1974 that the collapse of the Portuguese empire would fundamentally alter the political situation in Southern Africa. Geostrategically, Angola has potential in Soviet calculations as a springboard for a Soviet backed guerrilla movement against the South African regime. The Soviet perceived an MPLA victory in Angola as being linked directly to the operations of Soviet-supported liberation organizations in the region....50


But there is little evidence to support the position that the Soviet Union merely sought to establish Angola as a springboard for future intervention in the region. The period from 1975 has shown one or no Soviet involvements (or interventions) in Southern African countries, particularly in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Namibia and South Africa. Thus, it is plausible to contend that Western scholars, foreign policymakers and mass media were only crying "Wolf" to justify their interventionist policies.

South Africa

Because Angola is strategically located to the north of Namibia, South Africa has used this fact to rationalize her strategic interests on the grounds that Angola is Namibia's next-door neighbor and

...because Namibia is virtually the fifth province of South Africa. The Republic thus fears that if Angola became free she herself would be exposed to attack on this flank.... In short, Angola is one of South Africa's strategic buffers.

When Portuguese Colonialism in Angola came to a halt in 1975, there were strong feelings in the Republic that it

...should involve itself in some way to influence the course of events in Angola in a direction favorable to the Republic's interest. Well before (Angola's) independence, Military Intelligence had put out feelers to three liberation movements - MPLA, FNLA and UNITA - to try to establish their respective attitudes towards South Africa. The MPLA was found to be implacably hostile, whereas

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the other two organizations, UNITA in particular, proved quite amenable. Should the MPLA come to power, Military Intelligence concluded, South Africa's security interests in Namibia might be seriously jeopardized.\(^{52}\)

By the time of Angola's independence in 1975, South Africa was deeply entrenched in Angola's economy, with its economic involvement increasing year by year:

South African exports to Angola, which stood at only R2 million in 1964 had risen to R44m in 1975. A big part of the R100 million already invested in the Kunene hydro-electric scheme comes from South Africa, which hopes to include Angola in its giant electricity grid planned to cover the whole of Southern and Central Africa.\(^{53}\)

There is no doubt that South Africa's economic interests in Angola were immense since "South Africans were shareholders, direct or indirect owners of the Benguela Railway, oil companies, diamond mines, the banking system, and had major investments in Angola."\(^{54}\) For example, in 1967 a South African manufacturing firm, Bondcrete Limited, won a contract for laying a 13-mile water pipeline from the Bengo River to Luanda. Ignatyev notes that the Angolan Diamond Company had the sole rights over about 390,000


\(^{53}\)The African Communist, No. 64 (First Quarter 1976), p. 7.

\(^{54}\)Ignatyev, Secret Weapon In Africa, p. 135.
square miles. In addition to diamond mining it (had) agricultural, industrial and financial interests in Angola.55

Although De Beers holds only about 1.5% of the shares in Diamang Company, it still plays a very significant role in the diamond industry:

In 1978, Angola brought in Mining and Technical Services (MATS), a De Beers subsidiary, to run the mines, revive production and provide technical, managerial, and marketing services. Three of its directors are on board of directors of Diamang. MATS imports South African mining equipment and provides expatriates to help run the mines.... There are dozens of South African mechanics, electricians, direct recovery experts, and other diamond specialists working in the diamond mines in North Eastern Angola, which are guarded by Cuban troops....56

Also of note is the fact that a De Beers subsidiary, Central Selling Organization (CSO), markets Angola's diamonds.

South African economic interests span also into trading activities, which are somewhat more important. Angola's exports to South Africa have more than doubled in the period between 1975-1980, from $11.4 million to $33.1 million, accounting for 2.5% of exports in 1975 and 1.9% in

55Ibid., p. 19.

1980, and placing South Africa seventh in importance as a receiver of Angolan goods. South African imports to Angola increased from $56.8 million in 1975 to $170.7 million in 1980.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, Angola is of vital economic importance to South Africa. South Africa as an industrialized capitalist country is "anxious to find external outlets for its manufactured goods, sources of raw materials it lacks, such as petroleum, and new investments for its capital."\textsuperscript{58} It is because of these inherent interests that South Africa "wishes to maintain her system of ultra-exploitation and apartheid, she has to expand beyond her frontiers seeking to occupy neighboring countries and thus creating a 'political void' around them."\textsuperscript{59} Thus, South Africa sought to subjugate Angola economically by making her a dependency like other countries in the region. This interest was sought by hook and crook.

Further South African economic interests in Angola were reflected in the Kunene hydro-electric project, developed at the total cost of R188 million (about $216 million), which was a cornerstone of Pretoria's efforts

\textsuperscript{57}For a detailed account of Angolan-South African trade relations, see Ibid., pp. 283-301.

\textsuperscript{58}The MPLA Report To The International Conference In Support of Liberation Movements of Portuguese Colonies and Southern Africa, held in Khartoum, January 18-20, 1969, and reproduced in de Braganca and Wallerstein, The African Liberation Reader, p. 201.

\textsuperscript{59}Ibid., p. 202.
...to increase its exploitation of Namibia's natural resources, which include large deposits of zinc, copper, uranium, and diamonds (the Orangemund diamond mine is the largest in the world). 60

Since the agreement signed between Pretoria and the Portuguese colonialist in 1969 provided that no power from the Kunene project was to be supplied to Angola during its first phase of operation and royalty payments were pegged at a low rate, and as Harsch and Thomas point out,

It was widely expected that the few leaders who emerge after November 11, 1975 will hold out for a higher royalty payment; it would even be possible for a hostile government in effective control of the area to cut off the flow of water from the Gove and Calueque dams. This would seriously disrupt production at the mines in Namibia, particularly at Rosing Uranium. 61

Another South African economic interest in Angola was a highly strategic commodity which Angola produced – oil. Since the UN and Anti-Apartheid movements began advocating sanctions against racist regimes, South Africa's greatest worry became her vulnerability to an oil embargo. In November 1973, the OPEC members (with the exception of Iran) at the request of the OAU, placed an embargo on all oil sales to South Africa. Being a highly industrialized country, she cannot do without oil. Since frantic searches and prospecting within her borders had proved fruitless, she had an eye on Angola's oil.

60Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, p. 122.

61Ibid., p. 22.
In terms of ideological/political interests, South Africa, like the U.S. and Western European countries, felt threatened in Angola by the presence of a socialist government and by

...the promise of a genuine and radical decolonization which the MPLA represent(ed). For such a decolonization could be seen to involve, sooner or later, a stiff challenge to corporate access to Angola's riches, a tantalizing and counter-example to faltering neo-colonial projects in the area (particularly in Zaire and Zambia) and a firm base for the escalating struggle, spearheaded by SWAPO in bordering Namibia (a territory South Africa illegally occupies for the Western Corporate interests to mercilessly and heartlessly exploit).62

South Africa's ideological/political interest, thus, lies in ensuring that Lenin's thesis on the demise of capitalism does not materialize in the region by using Angola as a springboard.

As noted earlier, when the Portuguese lost their hold on Angola and Mozambique, the racist rulers of South Africa "understood that the prospect of independence for Angola and Mozambique made it difficult for them to prevent the spread of Black nationalist ideas within South Africa itself."63 In a nutshell, South Africa and American


63Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, p. 121. It should be noted further that the seriousness of this matter was reflected in the fact that "the entire South African army was reorganized into two main forces, a conventional military force and a counterinsurgency force. The budget for FY 1975-76 reached a record $1.4 billion, twice the figure of two years before and more than 20% of the entire South African government budget." Ibid.
administrations "appear to have viewed the Soviet involvement in Angola as a threat to the 'moderate' governments in neighboring states, to the status quo in Namibia, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa," as well as to Kissinger's international equilibrium. Viewed from the geo-politics of Southern Africa, Zambia and Zaire are very key countries. If they were to "fall" and radical governments took over, these governments would attain "very militant positions on the South African question, then that would do more to make the whole structure crumble...." There is no doubt that Angola, being a critical piece on the chess-board of Southern African politics, with the potential to become a key player in the on-going campaign against the White minority regime of South Africa, gave the latter cause for alarm.

**Cuba**

When Cuba sent thousands of troops to help the MPLA in 1975, against the U.S./South African - backed FNLA/UNITA, many wondered what her interests were in this Southern African country which had been under Portuguese domination for 500 years. So far, her strategic interests have not been established and cannot be said to attain the same lines like those of the powers discussed before. Cuba had

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no military or naval interests in Angola, or Southern Africa, whatsoever.

The economic interests which have been laid down have ranged from supply of petroleum to export of surplus labor. Sergio Roca suggests that Angola's oil-exporting capacity probably seemed attractive to Cuba since it potentially meant decreased reliance on Soviet deliveries and, subsequently increased international autonomy. However, Roca does not see Angola as developing into an alternative source of petroleum for Cuba for several reasons.

First, Angola needs to receive world market prices for its oil and any shipments of her oil to Cuba would require continued Soviet subsidy, albeit in a new triangular pattern. The main advantage Cuba would gain would be in reduction of oil transportation costs due to Angola's greater proximity to Cuba, that is 6,500 miles to the Black Sea ports, as compared to 4,700 miles to Cabinda.

Secondly, Angola appears more committed to increasing oil sales to Western market economies and participation by their oil companies. And thirdly, Angola would prefer convertible currency in exchange transactions, instead of barter trade. Even if bartering of commodities were to be carried out there are a few products which could be

exchanged between Angola and Cuba, since both produce many products which can be found on the other's market. Cuba would prefer the Soviet Union to remain her main sugar importer since she buys it at a higher price. The area of exchange which Angola benefits from is the construction technology, which she badly needs.

Another economic interest will lay in diversification of Cuba's foreign markets. This point is based on the assumption that:

In extending massive military assistance at critical junctures to Angola... and in providing civilian aid... Cuban strategists probably contemplated the implications for the diversification of foreign trade markets.67

But then several basic economic factors argue against this assumption. First, because of "the overwhelming benefits enjoyed by Cuba through Soviet friendship and CMEA membership," there are few advantages to be gained by trading elsewhere.68 Secondly Cuba has not been impressive in diversifying her foreign markets outside the socialist bloc, as G. B. Hagelberg notes.69 Roca notes that Cuban trade with African states, in years following the massive debut in Angola, probably remained unchanged. In fact, "trade with African countries accounted for 3%
of its total exports and less than 1% of its total im-
ports.... So far, Cuban economic relations with Angola
and Ethiopia have emphasized economic assistance agree-
ments, not commercial trade pacts.\textsuperscript{70}

Another economic interest is exportation of Cuba's
surplus labor. The assumption made here is that because of
the 1960's baby boom, Cuba has brought "a vast new labor
force into the stumbling economy."\textsuperscript{71} Thus, stationing
large contingents of military advisors and troops on
African soil may help alleviate job-creating pressures
applied to the Cuban economy by the excess supply of
workers.... \textsuperscript{72}

However, Roca submits, there are several points which
disqualify this assumption:

First, despite the large absolute size of Cuba's
military deployment in Africa, the number of
persons involved (about 35,000) represents only
a small fraction (roughly 1.1%) of the total labor
force. In this case, civilian personnel are ex-
cluded because the benefits of their exportation
are derived mostly from service charge earnings....
Second, the economic benefits of the military
draft may be captured entirely for the domestic
economy if the assignment of labor resources is
coupled with the assignment of young recruits
to internal development tasks as in the Youth Work
Corps. Third, it is possible that the existence
of surplus labor resources may be only a tempo-
rary feature of the Cuban economy.... In sum, the

\textsuperscript{70}Roca, "Economic Aspects of Cuban Involvement in
Africa," p. 169.

\textsuperscript{71}S.W. Saunders, "Why Is Cuba Waging War In Africa?",

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid.
exportation of Cuba's excess human resources through foreign military assignments probably constitutes a minor and transient benefit for the African involvement.73

Maybe it is only through service charges levied on Angola that Cuba derives some economic benefits from her involvement. Through civilian aid programs, Cuba charges a fee to Angola for services rendered by her professional and technical personnel in the fields of construction, health and education. According to Roca,

The development of this new field of economic activity augurs well for the perennial Cuban need for convertible foreign exchange.... In November 1979, the Cuban Construction Enterprise, in what may have been one of the first commercial contracts signed with Angola, committed itself to complete in 1980 several major projects, including 50 apartment buildings and three bridges, valued at $25 million and presumably payable in U.S. currency.74

On the whole, it is plausible and objective to note that Cuba had little or no strategic interests in Angola. However, she had immense ideological/political interests which were rooted in the principle of international solidarity (proletarianism) with forces in the Third World fighting capitalism, imperialism and neo-colonialism. Margaret Crahan adds that in Cuba's involvement

...there is... obviously an element of attempting to combat the influence of those powers which they regard as neo-colonialists and imperialist... their sense is that they must, for their own

74Ibid, p. 171.
survival, support the coming to power of other socialist regimes throughout the world.\textsuperscript{75}

In short, Cuba's ideological/political interests are the same as the Soviet Union's. She supported the MPLA because it was anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and socialist. Although an assumption had been made that she intends to use Angola as a stepping-stone in establishing revolutionary regimes in the region, this has yet to be seen.

These ideological/political interests have been reinforced by the cultural/racial interests. Castro has routinely labeled Cuba as a "Latin African" nation because "African blood flows freely through our (Cubans') veins." Thus, Cubans have to help their African "brothers and sisters" by fighting "on their behalf."\textsuperscript{76} In romanticizing this cultural/racial interest, Castro was alluding to the fact that nearly two-thirds of Cuba's 10 million people are either blacks or mulattoes, whom "countless thousands of their ancestors, ironically, had been captured in Angola itself by the Portuguese for sale to the sugar planters of Cuba."\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{75}Margaret Crahan's view during Brenner's "Marching to Pretoria: Round Table Discussion," p. 19.

\textsuperscript{76}Adelman, \textit{African Realities}, p. 42.

This rationalization of Cuban involvement on cultural/racial interests or similarities has been vehemently disputed by Ali Mazrui. Mazrui reasons that if Cuba rationalizes its involvement in Angola on the grounds of being an 'Afro-Caribbean country,' then the U.S. does gain legitimacy of intervention by "describing itself as fundamentally an 'Afro-Caucasian country.' Is the presence of people of African ancestry in a country outside Africa an adequate basis for the intervention by that external country in the internal African conflict?"78 But in answering the question of why Cuba went to Angola on December 19, 1976, Fidel Castro contended that,

Some wonder why we help the Angolans, what interests we have there. They are accustomed to thinking that whenever a country does something, it is in pursuit of oil, of copper, or some other natural resources. No. We are not after material interests, and logically, the imperialists do not understand this because they are exclusively guided by chauvinist, nationalistic and selfish criteria. We are fulfilling an elementary internationalist duty when we help the Angolan people.79

At this point, it is not wrong to conclude this chapter by submitting that Angola was, after all, well worth fighting for; it was not a banana republic, but a


vast country endowed with great mineral resources, fertile agricultural land and a strategic position. All these powers recognized the fact that with its mineral wealth, particularly oil, Angola could become a key power to reckon with in the region, and thus, it could either strengthen the socialist governments like Mozambique and Congo, while posing a direct threat to western neo-colonies of Zaire, and Zambia, and the apartheid regime of South Africa.\textsuperscript{80} There is no doubt that this economically and strategically enticing territory had all the likelihood of luring some external powers into a secretive, but massive, involvement in it's civil war. But because the superpowers feared the risk of being caught up in an escalating chain of action and reaction from which it might be difficult to disengage, they did not directly put on the line their prestige as we shall see in the subsequent chapters. By identifying their interests with South Africa's and Cuba's, the U.S. and the Soviet Union respectively capitalized on this coincidence of interest to involve themselves indirectly in Angola.

CHAPTER FOUR

U.S. - SOUTH AFRICAN/SOViet UNION - CUBAN RELATIONS

U.S. - South African Relations

The relations between the United States and South Africa are based on the fact that the former and her European allies have significant political/ideological, economic and military/strategic interests in the latter. The racist South African regime is seen as a bastion of imperialist powers in the region, standing against the communist menace and expansionism; it supplies the West with vital and strategic minerals while maintaining very cordial business ties; it also controls the momentous sea route around the Cape of Good Hope, a path through which much of Western Europe's commodities are shipped. Another important factor is that South Africa has some of the largest naval bases on the Western littoral of the Indian Ocean. In sum, these facts seem to be the raison d'être of these relations between the United States and South Africa.

The United States has always viewed South Africa as a 'friend' in that South Africa can be counted upon to protect Western interests and stave off communist threats,
thereby making Southern Africa a region of the "free world."\(^1\)

According to George M. Houser:

There is a considerable degree of truth in the designation of the U.S. as one of South Africa's chief allies. For the fact is that although the U.S. has repeatedly expressed criticism of apartheid in recent years, it has simultaneously contradicted its statements by other activities.\(^2\)

The United States' and South Africa's political orientations seem compatible in \textit{puris naturalibis}, in the sense that South Africa not only looked at the United States as "a source of democratic ideals" but increasingly looked to American racial segregation as legitimization for its own efforts and saw in American racial troubles a lesson that any weakening of racial barriers threatened their own vision of 'civilization.'\(^3\)

South Africa's value to American and other Western interests is not something of yesterday, but stretches to "World War II when South Africa was a valued, if distant, partner in the fight against fascism. South African troops fought in the North African Campaign and alongside

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Americans in Italy." These relations prospered after the war as seen in Prime Minister Jan Smuts' close cooperation with the U.S. in establishing the United Nations. Even after the defeat of Smuts by Daniel Malan in the 1948 elections, the latter volunteered to join forces in the fight against communism worldwide.

It was out of this pledge that the United States gratefully accepted South Africa's contribution of an air crew for the Berlin airlift and a fighter squadron for the war in Korea, although she ignored Malan's efforts to have South Africa incorporated into the NATO alliance as a southern flank or to establish a South Atlantic equivalent of NATO.5

Since apartheid became an issue in the United Nations in 1952, the United States has not only opposed the formation of the United Nations Commission of the Racial Situation in South Africa, but repeatedly and continually abstained or voted against (if not vetoed) resolutions condemning apartheid while chiding the world organization as not being competent to deal with the internal affairs of a member state.

Even by 1958, when the United States had somehow revised this position (of blindly backing South Africa) by

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4Ibid., p. 343.

5Ibid., p. 344. For a detailed account of South Africa's interests and efforts in forming SATO, see Background (Johannesburg), (May/June 1969), passim.
voting with a majority on the resolution expressing 'regret and concern' over South Africa's continuous flouting of the UN charter, she refused to permit the word "condemn" to be included in the resolution on the grounds that condemning apartheid is tantamount to intervening in the internal affairs of a country which has regularly declared itself a staunch ally in the fight against communism. Table 4:1 clearly shows this stance.

Houser contends that,

up to the Nixon Administration U.S. votes on colonial issues had frequently been abstentions.... But under the Nixon Administration, especially as the demands of the African states became urgent, the U.S. tipped the balance of its voting record to the negative. In the 1972 General Assembly, for example, of the eight major resolutions on Southern Africa and colonization issues, the U.S. voted negatively on seven and abstained on one. For the most part the U.S. was joined by both South Africa and Portugal.6

It is plausible to note at this point that the United States' political interests were neither a quest for democracy nor human rights, but ideological and political preoccupations which are the containment of communism and the promotion of pro-western/capitalist states. The undergirding assumption of these political interests is that there is a communist threat to the 'free world's' interests in South Africa.

There is a general belief among analysts and policy makers in Washington that the Soviet Union has attained

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### TABLE 4:1

**U.S. Voting Record on Apartheid and Colonialism**  
In The United Nations, 1952-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Nature of Resolution</th>
<th>Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>637VII</td>
<td>12/16/52</td>
<td>On the right of dominated people to self-determination.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11178XII</td>
<td>11/26/57</td>
<td>Appealing to South Africa to revise its policy of apartheid.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a14502</td>
<td>12/14/60</td>
<td>On elimination of colonialism.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a111.6</td>
<td>12/27/61</td>
<td>Proclaiming 1962 the 'Year of Ending Colonialism'.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807XVII</td>
<td>12/14/63</td>
<td>Condemning Portuguese colonialism.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2107XX</td>
<td>12/12/65</td>
<td>Condemning Portuguese colonialism.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2270XXII</td>
<td>12/18/68</td>
<td>Condemning Portugal and South Africa for their continued crimes of repression and opp-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2507XIV</td>
<td>11/21/69</td>
<td>Condemning Portugal for her colonialist crimes and calling for her NATO allies to stop supplying her with arms.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2621XXV</td>
<td>10/12/70</td>
<td>Condemning Portugal and South Africa for their continued crimes of repression and opp-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2678XXV</td>
<td>12/09/70</td>
<td>Condemning Portugal and South Africa for their continued crimes of repression and opp-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2708XV</td>
<td>12/14/70</td>
<td>Recognizing the legitimacy of the struggles against colonialism.</td>
<td>Abstained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2787XXVI</td>
<td>12/06/71</td>
<td>Affirming the importance of the rights to self-determination and independence.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Nature of Resolution</td>
<td>Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>279XXVI</td>
<td>12/10/71</td>
<td>Condemning Portugal and South Africa for their continued crimes of repression and oppression.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2908XXVII</td>
<td>11/02/72</td>
<td>Asking all Colonial powers to grant independence to their colonies.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2979XVII</td>
<td>12/14/72</td>
<td>Condemning the colonial powers and their supporters.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2918XXVII</td>
<td>11/14/72</td>
<td>Reaffirming the inalienable rights of all indigenous people of Southern Africa, recognizing the national liberation movements as rightful, and condemning the mistreatment of freedom fighters.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3103XXVII</td>
<td>12/12/73</td>
<td>Condemning the use of mercenaries by racist or colonial regimes in the wars of oppression and repression.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3116XXVIII</td>
<td>12/12/73</td>
<td>Condemning apartheid in South Africa.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3151BXXIII</td>
<td>12/14/73</td>
<td>Urging for intensified efforts in the eradication of apartheid.</td>
<td>Abstained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3163XXVIII</td>
<td>12/15/73</td>
<td>Condemning Portuguese colonialism.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the ability and capability "to operate in western sea lanes and may threaten a cutoff for political leverage during a crisis." Some analysts are of the opinion "that the Soviet Union could pose a serious threat to (the Cape) route if it controlled or had friendly access to, South Africa." A friendly and close relationship with the South African government, they argue "is therefore indispensable to counter the Soviet threat, especially since South Africa has modern ports with sophisticated repair and refueling facilities." 

Kevin Danaher says this communist threat theme

...has been brought to bear on the question of the strategic dependence of the U.S. on South Africa. With the 1973 oil embargo... and the general build up of the Soviet and NATO naval forces in the Indian Ocean, the U.S. planners have grown more attentive to the strategic assets of South Africa: its vast deposits of industrial minerals and its position astride the cape sea route by which most of the petroleum from the Arab Gulf is shipped to the West.

Danaher adds that such a conservative position basically hinges on two arguments, that,

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...the U.S. and its key allies are dependent on the Cape route and South's strategic minerals, and this dependence necessitates a friendly policy toward the white minority regime.\textsuperscript{10}

In portraying the situation in such stark terms, these analysts see South Africa as "a political bulwark standing in the way of the ultimate Soviet hegemony over all of Southern Africa."\textsuperscript{11} This argument of the Soviet threat to the sea lanes "assumes that Moscow intends to interdict the flow of oil to the West," thus disrupting the Western economy.\textsuperscript{12}

This view is countered by those analysts who argue that if the Soviets have the intentions of severing the Western oil's lifeline why should they 'choke it off' in such a remote region like Southern Africa if they could more effectively block the Straits of Hormuz or bomb the oil fields in the Persian Gulf area using planes based in the Soviet Union. Adelman argues that,

\begin{quote}
Were a radical (pro-Soviet) regime to come to power in South Africa and then allow the installation of Soviet naval facilities, there is still yet another question: would the Soviets use such bases to blockade or thwart Western shipping?\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

In answering this question, Adelman maintains the same view as Michael Dixon, Danaher and the Study Commission on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{11}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{12}Ibid.
\end{itemize}
U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa report,\textsuperscript{14} that:

a total blockade of vital Western oil shipments would constitute a \textit{casus belli}, as Moscow well appreciates. And should Moscow seek to spark a global conflict by halting oil flows there are far more enticing means than a naval blockade in Southern Africa. Bombing or sabotaging the oil fields in the Persian Gulf would be swifter, easier and surer...\textsuperscript{15}

Thus, notes Danaher, an attempt by the Soviet Union to block the sea lanes would not precipitate a war with the West but if such war broke out, then it will "be fought primarily in Europe, with possible secondary theaters in the Mediterranean and along the Sino-Soviet border."\textsuperscript{16} In view of this there is no justification for the Soviets to deploy their ships to stop the flow of oil to the West if such naval forces would be needed in the ensuing conflict with the West "in the North Atlantic, the North Sea, the Baltic, the Mediterranean, and the Sea of Japan, not off the coast of South Africa."\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{15}Adelman, \textit{The African Realities}, p. 21. Edgar Lockwood, "The Kissinger Team for Africa; 'Destabilization' Revisited", \textit{Southern Africa} Vol. 8, No. 4 (April 1975), p. 6 argues that "the fact that the Soviet's presence is not large and that if the Soviet Union attacked the U.S. oil supply routes, it would be more logical to attack in the North Sea, do not preclude arguments that the Navy prefers... to make assurance against all contingencies."

\textsuperscript{16}Danaher, \textit{In Whose Interests}, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid
In addition, it is argued that although ships usually take advantage of calmer seas and shorter passage by travelling close to the Cape, "if necessary, they would make a much wider sweep through the long stretch of navigable water between the Cape and Antarctica."\(^{18}\) The Study Commission's sardonic conclusion on this argument is that neither the small South African Navy nor its surveillance and logistical facilities are important factors in keeping the Cape route open to the West.\(^{19}\) Moreover, Danaher sees no way in which this sea lane would be threatened by a leftist-leaning pro-Soviet government in South Africa since "no empirical evidence supports this assumption." He notes further that, in fact:

the leftist regimes in the region have sought to expand trade with the West, not to restrict it.... Having suffered under white (minority) rule and foreign domination for centuries, they are not likely to turn their hard won independence over to Moscow. Neither Angola nor Mozambique has permitted Soviet naval bases on its shores. In sum, the possibility of an attack on the Cape route by the Soviet and/or leftist regimes in the region is extremely remote.\(^{20}\)

Danaher sees the strategic mineral's theme as having a stronger factual base than the Cape route argument. South Africa has rich and varied mineral resources which have made her the world's fourth largest supplier of non-fuel

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\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Kevin Danaher, *In Whose Interests*, p. 85.
minerals. She possesses the world's largest known deposits of chromium, manganese, platinum, vanadium, gold and many other minerals which are important not only to the United States but the West, due to their strategic, industrial and economic uses. Furthermore, South Africa is in possession of major reserves of many other valuable minerals, including asbestos, coal, copper, diamonds, iron, nickel, phosphates, silver, uranium and zinc. Thus, another of the U.S. strategic interests lies in maintaining adequate supplies of key (strategic) minerals exported by South Africa. Although South Africa describes nearly all of its mineral exports as strategically vital to the West, only four are of real importance, and even their "uses fall into different categories of importance. Some are vital to military preparedness, others are economically but not strategically significant, and some are merely convenient." 21

South Africa produces four minerals that are strategic: platinum group metals (platinum, palladium, iridium, ismium, rhodium and ruthenium), chromium, manganese and vanadium. (See Table 4:2.) The platinum group metals are highly efficient catalysts used in petroleum refining and in the catalytic converters used in most new cars for emission controls. Whereas chromium, manganese and

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vanadium are not only essential for Western industrial purposes, but also for military as alloying agents required for specialty steel.

**TABLE 4:2**

U.S. Import Dependency on Selected Critical Minerals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>Net Import Reliance (Imports) as % Total U.S. Consumption</th>
<th>Share of Imports from S.A., % of Total Imports (Rank as Supplier)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antimony</td>
<td>54 (1983)</td>
<td>Ores &amp; Concentrates 8 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oxide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromium</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>Ore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ferro Manganese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platinum</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanadium</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The South African government and several leading American mining companies involved in South Africa claim that the U.S. and other industrialized nations would suffer serious consequences if the supply of South African minerals is cut off. Even confidential reports carried out for the U.S. government in the past have also shown the importance of South African minerals to the Western capitalist economies and the serious economic dislocation that would result from the cut-off of their supply. The consequences resulting from this loss, the reports submit,
"would compromise the achievement of U.S. policy goals in the fields of environment, energy and employment."\textsuperscript{22}

Of the strategic minerals shown in Table 4:2, only the disappearance of South African chrome appears to present serious supply difficulties for the West, since alternative sources of platinum, manganese and vanadium exist in the U.S. and Canada, and could be developed to replace South African supplies.

It is now widely debated as to the real significance of these strategic minerals. For example, the importance of platinum is diminishing with the existence of possibilities which are good for meeting much of the future need by recycling the platinum now contained in catalytic converters. There are also abundant sources and substitutes for manganese and vanadium. In the case of chromium, the U.S. has stockpiled a large enough stock to cover a total interruption of South African chrome exports for eight years. In fact,

The U.S. government has been increasing its stockpiles of strategic minerals in preparation for any emergency disruption of foreign supplies. The building of stockpiles, in addition to the constant search for substitute materials, has resulted in a

trend toward reduced industrial vulnerability to mineral supply interruptions.\textsuperscript{23}

Nonetheless, in the long term, a continued cutoff of South African strategic minerals, for instance, chromium, "would become critical if new reserves were not uncovered and if processes for recovery of chrome from scrap metals were not successfully developed."\textsuperscript{24} Furthermore, severance of these minerals would hurt the U.S. indirectly in that it "will be harder on the other developed countries than on the U.S." since these countries are just as (or more) reliant on South African supplies of these minerals as the U.S., and "the absence of significant stockpiles makes them more vulnerable to short term stoppages."\textsuperscript{25}

Consequently,

...the heightened vulnerability of Western Europe and Japan has serious implications for U.S. policy. A world wide stoppage of South African minerals will lead to competition for reduced supplies and a struggle to afford increased prices would create tension among the allies.\textsuperscript{26}

The fact that South Africa produces several minerals which are significant and affect a wide range of industrial and

\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Danaher, In Whose Interests}, p. 88. See also Meyers, III \textit{et al}, \textit{U.S. Business in South Africa}, pp. 233-234, who argue that "there are no known substitutes for manganese, and those for chromium, vanadium and platinum are economically unattractive and less efficient."

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 244.

\textsuperscript{25}\textit{Study Commission of U.S. Policy Towards Southern Africa}, p. 320.

\textsuperscript{26}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 321.
defense considerations

...compounds the problems of conservation and substitution should a cutoff occur. For example, one of the substitutes for vanadium in making high-strength steel alloys is manganese. Manganese would also be in short supply if South Africa's mineral exports were stopped. Moreover, increased demand for substitute minerals, even those not supplied by South Africa, would cause market dislocations. Since South African minerals are used in so many different industrial sectors, economic disruption caused by across-the-board stoppage would be difficult to cope with. The inflationary effect of individual cutoffs would multiply. U.S., European and Japanese reliance on a wide range of South African minerals thus makes them more vulnerable than a mineral-by-mineral analysis would indicate. 27

In Danaher's view, the American fear that...

...a new, unfriendly (that is, leftist) government in South Africa might manipulate, suspend, or discontinue the sale of some or all of the minerals to the U.S. and/or other Western countries (is) highly unlikely due to the extreme dependence of the South African economy on its mineral exports. Some two-thirds of all South African export revenue is generated by sales of minerals and mineral products. Most of these go to the West. 28

However radical the government in South Africa would be, it is

...less likely to cut mineral exports than would the current regime (since)...it would come to power with a mandate to raise the living standards of the masses. This could only be accomplished by increasing, not decreasing, mineral exports to the West. In addition, the mineral exports policies of other leftist regimes in the region cast doubt on the likelihood of (this)... scenario... 29

27Ibid.

28Danaher, In Whose Interests, p. 89.

29Ibid.
In nuce, there is no doubt that

...no matter how rapidly the industrial countries implement safeguards against mineral supply disruption... they will still remain dependent to some extent on South African minerals.\textsuperscript{30}

It is in view of this that Washington puts into deep consideration the political conditions that are most likely to interrupt South African mineral exports. In the genius loci, South Africa is one of the three major countries (others being Canada and Australia) which the United States can count on politically not to impose embargoes on strategic minerals. The circumstances which can lead to such an outcome are out of the scope of this paper. A 1979 report by the South African government ironically stated, inter alia, that "with South Africa in the Western world's gold, platinum, chrome, manganese, vanadium supply line these commodities need not be considered strategic nor critical. But without South Africa, they no doubt are."\textsuperscript{32}

The United States is economically tied to South Africa through investments, loans, trade, et alia. It is quite obvious that the U.S.' economic ties with South Africa

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., p. 88.

\textsuperscript{31}This observation was made by the November 1974 study carried out by the White House Office on International Economic Affairs, which is also quoted in Lockwood, "The Kissinger Teams for Africa," p. 7.

dominated relations between the two countries. The U.S. official policy has always been that the U.S. government neither encourages nor discourages investment in South Africa. Due to the fact that investment in South Africa returns super profits there has been no need to encourage American businessmen. Tacitly, the U.S. government encourages investment, for example, U.S. firms receive U.S. tax credits for taxes paid to South Africa. The Ex-IM Bank has guaranteed and insured American exporters to South Africa, which has had an unfavorable balance of trade and imports capital for investment.

Despite the fact that the United States has vast economic vested interests in the Southern Africa region, it has keener interests in South Africa itself where its investments and trade are valued in billions of dollars. The October, 1975 issue of South African Scope\(^{33}\) pointed out that 360 U.S. enterprises had investments of over $1.2 billion in South Africa, which was an increase of 100% over a period of ten years. The importance of the South African investment market to the U.S. "is seen in the fact that South Africa is one of less than a score of countries with more than $1,000 million in direct American investment."\(^{34}\)

\(^{33}\)A monthly published by the South African Consulate in New York.

\(^{34}\)Ibid quoted in Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, p. 111.
U.S. investment in South Africa has witnessed a dramatic growth from an estimated $50 million in 1943 to $284 million in 1960, to $800 million in 1970. In 1971, repatriated earnings from this investment contributed about $58 million to the U.S. balance of payments. The general rate of return of these American firms in 1969 in South Africa stood at about 19% in comparison to 12.2% average returns on U.S. investment throughout the world. In mining alone, these returns reached 46% in 1970.

It is not surprising that the U.S. investment in South Africa doubled during the Nixon-Ford Administration, between 1970 and 1975, when it reached $1.57 billion from $778 million because NSSM 39 had recommended the removal of any constraints on the Ex-Im Bank facilities for South Africa while actively encouraging U.S. exports and facilitating U.S. investment so as to be in consistent with the foreign Direct Investment Program.

According to Adelman, as of 1980, U.S. investment in South Africa (stood at)

...between $5 and billion: $1.8 billion in direct involvement; $2.2 billion in private bank loans; and almost $2 billion in portfolio investment (primarily gold stocks). This investment, over 20% of the total foreign investment... is concentrated in the computer industry, transportation, energy and steel.35

Adelman notes further that although the bulk of American investment in South Africa comes from 'Fortune 500' firms,

"a mere four corporate giants, General Motors, Mobil, Texaco, and Ford account for half of all U.S. investments there; of the top 50 American corporations, 29 have operations in the Republic."  

Although the U.S. identified South Africa as a major outlet for investible capital in the post-war period, this investment was merely being built on early involvement in mining. From these earlier times (19th century):  

U.S. companies developed an important role in key sectors such as petrochemicals, metals, motor industry, agricultural equipment, and other manufactured goods. Major U.S. firms that later gained prominence in the U.S. and the world economies got an early start in South Africa. These included Singer Sewing Machine (1870's), Kidder, Peabody Co. (1870), Mobil (1897), General Electric (1899), Ford (1905), and Kodak (1913). By 1929 the following corporations had opened branches: National Cash Register, Armorand Company, National City Bank of New York, Prentice Hall, Colgate-Palmolive, Firestone, B.F. Goodrich, American Cynamid, 37 General Motors, and International Harvester.  

In the motor industry, American auto firms are among the oldest and, until recently, the dominant auto companies in South Africa. Ford Motors built its first plant in South Africa in 1923 and General Motors in 1926, while Chrysler entered the market in 1958. Both Ford and GM rank among the 25 top companies on the Johannesburg stock exchange. The United States investment in the motor industry in 1970 represented 25% of all the U.S. investments in South Africa.

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36 Ibid., p. 27.

37 Danaher, In Whose Interests, p. 47.
and cornered 35% of the market sales. GM and Ford also manufacture component parts; like batteries, spark plugs or radiators for use in their own vehicles. Dunlop, General Tire and Rubber Company, Goodyear and Firestone, supply more than 80% of the nation's tires. These companies have also supplied the South African Defense Force and police with transportation -- trucks, tires, et alia.

In the mining sector, which offers uniquely attractive business opportunities, half of the six million Krugerrand, valued at $1.15 billion, sold in 1978 went to American firms. Desaix Myers, III et al notes that the $15 million Americans paid that year in premiums "was greater than the $11 million U.S. mining companies made in direct investment in South African mining ventures." While the U.S. firms' direct foreign investment in mining and smelting rate of return on total book value between 1968 and 1972 in Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean stood at 5.3%

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and 12.8%, in South Africa it stood at 31.6%.\textsuperscript{40}

The American shareholders have approximately half of the Anglo-American Corporation's shares and...

...the corporation has assets of 1.7 billion rand and produces 40% of South Africa's gold, 37% of its uranium and 33% of its coal. The Anglo-American Corporation is part of a broader Anglo-American Group which also has other investments ranging from automobile manufacturing to breweries. Mining constitutes 70% of the group's activities.\textsuperscript{41}

Out of $3.3 billion of the $17 billion total investment in the South African mining sector from the U.S. and the European Economic Community countries, in 1975, close to $300 million was in the form of direct U.S. investment and an estimated $1.7 billion was indirectly invested in South African gold mines through the purchase of gold mining stocks by the American citizens and financial institutions.\textsuperscript{42} Union Carbide, U.S. Steel, Kennecott Copper Corporation, Newmont Mining Corporation, Phelps Dodge Corporation and Gulf and Western Industries, Inc.


\textsuperscript{41}Myers, III, et al, U.S. Business In South Africa, p. 224.

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., p. 225.
are some of the U.S. companies actively involved in the mining industry. Joy Manufacturing Company, Dresser Industries, Inc. and Ingersole-Rand Company supply the mining industry with the bulk of new technology and construction.\textsuperscript{43}

South Africa is heavily dependent on the U.S. for mining and construction machinery. For example, in 1976 South Africa imported mining and construction machinery valued at $74 million from the U.S.\textsuperscript{44} South Africa is enticing to the West because it has liberal mining, tax and ownership laws which guarantee profitable foreign investment, and because of her unblemished record in fulfilling contracts and supplying minerals at reasonable costs.

In the oil industry, Caltex has a market share of 19.8\%, while ESSO, a wholly owned subsidiary of Exxon Corporation, has 2.0\%. Caltex's estimated annual sale in 1976 stood at $575 million, and ESSO at $107.7 million in 1977.\textsuperscript{45} Of course, Caltex's increased role in the oil

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{44}The managing contractor for the SASOL was Flour Corporation, which is a California-based process engineering firm. Honeywell Control Data and Raytheon have close business links with SASOL.

\textsuperscript{45}Myers, III, et al, U.S. Business In South Africa, p. 183. It should also be noted that, Texaco, Standard Oil of California, Phillips Petroleum, Getty Oil and Conoco were at one time or another feverishly engaged in oil exploration off the coast of Namibia before they halted their activities in 1975 after failing to strike oil fields which could be commercially developed and exploited.
industry has made strategic petroleum products more available to South Africa's military adventures.

In the computer and electronics industry, IBM, Burroughs Corporation, NCR Corporation, Sperry Rand Corporation, Control Data Corporation, Datapoint, Data General and Wang are the heart of the industry. While American subsidiaries or affiliates such as Bell and Howell Company, Cutler Hammer, Inc., F and M Inc., G.E. Company, Hewlett-Packard Company, Motorola, Inc., and Westinghouse Electric Corporation are in the specialized electronics field. Desaix Myers, III et al contend that "at best only 50% of all electronics imports are of U.S. origin." But he notes that

...the SADF, the Atomic Energy Board, the Uranium Enrichment Corporation, the South African Arms Development and Production Corporation, and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research are among the more controversial agencies using computers as well as administrative tasks.

As John Blashill rightly notes, U.S. businesses see South Africa as a place where profits are great and problems few. A place where their capital is not threatened by political instability or nationalism, a place where labor is cheap, the market is booming and the

46 Honeywell, Inc., withdrew its sales operations in 1975 for economic reasons.

47 Ibid., p. 197.

48 Ibid., p. 191.
currency is hard and convertible. Other attractive investment terms are repatriation of all current income, low-interest rates on loans, preferential transportation rates, cash rebates and tax concessions.

Although due to recession, returns on all U.S. investments in South Africa dropped to 9% in 1978, with returns on manufacturing investments falling to 8%. By 1976 the rate of return for U.S. manufacturing companies returned to 14% and stayed steady in 1977 and 1978, and for some companies, most notably computer and electronics manufacturers, South Africa continued to be a booming market. As one South African embassy official in Washington D.C. once commented, "the presence of companies like GM is at least a sign of international support."

But the presence of the United States support is not only visible in the investment sphere, but also in trade and aid, mainly through loans to South Africa, as shown in Table 4:3.

U.S. trade with South Africa, though likewise small, has been on the increase. Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas notes that,

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51 Ibid., p. 41.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Financial Involvement in South Africa in 1982</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shares in South African Countries</td>
<td>$7.6 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Loans</td>
<td>$3.9 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Investment</td>
<td>$2.5 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to South Africa (1983)</td>
<td>$2.0 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Western Investment</td>
<td>$25.0 Billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey of Current Business, U.S. Federal Reserve Bank

The value of South African exports to the U.S. in 1974 stood at $650 million, a 74% increase over 1973 and more than twice the figure in 1972. South African imports from the U.S. rocketed to $1,200 million in 1974 up to 55.4% from the previous year and nearly twice the amount imported in 1972.\(^{53}\)

In 1975, U.S. exports to South Africa were $1.3 billion, representing 1.3% of the world total trade, while imports from South Africa stood at $0.604 billion, representing 0.6% of the world total trade.\(^{54}\) (See Table 4:4.) This made the U.S. the most important trading partner after Britain. South Africa has also immensely benefited from


\(^{53}\)Harsch and Thomas, Angola - The Hidden History, p. 114.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S. Exports to South Africa ($)</th>
<th>U.S. Imports From South Africa ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1.160 Billion</td>
<td>0.653 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1.302 Billion</td>
<td>0.881 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1.348 Billion</td>
<td>0.976 Billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: IMF Direction of Trade Annual, March 1979.)

either American support of loans from the IMF or from more than 50 U.S. banks and their overseas branches, which provided nearly one-third of the credits to South Africa—$2.2 billion in 1976 when South Africa's debt reached $7.6 billion as compared to $2.7 in 1974.\(^5^5\) Myers III, et al adds that American banks, with more than $1 billion in short term loans and trade credits and nearly $1 billion in long term notes, provided about a third of South Africa's foreign loans during the 1974-78 period.\(^5^6\)

Between 1974 and 1976, the U.S. played a very significant role in South Africa's acquisition of $2.7 billion worth of long-term international bonds and Euro-currency credits.\(^5^7\) In 1976 the U.S. helped South Africa acquire a


\(^{5^6}\)Ibid., p. 46.

\(^{5^7}\)Ibid., p. 42.
loan of $464 million from the IMF while utterly disregarding the fact that South Africa, with one of the largest gold stocks to back up its currency reserves, did not really need the fund's assistance at all compared to other countries, since she could easily raise the money needed by using gold as collateral. These U.S.-supported IMF loans to South Africa corresponded to the increase in South Africa's arms spending during the times they were given, (1976) as we shall see later.

Since the NSSM 39 had given the Ex-Im Bank the green light to encourage and facilitate U.S. exports to/and investment in South Africa, as we saw, the level of authorization from the Bank for loan guarantees and insurance quadrupled from 1971 to 1975. In 1971, the Ex-IM Bank was authorized to make up to $43 million available to South Africa, and the level of authorization was $162 million in 1975.

Since U.S. economic ties with South Africa are highly profitable, they have been marked by a high degree of collaboration with South African capital, both local banks and

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58 Frederick Wafula, "The IMF and the World Bank as Instruments of Underdevelopment in the Third World," (a research paper presented in Politics of International Trade class, Atlanta University, Political Science Department, Spring 1985), p. 20.

This same view was echoed by J. E. Spencer, who

"practical answer to insure the viability of Western
South African military ties are feasible and provide a
der-in-chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe, U.S.
- according to Admiral R. G. Cochrane, a one-time comman-

matters with the white minority regime in South Africa.

can, a degree of cooperation in defense and military
former two interests. Thus, in turn, has meant a gigantic,
defense interests in terms of long-term threats to the
get and economic interests have come to reinforce the

- sophisticated military equipment. Thus, the U.S. strategy

states also provided military personnel training and
military personnel and intelligence reports. The United
of military attaches in each other's country, but exchanged
these have grown, as the two not only increased the number
even earlier, but, it suffices to state there that these
readily seen how these ties stretch to World War II, and

with regard to military and defense ties, we have al-
ties.

- to the expansion and defense of the Western capitalist in-
have in time attached a strategic dimension which is linked
tation between units of foreign capital. Thus, these ties

from the Anglo-American, and by a considerable interre-

106
saw an alliance with South Africa as an appropriate way of meeting any presumed threat to the western interests. 61

Thus, it is not surprising that

...although the U.S. and its allies continued to turn a deaf ear to South Africa's reiterated interests in joining or formally complementing NATO, military cooperation proceeded routinely. Under the 1955 Simonstown naval cooperation agreement between Britain and South Africa, the U.S., as Britain's ally, acquired guaranteed access to South Africa's naval and air facilities in time of war, whether or not South Africa was a belligerent. American ships regularly called at the South African ports, and in 1959 U.S. ships joined British, French, Portuguese and South African units in joint submarine warfare exercises off South African coast. 62

As American naval ships continued to call at South African ports an agreement was signed in June 1962, allowing for the establishment of an American military space-tracking station in South Africa, in exchange for the sale of American arms to South Africa for use against the communist aggression.

The early 1970s saw an increased collaboration in the military fields as the Nixon-Ford Administrations approved "grey-area" sales involving light planes, helicopters, troop transporters and communications equipment. There was also an increased contact between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and South African Security officials as the


occasional visits back and forth of senior defense officials continued as routine matters. For instance, the Pentagon welcomed the head of South African Defense Forces (SADF), Admiral Hugo Biermann in 1974.

During his visit to Washington in early February 1973, Connie Mulder, South African Minister of Information, met with Vice-Admiral Ray Peet, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, in the Pentagon. Their discussion had implications for South African and American strategies in the Indian Ocean. They also referred to a recommendation by a U.S. research team on naval warfare from a 1970 school of naval warfare which stated that since South Africa possessed the strongest maritime force in the area, its navy should be invited to participate in a multinational naval presence in the area; even though political differences are to be anticipated.

It is now a well-known fact that despite the UN arms embargo against South Africa, Washington continued military cooperation with Pretoria and provided her with large amounts of sophisticated weaponry. In August 1963, the UN's Security Council passed a resolution calling on all members to voluntarily impose an arms embargo on the pariah racist regime of South Africa. 63 Desaix Myers III, et al,

63 Mandatory ban on arms shipments to South Africa was only passed in 1977 when South Africa had attained a near self-sufficiency and self-reliance in arms.
note that despite these resolutions banning exports of arms and munitions to South Africa, the U.S. has circumvented its rhetorics on observance of these resolutions by shipping "grey area" items which encompass materials of non-military nature, but could be easily converted to military and police use; for example, light aircrafts, specialized computer systems, certain electronic components and strategic spare parts.\textsuperscript{64}

Although the U.S. and her European allies were "honor-bound" to observe these embargoes

\ldots they felt free to go arming the South Africans with materials defined as strategic equipment for defense against external threats, though there were no signs that South Africa was at the time menaced by any foreign power.\textsuperscript{65}

Despite her declared intentions of strictly adhering to the U.N. resolution embargoing arms sales to South Africa, the U.S., through her ambassador in the U.N., Adlai Stevenson, maintained the position that,

\begin{quote}
As a nation with many responsibilities in many parts of the world (she would naturally have to reserve) the right in the future to interpret this policy in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security.\textsuperscript{66}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{65}Arthur Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 81.

Since NSSM 39 agreed to provide substantial quantities of military equipment to the South African armed forces, with the blessings of the Nixon administration, Cessna 185 sky wagons (whose U.S. Air Force version is designed U-17), Lockheed L-100 (whose U.S. Air Force version is designated C-130 Hercules) and Swearinger Merlin-IVs were exempted from the 1963 embargo with their declaration as 'civilian' products by the State Department.67

This flagrant disregard of the arms embargo by the United States was alluded to by the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1973 who lamented that,

...there has been... a massive erosion of the principles established during the 1960s, with significant sales of equipment aircraft, herbicides, even crop spraying aircraft... to civilian users who are likely to be connected with the military.... 68

Besides this method of arms transfer, some of U.S. arms also moved to South Africa by licensed production:

By these arrangements, U.S. corporations agreed to let foreign manufacturers produce weapons under license. The foreign manufacturer then shipped the item in question to South Africa.... The FMC Corporation, for instance, has licensed Oto

67Michael T. Klare and Eric Prokosch, "Evading the Embargo: How the U.S. Arms South Africa and Rhodesia," in Ibid, pp. 159-160. Klare and Prokosch also notes that the L-100s and the Merlins were "used to carry supplies to South African units fighting in Angola during the 1975 war, and... during the 1978 attack on Angola." For a detailed presentation of how the U.S. evaded arms embargo on South Africa, see Robert Sylvester, "U.S. Observation of The Arms Embargo," in Ibid., pp. 221-243.

68Quoted in Gervasi, "Breakdown of the United States Arms Embargo," p. 139.
Melara, a major Italian arms manufacturer to produce a version of the M-113A1 armored personnel carrier. It is the Oto Melara models which have been sold to South Africa... They were shipped from Italy. Oto Melara also produces or refurbishes the M-109 self-propelled gun under license, and sells it to South Africa. Bravia, a firm in Portugal produces the V-150 commando personnel carrier under license from Cadillac Gage of Detroit. The commandoes are then sent to South Africa.69

George M. Houser enumerated a number of transactions and events which characterized U.S. hypocrisy as to her commitments towards an arms embargo. The Johannesburg Star of 17 April 1971 reported that Olive Beech, head of the American Beechcraft Corporation, had announced in Johannesburg that South Africa's defense force could now buy light American aircraft for reconnaissance and training.70 The U.S. government also authorized the sale of helicopters to South Africa, such as the amphibious Sikorsky 62 that is capable of flying 400 miles without refueling and

69Ibid., p. 154.

70George M. Houser, "U.S. Policy and Southern Africa," in Frederick S. Arkhurst (ed), U.S. Policy Toward Africa, p. 108. Indeed between January and June 1971, Beechcraft sold 25 planes to South Africa. After President Carter had called South Africa a 'stabilizing force' and Vice-President Mondale had called it a 'good friend,' the Department of Commerce issued an executive order on February 16, 1978 implementing the United Nations' Security Council's mandatory arms embargo, but this order was never implemented since the Space Research Corporation exported substantial supplies of advanced design 155mm artillery shells whose range outmatched the Soviet-made artillery that had earlier harrassed the South African troops in Angola.
was used extensively by the U.S. Army in Vietnam. 71

Housner further notes that,

Several U.S. corporations have helped to supply South Africa with equipment that can be used for military purposes. For example, IBM has supplied at least four computers to the South African Department of Defense, while ITT's equipment and expert knowledge has been applied to the South African regime's communication systems. G.E., through its South African subsidiary, supplies about 95% of the diesel locomotives for South African railways. 72

Hence, this general slippage with regard to U.S. imposition of the arms embargo on South Africa was a conscious undertaking to incorporate, though de facto, South Africa into the NATO alliance system. According to Larry Bowman, the U.S. helped South Africa in its exact duplication of the 'NATO weapons family' (i.e. NATO's basic shoulder weapon, FN 7.62 assault rifle into an R-1 rifle); full computerization of South African "military stores items using the NATO classification system;" the charting of South African ship movements "in an operational area ranging from the Antarctic and North America to Bangladesh;" et alia. 73 Bowman adds further that since 1972 when NATO command decided to pay increased attention

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid., p. 109.

to developments outside the NATO area, authority was given to plan for the military protection of European shipping lines in the Southern oceans, and to complete a survey of North American and European oil arrangements for the next ten years. Thus, such contingency planning inevitably and informally links South African military with the United States and the entire structure of western defense systems.

All these military collaborations became more visible in the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, as South Africa became a dominant and aggressive military power. By 1975 she had built

...a large standing army, and a very large pool of trained manpower which could quickly be mobilized. It has also built a large modern air force with an impressive strike capability. (While its army had in its possession) hundreds of tanks and other armored vehicles which could be moved rapidly to any part of the Southern African region.

By 1976, South Africa had built one of the most formidable and awesome military powers on the African continent with the following inventory:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat aircraft</th>
<th>625</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Cars</td>
<td>1,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amored Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-propelled guns</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium and Light Artillery</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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74 Ibid., p. 149. See also texts adopted by the North Atlantic Assembly at its Eighteenth Annual Session, Bonn, North Atlantic Assembly, November 19-24, 1972.

75 Gervasi, "Breakdown of the United States Arms Embargo," p. 140.

76 Adapted from Ibid., p. 148.
While a large number of South African tanks are supplied by the U.S., 40% of the air force's active combat aircraft are "partly or fully of the United States origin." The United States helped manufacture or supplied, for example: M-3A1 armored personnel carriers, T-17 EL staghound armored cars, M-47 Patton main battle tanks, M-41 Walker Bulldog light tanks, M-113A1 armored personnel carriers, Commando N-150 armored personnel carriers, M-77 105mm self-propelled guns, M-109 155mm self-propelled guns, Lockheed F-104G star fighter jets, North American F-51D Cavalier coin aircrafts, Augusta-Bell 205A Iroquois helicopters and Lockheed Hercules C-130B transport aircrafts. 

Thus, the United States administrations have, despite the official policy to embargo military equipment and supplies to South Africa, acted in some ways or others to modernize and expand the South African military power by increasing its operational capacity, particularly the long-range strike capability. Gervasi submits that "if South Africa now threatens peace and international security in Africa, the responsibility lies in large measure with those states which have been assisting it militarily." Larry

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77 Klaire and Proksch, "Evading the Embargo," p. 153. A large number of Centurion MK105 with 105mm guns are United States' Patton tanks.

78 See also Gervasi, "Breakdown of the United States Arms Embargo," pp. 134, 153.

79 Ibid., p. 137.
Bowman contends that U.S.-South African security interests are nothing but "a rich mixture of subtlety, ambiguity and hypocrisy." 80

There are other cooperative programs in the fields of scientific research (particularly space exploration) and atomic/nuclear energy: (a) space research—on September 13, 1960, the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) announced an agreement with South Africa for the establishment of three tracking stations in South Africa, despite U.S. condemnation of the March 21, 1960 Sharpeville massacres in the United Nations. The most important of these stations had the deep space instrumentation facility, satellite tracking and data acquisition, with an operational budget of $25 million per year. The supplier of the equipment, technical supplies and finances was NASA; with South Africa's Council on Scientific and Industrial Research providing the staff, most of whom were trained by the United States. According to George Houser, this "program was of considerable help to South Africa because, among other things, it helped train South African personnel in advanced technology." 81

(b) In the nuclear/atomic energy field, collaboration goes back to 1954 when South Africa

80Ibid., p. 149.
...as an important supplier of uranium was invited to join the U.S., Britain and other European states in forming the International Atomic Energy Board. Through membership, South Africa acquired extensive technical information in the nuclear field. In implementation of President Dwight Eisenhower's 1954 'Atoms For Peace' program, which called for cooperation in the civil uses of nuclear energy between the United States and other nations, the United States and South Africa signed a 20-year agreement in 1957 providing for cooperation in nuclear energy research and eventually in the development of nuclear power. As outgrowths of these agreements, some 94 South African nuclear scientists were trained at installations such as Chalmers Ridge and Argonne National Laboratories, and Allis-Chalmers constructed South Africa's first research reactor, which went into operation in 1965.82

Consequently, "since 1962 the United States Atomic Energy Commission has worked with South Africa's Atomic Energy Board and cooperated closely with South Africa."83 The United States not only trained the South African staff members of South Africa's first nuclear reactor, inaugurated at Pelindaba in 1975, but "also supplied both a consultant for the Pelindaba reactor and the enriched uranium to start the reactor. Furthermore, the main contractors for the project were Allis-Chalmers and eight other American organizations."84

Ronald W. Walters, in his detailed expose of how the United States' private and governmental interests played a

82Study Commission on the U.S. Policy Towards Southern Africa, South Africa: Time is Running Out, p. 345.
84Ibid.
critical role in transferring nuclear technology to the white minority regime in South Africa, contends that

...while Allis-Chalmers provided a reactor to South Africa in 1961 at a cost of $450 million, other firms have since then provided additional materials which are crucial to South Africa's experimental nuclear activities. For example, special nuclear materials, largely enriched uranium fuel and plutonium have been provided by U.S. Nuclear, Gulf Oil, United States Steel, Texas Nuclear, and Gulf General Atomic. Source material such as thorium and depleted uranium have been provided by Kerr-Mcgee, Zirconium of America and Picker International, while by-products are traded by Beckman Instruments and Vernon Craggs. Edlow International was licensed to import materials from the South African reactor for reprocessing under the supervision of the United States Energy Research and Development Administration.85

Our analysis has so far shown that the United States has assisted South Africa in acquiring an extensive, technically sophisticated military capability, including radar, missiles, jet-propelled aircrafts, and possibly nuclear weapons. On its part, the South African racist regime has successfully utilized its strategic and economic significance and importance to the western capitalist world to bargain with it for increased political, economic and military support. It has additionally misused its growing military strength to harass her neighbors, like Angola and liberation movements like SWAPO, all in the name of keeping the region a 'free world' by warding off communist threats

which are epitomized by the Soviet Union.

Since South Africa "is highly interested in multilateral initiatives to safeguard South Africa and the Indian Ocean shipping lanes." this has meant close cooperation with NATO countries.86 This, in turn, has provided South Africa with leverage in regional conflicts to prove her worth to her allies. According to Larry Bowman,

If Vietnam had not brought forth the Nixon Doctrine, it could well be argued that South Africa would have produced it for the United States; the doctrine reiterates on a global scale little more than what South Africa has been begging the major western powers to allow it to do in Southern Africa for more than a decade. South Africa interprets its security concerns in terms of western defense, regional security, and the preservation of stability on behalf of the 'free world'. South Africa is eager both to accept Nixon's call for defense to be 'assumed by local or regional forces'....87

Bowman's submission is that South Africa is more happy in a rigid bipolar world, where "its stern anti-communism always found favor in the United States."88 Thus, when detente, a changed international structure, and a suddenly altered political situation in Southern Africa all combined, they came "to force South Africa to find new ways to stay close to the United States and Western European powers."89 This

86 Western Massachusetts Editorial Collective, "The Crisis in Southern Africa," in Ibid., p. 4.
87 Larry Bowman's "Comment" in Arkhurst, U.S. Policy Toward Africa, pp. 144-145.
88 Ibid., p. 145.
89 Ibid.
she did by dramatizing the communist threats on emotional issues such as western access to raw materials and the strategic and commercial importance of the cape sea route. By playing a disciplined game of enticing major western powers with its regional strength, geographic importance, and wealth of natural resources, South Africa successfully used these economic and strategic inducements to blindfold the United States and the western world of her racial policies and blatant aggressions and interventions against other Southern African states.

But the bottom line is that the United States sees the communist threat in Southern Africa as being a danger to her interests and must therefore maintain cordial ties with Pretoria, which is seen in Washington as a bulwark against the communist aggression/expansion. The United States has increasingly come to look upon the apartheid regime as a strong ally in the fight against communist (that is, Cuban and Soviet) influence in Southern Africa. This is how the United States formed an alliance with South Africa in her intervention in Angola.

**Soviet Union–Cuban Relations**

Although it is difficult to determine the nature of the Soviet-Cuban relationship, we can, however, observe clear-cut patterns on political, economical and military/strategical levels. According to Jorge Domínguez, it is the survival of the Cuban revolution that provides the basis of
this relationship.\textsuperscript{90} David Ronfelt saw geography, more than any other consideration, as explaining the attractiveness of Cuba to the Soviet Union. Cuba fronts the Southern border of the United States, well below the traditional track of war but nevertheless in a critical location. Major lanes for shipping petroleum and other commodities pass Cuba. In short, "Cuba's an island astride overseas access to the Panama Canal (sic)."\textsuperscript{91}

Although this relationship has witnessed and survived many jolts as a result of disagreements on many issues, it has blossomed and grown even closer since 1970. According to Martin Weinstein, Soviet economic assistance to Cuba has been essential for the survival of the latter's revolution in the sense that

\ldots the material underpinnings of Cuban national security would be devastated without Soviet support. Close alignment with the Soviet Union remains an indispensable pillar of Cuban national security policy, entirely independent of any joint overseas actions undertaken by these two countries."\textsuperscript{92}

Mesa-Lago and Belkin posit that


...the most relevant gains of Soviet has been political -- the establishment, successful defense against U.S., and consolidation of the first Socialist regime in the Western Hemisphere (anti-American and pro-Soviet) were accomplished in one of the countries closest and most influenced by the United States. Thus, Cuba is constant proof that Socialism is viable in Latin America and that U.S. power can be surmounted by a small nation.93

Hence, Soviet ties to Cuba "have been a great thing for the USSR to demonstrate the demise of the Monroe Doctrine and to have a pro-Soviet regime ninety miles from U.S. shores."94 Politically, Cuba has come to symbolize the piercing of the 'iron curtain'

...which American imperialism built up around Latin America aimed not only at securing a potentially rich market and the source of cheap raw materials, but also at the isolation of Latin American peoples from the other detachments of the world's revolutionary liberation movements.95

Furthermore, Cuba is a special case to the Soviet Union "because it is the only communist state in the Western Hemisphere and also because it became a communist state only a few years after its revolution, which was originally not a socialist revolution."96 In Fidel

94Weinstein, Revolutionary Cuba in the World Arena, p. 54.
Castro's own words 'the socialist revolution in Cuba would have been impossible if the Soviet Union did not exist; the imperialists would not have needed to use arms. They would have strangled the revolution with hunger; they would have liquidated it merely by means of an economic blockade.'

Thus, the fact remains that although the Cuban revolution could have occurred even if the Soviet Union did not exist, "Castro would not have embraced Marxism-Leninism nor would his regime have withstood the American economic boycott but for the assistance from the Soviet Union." 

Edward Gonzalez says,

The initial and continuing basis of the Cuban-Soviet relationship has been pragmatic. Havana required external protection for the revolution against interference by the United States, whereas Moscow sought to realize cold war and strategic objectives in the Western Hemisphere by rendering support to revolutionary Cuba. In addition, the ensuing ties between the two countries were reinforced by a commonality of interests. Cuba and the USSR shared the same international enemy - the United States. Moreover, both states professed their support for revolutionary movements through the Third World. Furthermore, with Castro's adoption of Marxism-Leninism in 1961, both Havana and Moscow shared a common commitment to the building of communism in their respective countries.

97 Quoted in Ibid.

98 Ibid.

But this does not mean that these relationships were smooth throughout, for they were recurrently strained by conflicts and divergencies over various issues. For instance, Soviet's peremptory and unilateral withdrawal of the missiles during the October 1962 crisis, which showed the Soviet Union's unwillingness to risk her security interests for Cuba's sake; Soviets' indifference in Vietnam; Soviet Union's lack of support or in most cases, opposition to Cuban involvement in Latin America; and many other issues pertaining to Third World revolutionary strategy/ideology and operational models for achieving communism.

This friction was aggravated when the Soviet bloc countries realized that they were subsidizing a model of communism which was "costly and unproductive." Gonzalez says the 1962 missile crisis resulted in two things: it demonstrated the weakness of the Soviet commitment to Cuba; and it abruptly reduced Soviet interest in Cuba as both a strategic base and revolutionary beachhead in the Western hemisphere.

Moscow's normalization of diplomatic and commercial relations with the Christian Democratic government of Chile in April 1965; extension of a $100 million in industrial credits to the Brazilian military regime of Castello Branco in August 1966, and (most galling to the Cubans) overtures for trade and financial assistance to the Columbian and Venezuelan governments (the two regimes under threat from Fidelista insurgent forces) in 1966 and 1967, all appeared
not only as abandoning Havana's revolutionary interests but also as directly subverting these interests.

In Vietnam, Havana felt Moscow had not deterred imperialist aggression nor actively responded to U.S. bombing of a bona fide communist state. With her memories of 1962, Cuba saw the Vietnam War as a reinforcement of her fears that Moscow was capable of sacrificing her allies for her own interest. Because of such differences, it was obvious throughout most of 1968 that Castro was maneuvering close to breaking Soviet-Cuban relations, although the final rupture never occurred.

The thawing relations between Havana and Moscow were given a boost in August 1968, when the Warsaw Pact forces occupied Czechoslovakia. Castro, while condemning the Warsaw Pact forces' occupation of Czechoslovakia as a

...flagrant violation of Czech sovereignty, also pointed out that it was politically justified because Czechoslovakia was moving toward a counter-revolutionary situation... and into the arms of imperialism... (and) it was absolutely necessary at all costs, in one way or another, to prevent this eventuality from taking place.100

He also posed another sarcastic question: "will they send the divisions of the Warsaw Pact to Cuba if the Yankee imperialists attack... (Cuba) or even in the case of the threat of a Yankee imperialist attack on ... (Cuba or if Cuba) requested it?"

100Ibid, p. 95
Since then Cuban-Soviet relationships have been characterized by mutual concessions and new bonds of solidarity, as reflected in economic and military fields. For example, the Soviets signed new trade protocols with Cuba in 1969 and 1970, and a Soviet naval squadron paid a highly publicized visit to the Havana harbor on the occasion of the July 26 anniversary of the Revolution -- this was the first time a Soviet naval fleet was honoring Cuba with an official visit.\textsuperscript{101} Then in November 1969, 650 Soviet technicians and diplomats led by the Soviet ambassador, spent a day cutting sugar as a gesture of international solidarity with the push for the ten million-ton harvest.

Gonzalez notes that, besides fully endorsing the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policies, and ceasing polemical attacks on the pro-Soviet Latin American Communist Parties while supporting some of them, Castro also paid tribute to the Soviet state because its existence had made it possible for Cuba to become 'the first Socialist country in Latin America.'\textsuperscript{102} He also lashed at Soviet's leftist critics in Latin America and Europe for their condemnation of the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia while acclimating the Soviet Union's supportive role in resisting imperialism in Vietnam, the Middle East and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{101}Ibid., p. 96.
\textsuperscript{102}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103}Ibid.
According to George Volsky, Cuba's allegiance to the Soviet Union, which oscillated in the early 1960s, has been a paramount factor in the island's political and economic life since 1968, ... prior to 1968, Cuban leaders occasionally advanced original ideas, publicly disagreed with Soviet policies, and insisted on carrying out a sui generis socialist revolution; after that date, the areas of foreign policy (and/or major international issues) they have not articulated views that differed from those in vogue in Moscow.104

Volsky adds that in organizing and hosting the meeting of 24 communist parties of Latin America and the Caribbean in June of 1975, Cuba enhanced the global interests of the Soviet Union as was demonstrated in the final declaration:

The conference energetically condemns the foreign policies of the leadership of the Communist party of China which flirts with Yankee imperialism, defends its presence in Asia and in Europe, justifies NATO attacks and slanders on USSR with some viciousness of the worst spokesmen of international reaction, fosters the aggressive militarism of the world bourgeoisie against it, promotes the insane policy of cold war against the heroic Soviet people.... The Chinese leadership also fosters everywhere groups of pseudo-revolutionaries who, from a false radicalism, divide the left, attack the communist parties, obstruct progressive processes and frequently act as enemy agents within revolutionary movements....105

In the Non-Aligned Movement, Castro has constantly called for the Movement to identify itself with its


105Ibid., p. 69.
"natural ally," the Soviet Union, as well as urging other members to align themselves with the Eastern bloc. At the UN, Cuba has consistently voted with the Soviet Union and the Third World nations on key issues.

However, posits Edward Gonzalez, "the Soviet Union's position was strengthened by the Cuban economy's need for maximum Soviet assistance."\(^{106}\) According to Sergio Roca, there is a high degree of Cuba's economic dependence upon the Soviet Union, whereby the latter extends massive financial assistance to the former.\(^{107}\) The Soviet Union generally support Cuba with credit, equipment and technical personnel for crucial projects which enhances Cuba's economic development such as construction and rehabilitation of sugar mills, nickel plants and nuclear power plants. The Soviet Union also heavily subsidizes prices of the principal Cuban exports, for example sugar and nickel, and of Soviet imports, for example, oil.

In terms of trade, Cuban exports to the Soviet Union from 1961-1976 averaged 43% of the total exports, and imports from the Soviet Union averaged 52% of her total imports.\(^{108}\) (See Tables 4:5 and 4:6.) Cuba occupies the

\(^{106}\) Gonzalez, "Relationship with the Soviet Union," p. 97.

\(^{107}\) Roca, "Economic Aspects of Cuban Involvement in Africa," p. 165.

\(^{108}\) Ibid.
seventh place in Soviet foreign trade, immediately following Eastern European countries. Its exports to the Soviet Union are sugar, nickel, cobalt, tropical fruits, tobacco and animal products.\textsuperscript{109}

When the U.S. Congress reduced Cuba’s sugar quota and set it at zero for 1961 and the following years, as a response to the July 1960 confiscation of most U.S. business holdings in Cuba, "the USSR and most Eastern European nations rapidly offered to buy varying amounts of sugar from Cuba and a multilateral agreement was signed in 1960 regulating these purchases."\textsuperscript{110}

\textbf{TABLE 4:5}

\begin{tabular}{cccccccc}
\hline
1.67 & 48.2 & 42.3 & 53.1 & 40.2 & 49.5 & 56.3 & 58.3 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


Expounding the level of USSR-Cuban trade, E.N.

Baklanoff contends that:

\textsuperscript{109}Kulski - \textit{The Soviet Union in World Affairs}, p. 245.

TABLE 4:6
Cuba's Imports from the USSR, 1960-1967 (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Communist bloc agreed in 1960-1961 to purchase 4.9 million tons of Cuban sugar annually, including three million tons by the Soviet Union, during the period from 1961-1965. Following somewhat the pattern set by the United States in earlier years, the Soviets entered in January 1964 into a new six-year agreement with Cuba to purchase a total of 24.1 million metric tons of sugar at a price of about six cents per pound.\[1]\[1\]

According to G. B. Hagelberg:

Since 1962, Cuban (sugar) exports to the Soviet Union have ranged from less than one million tons in 1963 to more than three million tons in 1970, 1975 and 1976, while other exports to other socialist countries registered a low point in 1964, with some 720,000 tons and a high point in 1971 with close to 1,770,000 tons. Comparatively, Cuba's sugar exports to other countries have been relatively stable, moving within a range of about 1.2-2.2 million tons. (See Table 4:7.)

The Soviet Union has repeatedly raised the accounting price put on Cuban sugar in these transactions. At the end of 1972, it was agreed to roughly double the 6-cent level that ruled throughout the 1960's; in 1974, the price is understood to have been increased to the equivalent of about $\[1\]111Ibid., p. 262. Baklanoff also adds that "only 20% of Cuba's sugar sales to the USSR were payable in dollars, with the balance being paid in barter, including agricultural and industrial commodities."
20 cents per pound; and in October 1975 it was announced that for the period of 1975-1980 the price had been fixed at the equivalent of about 30 cents per pound.  

By joining the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1972, a small underdeveloped island became involved in intricate designs for the division of labor, integration, plan coordination, and other aspects of a customs union of socialist countries a quarter of the way around the globe. Edward A. Hewett notes sarcastically that "Cuba has no common language and culture with the CMEA countries; the transportation costs are huge; and there (was) no genuine mutual appreciation of Marx and Lenin."  

But, these aside, he contends that:

The most striking characteristic of the period from 1960-1972 was the overwhelming importance of the Soviet Union in Cuba's relations with the CMEA countries. The Soviet Union has consistently accounted for 3/4, and usually more, of the CMEA countries' exports to Cuba. In the late 1960s, as Cuba's deficits with the Soviet Union grew large, the Soviet share in CMEA exports to Cuba rose to around 85%. Soviet imports from Cuba have typically ranged between 65 and 70% of all CMEA imports.... By 1972 probably 3/4 of all aids from the CMEA countries to Cuba, in the form of either loans for specific projects or of accumulated deficits, came from the Soviet Union.

112G.B. Hagelberg, "Cubas's Sugar Politics," in Weinstein, Revolutionary Cuba in World Affairs, pp. 40-41. In 1978, the Soviets committed themselves to buy Cuban sugar at a preferential price of around 40 cents a pound as against the earlier price of 31 cents and the current world price of 8 to 11 cents.


114Ibid., p. 57. See also Baklanoff, "International Economic Relations," p. 269.
### TABLE 4:7

Centrifugal Cuban Sugar Exports by Major Destination, 1970-1976
(Metric Ton Raw Value)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US %</th>
<th>USSR %</th>
<th>Socialist Countries* %</th>
<th>Other Countries %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia. (Source: International Sugar Council/Organization 1970. ff)

On joining CMEA in 1972, the Soviet Union...

...moved in several ways to sweeten the benefits of membership for Cuba.... In December 1972, less than six months after Cuba's formal accession, the Soviets granted Cuba a new loan of 300 million rubles for technical aid during 1973-75. More important... it postponed payment of the enormous deficits accumulated through December 1972 not covered under formal agreements. There were no more interest charges; repayments began in 1986 and it is spread over 25 years. There was also agreement on a substantially higher sugar price. After Cuba's entry there was also agreement on a substantially higher sugar price. After Cuba's entry there was also the implied commitment that all CMEA countries would participate in major investments to help Cuba better its huge nickel deposits. That agreement was subsequently formalized and signed by all CMEA members in July 1975....

---

115 Ibid., p. 64
As a result of such arrangements Cuba's cumulative trade deficit with the socialist countries reached $1,375.8 million from 1961-1967, with the USSR holding 83% of the trade deficit -- $1,145.5 million, as seen in Table 4:8.

**TABLE 4:8**

Cuba's Balance of Trade with USSR
1961-1967 (in millions of U.S. dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+38.3</td>
<td>-190.9</td>
<td>-296.9</td>
<td>-135.0</td>
<td>-106.0</td>
<td>-247.4</td>
<td>-207.6</td>
<td>-1,145.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The total exports from the USSR to Cuba from 1960-1972 were worth 5,542.9 million rubles. According to Edward Hewett,

The Cubans were able to pay with their own exports for 3,310.6 million rubles worth of those Soviet goods, or 60%. Since Soviet-Cuban trade has always been conducted on the basis of some sort of using dollar rather than convertible currencies, the remainder of these Soviet exports, 2,232.3 million rubles, is in fact the true value of Soviet aid to Cuba....

In terms of investments, the Soviet-financed projects in 1968 accounted for the following shares of Cuba's industrial capacity:

---

Electric energy - 30%
Steel - 95%
Nitrogen fertilizers - 100%
Sugar refining - 14%

In 1979, CMEA countries supplied the largest share of Cuban imported industrial machines and equipment, transport equipment, fuels, industrial raw materials and consumer goods.

In terms of financial assistance, the Soviet Union has aided Cuba in several ways, according to Sergio Roca,

By financing bilateral trade deficits, subsidizing sugar and nickel export prices and oil import prices, providing military equipment grants, extending credits for economic development, and supplying convertible currency to finance trade with capitalist countries. In 1976 alone... the sugar subsidy amounted to $897 million and petroleum subsidy was worth $375 million.... (Although) the Soviet price subsidies of sugar, nickel and petroleum are considered grants and are subject to repayment, however, Cuba's cumulative debt with the USSR was estimated at $4.6 billion in 1976, most of it arising from financing of bilateral trade deficits....

For instance, Roca shows how close Cuba is to the Soviet Union in terms of subsidizing oil:

Whereas the Soviet 'friendship price' of oil charged to other CMEA partners is estimated to have increased by 38% in 1979 over the previous year's level, the nominal oil price paid by Cuba remained heavily subsidized with its real price protected by the indexing clause. The importance to Cuba of continued Soviet aid in this area is magnified when forecasts of Cuban oil consumption and costs in the 1980s are considered.... If Cuba

117 These figures are adapted from Roco, "Economic Aspects of Cuban Involvement in Africa," p. 57.
118 Ibid., p. 166.
were to pay world market prices the oil bill in 1985 would (have) amounted to $1.5 billion or about 20% of 1974 GNP....\textsuperscript{119}

In 1976, the Soviet Union introduced another economic concession which consisted of an adjustment mechanism in her trade with Cuba "through which the value of a basket of Cuban exports is balanced against the value of a basket of Soviet imports, thus significantly reducing Cuba's trade deficit with the USSR."\textsuperscript{120}

By 1980 it was estimated that the Soviet Union was "underwriting the Cuban economy at a rate of more than $2.5 billion per year, as compared to an average annual rate of around $550 million in the early 1970s."\textsuperscript{121}

Table 4:9 shows that the total aid granted by the socialist bloc to Cuba in 1960-1969 may be close to $1.5 billion. Typical credits extended by socialist nations to Cuba have maturities ranging from 10-12 years and carry on an interest rate ranging from 2-2.5%.\textsuperscript{122}

Bearing in mind the facts that the U.S. economic blockade has prevented Cuba from overcoming her enormous economic difficulties and fully repaying the purchases from

\textsuperscript{119}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, p. 167.

\textsuperscript{120}\textsuperscript{Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Cuban Foreign Policy in Africa: A General Framework," in Mesa-Lago and Belkin, Cuba in Africa, p. 4.}


\textsuperscript{122}\textsuperscript{Baklanoff, "International Economic Relations," p. 269.}
TABLE 4:9

Some Credits Extended To Cuba: 1960-1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Year</th>
<th>Amount in Millions of Dollars</th>
<th>Annual Amortization Years</th>
<th>Interest Rate Percentage</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Development of metallurgy, electricity, petroleum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Development of mining (nickel and cobalt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>2-2.5</td>
<td>Chemical and fertilizer plants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>100-150</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>2-2.5</td>
<td>Finance trade deficit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>2-2.5</td>
<td>Finance trade deficit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>2-2.5</td>
<td>Development of sugar industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>2-2.5</td>
<td>Finance trade deficit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>Industrial plants and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Industrial plants and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Industrial plants and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Industrial plants and shipyard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country and Year</td>
<td>Amount in Millions of Dollars</td>
<td>Annual Amortization Years</td>
<td>Interest Rate Percentage</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checoslovakia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Electric and automotive industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Industrial plants, electricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Development of petroleum industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Development of mining (copper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Industrial plants and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Industrial plants, shipyards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Refrigerating and electric plants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Tractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Fertilizer plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$1,232</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Note: Not included in this table is $1.5 billion in military aid granted by the Soviets alone.
the USSR with her own exports thus leading to the former's huge balance of payments deficits with the latter since 1961, the USSR has been abundantly generous in granting Cuba long-term credits. According to Baklanoff, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe granted Cuba credits totalling $357 million for 1960-1969.\textsuperscript{123}

In the period between 1960-1972, about 40% of Cuban imports came in forms of loans, meaning that about 1/4 of all Cuban imports during this period came on loan from the Soviet Union. This also means that, on the average, the Soviet loans to Cuba were about four percent of her GDP of every year during this period.\textsuperscript{124}

More importantly, the Soviets loaned commodities particularly in unplanned loans which

\ldots were intermediate commodities crucial to Cuba's continued production of much of its GDP. The planned loans were primarily granted to finance machinery and equipment necessary for the growth of GDP; the unplanned loans financed mostly intermediate goods and primary products necessary to the production of the current GDP.\textsuperscript{125}

Since the value of all the planned loans, unplanned loans and unpaid loans are unknown it is hard to determine Cuba's indebtedness to the Soviet Union. However, Hewett shows

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{123}Ibid., p. 259.

\textsuperscript{124}Hewett, "Cuba's Membership in CMEA," p. 58. Hewett adds that "the particular 4% of the Cuban GDP which the Soviets loaned every year was composed of goods of considerable importance to production of the other 96% of their GDP."

\textsuperscript{125}Ibid.
that between 1960 to 1972 the Soviet Union gave Cuba about 479 million rubles in development loans. If this amount is compared to Table 4:10, then it is lower since the value of several loans is unspecified in some agreements.

### TABLE 4:10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Value (Million Rubles)</th>
<th>Uses</th>
<th>Interest Rate</th>
<th>Forms of Repayment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/13/60</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Geological exploration, expansion and construction of nickel and cobalt plants</td>
<td>2.5% on unpaid balance</td>
<td>Sugar and trade in exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1/61</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Geological exploration, expansion and construction of nickel and cobalt plants</td>
<td>2.5% on unpaid balance</td>
<td>Nickel shipments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/8/62</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Cuban export goods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/11/63</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>According to 2/13/60 agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/16/64</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Importation of land irrigation machinery and equipment</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Same as 2/60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/6/64</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Reconstruction of sugar industry</td>
<td>2.5% annual</td>
<td>Same as 2/60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/6/64</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Purchase of transport equipment for rebuilding process</td>
<td>2.5% on unpaid balance</td>
<td>Same as 2/60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Value (Million Rubles)</td>
<td>Uses</td>
<td>Interest Rate</td>
<td>Forms of Repayment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/20/65</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Geological exploration, material and equipment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Same as 2/60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/17/6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Equipment and other expenses associated with work on drainage and irrigation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>As in 1963-1965 loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/7/67</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Importing equipment and second phase of reconstructing sugar plants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Same as 1965 loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/15/68</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Construction of electric transmission line from Santiago de Cuba to Nuevitas</td>
<td>2.5% on unpaid loans</td>
<td>Same as 1960 loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/7/69</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Reconstruction of TV broadcasting network</td>
<td>2.5% on unpaid loans</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/8/70</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Construction of stations for relaying telephone telegraph, and TV signals to Moscow</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Same as 2/60 loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/13/70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Technical assistance in geology</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Same as 2/60 loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/18/72</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Expansion of thermo-electric transmission lines</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/22/72</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 4:10 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Value (Million Rubles)</th>
<th>Uses</th>
<th>Interest Rate</th>
<th>Forms of Repayment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/23/72</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>To allow Cuba to defer payments on all credits deficits issued up to Dec. 31, 1972</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Repayment to start 1986 for a period of 25 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In nuce, we can clearly see Cuba's economic reliance on the USSR in Table 4:11.

This heavy dependence on the Soviet Union has meant that:

The USSR has the capacity to cut the supply to Cuba of virtually all oil, most capital foodstuff and raw material, about a third of basic capital and intermediate goods, and all weaponry. In addition, loss of Soviet markets would mean an end to the purchase of about half of Cuban sugar and most nickel at subsidized prices. The USSR could also exert powerful influence over the GDR, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia to cease economic relations with Cuba. As with Yugoslavia and China, USSR could also stop technical assistance to Cuban economy. Obviously, Cuba would not be able to survive if the vital Soviet pipeline were cut. These are not hypothetical scenarios: in 1968 USSR used the oil stick (reducing the oil supply which forced rationing and economic slow down) and in the 1970s used the economic aid carrot to influence crucial shifts in Cuban domestic and foreign policies.126

126Mesa-Lago and Belkin, Cuba in Africa, p. 5.
### Table 4:11

Cuba's Economic Reliance on the USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Economic Aid to Cuba</td>
<td>$16.7 billion</td>
<td>1961-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Military Aid to Cuba</td>
<td>$3.3 billion</td>
<td>1961-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban Current Debt to the Soviet Union</td>
<td>$5.7 billion</td>
<td>1961-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba's percentage of total trade with the Soviet Union</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>1977-1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet share of Cuba's trade deficit</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>1961-1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Cuba's sugar exports to USSR</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>1975-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Cuba's oil needs supplied by USSR</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>1967-1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Cuba's foreign trade carried out by Soviet ships</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Doubtless, one day it will become evident exactly for what purpose this heavy Russian investment was intended for in the beginning, and whether it was decided upon simply because the Soviet Union was interested in a *quid pro quo* for underwriting the Cuban economy over so many years, (for example, it is estimated at $30 million a day).

Another area of importance in the Cuban-Soviet relations is the military. Over a period of time, there has been a growing Soviet military and security presence in Cuba. Jiri Valenta posits that:
At present, there are over 2,800 Soviet combat soldiers, probably engaged in training the Cuban armed forces for African missions and protecting sophisticated communication facilities in Cuba capable of intercepting U.S. microwave telephone conversations. In 1970, facilities for servicing visiting Soviet submarines were built by the Soviet Navy in Cienfuegos - a potential submarine base. Soviet airforce fighter units (MIG 23) have been engaged since 1977 in patrol missions while Cuban pilots serve in Africa.... (Since 1970) there is a close cooperation, particularly in Africa and the Caribbean, between the Soviet Union's KGB and Cuba's Direcjon General de Inteligencia (DGI).127

Because of Cuba's location, the Soviet Union has displayed interests in locating military facilities, building bases and stocking weapons in Cuba. According to David Ronfelt,

The Soviet Union has used Cuba for the positioning and/or support of medium-range nuclear missiles, nuclear-armed submarines and other warships, long-range reconnaissance and transport aircraft, boats for electronic intelligence gathering, eavesdropping antennas aimed at the United States, and communication facilities including via satellite.128

In positioning these medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, the Soviet Union aimed at advancing her national security with respect to the U.S.A. Although these efforts failed in 1962 and 1970:

The USSR did accrue some minor gains such as the use of Cuban harbors and airports to service warships and transport aircraft, a base for electronic intelligence gathering and communication facilities, and symbolically, the partial offsetting of the U.S. military presence in Europe.129

127Ibid., p. 143.
128Ronfelt, Superclients and Superpower, p. 3.
129Mesa-Lago and Belkin, Cuba in Africa, p. 6.
But this strategic importance of Cuban is minimized if it is born in mind that

...the USSR has a direct capability to destroy U.S. targets.... Hence, Cuba has a relatively low priority in terms of the Soviet's own national security vis-a-vis other regions or countries such as Eastern Europe, China and U.S.130

According to Edward Gonzalez:

The Cuban and Soviet militaries have had ongoing and institutionalized contact since 1960 when the USSR first began to supply armaments and training to Cuba. Indeed, the subsequent development of ties between the Cuban and Soviet military establishments constituted the most important, institutional linkage between the two countries during the 1960s, far overshadowing the relationship between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), whose official existence dates only from October 1965.131

Gonzalez adds that besides exchanging visits between high-ranking military personnel, "the Soviet and Cuban generals reportedly worked closely in coordinating the Cuban offensive in Ethiopia."132 He adds further that the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)

...became the recipients of material payoffs from the USSR in the wake of Angola. Most of the Cuban military equipment used in Angola was replaced by new inventories and upgraded weapon systems within two years of that operation. For instance, the Soviets supplied newer T-62 tanks to replace the Korean-Vintzen T-34 tanks, as well as Z-SU 23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns.133

130Ibid., pp. 6-7.
132Ibid.
133Ibid., p. 159.
In the Spring of 1978, Cuba received several MIG-23s which augmented her basic inventory of MIG-21s.

Thus, having regularly and continuously increased, trained and armed the Cuban armed forces, it is quite fair to concur with Gonzalez's observation that this:

Soviet support had enabled Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) to attain a new level of organizational combat proficiency by the mid 1970s. This enhanced proficiency, together with the reduced use of the FAR for domestic developmental tasks and the lessening of the external threat to Cuba as a result of the Soviet-U.S. detente, greatly increased Cuba's capabilities for carrying out overseas missions.134

In short, as Christopher Whalen notes, the introduction of these sophisticated Soviet weapons, which "are geared towards mobility and offensive missions has improved Cuban ability to conduct military operations off the island."135

The relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union shows how a small nation can exploit to the maximum advantage its relations with a superpower. According to Edward

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134Ibid., pp. 152-153. Besides these facts the joint Soviet-Cuban declaration signed on May 23, 1963, granted Cuba Soviet military support 'if an attack were made against Cuba in violation of the obligation undertaken by the President of the USA of not invading that country, the Soviet Union would carry out its international duty toward the fraternal Cuban people and would offer it aid necessary for the defense of freedom and independence of the Cuban Republic, with all means within its power.' Quoted from Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs, p. 245.

Gonzalez:

Beginning in 1960, Castro worked toward the... objective... (of) securing and then maintaining Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union as the extra-continental guarantor of the Revolution. The Soviets provided the indispensable political, economic and military lifeline over the years, which enabled the Cuban regime to break out of its revolutionary isolation and to offset its vulnerability to the United States.136

In acknowledging Cuba's indebtedness to the USSR, the Cuban President O. Dorticos Torrado said in a speech delivered in Moscow at the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birthday celebration on April 22, 1970:

It is enough to recall that at the time when imperialism began to threaten our country and prepare an aggression against us we received weapons necessary for our defense as a gift from the Soviet Union. When imperialism began to paralyze our economy by stopping oil supplies, the Soviet Union ensured the uninterrupted functioning of the economy by supplying us with oil. When imperialism closed its markets to our sugar, the Soviet Union decided to purchase it, solving without delay the problem of exports vital to us.137

This undoubtedly has meant a high degree of Cuban dependence on the Soviet Union, which Cuba has paid back "in large part by supporting the Soviet position in world affairs."138 As the relationship between the two countries grew closer there was also an identity of Cuban and Soviet views on global issues and situations, which made it

136Gonzalez, "Relationship with the Soviet Union," p. 81.

137Pravda, 23 April 1970.

possible for both of them to coordinate their policies toward these issues and situations. According to Leo Grande:

The virtual identity of Cuban and Soviet views on global situation makes possible a coordination of Cuban and Soviet policy in Africa and elsewhere. At the same time this enables Cuba to project its military capabilities abroad to much greater extent than if it were acting alone.\(^\text{139}\)

Thus by balancing their expectations they "are able to depend on each other as a relatively stable and reliable factor in the pursuit of their policy objectives."\(^\text{140}\)

Obviously, as Shoemaker and Spanier succinctly note:

There are many... factors that helped shape the complex relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. However, the underlying cause of change in the relationship was the strategic value that the Soviet Union placed on Cuba. As this calculation changed, Soviet willingness to pay the economic and political price for support of Cuba changed as well.\(^\text{141}\)

In general, this means, "Cuba is probably the closest, most dependable and most effective ally the Soviet Union has, excepting even East Germany and Bulgaria."\(^\text{142}\)

\(^{139}\)Leo Grande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, p. 2. See also Leo Grande's "Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa," in Mesa-Lago and Belkin, Cuba in Africa, pp. 15-16.


Considering all these facts, it can only be concluded that Cuba's foreign policy, although independent in regions, countries and issues which are less vital to the Soviet Union's national security and interests, is nonetheless "highly dependent in relation to regions/countries/issues which are vital to the USSR particularly when they affect Soviet national security."\textsuperscript{143}

So far this chapter has shown that geopolitical interests, more than any other consideration, explain the attractiveness of South Africa and Cuba to the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. While South Africa is strategically located and possesses strategic resources which are vital to the Western economies, Cuba fronts the Southern border of the United States. These geopolitical interests have led to institutional linkages that affected the exercise of influences and leverages by all sides. In both cases of South Africa and Cuba, the respective superpowers have made large political/bureaucratic, economic, military and moral commitments to develop and defend them. In summary, this chapter has shown how the superpowers have cultivated very close ties with their allies by subscribing to the same ideology, providing economic aid, investments and loans, transferring technology and providing advisory services and training, while stationing field officers and numerous civilian and military personnel in South Africa.

\textsuperscript{143}Mesa-Lago and Belkin, \textit{Cuba in Africa}, p. 10.
and Cuba. It has also shown how close the United States and South Africa, and the Soviet Union and Cuba are politically/ideologically, economically and militarily. These links have in turn augmented the superpower's capabilities of projecting their foreign policies in Angola through South Africa and Cuba.
CHAPTER FIVE

U.S. - SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA

U.S. Policy Objectives Towards Angola

The United States' policy objectives are based on three broad tenets. These are: 1) the United States must permanently reject isolationism and substitute it for an active involvement in international affairs; 2) she must challenge and contain communism which constitutes the principal threat, not only to the American way of life but also to world "democracy" and peace; and 3) pursuant to this, she must dedicate her foreign policy to contain the Soviet Union's (the carrier of communism) expansionist tendencies and influence. It is this anti-communist stance which in turn has defined the goals of U.S. policy in the Southern African region: to minimize the likelihood of escalation of violence in the area, as perpetrated from Moscow, with minimum U.S. involvement while protecting her economic, scientific, military, political and strategic interests and opportunities in the region.¹

Thus, the U.S. policy objectives towards Angola have

sought to enchanche her interests enunciated in Chapters Three and Four. In pursuit of these interests, Washington's goal has been to protect the Southern African region from what it perceives to be a deadly and diabolical campaign of destabilization orchestrated from Moscow. Hence, the U.S. made a commitment to actively preserve the status quo in the region. This truculent and inflexible policy objective was well-articulated by Henry Kissinger, who believed that "to foreclose Soviet opportunities is... the essence of the West's responsibility. It is up to us (the U.S.) to define the limits of Soviet aims."  

The application of such policy towards Angola meant relegating her to an appendage of Soviet policy.

According to Kevin Danaher, documentary evidence shows that top U.S. and South African officials have stressed the U.S. priority as "to stop Soviet encroachment in Africa."  

One confidential memo discusses how the Reagan and Botha Administrations see the Soviet Union and her allies as being the chief threat to the realization of stability and cooperation in the region. On the whole, the undergirding precepts of the U.S. policy towards Angola show that it was (and is) weak, anti-revolutionary, non-initiating,

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reactive, racist, imperialist and interventionary. It is pertinent to note at this point that while some themes of U.S. policy towards Angola are clearly stated, others are merely implied, and more so those which are stated did not relate to the dynamics of change in Angola nor to the realities of Southern Africa. On the contrary, they related most effectively to the static reality of the status quo, that events have revealed will be temporary.

Before Angola's independence, the U.S. sought to avoid confrontation with Portuguese colonialism. According to George Houser, Angola was never given a foci/place in the scale of American foreign policy priorities. If Angola was ever considered then it was in the context of U.S.-Portugal relations, and East-West politics. In the early 1960s, the U.S. had a very uncommitted policy towards the Angolan liberation movements. Gerald Bender notes that since 1960 U.S. Angolan policy has zig-zagged. In 1961, the Kennnedy Administration provided covert assistance to Angolan nationalists fighting the Portuguese colonialists. Later in the 1960s, the U.S. pursued a contradictory policy of covertly aiding both the Angolan nationalists and the

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Portuguese colonialists. For instance, despite the U.S. voting for the U.N. General Assembly's Resolution 1742 in January 1962, reaffirming the right of the Angolan Peoples to self-determination, deploring 'repressive measures' by the Portuguese, and calling for reform and for no support and assistance to Portugal, she turned around and voted with Portugal on all major issues involving the Portuguese colonies. In fact, Kennedy's appointed ambassador to Portugal, Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., recognized Portugal's 'civilizing presence' in Africa when he paid visits to Angola and Mozambique in 1964.

After Nixon's election in 1968, his administration not only cut its ties to the nationalists but greatly increased its support for the Portuguese colonialists. According to Bender:

The U.S. trained Portuguese officers in the United States and supplied Portugal with airplanes, equipment which could serve either civilian or military purposes, $400 million in credits and loans..., napalm, herbicides, and most importantly, moral support.... The sum total of American actions left no doubt about which side the U.S. actually supported in the wars of independence in the Portuguese colonies.6


Thus, the U.S. pronouncements in support of the idea of self-determination (not necessarily independence) were not reflected in performance. In Angola, as in the rest of Southern Africa, the U.S. followed a policy of normalcy in her dealings with the Portuguese imperialists and other white minority regimes, and a policy of benign neglect while dealing with liberation movements and independent African states. Courtland Cox contends that "towards the liberation movements, the (U.S.) government displayed a policy of callous disregard."  

By the Kissinger study's (commonly referred to as NSSM 39) recommendation, the U.S. adopted a general posture which compensated rather than abandoned her tangible interests in the white states. This study established an already known fact that U.S. policies towards Southern Africa have always been based on the white minority regimes. This study helped to develop policies which put the U.S. on good terms with these white minority regimes.

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Of the five premises and strategies outlined in the NSSM 39, Kissinger strongly recommended option two, which "called for the Nixon Administration to continue the rhetoric of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations and maintain public opposition to racial repression, but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states;" ⁹ that is, Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, and racist-ruled Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia. This strategy also called for "diplomatic steps to convince the black states of the area that their current liberation and majority rule aspiration in the Southern African region are not attainable by violence and that hope for a peaceful and prosperous future lies in closer relations with the white dominated states." ¹⁰ Thus, the Nixon Administration denied the existence of liberation movements by concluding that they were ineffectual, not 'realistic or supportable' alternatives to continued white rule. By questioning the depth and performance of black resolve, this report ruled out a black victory at any stage.

Pursuant to the strategies outlined in Option Two of the NSSM 39, the Nixon-Ford Administration put into place programs necessary for the success of their policy.


According to Cox,

The U.S. increased its military support to the Portuguese colonial regimes, South Africa and Rhodesia.... The U.S. shipped large quantities of herbicidal ingredients 2, 4-D and 2, 4, 5-E to Mozambique and Angola to be used against Africans in the colonial wars.... The United States also trained hundreds of Portuguese military personnel in psychological operations, intelligence gathering, precision photography... and biological and chemical warfare. Many of the personnel trained in the United States were used in colonial wars in Angola and Mozambique. Like their predecessor, the Nixon-Ford Administration gave the Portuguese tanks, armored cars, long-range guns and all the materials of war, under guise of selling equipment for NATO purposes.  

### TABLE 5:1

**U.S. Export of Herbicides to Angola (1969-72)**

(Millions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In short, NSSM 39 demonstrated the new rationale and direction which Kissinger's real-politik brought to Nixon's Southern African policy, that is, a closer relationship

11Courtland Cox, "Western Strategy in Southern Africa," pp. 41-42.
with the white minority regimes. On another scale, NSSM 39 put Angola

...in the context of a global struggle for power in which the Western capitalist countries, led by the U.S., compete with major communist powers, the Soviet Union and China, for strategic bases, for economic privileges and interests, for scientific and technological advances and for political influence. Morality, human aspirations, justice, or legitimacy do not intervene in such an analysis to disrupt the calculation of interest. Only what is tangible is realistic.¹²

A tangible demonstration of this observation is the sacrifice of the Angolan people's destiny by avoiding pressures on the Portuguese, who had claims to the Azores.¹³ Thus, as Waldeman A. Nielsen aptly notes, "U.S. NATO obligations and its security interests in the military base on the Azores played an important role in shaping U.S.


¹³The Azores Islands are strategically located in the Atlantic Ocean. The Azores bases are military facilities made available to the U.S. under a direct arrangement with Portugal, first signed in 1951. These bases provide a staging base for air transport, a refueling base for strategic air power and a communication center for naval operations in the Eastern Atlantic. The importance of the Azores was best demonstrated in 1973, during the Arab-Israeli war when they were used to ferry replenishments to the Israeli army. The Lajes air base on Terceira Island and its back-up field on Santa Maria Island, which represented an investment of $100 million, were crucial in the 1961 redeployment of U.S. troops in Europe.
policy toward Angola during Portuguese colonialism."\textsuperscript{14}

During its use of these bases, and even after the agreement had expired without renewal, the United States was very cautious in taking steps contrary to Portugal's wishes, be it at the U.N. or elsewhere. Viewed in this prism, "the independence of Angola, \textit{per se}, took a secondary place."\textsuperscript{15} The U.S. could not commit itself to support 'self-determination' for the Angolans, who were ruled by a NATO ally, because of their adherence to the NATO doctrine which barred Washington from taking any position in Africa that would impair cooperation with fellow members who had interests and colonial possessions in Africa. Thus, the U.S. strove to avoid stepping on the toes of the Portuguese until she had given up her colonial possessions. In reality, therefore, the Americans and other NATO nations were bound to continue supporting the Portuguese with their material needs in the colonial wars.

Even with the Portuguese decision to hand over power to the Angolans, this American policy towards Angola and the Southern Africa region was never reevaluated although

\textsuperscript{14}Waldeman A. Nielsen, \textit{African Batttleline: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa} (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 29. However, Nielsen notes, the treaty clearly excluded Angola and Mozambique from those areas covered in the case of an attack on NATO signatories and did not "in any way bind the signatories to support the colonial policies of other NATO members." (p. 30)

the approaches for achieving her policy objectives were forced to change, as we shall shortly see. Henceforth, an underlying desire in the United State's policy toward Angola was to create and maintain a "moderate" pro-western government in this former Portuguese colony. This came to entail an abortion of a fundamental socio-politico-economic reconstruction which could have given the Angolan people a direct access to, and meaningful utilization of, the vast rich resources of their country. Since the coming to power of the MPLA inevitably heralded the outright collapse of imperial rule, the U.S. was determined to thwart all her efforts. On the whole, U.S. policy in Angola has seen no efficacy and morality.

South African Policy Objectives Towards Angola

Although South Africa's foreign policy is based on "Pretoria's own perceptions of what is necessary for its future survival regardless of U.S. inducements...", her policy towards Angola has some underlying themes similar to those of the U.S.

According to Danaher, "the South African government has a long history of justifying its policies with anti-communist rationales." Thus, South Africa has successfully used anti-communism to rationalize her aggressive

17Danaher, In Whose Interests, p. 82.
policies in the region. By using this anti-communist theme, the South African government has justified its persistent and consistent covert and overt intervention in Angola. In an interview in the New York Times of February 17, 1983, Pieter Botha justified such interventions: 'if fellow Africans are threatened by the evils of communism, we shall assist them when our assistance is requested."

When it became inevitable that the Marxist-Leninist Soviet-supported MPLA was the main contender for power in Angola, the country was earmarked for a destabilization policy. Henceforth, Angola has been a perennial victim of South African destabilization efforts since she is viewed in Pretoria as a "puppet socialist state, propped up by the Soviet bloc...." But the most sarcastic thing to note is that South Africa being "the very heart of brutal white hegemony in Southern Africa has been allowed to appropriate the halo of resistance to communist aggression."  

In geopolitical terms, South Africa also defined her policy towards Angola in view of Angola's strategic location in the region. South Africa saw the MPLA's victory as perceptively drawing them closer to what they feared most - isolation on the continent with implacable hostile black

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governments. The MPLA's victory was bound to boost the morale and channel material support into the independence movement in Namibia, which had enormous South African and Western interests. These fears were enhanced by the fact that in due course Namibia, on gaining her independence, will become a stepping stone in the liberation of South Africa itself. The independence of Angola and Namibia would definitely incite the millions of blacks in South Africa, who will then agitate for own freedom more vigorously.

Kennedy W. Grundy notes that:

From 1975... South African policy (towards Angola) ... was pugnacious and militaristic. In a word, South Africa tried to destabilize neighboring governments to force them to forsake forces antagonistic to the white minority government in Pretoria. 20

Grundy notes further that:

There is substantial evidence, occasionally circumstantial but generally more direct, that South Africa pursued policies designed to subvert the governments and to engage them militarily in order to keep them from supporting revolutionary and nationalistic liberation movements harbored in their territories. South Africa was determined to pursue a forward defense of status quo, either by assisting dissident elements hostile to neighboring regimes, or by mounting direct incursions by regular or irregular units of SADF and ancillary security forces.... 21


21Ibid.
By increasing cross-border incursions into Angola by her SADF members and providing diverse support for UNITA, South Africa virtually occupied an extensive territory along Angola's southern border. The sole aim of the South African government was to punish the MPLA government and force it to 'pay' for its assistance to SWAPO. They also aimed at precipitating change in the government in Luanda, "or at least, a change in its policies vis-a-vis Namibia ...."22

Since the defeat of the Portuguese and the prospect of radical governments coming to power in both Angola and Mozambique signaled a fundamental change in the regional balance of power, South Africa justified her intervention ...

on the grounds that it was a logical step in the implementation of detente... it was designed to prevent a sudden shift in the regional balance of power that might have damaging consequences for the stability of both the domestic and regional order in the Southern Africa state system.23

As a result of this, South Africa has pursued a very aggressive policy in the region:

It has engaged, directly or indirectly, in the systematic economic and military destabilization of both Angola and Mozambique. As a result, South Africa has become a rogue elephant of Southern

22 Ibid.

Africa, and its behavior has been abetted by Western acquiescence.  

After South Africa's stunning humiliation in the Angolan civil war, P. W. Botha, then Defense Minister, and General Magnus Malan, the head of SADF, came up with a policy of "total onslaught" on Angola, and other radical regimes in the region. This policy "had to be met by a well-conceived, multifaceted total strategy."  

South Africa took upon herself the onus of checking the "intervention of predatory outside forces," led by the Soviet Union which covets Southern African minerals and strategic locations. It was in this vein that South Africa saw Angola, with the Soviet presence, as being a launching pad for Soviet infiltration and attacks on her.  

To counter this 'total onslaught' from the Soviet Union, the South African government has developed and pre-pondered a 'total strategy.' While the external dimension of this strategy has a conciliatory element, stressing economic cooperation, it is mainly confrontational and destabilizing. According to Callaghy, this policy is "character-gance", particularly during the Reagan Administration.  


25 Ibid., p. 268.  

26 Ibid.  

27 Ibid., p. 272.
Callaghy notes further that "South Africa is not sure it can rely on direct Western military support, but it knows it can rely on Western acquiescence." 28

But the naked fact is that South Africa has found ...the Soviet-bloc presence useful and may even seek to perpetuate certain aspects of it for specific purposes. It is, for example, a handy justification for destabilization efforts generally and military raids specifically. It helps somewhat to sustain partial Western acquiescence for these activities.... South Africa may even hope the Cubans will engage South African forces, forcing Western supporters to come to its aid with direct military assistance. 29

In short, South Africa's policy towards Angola is umbrellaed in her goal of maintaining herself as a strong economic military power in the region, while her neighbors remain in client status. By extending her hegemony over the region South Africa hoped to "generate approval and support from the Western powers, impressed by the regional contribution of a stable, rich, and powerful ally to the global struggle against communism." 30 Thus, South Africa "aspired to be a prime candidate for what subsequently came to be enunciated as the Nixon Doctrine." 31

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., p. 273. In 1980 South Africa bought Soviet arms worth $8 million and deposited them in UNITA-controlled territory and claimed that they were captured from the Cubans and FAPLA forces by UNITA.


31 Ibid.
Ernest Harsch notes that,

While Pretoria shared Washington's goal of preventing Moscow from gaining political influence in an independent Angola, it did so from a more immediate perspective. Washington was primarily concerned with the effects Angola could have on the detente relationship with the Soviet Union. Pretoria feared that MPLA regime, with Soviet backing, might provide greater support for the African nationalist groups of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa itself. 32

Ultimately, South Africa has effectively manipulated the "Communist threat" to garner for Western support in the protection of her abhorred and universally rejected socio-political order.

U.S. Involvement in Angola 33

As we have already noted, U.S. involvement in Angola goes many years back during the time of Portuguese imperialism, when she supported "ortugal and UPA. Although the U.S. gave the latter support to build up a liberation front the support was not enough to make it a real threat to Washington's NATO ally.

NATO's contribution to Portugal's colonial war in Angola and South Africa's military assistance is well documented. Thus, these contributions made the U.S. a mainstay of Lisbon's war against the Angolan liberation movement,

32Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, p. 27.

33The analysis of the superpowers' involvement in Angola is all the more difficult since parts of their involvements are still being played out and secrecy surrounds many of the aspects.
and since Angola's independence has staunchly supported the intervention of South African aggression forces.

In support of Portuguese colonialism, the imperialist powers led by the U.S. consistently gave military support to the colonial army of Salazar. According to Oleg Ignatyev, 50 sabre fighter aircraft were sent to Portugal within the framework of U.S. military aid in 1961. The same year, in connection with the commencement of military operations in Angola, NATO agreed that Portugal's contingent in the organization should be reduced to one division and the U.S. military advisors began to train the Portuguese army anti-guerrilla warfare tactics.

Noting in detail how the U.S. was deeply involved on the side of the Portuguese, Ignatyev reveals that

...in January 1963 the U.S. undertook to deliver 30 T-37C fighter aircraft to Portugal...(and) in 1963, former Commander-in-Chief of NATO Armed Forces, General Lyman Lemnitzer expressed admiration for the Portuguese colonial troops in the 'overseas territories' where they were fighting not only in defense of principles, but also of raw material and bases essential for the defense of Europe and the West as a whole.

It was because of such tangible support that a West German newspaper, Suddeutsche Zeitung wrote on April 22, 1969 that "Portugal's NATO allies, particularly the U.S., are

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35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., p. 15.
displaying increasing sympathy for her overseas policy."\textsuperscript{37}

On the demise of Portuguese colonialism, the U.S. was left with no other option than to get directly involved in Angola, in one way or another. According to Ernest Harsch:

The U.S. intervention in Angola came at a time when the memory of Washington's long and brutal war against the Indochinese peoples was still fresh. In fact, the scenario sounded all too much like a re-run of the early 1960s. First came the demagogic warnings about 'Soviet expansionism' in Africa and its alleged threat to 'American security.' Then came the revelations that Washington was already deeply involved, that for months large amounts of U.S. arms and money had been funneled to one of the sides in the civil war, that American pilots were flying reconnaissance planes over Angola, and that the CIA had recruited thousands of mercenaries for an 'undercover army....'\textsuperscript{38}

Initially, the U.S. wanted to use China in its intervention. Ignatyev reveals that, at the end of July 1975, George Bush, then U.S. ambassador to Peking, met confidentially with the Chinese deputy Foreign Minister, Ho Ying, and the Ministry's head of the African Department, Ho Kung-Kai and his deputy, Chou Ming-Chi. At this meeting, and the subsequent ones on Angola, discussions were focused on the situation in Angola, and the measures which should be taken to help the FNLA.\textsuperscript{39} "They agreed, among other things, that China would increase arms deliveries to Angola and that Chinese military advisors and instructors should

\textsuperscript{37}Quoted in Ibid, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{38}Harsch and Thomas, \textit{Angola: The Hidden History}, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{39}Ignatyev, \textit{The Secret Weapon in Africa}, pp. 120-121.
be with the FNLA forces in the field."40

Thus, as Portuguese imperialism was inevitably doomed, the U.S. and other imperialist forces hastily decided to coordinate their involvement in quest of forming a united front and working out a common program of action:

With this aim in view, the Provisional President of Portugal, General Spinola met U.S. President Nixon. The meeting took place in the afternoon of June 19, 1974 in the Azores in the Officer's Club Number 4 at the Lajes Base near Angra do Heroismo, and lasted for more than 90 minutes. It was described as a 'working meeting' at which the future of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, particularly Angola, where the U.S. had considerable capital investments, was discussed.

At about the same time the chief of the General staff of the Republic of South Africa Hugo Bierman made a 'private visit' to the U.S. where he conferred with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas N. Moore and other top U.S. officials. Commenting on the trip, the Christian Science Monitor wrote that the South Africans dreamt of U.S. cooperation in preventing the threat, which was originating from Mozambique and Angola, from spreading to Rhodesia and South Africa.41

Ignatyev adds that out of all these efforts there emerged "a sort of quadrupartite arrangement" involving Portugal, the U.S., South Africa and Zaire.42 But this arrangement became a tripartite one between the U.S., South Africa and Zaire, after the resignation of Spinola in September 1974. It was in pursuance of this ploy that on January 22, 1975, the 40 committee authorized the CIA to pass $300,000 to the

40Ibid., p. 121.
41Ibid., p. 134.
42Ibid., p. 135.
FNLA, which according to John Stockwell, "was historically the most war-like of the movements and which was thought to have the largest army." Stockwell adds that with Zairean and American encouragement, Holden Roberto moved his forces into Angola and began an attack on the MPLA in Luanda and Northern Angola.

By August 1975, Mobutu, Kaunda, Roberto and Jonas Savimbi had been incorporated into the CIA program as principal collaborators. There was to be no direct U.S. involvement but "a resupply operation to Mobutu's army, which had been selling arms to Roberto, and there was an understanding with Mobutu that no CIA arms would go directly into Angola." 44

Initially, Zaire alone was used to fulfil the imperialist designs and, in most cases, she also took direct action in enhancing these designs, by maintaining close contacts and coordinating plans, which were in turn implemented by UNITA and FNLA. It is plausible to note at this point that the U.S. wanted to duplicate the success of her policy during the Congo Civil War in Angola. According to Henry Jackson, "the 'Congo syndrome' is the practice by which the U.S. intervenes in an African nation (often in a period of crisis), identifies a local leader susceptible to a moderate or pro-Western orientation, and then provides

43 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 67.
44 Ibid., p. 89-90.
him with enough material to secure his victory over his opponents...."45

Thus, the 1960s' massive and direct-armed U.S. intervention in the Congo was, according to Immanuel Wallerstein, the opening salvo of more general U.S. involvement in Southern Africa since Zaire came to act as "the launching pad of a new U.S. attitude towards Southern Africa."46 For the U.S., a conservative regime in Zaire would have a true interest of helping establish a regime of exactly the same variety in Angola.

By using Zaire in the early stages, the U.S. hid her involvement on the side of the FNLA. Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas note that,

In the initial months of the CIA operations, when Washington did not want American arms to be seen in Angola, the White House... gave funds to Mobutu... to buy arms for the FNLA and UNITA from various European countries particularly Belgium. In addition the White House proposed sending $60 million in financial and military aid to the Mobutu regime for FY - 1976; of that amount, $20 million was for 'Security Supporting Assistance,' a category designed to support or promote economic or political stability. When Kissinger was asked during hearings on U.S. aid to Zaire before the Senate Appropriations Committee on November 22, (1975) whether


Washington was helping Mobutu 'do whatever he was doing in Angola,' Kissinger replied: 'yes.'

Thus, Zaire became a conduit of American armaments destined for the MPLA's rivals. According to John Stockwell, the U.S., with remarkable support from diverse military offices around the world, mounted the controversial, economy-size war with single-minded ruthlessness. The lumbering USAF C-141 transport continued to lift 25-ton loads of obsolete U.S. or untraceable foreign weapons from Charleston, South Carolina to Kinshasa, where small planes took them into Angola. The U.S.S. American Champion sailed from Charleston on August 30 with a cargo of arms and equipment. Any 'snaps' were handled by a phone call from the CIA to the White House, Pentagon, or State Department and the problem magically disappeared.

It was because of such U.S. support that enabled Mobutu to commit his elite 7th and 4th Commando Battalions by flying them in his C-130 planes. Because of the joint forces of Zairean, FNLA and Portuguese troops, the tide swung in favour of the FNLA as seen in the retaking of Caxito and their cautious advance toward Luanda. In short, Zaire was banked on to oppose Moscow's interest in Africa and to

47Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, p. 98. Mobutu was a staunch supporter of Holden Roberto, whose FNLA enjoyed sanctuary on Zairean soil. Although Mobutu singled out the leftist MPLA as the enemy of his kleptomaniac pro-Western dictatorship he nursed his own vested interests in Angola's oil rich cabinda. By conniving with the U.S. to orchestrate a campaign of ensuring the defeat of the MPLA Mobutu's Zaire became a vital link in the chain of U.S. involvement and policy towards Angola.

48This, of course, was intended to deceive the State Department, the Congress and the American public.

49Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, pp. 161-162.
advance Washington's interests. According to the New York Times of December 12, 1975, a U.S. high-ranking official revealed that "the American supplies were flown aboard U.S. C-141 starfighter transport planes to landing fields in Zaire, where they were turned over to the Zairean Army." This official admitted further that Washington had supplied five artillery spotter planes that flew over Angolan battle zones and returned to bases in Zaire. These planes were piloted by Americans. On March 13, 1974, Zairean regular troops invaded the oil rich Cabinda enclave and henceforth continued to fight alongside the FNLA. During the assault on Luanda, Zaire fielded three infantry battalions or 3,000 men and contributed at least 12 AML armored cars with crews totalling around 100 men, a 130mm Howitzer, an M-106, seven batteries and a shelling squadron numbering a further 100 or so men. These Zaireans were accompanied by 300 Chinese and 200 Portuguese mercenaries.50

To complement Zaire's efforts the CIA went ahead and recruited mercenaries, as it dawned on the U.S. policy makers that much greater outside support was needed to bolster pro-Western FNLA's and UNITA's efforts of gaining power. They enlisted the South African, American, French,

50See Wolfers and Bergerol, Angola: In The Frontline, p. 19. Senator John Turney (D-California) revealed on December 12, 1975 that Hercules C-130 planes of the U.S. Air Force were airlifting military equipment from Zaire to Angola. See Ignatyev, Secret Weapon in Africa, p. 173.
Portuguese, Belgian, and British mercenaries.  

The use of the mercenaries by the U.S. was deemed a perfect substitute for the expeditionary forces because they were not identifiable with the U.S. government or its policies, and, more importantly, they were immune to public criticism and debate. The techniques of recruiting these mercenaries in the U.S. were disclosed by the South African Daily Rand Mail of January 15, 1976:

Presently, American and other mercenary forces -- some from regular units who have signed letters of resignation from the U.S. Army and volunteered for Angola -- are working from base camps in Zaire and Zambia.... Recruiting is underway in the U.S. for more than 150 helicopter mechanics and pilots to handle a squadron of 13 helicopter gunships equipped with heat seeking missiles. These aircrafts are reported to be en route from France to Angola.

According to one of the recruiters, David Bufkin, a former U.S. paratrooper, the mercenaries were being offered $1,200 per month. Although President Ford denied on January 3, 1976, that the U.S. was training foreign mercenaries to fight in Angola, he admitted that the U.S. "does expend some federal funds - or U.S. funds - in trying to be helpful."  

But when these overall evil plans were exposed and the ploy was shattered, Ford and Kissinger were forced to explain that they had been provoked by the Russians to get

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51 See The Christian Science Monitor, 2 January 1976, p. 7 and Star Weekly (South Africa), 6 December 1975, p. 11

52 See Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, p. 100.
involved and as the former put it, the United States' "res-
sponsibilities for peace had been put to the test." Even
after the Senate had passed the Tunney Amendment, the arro-
gance of power seized Kissinger's intelligence, distorted
his judgement, and finally obsessed him with a policy
grossly at odds with the realities of the nationalist move-
ment in Angola. In trying to divorce Angola from Vietnam,
he rationalized U.S. involvement before the House of Repre-
sentatives on January 27, 1976 thus:

The U.S. - the people and this body - should under-
stand clearly that getting into war in Vietnam and
supplying arms to our friends in Angola are not
one and the same thing. No one is asking America
to send troops, and I believe none should be sent
in. However, some shipment of arms will be re-
quired if the pro-Western forces are to stand a
chance at all in the field against an enemy who is
being armed by the other power in... (the) war.54

This rationalization was a follow-up to the one he had
made on December 23, 1975:

The issue is not whether the country of Angola re-
resents a vital interest to the U.S., the issue is
whether the Soviet Union backed by a Cuban expedi-
tionary force, can impose on two-thirds of the pop-
ulation its own brand of government.55

Kissinger then went further and rationalized the use of
other forces:

53 Roger Morris, "The Proxy War in Angola - Pathology
of a Blunder," The New Republic Vol. 174 (January 31,

54U.S. Congress, House, Henry Kissinger speaking
before the Intelligence Committee, 94th Congress.
Congressional Record, January 27, 1976, p. 334.

55U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State, Press
Conference, December 23, 1975, p. 3.
And the issue is not whether the U.S. should resist with its own military forces.... The President (Ford) had made it clear that under no circumstances will... (the U.S.) introduce American military forces.\textsuperscript{56}

Thus, the U.S. had to get involved by any means necessary because:

The issue is whether the U.S. will disqualify itself from giving a minimal amount of economic and military assistance to the two-thirds of the population that is resisting an expeditionary force from outside the hemisphere and a massive introduction of Soviet military equipment.\textsuperscript{57}

To the Congress, Kissinger seemed to be crying 'wolf' and it did not buy his despondency allegation for on December 19, 1975 the Senate, amid charges of deception and angry allusions to Vietnam, passed a bill to curtail further U.S. covert involvement in Angola.\textsuperscript{58} Thus, the United States' intention of demonstrating her renewed power and authority in international politics became instead a display of impotence and uncertainty.

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{58}The Tunney Amendment, passed in the Senate by a vote of 54-22, prohibited the use in Angola of any funds from the Defense Appropriation bill (of fiscal year 1976) and the House of Representatives also followed suit on January 27, 1976 by a vote of 323-99. However, these votes did not terminate U.S. involvement, since under the 1973 War Powers Act, the CIA could still do so. The other loophole, for example, is that it did not foreclose the use of other countries in U.S. involvement. This came to the realization of Congress when the State Department capitalized on this loophole to secure a $10 million 'emergency loan' to bolster Zaire's ailing economy. This money was actually intended for FNLA-UNITA forces. See the \textit{New York Times}, January 20 and 21, 1976.
Reacting to this Senate vote, Ford exclaimed on December 19, 1975:

How can the United States... refuse equipment and assistance to the majority of the local people who only ask for military equipment to defend themselves? The issue in Angola is not, never has been, and never will be a question of the use of U.S. forces....

As the funds were cut off it dawned on the U.S. that the mercenaries and Zairean back-up of the pro-Western liberation groups was not sufficient to defeat the Soviet and Cuban-backed MPLA. Thus, it was this realization of the mercenaries and Zairean ineffectiveness which led the U.S. to enter into a de facto sinister alliance with the racist South Africa. In entering this alliance, the United States' role was somehow camouflaged. In short, South Africa's full-scale involvement in Angola was heralded by limited funds available to the CIA, the revelation to the American people of covert U.S. involvement, and the congressional limits debarring direct U.S involvement in a country where the U.S. had no established interests at a time when the Americans had developed a profound aversion to getting involved in foreign wars as a result of Vietnam's gruelling scenes on TV sets. This also was the time when the executive branch of their government had been stunningly weakened as a result of the Watergate scandal.

Ignatyev succinctly notes that:

In the hope of camouflaging its intervention in Angola, the U.S. increasingly used South Africa for this purpose by sending larger quantities of weapons, ammunition and transport means. A French press correspondent reported from Johannesburg on January 18, 1976 that South Africa purchased from the U.S. six giant Lockheed Hercules transport planes which were in fact a civilian version of the transport and troop-carrier C-130 aircraft used by South African Air Force.60

These American supplied C-130 aircrafts have been utilized by the South Africans to supply UNITA with arms and other supplies.

Then CIA chief, William Colby and Kissinger were summoned by Senator John Clark to answer blunt questions: 'What was the U.S. - South African relationship and was the U.S. involved in Angola?' Kissinger gave a vague answer: "The Soviet Union must not be given any opportunity to use military forces for aggressive purposes without running the risk of conflict with...(the U.S.)."61

In a press conference in January 1976, Kissinger eluded answering the question whether "the U.S. solicited South Africa's help to turn the tide against the Russians and the Cubans in Angola..." by invoking violation of 'the confidentiality of government to government communication.' However, he hinted: "But if you are making the statement, I won't call you a liar."62

60 Ibid., p. 173.
Nevertheless, in an interview with Newsweek (May 17, 1976), John Vorster was asked the question, 'would it also be accurate to say you received a green light from Kissinger for military operation in Angola...?' He replied, 'if you say that of your own accord, I will not call you a liar.' According to Thomas Callaghy, "during the Angolan crisis, very clear intelligence and coordination linkages were developed among Zaire, the U.S., and South Africa...." Some of these linkages survived the civil war and have grown even stronger. For instance, the charge by Senator Clark that the CIA was illegally collaborating with South Africa was substantiated by John Stockwell, who shows how the CIA and Bureau of State Security (BOSS) officials met regularly in Kinshasha and Silva Porto, and how the South Africans provided advisors, soldiers, supplies and an assortment of various weapons, many of them with U.S. or NATO origin, to the joined FNLA/UNITA/Zairean columns.

But as it became obvious that this unholy alliance would do as much damage to the U.S. interests as the Soviet and Cuban military aid was doing in securing a leftist government in Luanda, Kissinger tried to distance the U.S.

63See also Ibid., p. 156.


from South Africa. Despite his earlier hints that South Africa was intervening in Angola with Washington's consent, he tried to disclaim this complicity in a Senate hearing in early 1976:

...Some charge that we have acted in collusion with South Africa. That is not true. We had no knowledge of South Africa's intentions, and in no way cooperated with it militarily.66

Kissinger was fond of making such denials, which were only face-saving. For instance, during his earlier appearance before the same Senate committee, he had denied any form of U.S. involvement in Angola, even when the American mass media was full of revelations of CIA's clandestine involvement. According to the Senate Intelligence Committee's conclusion, it was revealed that Henry Kissinger and William Colby misled Congress about the extent of the CIA's activities in the 1979 Angolan civil war. At the time of these testimonies, both Kissinger and Colby knew that their testimonies were incorrect.67

When Kissinger testified on Angola before the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 29, 1976, he said, "the CIA is not


involved" in the recruitment of mercenaries for Angola.\textsuperscript{68} But he hinted, "it is, of course, possible that in a very indirect way that money has been given" to UNITA and FNLA, both supported by the U.S. According to John Stockwell, it was Kissinger who pushed the CIA "into the covert operation in Angola."\textsuperscript{69}

When, by July 1975, it became obvious to Washington that the MPLA forces had gained enough strength to take Luanda and its hinterland, and that Mobutu was economically exhausted and could no longer support Holden Roberto, who had not mustered tangible countryside political support, the 40 Committee came up with the following options on Angola: limited financial support and covert action, costing $6 million designed to redress the balance of forces in the civil war; provision of larger amounts of money, $14 million, and material to give Savimbi and Roberto superiority over Neto, provided the Soviets did not escalate its assistance to MPLA; and provision of substantial support to Savimbi's and Roberto's forces for a year, costing $40 million.\textsuperscript{70}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{68}Ibid., p. 1508.
\item \textsuperscript{69}Stockwell, \textit{In Search of Enemies}, p. 43.
\item \textsuperscript{70}Ibid., p 54. The 40 Committee is an arm of the National Security Council (NSC), which "directs covert wars, assassinations attempts, and coups in other countries.... From 1969-1976 the NSCO was dominated by Henry Kissinger, who often dispensed with its services altogether, giving his orders directly to the CIA." See Ibid, p. 154.
\end{itemize}
Thus, in resorting to a military solution to the Angolan civil war, Washington was plunged into "the costliest single covert CIA operation of its kind... (since Vietnam), the largest unilateral American intervention ever mounted in Africa." 71

Hence, it is facile for the Ford/Kissinger Administration to deny its knowledge of American involvement in Angola when:

On July 14, 1975, the 40 Committee had requested the agency to submit a cover plan for the Angolan operation. This plan was drafted by the African Division of the CIA and submitted on July 16. It was approved the same day by President Ford, who authorized the expenditure of $6 million. On July 27, Ford had authorized additional $8 million. On July 29, the first plane load of arms left South Carolina for Kinshasha. 72

By August 8, when the South Africans invaded Angola, Washington had decided to increase aid to the FNLA and UNITA to $25 million. 73 According to Stephen Weissman, Kissinger justified this covert intervention on the grounds that

...overt aid could have led to an 'unmanageable' and 'open' confrontation with the Soviet Union. Still, legal barriers might have been surmounted and the risk of disproportionate Soviet reaction


72 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 55.
Harsch and Thomas point out that the amount of American support was undervalued, for example, "a .45 calibre automatic pistol... was listed for as little at $5, and a .30 calibre carbine at $7.55." See Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, p. 97.

73 Ignatyev, Secret Weapon in Africa, p. 158.
to some overt aid lessened if Congress and the public had been as supportive as in the early days of the Congo rebellion. 74

In this connection it is also absurd for the Ford/Kissinger Administration to deny its connivance with South Africa when it is well established that there were several factors mitigating against full-fledged U.S. involvement. First, the Vietnam hangover was still heavy for the U.S. to juggle with another intervention; secondly, in the reigns of power was an executive branch, which, having been weakened by a Watergate scandal and headed by an unelected president, was unable to sustain congressional support for another U.S. involvement in a foreign war; thirdly, the CIA was under close scrutiny for its past malpractices and its operation of a covert action was greatly limited; and lastly, South Africa, though an international pariah, offered greater opportunities.

As we have seen, the use of South Africa came in the wake of the fact that neither Savimbi nor Roberto were good fighters and Washington was playing a wrong game and her players were losers. According to Nathaniel Davis, an assistant secretary of State for African Affairs, who resigned after realizing that the State Department was obstinate in refusing to perceive this reality, "When the U.S. intervention in Angola failed, such American supporters in Africa as Mobutu and Kaunda would be injured,

leaving Washington with South Africa as its only ally in the region. "75

In fact, just four days after the Senate barred additional funds for the CIA operation in Angola, Kissinger, on December 23, 1975, adamantly reaffirmed the United States' determination in her involvement in Angola by proclaiming that she will "make a major effort (in Angola), both diplomatically and on the ground..." despite the fact that the Senate had "severely complicated" her plans.76 As the subsequent section will show her "major effort... on the ground" was done via her most important partner in the imperialist intervention — South Africa.77

Although the then U.S. ambassador to the UN, David Patrick Moynihan, stated on December 14, 1975 that South African and U.S. intervention in Angola was a "convergence in policy" between the two governments and denied "any coordination of U.S. and South African operations" in Angola, he nonetheless admitted that the U.S. and South Africa "are doing the same thing, sort of."78

75Quoted in Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, p. 103. In the previous chapter, we established how South Africa's military machines and resources catapulted her into playing a role of a Western gendarme as compared to Zaire which had an ocean of economic and political problems.

76See Ibid., p. 106.
77Ibid., p. 108.
78Ibid., p. 109.
In refuting this denial of coordination, Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas contend that,

The fact that Washington and Pretoria were fighting on the same side in Angola was not mere coincidence or temporary 'convergence.' In fact, behind the absence of open, formal military relations between the two powers, and behind the smoke-screen of periodic denunciations of apartheid by the U.S. officials at the UN, lies an intricate and increasingly coordinated network of military contacts and alliances between Pretoria and its U.S. and European allies.79

South African Involvement in Angola

South Africa developed vested interests in Angola in 1961 with the outbreak of the nationalist struggle against Portuguese colonialism. As we saw earlier, and as J.E. Spence also noted:

The possible loss of Angola and Mozambique to nationalist African control was regarded as a direct threat to the security of the Republic's strategic perimeter and meant, in effect, the possible conquest of the buffer area traditionally protecting South Africa from continental African nationalist envelopment. This meant the Republic's control of South West Africa would be jeopardized, although African control of Angola was less dangerous than Mozambique (which shared a common boundary with South Africa).80

Thus, by 1969 South Africa had not only developed collaboration with the Portuguese in the economic field, but also in the military field. In the former, joint efforts led to the development of hydroelectric power at Cabora

79Ibid.

Bassa in northern Mozambique, Ruacana Falls, and the Kunene River scheme, both on the Namibian-Angolan border. The Cabinda oil was also a lure in view of the fact that South Africa was (and is) vulnerable to international economic sanctions.

But South Africa became seriously concerned by what was happening in Angola in 1968 when the then Defense Minister, P. W. Botha, pointed out in May that South Africa (had) an interest in what was happening in Angola. . . . The onslaughts there are aimed at the Republic in the final instance. About that we have no illusion.81

This alarming concern was echoed by the leader of the United Party, Sir De Villars Graaf, who issued a policy statement which warned that, "if the Portuguese troops failed in their operations in Angola and Mozambique, South Africa could be faced with a guerrilla war within weeks."82 He urged further that Portugal should be given help since, "in a sense they are fighting our battles and they are acting as the most effective buffers for us."

Nevertheless, when the military coup took place in Portugal in 1974, South Africa was exposed to what John Stockwell calls "fresh, chilly winds of black nationalism, as Mozambique and Angola threatened to succumb to Soviet-sponsored, radical black movements, which promised

81Ibid., p. 53.
82See The Sunday Express (Johannesburg), 4 August 1968.
increased pressure on Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa itself." Stockwell adds that, since "the White buffer zone was no longer viable," South Africa had to create moderate states (regimes), "which like Malawi and Botswana, would be friendly, or at least not hostile to South Africa."

Although South Africa has used a broad array of tactics in its involvement, for instance, sponsorship of UNITA bandits, commando raids on key economic installations and residential areas, air strikes and blatant full-scale invasions, generally there were three prongs of South Africa's intervention. The first prong involved "hot pursuit" of SWAPO guerrillas across the Namibian border; the second prong, the protection, through occupation of Southern Angola of the Cunene-Ruacana dam sites; and the third prong, the "joint struggle" with the FNLA/UNITA forces against the Soviet-Cuban-backed MPLA.

In her "hot pursuit" of SWAPO nationalists or in a cleaning-up operation across the Namibian border, South Africa had often penetrated as deep as 200 miles into Angola. As Harsch and Thomas note, "eventually South African troops made effective occupation in the Southern part of Angola. According to Wolfers and Bergerol:

83 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 185.
84 Harsch and Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History, p. 123.
Pretoria obstinately held to the hope that it could continue to occupy the Southernmost strip of Angola, along the Namibian border. Pieter Botha, (then) Defense Minister, declared that his country's troops would remain on the 'Angolan frontier region' until it received guarantees on the border and on South African interests....

Out of this fear, the South Africans "began talking of dividing Angola at the Cuanza." On completion of this division, reveals Wolfers and Bergerol, "the north could be for the MPLA, and the south for the Angolan government that would not support SWAPO." Thus, since her embarrassing withdrawal from the Kunene on March 27, 1976, South Africa has operated a fallback plan of "destabilization and continual undeclared border war in order to weaken the young revolutionary state's economic reconstruction and strike at SWAPO, which had seriously disappointed Pretoria."

According to Wolfers and Bergerol, it was the Kunene Dam and Ruacana River scheme which provided the pretext for the South African wars of aggression against Angola. The scheme had been projected in Portugal's Third Development Plan for 1968-1973 to "provide irrigation for the White farmers and cheap hydro-electric power to South Africa and

85 Wolfers and Bergerol, Angola: In The Frontline, p. 55.
86 Ibid., p. 60.
Western mining companies in the Republic of South Africa and Namibia." Therefore, by April of 1975, Pretoria had poured over R600 million in the project.

When the South Africans occupied the Calueque dam site on August 9, 1975 and Ruacana dam shortly thereafter, they claimed they had been 'provoked' into taking such an 'operational action' but would stay only to a certain time 'to protect the dam.'

Shortly after the South Africans crossed the Namibian border on August 9, and took positions at the Kunene hydro-electric project, they opened training bases for both the FNLA and UNITA, not only in Namibia but also in Southern Angola. But according to William M. Leo Grande, probably as a consequence of their allies' inability to gain the upper hand on the battlefield, South Africa intervened directly in the Angolan civil war on October 23, (1975). Under the code name 'Operation Zulu', some 5,000 South African troops launched an armoured assault from Namibia. The Chipenda column, as the force was called, moved rapidly up the coast covering 500 kilometers in just over a week.

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88Ibid., p. 12.

89Ibid., p. 13. See also Charles E. Ebinger, "External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War," Orbis Vol. 20, No. 1 (Fall 1976), p. 684, for a further discussion on the importance of these projects to South Africa.

90See Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, pp. 266-269 for a detailed presentation of this ploy.

But it should be noted that the South Africans began the
provision of arms and training to UNITA and FNLA fighters
in September at Runtu in the Angolan/Namibian border.

Thus, October 1975 can be pinpointed as marking the
first major South African intervention in the Angolan civil
war. This was the time when the MPLA was in control of
most of the cities along the Atlantic coast and was hard
pressing the UNITA forces towards the South. When the
FNLA-Zairean columns failed in their attempt to capture
Luanda before November 11 (Independence Day), a Portuguese
mercenary in the ranks of the FNLA retorted that:

The only possible help free from future compromise
was the South African, since they had with UNITA,
already advanced hundreds of kilometers into
Angola. The South Africans were contacted and on
the 8th of November, two Hercules C-130 planes of
SAAF touched down in Ambriz. From their bellies a
group of about twenty soldiers jumped out, impec-
cably informed and in a rapid operation, two gi-
gantic weapons and three 140mm Howitzers were
rolled down the back ramp trailer by trucks
carrying more than 1,000 projectiles....

Wolters and Bergerol adds that, against ill-equipped
FAPLA forces in the South, South Africa made rapid advances
northwards, overwhelming the FAPLA forces, which retreated
further north. But "if the South Africans had pushed
ahead, Angola might have been theirs. But the West's plan

92Wolters and Bergerol, Angola: In the Frontline,
p. 18; idem., pp. 19-23 gives a deeper analysis of the
South African involvement. See also Der Spiegel, 17
November 1975; New York Times, 12 December 1975, and the
Washington Post, 30 November 1975 for the exploits of the
South Africans in the war.
was for taking Luanda by the northern black force."\textsuperscript{93}

When South Africa intervened in Angola, it had just passed legislation empowering its army to intervene 'anywhere south of the equator' if its interests are at stake. In being more specific, on January 28, 1976, the then Defense Minister, P. W. Botha, tabled a draft-bill in the South African parliament, which many observers regarded as a "belated maneuver designed to justify the military operation in Angola."\textsuperscript{94} This bill gave the army the right to interfere militarily in areas beyond the South African and Namibian borders. When this law was adopted, South Africa, according to Ignatyev, "appropriated the 'right' to commit aggression against Angola on a 'legitimate basis.'"\textsuperscript{95}

Although South Africa was defeated in January, when it ordered its army to retreat towards the Namibian border, it obstinately held to Southern Angola, as we have seen. And even more interesting, as R. W. Johnson notes, South Africa was also under "enormous pressure emanating from Washington for (her)... to stay on."\textsuperscript{96} Hence, even though by March 27, 1976, the Kunene region had been emptied of South African troops, who had retreated by then into Namibia,

\textsuperscript{93}Ibid., p. 23.

\textsuperscript{94}Ignatyev, \textit{Secret Weapon in Africa}, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{95}Ibid.

"the SADF immediately began systematic border wars,"\(^{97}\) and henceforth commenced "the South African covert war of attrition..."\(^{98}\) against the Angolan people. By 1981 the war reparation had, "reached over $7,200 million in blown bridges, roads, and railways, bombed schools, hospitals, factories, oil depots, administrative buildings and homes."\(^{99}\) In short, the adventuristic aggressions of the South Africans are best portrayed in the words of the Angolan ambassador to the UN, Elisio de Figueiredo, who complained to the security council that South Africa "uses (Angolan) territory as its battlefield and (the Angolan) people as its sport."\(^{100}\)

But what is quite clear is that these destabilization acts are in the best interests of South Africa, if the words of Luis de Almeida, the Angolan ambassador to Paris are put into consideration:

The South Africans are worried because hostility in the West towards Angola is diminishing. Investors are coming in on a 49-50% basis with the government in agriculture, oil production and minerals. South Africa does not like that. They are trying to tell the West: 'Look, this region is for our economic influence. We are masters here.' Their

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\(^{97}\)Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola: In the Frontline*, p. 62.

\(^{98}\)Ibid., p. 127.

\(^{99}\)Ibid., p. 157.

\(^{100}\)See *Southern Africa* Vol. 13, Nos. 7-8 (July - August 1980), p. 6. Also quoted in Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto*, p. 83.
aim is to create instability and keep us poor and isolated if possible. Bombing is bad news for investors.101

Another view from Luanda is that the South African undeclared war, open aggression and subversion against Angola had 'undoubtedly... the military and financial backing of the Western powers', particularly the United States.102 For one thing, South Africa did not want to face the risks and bear the burdens of such a heavy involvement in Angola alone. It was with this reason that P. W. Botha, on November 27, 1975 called for a more direct involvement from the 'Free World' so as to counter Moscow's evil designs. But such a call can also be interpreted as meaning a need for Pretoria to incorporate the Western powers in her evil designs and to interpret it as a sign of political backing of her role in Angola. Thus, despite her increased military capability, these pleas for a stepped-up U.S. involvement indicates she is basically dependent on the West's backing in her destabilization campaigns in the region.

It is imperative at this point to continue our discussion on the support the U.S. has accorded South Africa in her destabilization activities in Angola. The main question to be addressed here concerns whether the South

Africans carried out this policy on their own, independently and/or without the knowledge and support of the U.S. government. Although the U.S. denies collaboration with South Africa, we have already seen the contradictory statements of the U.S. government officials and the South African government officials. But, according to John Stockwell, South Africa was in fact an ally of the U.S., as she "accepted voluminous intelligence reports and detailed briefings from the CIA stations...."\(^{103}\)

In a lucid presentation of this collaboration, Stockwell adds further that, since in the eyes of the CIA, the South Africans were an ideal solution for the Angolan problem, they encouraged the South Africans to involve themselves directly in Angola, as

...quietly the South African planes and trucks turned up throughout Angola with just gasoline and ammunition needed for an impending operation. On October 20, (1975), after a flurry of cables between the (CIA) headquarters and Kinshasha, the South African C-130 airplanes, similar to those used by the Israelis in their raid on Entebbe, feathered into Ndjili airport at night to meet a CIA C-141 flight and whisk its load of arms down to Silva Porto. CIA and BOSS representatives met the planes at Ndjili and jointly supervised the trans-loading. At the same time the CIA chief in Kinshasha requested and received headquarter's permission to meet BOSS representatives on a regular basis in Kinshasha.... On two occasions the BOSS director visited Washington and held secret meetings with (the top CIA officials).... The Chief of Station in Pretoria was ordered to brief BOSS about IAFEATURE, and nearly all CIA intelligence reports on the subject were relayed to

\(^{103}\) Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 181.
Pretoria so this briefing would be accurate and up to date.104

Elucidating his point, Stockwell points out that even though there were no memos written at the CIA headquarters saying 'let's coordinate with the South Africans,' coordination was affected at all CIA levels and the South Africans escalated their involvement in step with (America's) own."105

In fact, South Africa was viewed "pragmatically" as a friend and ally of the U.S. This was enhanced by the vested interests and links the latter maintained in the former, as we saw in the preceding chapter.

Since escalation of hostilities toward Angola was a game the Americans and the South Africans played very well together, in October the South Africans requested, through

104Ibid., p. 197. According to Stockwell, BOSS has had a traditional sympathy with CIA, besides enjoying a close liaison with it. For example, the two intelligence organizations had an identical violent antipathy towards communism as witnessed in the early 1960s when the South Africans greatly helped the CIA in recruiting mercenaries to suppress the Congolese rebellion.

105Ibid., p. 188. B. Asoyan reveals that during William Casey's (the CIA director) visits to South Africa in 1981 and 1982, "several agreements were signed on joint action against Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and other 'frontline' liberation struggles being waged by the peoples of South Africa and Namibia." See his article entitled, "The Neocolonialist Ambitions in Africa," in International Affairs (Moscow) Vol. 7 (July 1985), p. 13. And Danaher (In Whose Interest, p. 7) reveals that "a top-secret U.S. intelligence report revealed that the Reagan Administration had advance knowledge, via satellite photographs, of a 1982 South African invasion of Angola, yet chose to take no preventative action."
the CIA station chief in Pretoria, ammunition for their 155mm Howitzers. 106 At another time the CIA considered shipping arms to Walvis Bay in Namibia, so that the "South African efficiency would rush them by C-130 to the fighting fronts. When Roberto and Savimbi ran short of petrol, South Africa delivered small amounts in their C-130s...."107

In elaborating on this connection, Stephen Talbot reveals that:

In the South African parliament in 1978, (P. W.) Botha became the first senior South African official to publicly accuse Washington of encouraging and abandoning Pretoria's abortive 1975-76 invasion of Angola. The U.S. 'recklessly left us in the lurch,' Botha complained. Despite embarrassed denials by the State Department, Botha insisted that the U.S. planes had delivered arms to South African bases in Angola. 'I was there myself,' Botha stated, 'I saw how the arms were offloaded.'108

Later on, in November, South Africa approached the U.S. and other Western powers for more direct assistance to the FNLA and UNITA fighters, and an increased delivery of modern weapons to Angola.109 Arthur Gavshon's argument is that if Pretoria's account that both UNITA and FNLA sought

106Ibid.

107Ibid., p. 189. However, Stockwell hints that despite the CIA's continued cooperation with the South Africans, with tacit approval of the CIA heads, this cooperation did not expand beyond the policy level. Ibid., p. 190.


its "help for a phased pre-Independence Day campaign to reconquer South and Central Angola and to consolidate their hold in the east and north," was accurate, then

...it is hard to believe that Savimbi and Roberto had not simultaneously consulted their CIA liaison officers, who in turn would have reported to the headquarters at Langley, VA. It was always Kissinger's claim that he kept himself fully informed of what the much-assailed CIA was doing, learning and seeking to accomplish. If efforts of South African planning and their subsequent field collaboration with the CIA failed to reach Kissinger, then someone somewhere was keeping things from him.110

Since Kissinger did not bother to convey his disapproval of the U.S. being identified as South Africa's partner, he must have been aware of the links. Indeed, Stockwell amicably shows how the coordination between the CIA and BOSS corresponded to South Africa's escalation in their involvement in step with the United States. Ignatyev's position is that the United States did not only connive and seek cooperation with South Africa in her involvement in Angola, but the two actually "had specific mutual commitments and they fulfilled them...."111

In asserting this argument more bluntly, R. W. Johnson contends that the South Africans intervened because "Pretoria was being pushed hard by both France and the U.S."112 Obviously, adds Johnson, Pretoria would not have

110Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 244.
intervened simply by requests from Chipenda as:

She had already turned Savimbi down twice at least (in March and April) and was hardly unlikely to have risked her entire detente policy on the request of an erratic Chipenda. Pretoria, when approached to intervene by Washington and Paris, would doubtless have stipulated that she heard the request directly as well from those she was intervening to help...(sic). Pretoria was later to (reveal)... 'guarantees from a Great Power which were not honored,' as she was also to claim that (some) African Heads of States had pleaded with her to intervene.... Pretoria is fairly certainly telling the truth, for she would have been foolish indeed to intervene without very considerable inducements.113

Thus, Washington's inducements are reflected in the Pretoria-Washington coordination of the involvement:

On the day before Pretoria's first incursion, Roberto put his troops on full alert to march on Luanda, and Kissinger, using the CIA 40 Committee, began to pour funds on an unprecedented scale. Kissinger also stepped up pressure on Congress for aid at this point. South Africa was clearly to move into the South just as Roberto... swept down from the North.

South African troops stopped at the Cunene River, however, with Pretoria claiming that her intervention was solely motivated by the desire to protect the dam installations there. This is not true. There was no fighting going on near the dam -- the battlefield lay in the North. Secondly, Pretoria had not acted to protect the much more important Cabora Bassa scheme in Mozambique -- had indeed, withdrawn her troops protecting it after April 1974. Thirdly, had she wished to send troops to Cunene, she could have done so at any point after April 1974. She scrupulously desisted for 15 months -- and then sent them just as the FNLA offensive in the North was about to begin. It was a movement clearly coordinated with FNLA and only a Great Power could have persuaded Pretoria to it.... Any South African presence in Angola -- even right down on the Cunene -- was a major threat to the MPLA and might well force them to divert Southwards

113Ibid.
troops desperately needed to withstand the FNLA in the North. If this occurred, then the American-backed FNLA would take the capital, the MPLA might well fold up and Pretoria might do no more.\textsuperscript{114}

This stratagem definitely proves that "the Vorster government had stepped into the Angolan crisis at the insistence of the U.S., to hold the Western front..."\textsuperscript{115}

South Africa's destabilizing involvement in Angola has also been morally boosted "with the tacit approval of all major Western powers who continue to call for withdrawal of Cuba's internationalists from Angola rather than demand the unconditional retreat of the racist SADF from the Angolan soil."\textsuperscript{116} The United States' policy toward Angola has far-reaching implications as it encourages South Africa to resist not only a political settlement of the Namibian independence, but also it is interpreted as Washington's continuing hostility toward Luanda and a license for Pretoria's anti-SWAPO and pro-UNITA mischiefs in Angola. This policy strengthens South Africa's resolve against Angola's independence, which is seen in Pretoria as a harbinger for the eventual collapse of the white minority rule in the region.

According to Patrick J. Rollins:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{114}Ibid.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{116}Wolbers and Bergerol, \textit{Angola: In The Frontline}, p. 233.
\end{quote}
The connection between the Cubans in Angola and the South Africans in Namibia is not an obvious one. Further, the Cubans clearly have been deployed so as to avoid conflict with the SADF, and the Namibian question will exist with or without the Cubans. In fact, the two issues were originally linked in Washington. The American policy since 1975 has been to withhold recognition of Angola as long as the Cubans are present in force. However, in 1977 the U.S. did suggest privately that the Namibian question might be resolved by linking it to the withdrawal of Cubans. During the fall of 1982, Washington fell in line with Pretoria and adopted "linkage" as an official position.117

The U.S. voting pattern and veto use in the UN provides further evidence of this moral support. For instance, whenever the security council has voted to condemn South Africa's destabilizing activities in Angola, the U.S. has either abstained or used her veto power. Richard Leonard aptly notes that since the emergence of the Reagan Administration, South African aggression against Angola has not only increased, but the United States has consistently used her veto power to protect Pretoria "from economic sanctions and other forms of concrete action by the international community."118

At this point, it is worth noting that while Pretoria's role in Angola was undoubtedly motivated to a certain extent by her own egoistic interests, her involvement was done in full acquiescence of Washington, and her Western


allies, with the former providing active collaboration. In other words, the destabilizing war against Angola has "the open political and covert military support of the United States' administration."  

In arguing this point further, R. W. Johson contends that South Africa "had no very pressing reason to get involved (in Angola) and every reason for not doing so" because, after all, it had recognized and come to terms with Marxist FRELIMO in Mozambique. Consequently, South Africa would have stayed out of Angola "if only her Western friends would let her...."  

In concluding this chapter, it is best to do so by adopting Johnson's revelation of a U.S. - South African ploy to  

...create a great bloc of safely conservative and pro-Western Black Regimes in West and Central Africa stretching from Cameroon and the Central Africa Empire (now Republic) through Zaire, Gabon (and a de-radicalized Congo?), a UNITA/FNLA-led Angola, a Muzorewa-led Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), a Kapuuo-led Namibia, Botswana, Zambia and Malawi. Such a bloc (to which Kenya in the East will be added) would, especially if backed by South African and American economic and military muscle, leave the radical states of the Eastern seaboard isolated and impotent. The Russians and the Cubans would be evicted from most of Africa before they had properly got a hold.  

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119 Wolfers and Bergerol, Angola: In the Frontline, p. 233.  
121 Ibid., p. 133.  
122 Ibid., p. 263.
This plan, which was to hinge on the overthrow of the MPLA, was to work as follows:

First, UNITA, FNLA - and even FLEC - must reappear, harrassing the Luanda regime and establishing a credible anti-MPLA presence, assisted by a sympathetic publicity campaign in the Western press. The MPLA Regime must meanwhile be denied legitimacy as far as possible and attention focused on its shaky and provisional tenure of power. It will not be recognized by the U.S., it would be denied recognition by its closest neighbor, Zambia (which might again become a base for operation against it), it would not even be allowed into the UN. Savimbi must be built up as an anticommunist paragon. South Africa would assist the UNITA campaign and build up her own forces on the border, simultaneously complaining about MPLA atrocities and SWAPO complicity in them, and of SWAPO border attacks, provoking the need for 'hot pursuit....' Once a casus belli had been provided... South African forces would intervene with great force and speed in Angola, their armoured columns and paratroopers seizing control of all coastal towns... Having installed the UNITA/FNLA forces South Africa would then withdraw leaving behind Neto's Angola much the same way as Allende's Chile. Nujoma would be displaced by SWAPO's internal leadership, or would himself quickly rediscover the merits of the alliance with Savimbi he had earlier discarded. In Rhodesia, Smith would begin the transition to a Kenyatta-decolonization, in which the loudest praises for Zimbabwe's Kenyatta - Nkomo or Muzorewa would come from his old opponents among the white settlers.123

In short, the U.S. involvement in Angola, side by side with South Africa, is an indication of her dubious and diabolical manners of intervening against struggles for self-determination no matter where in the world and with who ever, no matter how evil.

123Ibid. Although this plan's evidence is mainly circumstantial and fragmentary, it is nevertheless a reflection of the intentions and practice of the U.S. involvement in the region.
CHAPTER SIX

SOVIET UNION - CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA

Soviet Policy Objectives Towards Angola

The overall Soviet policy objective towards Angola revolves around one of her foreign policy pillars - solidarity with progressive forces and governments. This policy can be traced to the second Comintern Congress of 1920, in which Lenin spoke of the opportunities to advance communism through wars of 'national liberation.' In the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's manifesto, it is stated that it is the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty to assist the peoples who have set out to win and strengthen their national independence," as well as "all peoples who are fighting for complete abolition of the Colonial system."¹ Subsequent Soviet leaders have pursued this policy to the hilt, though with varying emphases.

In supporting the MPLA, the Soviet Union also aimed at

weakening the imperialist and revisionist enemies - the U.S. and China; and converting the Angolan peoples, as well as other dominated Southern Africans, into friends, allies and ultimately partners in the Socialist community.

According to Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, Angola, prior to the Portuguese Revolution of April 1974, was not viewed as strategically essential by the Soviet Union. This was due to the fact that:

Soviet policy towards Angola was based on a consideration of objectives and tactics for facilitating them, but the existence of a specific strategy (was) somewhat ambiguous. Time constraints and deadlines may have led to an incremental, ad hoc and rather pragmatic approach emphasizing immediate tactical advantages rather than long-range, strategic ones and past Soviet experience with the ephemeral nature of African political alignments may also have downgraded the significance of the strategy.2

Thus, when the Soviet Union eventually undertook her policy options, wholeheartedly, it was only after the costs, risks, benefits and probabilities of success had been weighed and taken seriously into consideration.

The initial and basic Soviet policy objective in Angola was the installation of the MPLA in power. In achieving this objective, the Soviets also wound up preventing Zairean-American backed and Chinese-backed movements from gaining control of the country. Hence, in pursuance of the primary battlefield objective, they had to

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assist the MPLA to gain control of the entire Angolan territory, including the oil-rich Cabinda. Although this was accomplished with substantial arms shipments, the Soviets had to keep a very low profile so as not to attract massive American, Zairean and South African interference.\(^3\)

Once this objective had been attained, the Soviets developed an "image as revolutionary, an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and anti-racist power," while "embarrassing the United States and China by identifying them with counter-revolutionary forces and racist South Africa."\(^4\) The Soviet Union also showed the African liberation movements its reliability and the African states its opposition to separatism by endorsement of the OAU's principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and borders. Ultimately, it also showed the United States that its conviction about "detente would in no way be allowed to inhibit its behavior in Third World situations where significant superpower interests were not at stake."\(^5\)

Thus capitalizing on the West's, and particularly, the United States' failure to identify with the aspirations of the African peoples against colonialism, racial discrimination and other forms of exploitation, the Soviet Union had diametrically identified her interests with those of

\(^{3}\)See Ibid., p. 147.

\(^{4}\)Ibid., p. 148.

\(^{5}\)Ibid.
the Africans fighting against colonialism, imperialism, racial discrimination and other forms of human degradation and suppression.⁶

Many observers at the time believed that the Soviet Union was involving herself in Angola with the ulterior motive of gaining a foothold, from which she would project her aim of controlling the southern African region and thereby depriving the United States and her Western allies of vital raw materials as well as cutting their supply routes from oil in the Middle East. However, as we saw in Chapter Three, this claim is not only alarmist and borders on a declaration of war, but it also ignores the vital interests of the Southern African states themselves, who perceive the Western countries as major trading partners.

Keith Somerville, in dismissing this view, contends that it does not

...seem that Moscow would wish to control the region's resources for its own use. It has made no attempt so far to gain even preferential access to Angolan oil. It does not need the region's commodities desperately, and has no immediate interest in denying them to anyone else and thereby provoking a major conflict.

The region's strategic importance is undoubtedly appreciated by the leaders of the Soviet Union, just as it is by those of the West. However, despite close relations with Angola and Mozambique, the USSR has no bases in these countries... and there is no evidence that they have been sought. (Even if they were sought they will not be granted

since these countries' constitutions forbid such actions).

In supporting the MPLA, the Soviet Union also aimed at undercutting the Chinese influence in the Third World. According to Arthur Gavshon, the Soviets could not have allowed the Chinese-backed FNLA a "free rein to win," since this would have been for Moscow "a grave setback in the struggle for influence in the Third World."

As we shall see in a latter section, the Soviet's policy towards Angola was not uniform and consistent over the years, and it was not until 1974 that this policy underwent a radical transformation. Before then, it was tailored along the general African policy, and determined mainly by her geopolitical and strategic interests. Between 1964 and 1974, during which period the Soviet-supported Lumumba forces in the Congo were smashed by the West, and Nkrumah and Ben Bella were overthrown, the Soviets saw little prospect for revolutionary transformations in Africa. Since geopolitical interests gained prominence in her foreign policy, her "efforts were concentrated on areas of inherent significance - especially


the areas along her southern border (Iran, Turkey and India)." 9 Thus, North Africa, particularly Egypt, and not sub-Saharan Africa, became her area of interest because of its location.

Hence, it is arguable that when the Soviet Union decided to intervene in Angola in 1975, her policy

...was reactive rather than primary in the sense that there was no preconceived plan activated without regard to the intrinsic realities of the conflict. The Soviet policy developed incrementally and was reactive to the internal Angolan situation and the policies of other external actors. 10

However, factors and interests inherent in her foreign policy, as displayed above and in Chapter Three, are enough an explanation for the Soviet's motivation to get involved in a country far away, and even at the risk of wrecking SALT and detente.

Cuban Policy Objectives Towards Angola

In analyzing Cuba's policy towards Angola, it is quite obvious that her foreign policy, "like that of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, proceeds from the fundamental Leninist thesis of subordinating whenever necessary their national needs and interests to those of the worldwide struggle for socialism and national liberation." 11

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10Klinghoffer, The Angolan Civil War, pp. 149-50.
Although not the gist of our focus in this section, the question of whether Cuba is not pursuing her own policies in Angola, and Southern Africa, but those of the Soviet Union is one which stirs a lot of emotional controversies and outbursts. Despite attempting to steer clear of these controversies, this section will aim at striking a rational answer.

Cuba's policy towards Angola is staunchly internationalist in the sense that it is motivated by its serious commitment to the principle of international solidarity with the struggling peoples of the world. This principle has not only enhanced the efforts of these struggling peoples but also the survival of the Cuban Revolution, which was so dependent on such international assistance. However, it should be pointed out that Cuba's assistance is not motivated "by hopes of any direct tangible benefit for (herself), but rather in hopes of advancing the cause of socialism."\footnote{William M. Leo Grande, "Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy In Africa," in C. Mesa-Lago and J. S. Belkin, (eds.), Cuba in Africa (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, 1982), p. 19.}

According to Margaret Graham, the Cubans see it as a moral commitment to carry their revolution into their foreign policy by aligning themselves with those movements that they believe are committed to the same type of goals - to groups that they feel are aimed at liberation from colonial or neo-colonial regimes, from regimes
in which there is a high degree of inequality; and committing themselves to those movements that seem to have programs aimed at improving the mass of the people who may be dispossessed from enjoyment of the economic benefits within their countries.\(^{13}\)

In expressing international solidarity with the oppressed peoples, Ernesto "Che" Guevara said in 1963 that:

> We must practice true proletarian internationalism, feel any aggression as one committed on us, any affront, any act that goes against the dignity of man, against his happiness anywhere in the world. (sic)\(^{14}\)

In affirming this solidarity with Angola and other African countries still under the yoke of imperialism and colonialism, Raul Roa, the then Foreign Affairs minister, reiterated Cuba's position in September 1974: "To contribute to their immediate liberation by giving material, political and moral support is our duty."\(^{15}\) Since the birth of her revolution, Cuba has been unflinchingly and resolutely committed to international revolutionary solidarity. This principle has been pursued with ardent

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\(^{15}\)Monitored on Radio Havana, on September 21, 1974 and quoted in Nelson P. Valdes, "Cuba and Angola: The Politics of Principles and Opportunities," paper presented at the Conference on the Role of Cuba in World Affairs, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Pittsburgh, November 15-17, 1976, p. 9. Article 12 of the Cuban Constitution proclaims the internationalist duty to give aid to those fighting for national liberation or against imperialist aggression.
consistency even when it endangered her security in the hemisphere or her relations with other communist states.

While it is interesting to note that "Cuba's internationalist position stems from its unbreakable alliance with the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and the international communist movement,"\(^{16}\) it is quite obvious that its policy towards Angola in the 1960s was not being directed by or coordinated with the Soviet Union. This is so because while the Soviet Union's interest was waning, Cuba's was on the increase. But this does not mean that their policies were in conflict nor identical.

Jorge I. Domínguez, however, notes that this principle of 'internationalist solidarity' was "strengthened by the growing sense of gratitude to the Soviet Union for having made it economically possible for the Cuban revolution to survive... the persistent hostility of the U.S. government."\(^{17}\) Although ideology was the main motivator behind Cuba's policy towards Angola, she had other operational goals and objectives, which were: the assumption by Havana of effective leadership over the Third World, and the non-aligned movement in particular; and the lessening of her asymmetrical dependence on the Soviet Union and the

\(^{16}\)The African Communist, p. 58.

creation instead of a new alliance and partnership with the USSR on a more or less equal basis. However, the Cuban policy in Angola remained consistent with her ideology and her internationalist stance.

An interesting point to note is that while Cuba's policy towards Angola has been consistent and uninterrupted, the USSR's has fluctuated during the periods 1963-64 and 1972-74. When the Soviets interrupted the aid flow to the MPLA in 1963, it was as a result of the MPLA's debacle in the OAU, whereby the FNLA's GRAE was granted recognition by the Liberation Committee. The support was resumed in 1964, but waned in 1972 until it halted altogether in 1974. This was caused by the MPLA's internal squabblings, which were manifested in her poor military performance and defections.

Thus, when the Portuguese Armed Forces overthrew the Caetano dictatorship in April 1974, the Soviet and Cuban policies were not only operating under different assumptions, as Leo Grande notes, but were also at odds, though not belligerently so.\textsuperscript{18} However, Leo Grande notes further that two developments during mid-1974 "brought Cuban and Soviet policies towards Angola into harmony. The first was the arrival of Chinese arms and military instructors for the FNLA; the second was a decision by the U.S. in July to begin shipping arms to FNLA through Zaire."\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18}Leo Grande, \textit{Cuba's Policy in Africa}, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.
Since 1974, despite occasional policy differences, both Cuba and the Soviet Union seem to have balanced their expectations, goals and objectives, while depending on each other to pursue their respective policy objectives, which became almost identical. It is these identical policy objectives which in almost every respect has caused the U.S. to refuse acceptance of the "fact that the Cubans are capable of pursuing an independent foreign policy."\(^{20}\) Wolf Grabendorff notes that

\[\ldots\ \text{this fact can not be explained solely by Cuba's objective dependence on the Soviet Union. It is rooted in the assumption of the U.S. that any state the size of Cuba and within it own political sphere must naturally consider American interests when forming domestic or foreign policy.\(^{21}\)}\]

In conclusion of this section, it is logical to note that despite the marked contrasts of Cuban and Soviet policies toward Angola, and Africa in general, and despite a demonstration that Cuba's involvement in Angola was a logical extension of her historic policy of providing international assistance to progressive governments and liberation movements abroad, there ensued a discernible compatibility and increased coordination with the Soviet policies. Although Cuban and Soviet policies towards Angola, like in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, stood in sharp contrast to


\(^{21}\)Ibid.
one another during the 1960s, they from 1974 became not only increasingly coordinated, but also almost identical in concept and application as we shall soon see.

Soviet Involvement in Angola

To date, the analysis of the superpowers' involvement in Angola is all the more difficult since parts of it are still being played out and extreme secrecy surrounds many of their policy applications. However, it is not difficult to retrace the Soviet's involvement to the 1950s when links between the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the MPLA were forged. According to Arthur Gavshon, "from the late 1950s Moscow displayed an active interest in the MPLA, expressed first in terms of political support and then materially."22

However, the 1960s saw more moral than material support. Most of this moral support is reflected in Soviet-supported resolutions in the UN. For example,

On May 27, 1961 the Soviet government called upon all countries and peoples to force Portugal to end its bandit colonial war in Angola and fulfill the demands of the UN Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial countries and peoples. The Soviet statement said in part, 'it is impossible to shut one's eyes to the fact that what Portugal is doing in Angola creates a serious threat to peace and security of the peoples of Africa.... In these circumstances it is the duty of the UN to take effective measures to curb the Portuguese

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22Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 237.
colonialists. Such crimes should not be permitted in our times.'

In 1963, the Security Council adopted a resolution urging the Portuguese Government to recognize the rights of the peoples in her colonies to self-determination and political independence, end the war in Angola, and hold talks with national liberation movements. In collaboration with other nations, the Soviet Union succeeded in attaching to the resolution an appeal to all countries to cease arms deliveries to the Salazar regime in Portugal. Through the Soviets' campaigns, Portugal was later expelled from a number of international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, while her isolation in those organizations in which she retained membership became more and more pronounced.

As a result of the UN's Security Council meeting (held in Addis Ababa in 1972), which was engineered by the Soviet Union, the MPLA not only gained recognition by the UN and other international organizations, but admission to UNESCO, WHO, UN's Economic Commission for Africa, and many other international organizations. When the CPSU held its 23rd Congress in early 1966, Leonid Brezhnev, the then General Secretary of the CPSU, openly acknowledged Soviet support of the MPLA's, FRELIMO's, and PAIGC's struggles against

'foreign enslavers and invaders' when he said, 'Our party and the entire Soviet people actively support this struggle, (and) we are giving effective all-round assistance to peoples fighting against foreign invaders for freedom and independence and shall continue to do so.'

This support was echoed by V. Solodovnikov, the vice-chairman of the Soviet Solidarity and the Afro-Asian Committee, in an interview in Pravda of July 5, 1970, when he said,

The Soviet Union supports the armed struggle of the patriotic organizations of the Portuguese colonies. It sends them communication facilities, clothing, and other commodities and equipment essential for waging a successful struggle against the colonialis... Their military and civilian specialists are being trained in the USSR.

After the war had almost been won in 1976, the Pravda (3 January 1976) openly stated that, "the Soviet Union makes no secret of the fact that it has furnished and is furnishing moral and material aid to the patriotic forces of Angola, the MPLA, in their struggle against

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24See Ibid., p. 9. However, Ali Mazrui notes ironically that this support was not substantial enough to win the struggle against the Portuguese and waited "until the war (was) directly a conflict between the blacks" before they provided planes and men (Cubans) to their favorite faction (the MPLA). See his article, "Micro-Dependence: The Cuban Factor in Southern Africa," The Indian Quarterly Vol. 38, No. 3 (June-September 1981), p. 339. Additionally, Arthur Klinghoffer notes that "the Soviet Union did not attach a high priority to the anti-colonial movement in Angola but the Portuguese revolution heightened Soviet interest and led to (her) increased involvement in Angola." See Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 8.

25Ignatyev, Secret Weapon in Africa, p. 11.
colonialism."\(^{26}\) This support did not go unnoticed by the MPLA, whose President, Augustinho Neto, acknowledged in 1971 that the Soviet Union was "one of the most important forces upon which (the MPLA) rely on in the development of (the Angolan) liberation struggle."\(^{27}\)

Thus, by 1975, the Soviet Union can be said to have been an ardent, if not consistent, supporter of the MPLA in its struggle against Portuguese colonialism. This support was mainly through arms supplies, financial, medical and educational aid, as well as diplomatic efforts. The Soviets supported the MPLA because of its marxist orientation and strong ties to the Portuguese Communist Party. MPLA's rivals, the FNLA and UNITA, were regarded as reactionary groups with links to imperialist and revisionist forces, the U.S. and China.\(^{28}\) Although the Soviet Union's active support for the MPLA in its struggle against Portuguese colonialism goes back to the 1950s, it was not until 1964, after Neto's visit to Moscow, that she started sending arms to the MPLA. MPLA members were thereafter given advanced military, educational and scientific

\(^{26}\)Quoted in Ibid.

\(^{27}\)Ibid., p. 12.

training in the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The Soviets also cultivated very close ties with Neto during his numerous visits to Moscow: in 1966 and 1971, when he attended the 23rd and 24th Congresses of the CPSU; in 1967, when he attended the celebration marking the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution; and in 1970, when he attended the 100th anniversary celebration of Lenin's birth.

An interesting reason for Moscow's support of the MPLA was underlined by Stephen Larrabee who contends that:

Moscow sought to portray its support for the MPLA as part of a long-standing policy of help for national liberation movements as a whole in an effort to refurbish its tarnished image as the true friend of African revolutions, and particularly to counter Chinese influence. At the same time it sought to discredit the U.S. and China by depicting them as allies of South African 'racism,' a tactic designed to win Moscow support not only with the more radical African nationalists but with the moderates as well.29

Factors influencing the Soviet Union's involvement in Angola from 1975 are presented by three schools: the Kissinger school, which sees this involvement in terms of East-West conflict, that is, Angola is seen as just another prey in the Soviet's expansionist efforts at the expense of the U.S. and the West; the Stockwell school, which sees the involvement almost through the same prism as the Kissinger school, that is, superpower rivalry, but interprets the

29Larrabee, "Moscow, Angola and Dialectics of Detente," p. 177.
intervention as a response to the increased U.S. involvement in the war; and the Legum school,\textsuperscript{30} which sees the involvement as a tentacle of the Sino-Soviet conflict and Cuba's role as that of a Soviet mercenary.\textsuperscript{31}

According to Jiri Valenta,

The risks of an intervention on behalf of the MPLA were undoubtedly an important consideration in Soviet decision-making. The main Soviet concern was to assess possible U.S. responses to such an action and the repercussions on U.S.-Soviet relations. Judging from Soviet analysis in the summer of 1975, Soviet - U.S. watchers were aware of the domestic constraints under which the U.S. policymakers were operating after the collapse of South Vietnam in April 1975. Indeed, the Soviets viewed the outcome in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal as having far-reaching effects on the mood of the American public and U.S. Congress.\textsuperscript{32}

Contrary to the yarns spun in the Western press, the Soviets made a decision to involve themselves massively after the South African troops had entered Angola from the south and the FNLA-CIA-Zairean forces were rapidly encircling on Luanda. Thus, when the MPLA made an appeal to her friends for military aid to ward off this onslaught,

\textsuperscript{30}See \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. 54, No. 4 (July 1976), pp. 745-762, passim.


The Soviet Union quickly stepped up their flow of arms. After a meeting between Neto and Cuban commandant Flavio Bravo in May (1975), Cuba agreed to provide several hundred instructors to open four military camps for MPLA recruits.33

Although the Soviets turned down an appeal for military personnel, they took up the role of arms supplier to the Cuban-MPLA forces. It was not until 1976, when the Soviets also took up the role of transporting the Cuban troops, that "the compatibility of their policies became clear (and) the Cubans and the Soviets began coordinating their actions."34

In enhancing the Stockwell school's position that the Soviet involvement was a reaction to U.S. increased involvement, Leo Grande posits that:

...increases in Cuban and Soviet aid were essentially reactive. The West, especially the U.S., initiated the conflict by escalating its aid to the FNLA in hopes of promoting a military solution that could deprive the MPLA of any effective role in the coalition government outlined at Alvor. In view of both Cuba's and USSR's history of support for the MPLA, U.S. action virtually guaranteed a concomitant increase in Cuban and Soviet involvement....35


The state of affairs was so precarious that if the Soviet Union had not acted, the invasion by South Africa, backed by the U.S., would have definitely given victory to the FNLA and UNITA before November 11 - Independence Day. After the proclamation of the Peoples Republic of Angola by the MPLA on November 11, 1975, the Soviet Union accorded it full recognition:

Ships and huge Antonov 22 transport planes began disgorging tons of sophisticated arms in Luanda and Henrique Carvalho, including Soviet T-54 and T-34 tanks. Most telling were the 122-mm rockets that tore holes in the FNLA military front that had been pressing on Luanda from Caxito some 30 miles to the North.36

For the MPLA to have a decisive victory, they had to receive sufficient support, which in practical terms meant the right amount of sophisticated weapons and the right number of experienced soldiers capable of handling these weapons.

Since the Soviets could not send their own men and the MPLA fighters could not handle the sophisticated weapons like the T-54 tanks and 122-mm rockets, the Soviet leadership decided on a massive deployment of Cuban combat units and Soviet advisors to support the MPLA fledgling forces.37 At first the Cubans transported their combat troops on any available means of transportation - fishing ships, merchant


ships and civilian aircraft. Although Soviets were still cautious, according to Valenta, because they wanted to work within the parameters of international law, in October 1975 the Soviet Military Transport (VTA) had launched an emergency airlift of military equipment by medium and heavy logistic transport aircrafts (Antonov-12 and Antonov-22).  

As the Soviet and Cuban military involvement escalated in both quantity and quality, December and January saw what had originally appeared as a rescue operation develop into a broad and prolonged offensive. Thus, these months saw the Soviets take over the air and sea lifts of Cuban combat troops and launch a massive operation which effectively involved the Soviet Air Force and Navy. Valenta contends that:

> The Soviets had clearly learned from their experience in the early 1960s in the Congo, where poor coordination and shortages of sealift and airlift capabilities and experienced personnel had led to serious difficulties and ultimately to the failure of Soviet operations.... Soviet VTA aircrafts carried military equipments from the USSR to Algeria and Congo-Brazzaville to Angola, and Soviet merchant ships carried arms to the Congolese ports of Pointe-Noire and then to Angolan ports.

As the Soviet Aeroflot IL-62s were transporting reinforcements of the Cuban troops from Cuba, the Soviet Navy was playing a very significant role:

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38Ibid., p. 97.

39Ibid.

In simple sequence, this is how the Soviet Union and

advisors from Angola,
situation called for evacuation of Cuban units and Soviet

the pro-Western Zairian Navy, and to be handy in case a

instance, photo-note of Cuban units against attacks from
december served to protect the landing points for

deployment of amphibious landing ships in late November and
rectangle of progressive change, offshore, 42

by playing the role of what Admiral Gorshkov called a 'pro-

physical and psychological boost to the Cuban combat units

nael deployment. First, this naval presence served as a

There are two prominent reasons for this giant

sites. In

and coastal, and by electronic intelligence satellite.
over the Atlantic Ocean from the bases in Havana
reconnaissance aircraft (Tu-95R) deployed
ployment was also supported by long-range naval
beginning in january 1976, the soviet naval de-
U.S. carrier task group that did not show up.
emergent in January 1976. Thus cold move seems

Atlantic, in the central
carrier warfare (ACW) task force in the central

soviets Navy deployed at least one anti-

ships in reserve, near the fleet of Gibraltar.
and possibly submarines. The soviets keep addi-
sites, an intelligence collector, several auxiliary
a cruiser and a destroyer armed with guided missiles-
and Southwestern Atlantic waters, including a-
USSR deployed a number of warships in west Africa.

From early December 1975 to February 1976, the

221
Cuba worked in tandem: after the MPLA's request to Moscow for military personnel was rejected, the MPLA delegation made a beeline for Havana, only after assurances from Moscow that more arms would be sent in larger quantities and of higher quality. So when the Cuban combat troops arrived in Angola, the Soviet arms were already waiting for them and they commenced to work on them. Although the Cubans utilized their own transportation means in this early stage, by the end of the year the Soviets took over the shiplifting and airlifting of the Cubans in thousands. According to Jiri Valenta, the Soviets and the Cubans even went further in the late summer of 1975,

...(by taking) steps to insure that they could launch a massive invasion on short notice by negotiating an agreement with President Marien Ngouabi of the People's Republic of Congo to use Brazzaville as the staging base for Cuban military personnel sent to Angola....43

The Cuban and Soviet policies and activities in Angola became so compatible and coordinated that they even started issuing joint statements on the situation in Angola. For instance, in December 1983, when South Africa launched a massive offensive against the MPLA forces in Southern Angola on the pretext of "hot pursuit" against SWAPO guerrillas, the Soviet Union and Cuba called the invasion 'stepped-up American aggression' and demanded the complete withdrawal of the South African forces from the Angolan

soil. The Soviet Union and Cuba also resolved to beef up Angola's defense capacity so as to resist further South African aggressions. This warning was similar to the one issued after 'Operation Protea' in 1981. This devastating invasion of Angola spurred the Soviets and the Cubans to warn South Africa that the Cuban troops will in the future be used to resist South African aggressions. Subsequently, both the Soviets and Cubans stepped up their military assistance to Angola. According to Patrick Rollins, additional Soviet advisors arrived in September of 1981 and, "by 1982 Angola's two dozen MIG-21s had been replaced or reinforced by one or two squadrons of MIG-23s. The Soviets also built or augmented the air defense systems both in Southern Angola and around key Angolan cities."44 This was followed by a 25% increase of the Cuban troops, bringing their number to 25,000.

At a meeting held in Moscow on January 11, 1984 to discuss the situation in Angola, the Soviet Union and Cuba, expressed "solidarity with the Angolan people's struggle in defense of their revolutionary gains." They also reached an accord on providing aid to PRA (the People's Republic of Angola) in the matter of strengthening its defense capacity, independence and territorial integrity.45


Oye Ogunbadejo notes that:

The Soviet involvement in Angola was greatly facilitated by the Chinese (presence) and the speed with which Moscow found a close working ally in Fidel Castro's Cuba. Once Havana had let it be known that it would provide troops to fight side by side with the MPLA forces, the way was left clear for the Soviets to pump arms and ammunition, on a massive and unprecedented scale to Luanda.  

Stephen Larrabee contends that:

There is some indication that the Soviet leadership — perhaps under pressure from the military — may have regarded Angola as a test case for the use of non-Soviet troops to achieve Soviet policy goals. However, whether the initial impulse for the dispatch of Cuban troops came from Moscow or whether it was the result of Castro's own decision is not clear. What is clear is that the introduction of Cuban troops turned the tide of war and enabled the MPLA to defeat it two pro-Western rivals.  

Larrabee adds that this large influx of Cuban troops in the Angolan conflict not only precipitated a gradual shift in the military tide of the struggle, "but it also changed the nature of the war from one between raw Angolan troops unfamiliar with mechanized combat to a semi-conventional war by proxy...."  

Thus, the Soviets saw in the MPLA's victory very attractive advantages, despite the relatively low strategic considerations placed on sub-Saharan Africa. The Soviets prevailed in their objectives of dealing a blow to Western


48 Ibid., p. 179.
and Chinese influence when the People's Republic of Angola was created by the MPLA. But this did not happen without Cuba's assumption of the burden of field combat with the MPLA's foes. The Cuban presence allowed the Soviets to reap the benefits of their policy objectives with a relatively low profile and minimal problems accruing from their involvement without seriously injuring other policies with higher priorities.

Cuban Involvement in Angola

As we established earlier on, the fundamental principle undergirding Cuba's involvement in Angola was ideological, which flows from her commitment to international solidarity and rendering support to national liberation movements. Our main concern here is to establish how an island in the Caribbean only 90 miles from U.S. shores, with a population of about 10 million people, besieged by economic problems, lacking crucial raw materials such as petroleum, coal and iron, and isolated in the Western hemisphere during much of the 1960s could mount such an ambitious and gigantic operation in Angola in the 1970s. The large-scale depth and essentially successful commitment of regular Cuban combat troops to Angola, though not unprecedented, marked a new departure in Cuban military assistance to other Third World countries.

The first contact between Cuba and the MPLA dates as far back as August 1965, when "Che Guevara was taking part
in the guerrilla struggle in the Congo." According to Gabriel Marquez, the following year Neto, accompanied by Hoji Ya Henda, the Commander-in-chief of the MPLA, visited Cuba and met Fidel Castro. Marquez adds that, "owing to the conditions of the struggle in Angola, these contacts became sporadic." It was not until May 1975, when the Portuguese were preparing to withdraw from Angola and other African colonies, that Cuba began a serious involvement. It was then when Commandant Flavio Bravo, a high-ranking official of the Cuban Revolutionary Forces, met Augustinho Neto in Brazzaville.

Ali Mazrui sarcastically observes that:

It must not be forgotten that there was no Cuban army to help the liberation of Angola for as long as the Portuguese were still in occupation. MPLA fought the Portuguese for two decades without getting support of Cuban troops and without adequate supply of advanced heavy weaponry from the Soviet Union. It was only after the Portuguese left Angola in November 1975 — and the war had become primarily one among (Angolans) themselves — that the Cubans were suddenly available for Angola's liberation, and the Soviet was at least willing to supply war planes and heavy artillery. The conclusion is irresistible — neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba want to fight the Portuguese colonialist and risk confrontation with the NATO.51


50Ibid.

However, "Che Guevara's visit on the continent in 1964-65 stands as the principle point of reference in the history of Cuba's involvement" in Angola. 52 When "Che" Guevara's revolutionary forces withdrew from their noble effort of overthrowing the Tshombe government in the Congo (Leopoldville), part of the force remained in Congo-Brazzaville to set up training camps for the MPLA. Up to 1975, Cuban assistance to the MPLA consisted mainly of arms and training programs in Cuba and Congo-Brazzaville.

Leo Grande submits that:

Cuba's preference of the MPLA (like the Soviet Union) over its rivals (FNLA and UNITA)... was primarily ideological. Not only was the MPLA the oldest liberation movement in Angola, but it was also by far the most ideologically sophisticated .... From the outset the MPLA has adhered to a staunchly anti-imperialist, multi-racialist, and pro-socialist ideological position, and it has pursued a strategy of political organization primarily among the mestizo and black Urban working class of Luanda.... 53

Although it is hard to establish the exact date of the arrival of the Cuban troops on the Angolan soil, it is well established that in May 1965, when Neto asked for assistance in more arms shipments, he also raised the possibility of wider forms of aid. 54 In August 1975, a Cuban delegation, led by Commandante Raul Diaz Arguillo,

52 See Leo Grande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, p. 9.
53 Ibid., p. 13.
received a more specific request from Neto, for instructors to set up and run military training centers for the MPLA fighters. Thus, an armada of three improvised ships - El Vietnam Heroico (a passenger ship converted into a training ship), El Coral Island and La Plata (both modified merchant ships) - set sail with about 480 Cuban instructors. 55 Despite not receiving authorization from the Portuguese authorities to land supplies on the Angolan ports, "El Vietnam Heroico put in at Puerto Amboim at 6:30 a.m. on October 4, and El Coral Island arrived at Punta Negra on October 7, followed four days later by La Plata." 56

This contingent of Cuban instructors set up four training centers in Delatando (Salazer), Benguela, Henrique de Cavalho and Cabinda. But the establishment of these training camps did not significantly enhance the MPLA's standing in the power jostle and tussle. If anything, the MPLA found itself in "a less favorable position" than its rivals. 57 This predicament was enhanced by the fact that she "had Soviet weapons, but not the personnel capable of

55Ibid., p. 125.


57Marquez, "Operation Carlota," p. 124.
handling them."\textsuperscript{58} Hence, what emerges here is a picture depicting a desperate MPLA appealing to Moscow for both arms and troops, but getting only the former in large quantity and high quality. The latter is instead provided by Cuba. According to Leo Grande:

At this point, Cuban-Soviet coordination (of their involvement) was still relatively low. Neither country had departed sharply from its historic policy of aiding the MPLA, though the level of aid had been growing gradually since early 1975. The policies of both were essentially reactive, each successive increase in aid came at the request of the MPLA in response to escalations by the MPLA's opponents, domestic and foreign. Through the summer of 1975 both Cuba and the USSR appeared to be making independent decisions on their aid to the MPLA. As the compatibility of those decisions became clear, greater coordination was established.\textsuperscript{59}

Despite the Soviet armaments and the Cuban training, the MPLA's standing in the civil war considerably declined when the South Africans launched 'Operation Zulu' on October 23, 1975. As the South Africans rapidly moved towards Luanda, the MPLA had to grapple with this desperate military situation by appealing to the Cubans to help defend Luanda. Gabriel Marquez says that the Cubans heeded to this appeal on November 5 and sent one battalion, which landed on November 8.\textsuperscript{60} Thus, manning the Soviet-supplied BM21 40-pod mobile 122-mm rocket launcher (commonly called

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{60}Marquez, "Operation Carlota," pp. 127-128.
the Stalin Organ), the Cubans not only screeched, terrified and tore holes in the FNLA and South African columns closing on Luanda, but also revised the course of the war in favor of the MPLA. 61

It is important to note that the initial air and sea deliveries in the early part of the war were made primarily with Cuban civilian airliners (Britanias or Air Cubana) and Cuban merchant ships because the Soviets were still cautious of preserving the image of a non-violater of international law, at least before Independence Day. 62 However, the Cuban presence per se made a tangible difference: from November to December the Cubans stabilized the MPLA territories and in early January unleashed their major offensive in three different fronts at the same time. Some Western intelligence establishments estimated that between November 15, 1975 and February 3, 1976 the number of Cuban troops rose from 2,000 to 14,000 and that at its peak the Soviet Union transported 400 troops every day. 63

By 1976, the Cubans had not only helped the MPLA win independence and sovereignty but also recognition from all

61 See Wolfers and Bergerol, Angola: In the Frontline, p. 1-62 for a detailed presentation of the war.
62 However, Valenta reveals that the Soviet Union started playing the role of transporter into late October, when the Military Transport and Aviation (VTA) laundered an emergency airlift of equipment by medium and heavy logistic transport aircrafts (AN-12 and AN-22). See Valenta, "The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola," p. 97.
63 See Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, pp. 231-232.
over the world, except from the U.S. and her close friends. It is undisputable that the Cubans have played a crucial role in Angola - their teachers and doctors helped alleviate Angola's ignorance and disease, respectively, and their soldiers have played various roles. During the early months of the war they were tank crews, logistic experts and artillery gunners. They have stood by the MPLA during major confrontation with South African troops,

...flying the MIGs and occasionally shooting down the South African planes which frequently violate Angolan airspace; assisting in search and destroy operations against UNITA in the central and southern parts of the country; assisting the Neto (government) in squashing (the Nito Alves)... coup in 1977; (very ironically) protecting Gulf Oil installations in Cabinda; and perhaps most importantly today, providing the bulk of the training for the Angolan armed forces.64

As we saw earlier in Chapter Two, one of the cornerstones used to determine proxy relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union has been whether the latter made the decision for Cuban involvement. Cuba has on various occasions categorically denied that it took the decision at the behest of the Soviet Union. Fidel Castro, in his major discussion of Angola on April 19, 1976 contended that:

Cuba made its decision completely on its own responsibility. The USSR, which had always helped the peoples of the Portuguese colonies in the struggle for their independence and provided besieged Angola with basic aid in military equipment and collaborated with our efforts when imperialism had cut off practically all our air routes to Africa, never requested that a single

64 See Gerald J. Bender's "Comment," in Mesa-Lago and Belkin, Cuba in Africa, p. 152.
Cuban be sent to that country. The USSR is extraordinarily respectful and careful in its relations with Cuba. A decision of that nature could only be made by our own party.\textsuperscript{65}

Leo Grande, like Gabriel Marquez and others who determine proxy relationships on the basis of who makes the decision for the involvement, submits that "Cuba's decision to commit large numbers of troops in regular combat units was an independent one, not one directed by the Soviet Union."\textsuperscript{66} A Soviet official also concurred in 1976 by explaining, "We did not twist their arms. The Cubans wanted to go in."\textsuperscript{67} Marquez even contends that Moscow was only informed after the decision had been made.\textsuperscript{68}

However, Marquez admits that when the Cubans made the decision to intervene, they knew they "could safely rely on the solidarity and material aid of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries...."\textsuperscript{69}

On the other hand, Castro maintains that the decision was actually made by the Angolans:

\textsuperscript{65}Quoted in Gramma Weekly Review (18 April 1976). See also same quotation in Leo Grande, "Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa," p. 25.

\textsuperscript{66}See Ibid.

\textsuperscript{67}See The New York Times (5 February 1976). Also, the same view was reiterated by Fidel Castro during an interview with Barbara Walters of ABC-TV on June 18, 1978.

\textsuperscript{68}Marquez, "Operation Carlota," p. 128.

\textsuperscript{69}Ibid.
We simply could not sit back when the MPLA asked us for help. We gave the MPLA the necessary assistance to prevent a people fighting for their independence for almost 14 years being crushed. It was our elementary duty... to give that assistance to the MPLA regardless of the price.\textsuperscript{70}

In absolving the Soviet Union from the decision-making, Wolfers and Bergerol enhanced the above position by contending that:

The Soviet Union was involved neither in Angola's decision to turn to Cuba for help, nor in Cuba's decision to send their combatants.... The Red Army's role, decided by the MPLA, was to supply weapons that Cuba's regular army Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaries (FAR), knew how to use, and which could equal the South Africa's fire power...\textsuperscript{71}

This position, besides resembling that made by South Africa, also bears similarity to the Cuban officials contention that even those young internationalist fighters who went to Angola did so on their own volition. It becomes very difficult to point a finger at who made the decision in view of these contradictory statements. Most of these explanations are not sustainable. For instance, if the people of South Africa made a decision to invite the Cubans, would Cuba send its troops to South Africa or if the Cuban internationalists decided to fight apartheid would Castro let them go into South Africa?

\textsuperscript{70}Quoted in Wolfers and Bergerol, \textit{Angola: In The Frontline}, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid. This position is similar to the one made by South Africa, who also claimed the decision to intervene was made by UNITA, Zambia and Zaire, plus other pro-Western African governments.
George Volsky, departing drastically from this position, argues that the Soviets exercised a strong influence on the Cuban's decision to intervene in Angola because it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for a small Caribbean island with economic problems to launch such "a costly military expedition in the heart of dark Africa."\textsuperscript{72} Volsky concludes that Castro was definitely "persuaded to dispatch troops to Angola by the Kremlin."\textsuperscript{73}

It is our contention that whoever made the decision of Cuba's involvement, that is, whether the decision was made by the MPLA, by Cuba on its own, or by the Soviet Union is far behind the point. The point is: despite the fact that Cuba handled its own transportation in the initial stages of the war, the Soviet Union supplied the weapons. Furthermore, if the Soviets had not taken over the transportation of the FAR, when the U.S. pressured Guyana and Jamaica to stop refueling Cuban planes en route to Angola, and supplied more sophisticated weapons to stop the South African rapid advance on Luanda, the coalition of Western-South African-Zairean and FNLA-UNITA would have been the victor. Carmelo Mesa-Lago posits that, "it is therefore difficult to accept that Cuba - even if it was

\textsuperscript{72}George Volsky, "Cuba's Foreign Policy," \textit{Current History} Vol 70, No. 413 (1976), p. 71.

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid.
the initiator - could have gone to Angola without previous consultation and coordination with the USSR. 74 It is also quite hard to figure out how the Soviet Union could ferry such quantitative and qualitative military material to a country which lacked skilled personnel to handle them and to whose people such weapons were unknown, without the manpower to use them. Unless the Soviets wanted to use Angola as a dumping ground for her obsolete weapons there is no other reason to explain how on earth such a thing can happen.

It is our hearty contention that despite Cuba's insistence on her independent decision to get involved in Angola, so as to provide the basis for belief in her independent policy vis-a-vis the Soviet policy, the naked fact is that her successful involvement would not have happened "without the Soviet arms shipments and economic aid." 75 Claude Gabriel submits that "the division of labor between the Cubans and Soviets does not conceal a different policy." 76 John Marcum notes that although Cuba brought her own arms during the initial stages of the war, this became unnecessary in later stages of the civil war since

74 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Causes and Effects of Cuban Involvement in Africa," in Mesa-Lago and Belkin, Cuba in Africa, p. 199.


76 Ibid.
more sophisticated arms "were sent directly from the Soviet Union, and were waiting for the Cubans when they arrived."77 Thus, in no time, "as the compatibility of their policies became clear, the Cubans and the Soviets began coordinating their actions."78

George Volsky's view is that the Cuban plans of sending troops to Angola:

...had to be known to the Russians from the beginning because planning and assembling ships for Operation Carlota had begun six months before the first regular Cuban troops arrived in Angola. Whatever the relative 'independence' of the decision, the Castro government was sure of eventual support of Russia and other communist states.

Even accepting Castro's claim that the decision was entirely his own, clearly he must have made his move realizing that his troops could not operate for any length of time without massive Soviet logistical support. He therefore knew he could convince the Kremlin to go along with his 'unilateral' decision, or he was told that if the Cuban military intervention did not meet a resolute Western response it would be eventually supported by Moscow.79

Volsky adds further that "the Soviet Union may have played a cautious, sophisticated, low-risk game" by "making Castro do what he wanted to do all along."80 Volsky is highly skeptical of the fact that "after fifteen years of close relations with Cuba," Moscow was "not privy to what

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77Marcum, _The Angolan Revolution_, p. 273.
78See Leo Grande, _Cuba's Policy in Africa_, p. 22.
80Ibid.
was being planned at the highest level of the Cuban government.\(^{81}\) In fact, Volsky argues, "Moscow did not have to request that a 'single Cuban soldier be sent' to Angola as Castro stated."\(^{82}\) By simply not preventing Cuba from her massive involvement and by making available the necessary supplies, "the Soviet Union, was in effect, using Cuba in what Moscow viewed as a no-loss proposition."\(^{83}\)

Thus, by operating the sophisticated war materials sent by Moscow, and by training the MPLA fighters in their application, Havana relieved Moscow of the diplomatic hazards of sending in military advisors.\(^{84}\) Moreover, Moscow's substantial cooperation in transportation as well as her military, economic and political backing ensured the success of the operation.\(^{85}\)

Since Moscow's direct involvement would have complicated matters in other areas of her international relations,

\(^{81}\)Ibid.

\(^{82}\)Ibid., p. 65.

\(^{83}\)Ibid. Abraham Lowenthal also agrees that before Cuba heeded Neto's request for soldiers the Soviet Union must have "already indicated its willingness to provide air transport, furnish equipment on the ground, and absorb certain foreign exchange costs." See Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Why Is Cuba in Angola?" in Martin Weinstein (ed.), Revolutionary Cuba in the World Arena (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979), p. 102.


"the willingness of Castro to offer Cuban combat troops provided a convenient, if not superior, alternative." Valenta says this was enhanced by the fact that

...the Cubans were familiar with the physical environment of Angola, which is similar to that of Cuba. The fact that they could offer a substantial number of blacks and mulatto soldiers meant a fortuitous racial, as well as linguistic affinity, with the MPLA soldiers.

Furthermore, the Cuban army, having trained under conditions similar to those in Angola - heat, heavy forest canopy, and so on - adapted quickly to the terrain and style of fighting in Angola. Adam B. Ullman contends that the Cuban involvement camouflaged the Soviet involvement because Cuba was seen as "another Third World power... offering its military support to the progressive cause in Africa." But the fact remains that "the burden of logistics as well as financing... had to be borne by Moscow."

Thus, it is in line with reality to conclude that Cuba's involvement, on the scale it was in Angola, was very

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87 Ibid. The Soviet soldiers, because of their blond hair, blue eyes and different culture, would have been conspicuous and alienated not only from the environment, but also from the Angolan people.


89 Ibid., p. 135-138.
important for the success of Soviet policies in Angola. Hence, Cuba's impressive and successful performance in Angola came to serve both her own and the Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives in a convergence of interests. In other words, the Cuban presence served both the Soviet Union's and her interests, both collectively and individually.

When Cuba got militarily involved in Angola, the U.S. government and press branded this involvement in fulfillment of international solidarity as 'adventurism' and 'militarism,' and portrayed her commitments as mercenary actions carried out "as part of a Soviet effort to 'take advantage' of African conflicts in order to bring resource-rich Africa under Soviet domination." This assumption was not only wrong but failed also to make a distinction between the Cuban and South African involvement in the sense that whereas the former acted (and still acts) as a "stabilizing factor," particularly against subversion, the latter is a destabilizing factor and aids subversion. Andrew Young, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, in 1978 accepted the Cuban presence in Angola as bringing a certain stability and order. But in their stabilization

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process, the Cubans not only blocked the unfolding of a reactionary and pro-imperialist situation, but also the pay-off, for this policy is utilized by the Soviets, who gain in one way or another.92

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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

Our efforts so far have shown that despite their vested interests in Angola, the United States and the Soviet Union, because of a myriad of reasons, sought a risk-free involvement in this significant and strategically located Southern African country. Nevertheless, these superpowers took brazen actions to enhance their interests through other parties.

Our efforts have also shown that South Africa's and Cuba's interests in Angola coincided with the United States' and the Soviet Union's respectively. Because of this commonality of interests, we saw that their foreign policy objectives towards Angola coincide also. So, in enhancing their own interests, both South Africa and Cuba also enhanced the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union respectively.

In fulfilling this commitment, both South Africa and Cuba received substantial and adequate, tangible and intangible support from the respective superpowers. In Chapter Four, we saw how these superpowers provided this support through various means of cooperation - economic, political, and military. It logically follows that this support came
to be translated in the levels and successes of both South Africa's and Cuba's involvement in Angola. If the U.S. had not armed South Africa with sophisticated war material and complemented this with economic aid packages, as well as moral support, the latter would not have endured long in her persistent and consistent overt and covert destabilization of Angola. Likewise, Cuba would not have been successful in installing the MPLA to power in Luanda had it not been for the Soviet support in terms of transportation, weaponry and economic aid packages. Both South Africa and Cuba not only received logistical and intelligence support from the respective superpowers, but they also coordinated their involvements as time went on.

Since the United States' policy objectives towards Angola, southern Africa and the liberation struggle in general remained characteristically low-keyed, she let South Africa enhance her interests so long as the latter's mission did not interfere with other crucial issues, for instance SALT and detente. The United States had all the confidence in South Africa's ability and capability in enhancing her interests in Angola since the latter was almost 100% reliable; armed with the latest NATO weapons, South African military officers and technicians had been trained in Western military academies, and her politicians and intelligence organization worked in tandem and in liaison with Western governments.

The preponderance of the facts so far show that South
Africa's and Cuba's involvements in Angola were not carried out solely on their own. The former's involvement, as we saw in Chapter Five, was part of a scheme by the U.S. to rid the region of communist influence and make the "world free" for "democracy" to thrive, whereas the latter's efforts were aimed at helping a socialist-oriented movement gain independence and control over Western-oriented movements. Thus, over time there developed a very elaborate and distinct overlap of the presence of the South Africans and U.S., on one hand, and Cubans and Soviet Union on the other hand. The *modus operandi*, which came into play distinctly displayed a clear-cut division of labor. However, within this arrangement there developed considerable room for the pursuit of independent policies. But it is preposterous to argue that because of some differently expressed interests on slightly separate goals these parties were operating on their own. The fact of the matter is that they worked as teams in clearly defined relationships.

There is no doubt that the sequence and nature of the United States/South African and Soviet Union/Cuban involvements in Angola can be interpreted to show that these countries needed each other in successfully enhancing their objectives, despite the fact that the relationships which developed were asymmetrical, with the U.S. and the Soviet Union being dominant powers. However, this asymmetrical nature of their relationships did not rule out the fact
that an element of mutual dependence existed.

In Chapter Four, we saw that Cuba lacks the kind of resources which can enable her to project her foreign policy objectives on such a massive scale as she did in Angola. Consequently, the lack of vital minerals (such as petroleum), and of an advanced industrial and economic infrastructure has subjected her to dependence on the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, within this dependency, the Soviet Union not only exercises her leverage over Cuba, but the latter also exercises her leverage over the former. Cuba derived this leverage through her ability to exploit the Soviet Union's big power interests, geo-strategic aims and capabilities in southern Africa to her own advantage. In pursuance of these efforts, she availed herself of Soviet logistical support and air and sea lift facilities.

Although it is erroneous to view Cuba's policy in Angola as being subservient to the Soviet Union's, it is far-fetched to view Cuba's actions as autonomous. This is so because her emergence in the 1970s as a power to reckon with in Africa was made possible mainly by the growing Soviet military and economic power and the Soviet's active participation in the changing international system. Thus, détente, after the Soviet's acquisition of strategic parity with the U.S., and her immeasurably improved conventional capabilities greatly helped Cuba's involvement in Angola.

By enhancing other Soviet interests, like backing
nationalist forces in southern Africa and acting as a bridge between African States and the Eastern-bloc countries, Cuba has been handsomely rewarded by Moscow. Since Cuba's deployment of combat troops to Africa became indispensable to the Soviet Union's African policies, Cuba has definitely gained a privileged-ally status, which enabled her to gain adjustments in her economic and political relations with the Soviet Union. For instance, between 1976 and 1978 Soviet economic subsidies to Cuba rose by three and one half times. Additionally, her armed forces were refurbished with newer and more sophisticated weaponry such as T-62 tanks, Z-SU-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, and MIG-23s.

Although Cuba vehemently disavowed having been asked or pressured by Moscow to intervene in Angola, she never denied her reliance on and coordination with Moscow. In fact, Fidel Castro alluded to the fact that the installation of the MPLA in power could not have been possible without the concerted efforts and help from the Soviet Union, which gave Cuba "great support and great lessons in internationalism," and "refused to allow imperialism to strangle, to swallow-up, and to destroy (Cuba)." ¹

It is erroneous to argue that it is Cuba which pressed the Soviet Union to get involved in Angola because Cuba had

¹Castro's speech delivered to the First Party Congress in Havana on December 22, 1975. Also quoted in Southern Africa Vol. 9, No. 3 (March 1976), p. 11.
no leverage over the Soviet Union and if she had, she failed to utilize it in pressuring or convincing the Soviet Union to support her revolutionary activities in Latin America and the efforts of the Vietnamese people to liberate themselves. Whereas the Soviets remained aloof in the latter cause, they undermined the former.

Although Cuba could not engage in military ventures which would antagonize the Soviet Union's strategic interests or put her in a direct confrontation with the United States, the creation of a People's Republic of Angola was a devastating blow to Western and Chinese influence in Southern Africa. Furthermore, Cuba's provision of combat forces allowed the USSR to reap immense benefits while maintaining a relatively low profile, hence minimizing 'linkage' problems which might have threatened policies with higher priorities for her. Thus, Cuba's involvement allowed the Soviets to obtain policy objectives which she could not have achieved if Cuba had not cooperated.

There is no doubt that Cuban-Soviet partnership in Angola is a perfect illustration of a positive-sum game. Both Cuba's and Soviet's policy objectives, though not identical in the beginning, were not conflictual and were best attainable only through cooperation and coordination. Although their operational policies also evolved independently, they nevertheless became increasingly coordinated as the South African/U.S./Chinese involvement intensified.

In the case of the U.S., her alliance with South
Africa was heralded by limited funds available to the CIA, the revelation of covert U.S. involvement to the American public, and the Congressional action debarring direct U.S. involvement in a country where the U.S. had no established interests and at a time when the Americans had developed a profound aversion to getting involved in foreign wars after witnessing gruelling scenes of the Vietnam War on their TV screens. This was also a time when the executive branch of their government had been stunningly weakened as a result of the Watergate scandal and was occupied by a weak and unelected president, who could not sustain Congressional support for another U.S. involvement in a foreign war. On top of this, South Africa, although an international pariah, offered greater opportunities and the best alternatives left for the U.S..

By assisting the FNLA and UNITA in Angola, South Africa established a *casus belli* for intervention with impunity into the affairs of the People's Republic of Angola. This South African destabilizing involvement in Angola has been morally boasted by the tacit approval of the U.S., who time and again has turned a deaf ear and blind eye to South African acts of naked aggression in Angola. The U.S. has also called for the withdrawal of the Cuban internationalists from Angola rather than demand the complete and unconditional withdrawal of the racist forces from the Angolan soil.

Through policies such as the now-disgraced
"constructive engagement" and NSSM 39, the United States has given South Africa the mandate to resist political settlements of issues in the region, for example, the Namibian independence, and the license to perpetuate imperialism and aggression in the region.

Notwithstanding these, a distinction of the superpowers' involvement in Angola over a span of time should be made. While the Soviet involvement became direct with the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1976 and the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1977, the United States' involvement did not attain a definite shape since Congressional debaunent remained in place until 1986. Even after the repealment of the Clark Amendment, the U.S. still finds it more convenient to rely on South Africa and Zaire for fulfillment of her diabolical designs on Angola.

Whether the superpowers ordered, requested, or just gave tacit approval to South Africa and Cuba, the fact remains that their interests were best fulfilled or enhanced by South Africa's and Cuba's involvement in Angola.

In conclusion, we can contend that the coincidence of interests and the compatibilities of the policies led to coordination of the actions of the superpowers and their respective proxies. The presence of Cuba and South Africa in Angola, propped up by substantive and critical support, and their assumption of the duties of proxies enabled the respective superpowers to reap the benefits of their
foreign policy objectives with a relatively low profile and minimized problems which could have accrued if they were directly involved. Thus, the practice of proxy diplomacy came to be preferred by the superpowers because it reaped high returns for them by concealing their involvement and not antagonizing other aspects of their relations or other foreign policy objectives with higher priorities.
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