THE ATTITUDE OF THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
TOWARD THE INDEPENDENCE OF CUBA
JANUARY 1899 -- JUNE 1902

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This is the continuation of a study made by Dorsey Walker, entitled The Attitude of the Atlanta Constitution on the Cuban Crisis 1898 - 1900. This study, like his, places special emphasis upon sectional, racial, economic, and political questions. An analysis of the Constitution is all the more valuable because through S. L. Beckwith, the paper's correspondent in Cuba, was given a day by day report of events on the island. This study may perhaps be not without importance because of the fact that Joseph E. Wican in his study limited his analysis to the New York Press and goes only to 1898.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Cuba has inevitably been a prominent factor in the international rivalries of European powers in the Americas. Many a project was devised in England to snatch the island from Spanish control, but Spain clung tenaciously to Cuba, realizing how much her empire depended on its maintenance. English interest, meanwhile, passed on to the American colonies, which were fully aware of the strategic importance of the island as early as the close of the eighteenth century. 1

In 1807 Thomas Jefferson admitted that he had always looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could be made to our system of states. 2 In 1808 he declared that the United States would view with alarm the cession of Cuba to France or England. With the purchase of Florida in 1819 the Cuban question became more acute. Rumors that Spain might cede Cuba to England 3 caused great alarm among the Americans. This concern on the part of the United States was one of the principal factors leading to the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Adams was deeply disturbed over the fate of Cuba, especially when Canning's proposal of an alliance revealed his desire to limit the action of the United States with regard to Cuba.

The American government refused the invitation knowing that the

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3 Chapman, op. cit., p. 49.
alliance would interfere with any inclinations toward annexation it might have. Adams had written of the strategic location of Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, emphasizing her "transcendent importance" to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Her commanding position with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West India Seas; the character of her population and her situation midway between our southern coast and the island of St. Domingo; her safe and luxurious harbor of Havana; the nature of her productions and of her wants; all these gave her an importance in the total sum of our national interests.\(^5\)

The United States was satisfied to see Cuba remain in the hands of a country too weak to threaten her. The Monroe Doctrine was, therefore, primarily aimed against the Holy Alliance and not against Spain. Nevertheless, from the Spanish point of view, the adoption of this principle was a grievous injury because it cut Spain off from any hope of outside aid to regain her territories.\(^6\)

As time passed, Cuba became of greater importance to the American government. In 1840 it offered Spain aid if any power tried to take this portion of her territory because the best policy was to let Spain keep the island until the United States could get it.\(^7\)

The annexation of Texas in 1845 and further annexations resulting from the Mexican War gave the United States a new attitude toward the Cuban affair, for she no longer feared England or France. President Polk, "the great exponent of expansion," was not satisfied with the Mexican territory, and was "decidedly in favour of purchasing Cuba and making it one of

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\(^5\) A Compilation of Reports of Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 1789-1901 Diplomatic Relations with Foreign Nations - Affairs in Cuba (Washington, 1901), VII, 69.

\(^6\) Coolidge, op. cit., p. 123.

\(^7\) Coolidge, op. cit., p. 125; see also Leland Jenks, *Our Cuban Colony A Study in Sugar* (New York, 1928), pp. 9-10.
the States of the Union. From this time on the policy of the United States was to buy Cuba from Spain as soon as possible.

In October, 1854, the American ministers to London, Paris and Madrid met and issued the "Ostend Manifesto." This document proclaimed the right of the United States to take Cuba by force in case a reasonable offer were refused. According to Ettinger, however, the manifesto did not represent the attitude of the administration and was met with ridicule at home and abroad.

During the election campaign of 1856 the slavery question had been an important issue. The South had succeeded by the Kansas-Nebraska Act in extending slavery into the unoccupied Louisiana territory. As a result of her victory she increased the anti-slavery sentiment in the North. The slave problem was finally settled during Lincoln's administration by the Emancipation Proclamation. Thus, the American Civil War altered the American view toward Cuba. The policy that Cuba should belong to either Spain or the United States was abandoned and many Americans became willing that the Cubans govern themselves. The deciding factor against American acquisition of Cuba was the race question which was still acute at the time. Now that slavery was abolished a slave-holding Cuba was certainly not desired to create more disturbance.

In 1868 the Cubans broke out in their first concerted revolt against Spanish rule. Having realized the sympathy in this country, they turned to the United States for aid. President Grant in August, 1869 was on the verge of proclaiming the belligerency of the Cuban rebels when prevented by Secretary Fish. The American concern about Cuba had by this time entered

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10 Chapman, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
a comparatively unimportant phase. There was a strong party in Cuba wanting slavery as a cornerstone of Cuban institutions, "while the other Cuban party leaned toward abolition, but favored independence rather than annexation." Naturally American enthusiasm would be somewhat subdued. The Cuban question was a "chronic nuisance" and even if it had subsided for a time, with slavery abolished and a distressing race problem persisting in the political reconstruction of the South, no one at the time wanted to annex more land inhabited by a people who would increase the race problem.  

Yet the Americans sympathized with the Cuban patriots to a certain degree. Fish in 1875 proposed to the governments of Europe that they support the United States in an intervention in Cuba to end the war. They refused unanimously. Hence, the United States became the only champion of autonomy. The war continued, however, until in 1878 the Pact of Zarzam with the insurgents ended the Ten Years' War.  

The Spanish administration after the Ten Years' War continued to be both "autocratic and inefficient." But its policy might have worked had it not been for the exiled revolutionists in the American cities and the economic distress which existed in Cuba. Both factors were definite causes of the revolt of 1895.  

The Cuban question became critical at the close of the nineteenth century, the end of a unique epoch in American history. "It coincided with . . . the disappearance of the American frontier and the turning of the national imagination to other fields of interest." It came to a climax when the Americans became aware of their approaching maturity. President Cleveland's

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12 Nevins, Fish, pp. 878-887.
call for the support of the Monroe Doctrine in 1895 had awakened this feeling. 16

In the long bitter fights in the Senate and the House over the Cuban situation, business interests spoke most loudly. Since the panic of 1893 American business had been in the doldrums. Tendencies toward industrial revival had been checked first by the Venezuela War scare in December, 1895, and again by the free silver menace in 1896. But by 1897 a real revival began and signs of prosperity on all sides terminated the year. It has been definitely stated that the business interests of the United States were strictly opposed to any war with Spain. This can readily be seen in that it would cause great financial loss. 16

Meanwhile, in Cuba the social and economic system had undergone some definite changes. Slavery was abolished in 1886. The Negro population showed a relative decline and a growing class of white laborers appeared. Most important was the great influx of American and European capital into the island, especially in the enormous staple industry of sugar production. 16

The insurrection of 1868-1878 came at a period of revolution in the United States to further expansion, at a time when American faces were turned inland.

The latter insurrection took place in a different generation when shrill expansionists were demanding a larger national policy. 17 The Cuban insurrection was further precipitated by Jose Marti, an exile in New York. To assist him more than two hundred clubs were formed in the United States, Mexico, and Central and South America. The Cubans in the United States, however, played the dominant role in both contributions and actions. 18

16 Willis, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
The island was again aflame with revolt. The insurgents destroyed
the sugar plantations, cattle ranches and any other property at hand. The
Spaniards, unable to distinguish friend from foe, adopted the much hated
Reconcentration System. 19 Although this policy of General Weyler's was prob-
ably not so atrocious as it was pictured by the correspondents of American
newspapers, the Americans watched developments with growing concern and re-
sentment. It has been reasonably estimated that at least from $30,000,000
to $50,000,000 of American capital was invested in plantations, railroads,
mining and other business enterprises on the island. 20 All of this revolu-
tionary procedure threatened American property and persons. The same problem
that Grant and Fish had to face became the anxiety of Cleveland and Olney ---
that of "uncompromising protection of treaty rights of all American citizens,
and opportunity to Spain to accept American mediation to end the contact, lest
it continue for another ten years to harass Spanish-American relations." 21

Cleveland stated: "In regard to the Cuban question, my position was
fully made known in Congress in the various messages in which the subject was
discussed. I was opposed to the recognition of the belligerency of the is-
land and my position was perfectly well known. . . . 22 It was clear that
while Cleveland intended to protect what he considered our legitimate interests,
he was not willing to change his policy of non-intervention and non-recognition.
In one of his letters Cleveland wrote: "I am thinking a great deal about Cuba
but am far as ever from seeing the place where we can get in." 23 It is now no
mystery that the American policy toward Cuba under the Cleveland administration

19Bemis, op. cit., p. 437; Millis, op. cit., p. 46.
20James Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
(New York, 1912), VIII, 6150.
21Bemis, op. cit., p. 438.
23 Ibid., p. 446.
was due to the leading American business man on the island, Edwin P. Atkins. 24

The influence of Atkins, exercised through Hanna, Charles P. Adams, and John Long long prevented McKinley's administration from recognizing the insurgents.

In his first annual address December, 1897, McKinley remarked that the near future would demonstrate whether the United States should take action concerning Cuban affairs; 25 he held that this concern over Cuba must work out in the recognition of belligerency or independence, or an intervention against both sides in favor of one side. Events now moved rapidly. As long as Cleveland was president, all efforts were made to keep the United States a disinterested spectator. In his last message to Congress (December, 1896) he intimated that unless Spain should soon satisfy the rebels with a grant of genuine home rule America might feel compelled to intervene because of her "higher obligations." 26 Thus, McKinley's administration began to pursue the aggressive policy hinted at by Cleveland. As a result Spain recalled General Weyler in 1897 and modified her policy under General Blanco. But the terms came too late to affect the course of affairs. When the grant of autonomy went into effect January 1, 1898, the die-hard Spaniards were uncompromising in their opposition. They organized against Blanco, the United States, and the Americans in Cuba. When, at the request of the American Consul, Pittsburgh Lee, the Maine was sent to Havana to protect American interests, it was blown to pieces. Until this day this mystery has not been solved. Both the Spaniards and the Cubans have been accused of its destruction, while others attribute it to an internal explosion. 27

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24 Jenks, op. cit., p. 44.
25 Richardson, op. cit., VIII, 6285.
26 Ibid., VIII, 6154.
27 Chapman, op. cit., pp. 82-84; Millis, op. cit., pp. 100-145; Bemis, op. cit., p. 441.
From the beginning the sympathy of the Americans had been with the Cubans in their final effort to gain independence. This sympathy was made more acute by the new journalism featured by Pulitzer's *World* and Hearst's *Journal*. They exaggerated and distorted the activities of the Spanish until American public opinion was sufficiently aroused. The forces acting upon the American mass mind exploded with the *Maine* and demanded war.

What did the countries on the continent advocate? France had heavy investments in Spain and was anxious to prevent war. Germany had designs in the Pacific and she, too, opposed any conflict between Spain and America. On the whole, public opinion abroad was strongly pro-Spanish, but England supported the United States. Balfour told Hay, the American Ambassador to London, on April 6, 1898 that "neither here nor in Washington did the British government propose to take any steps not acceptable to the government of the United States."29

This attitude by Great Britain contributed to the perfunctory reply given Spain in answer to her appeal for justice. On this same day April 6, the foreign representatives of the powers at Washington presented a plea for peace.

At Madrid in September, 1897 Woodford explained the American attitude in a number of private interviews. There can be no question of the sincere desire of McKinley and the American minister to Spain to find a solution without resorting to war.31 A second attempt at intervention was made April 14, 1898. A dispatch was addressed by each ambassador in Washington

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to his foreign office proposing that an identical note be addressed to the Department of State. Sir Julian Pauncefote drafted the note. Cambon, the French Ambassador, suggested changes whereby the note was transformed from a friendly plea for peace to a remonstrance based on a denial of the correctness of American action. The note was coldly received in Europe by Germany and England.

This incident coincided with McKinley's struggle with himself and Congress to declare war. Again, had it not been for the determination of Congress to have war Woodford could have made an agreement with Spain. Thus, Rhodes' phrase "an unnecessary war" is aptly applied. That McKinley was a "man of peaceful disposition" and "consented slowly and reluctantly" because of the pressure of public opinion is an accurate conclusion. One writer is convinced that a strong president could have avoided war and that on April 10, the day before McKinley's message to Congress, Woodford had notified him that Spain would go "as far as and as fast as she can to insure peace." Spain up to now had pursued a policy of vagueness and diplomatic delay apparently in the hope that the foreign powers including the Vatican might mediate to save Cuba for her. While she was in this uncertain state of mind McKinley had demanded March 29, 1898 of Spain complete abandonment of reconcentration, establishment of an armistice in Cuba

32 Ibid, p. 75.
33 Coolidge, op. cit., p. 128.
35 Shippes, op. cit., Since the publication of the German series of diplomatic correspondence, Die Große Politik, 40 V. (Berlin, 1922-1927) the preferred mediation of the Pope on the principle of the independence of Cuba has been revealed. The Vatican's mediation was urged at Rome by the German Foreign Office, which was anxious to prevent war between the United States and Spain because it might interfere with a German project for purchasing Spanish Islands in the Pacific including the Philippines. See also, Harry F. Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba A Study in International Relations (New York, 1934), p. 44.
preparatory peace negotiations to be conducted through himself. Since Spain was slow in coming to terms, she convinced McKinley that war was the only solution. On April 11, he sent his message to congress recommending intervention in Cuba "for the sake of humanity," for protection of American lives and property, and for the purpose of ending a needless and costly war. Congress responded on the 19th of April with three resolutions authorising the use of force on behalf of Cuban independence. A fourth resolution was adopted on the motion of Senator Teller assuring the incredulous world that the United States disclaimed any intention to exercise sovereignty, or control over the island except for pacification, and, when that was accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people. Later in spite of this "unique profession of international altruism" the United States believed it had a right to compensate herself for expenditures and losses and was promptly accused of hypocrisy and greed. 36

Spain was ready for peace by July, 1898. The president named the following terms as a preliminary to negotiations for peace:

(1) Spain must give up all claim to Cuba and evacuate it immediately;

(2) In lieu of indemnity the United States would take Porto Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones;

(3) The United States would retain Manila until it should be determined in the treaty of peace what disposition was to be made of the Philippines.

Spain accepted the terms, but unwillingly. They were later embodied in the Protocol of August 10, 1898 signed on August 12, 1898. 37

36 Coolidge, op. cit., p. 129
In the final peace negotiations in Paris the Spanish commissioners endeavored to get the United States to annex Cuba, but America was unwilling to entertain such a proposition. Spain expressed her fear that the island if left to itself, might become Africanized. The examples of the Dominican Republic and Haiti aroused fears that an independent Cuba might be a prey to frequent revolutions with the result that neither property nor personal rights would be protected. To save the island from the consequences of a premature independence, Spain wished to have the United States keep at least a degree of control sufficient to insure order. No engagement on this point appears in the treaty.

In the end, it was decided that the United States would act as a Trustee of the island "for protection of life and property." Ratification came later and the treaty was proclaimed April 11, 1899. Whatever caused our intervention into the Cuban War, the consequences were far-reaching. Jenks believes that we thereby stumbled into an Empire. We established bases in the mid-Pacific, annexed Porto Rico, aroused industry and credit, and secured a prosperity which resulted in the formation of gigantic trusts. Many business men, hesitant at the thought of war, managed to emerge with high profits as a result of it.

Spanish rule continued to exist legally throughout the closing months of 1898. On January 1, 1899 the Americans moved into Cuba to begin their program which would aid in the ultimate independence of the island.

American interest in Cuba goes back almost to the establishment of our independence. She later warned the European powers against interference in this hemisphere declaring herself the protector of this corner of the world.

38 Chapman, op. cit., p. 94.
39 Malloy, op. cit. II, 1690-1895.
40 Jenks, op. cit., p. 58.
The strategic importance of Cuba became so vital to the American government that she attempted to buy Cuba from Spain. The Negro problem in this country at the time caused a gradual change in her policy, since she did not want to increase the race difficulties. America's interest in Cuba, therefore, lagged with a few exceptions, through the Ten Years' War, 1868-1878. By the time of the revolt of 1895, American imperialistic interests were alive again to the importance of Cuba. Cleveland, despite public sentiment favoring the insurgents, managed to avoid intervention. But McKinley driven by the sensational "yellow journalism," members of Congress, and loud public cries for war, finally desired war on Spain. The destruction of the Maine at last gave the United States a good pretext to intervene in Cuba to carry out whatever plans she might have. America's traditional interest in Cuba had at last terminated with intervention to protect American citizens and to give independence to the Cubans.
CHAPTER II

In the midst of chaos and destruction the Spanish government relinquished the island of Cuba to the American government. The Spanish flag which had floated for four centuries over this section of the western hemisphere had been lowered and replaced by the stars and stripes of America. The Americans displayed much enthusiasm which was in utter contrast to the solemn countenances of the Spaniards. Celebrations and festivities were enjoyed throughout the provinces — the island had never known such gaiety.  

With the appointment of General John Brooke as Governor-General of Cuba, the American occupation began. The first step of the new government, taken by the War Department, provided for the centralization of the revenues from the custom. The Cubans became alarmed at this action and began to question the extent of American intervention.  

But it seemed that there was a misapprehension of the War Department’s orders. The revenues of all the ports were to be used for the betterment of the island. This department also decided with a few changes, to continue the Spanish system of collecting taxes. The Spanish Bank of Cuba was made the collector of these taxes. Robert Porter was commissioned to investigate the economic and industrial conditions of Jamaica with reference to their application to Cuba. From his reports it

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1 Atlanta Constitution, January 1, 1899, p. 14; January 2, 1899, pp. 1-2; January 3, 1899, p. 1. All conclusions in this chapter are those of the Constitution unless otherwise indicated. Also, where only dates are given they are references to the Constitution.

2 January 5, 1899, p. 2.
seemed that bright prospects were in store for this "ever faithful isle."³

One of the most disturbing problems of the Americans was the question of sanitation. A report was sent to Washington January 8, 1899, revealing the terrible conditions of the cities, especially Havana. The death rate was decidedly high; garbage was thrown in the streets in defiance of orders; foul pools sprang up along the streets and avenues; and no efforts were made to cleanse the thoroughfares either by the civilians or the officers. The Atlanta Constitution demanded that these deplorable conditions be remedied. It is stated that "as long as Cuba... was under Spanish control it was useless to look for improvement" but "now that we have possession of the island... it behooves us to see to it that the causes of epidemic are removed, and whenever the time comes to turn the island over to a local government sufficient provision should be made to enforce the observance of sanitary measures. The matter is one which is vital to us, and which should not be side-tracked from any false sense of respect to Cuban autonomy or independence." The Constitution further declared: "Let the island be independent, if it need be, in all things save the one privilege of being filthy. At that point we should draw the line and compel the inhabitants of that country to observe the decenties of civilized life."⁴

On January 22, 1899 orders from the American military authorities were given to the local press in Santiago for publication, directing the authorities not to expend a cent of the custom receipts without the permission of the governor-general, and to see to it that thereafter the bulk of the sanitary work should be done without money pay and for rations only. A Cuban inspector in the sanitary department told Major George Barbour, the

³January 8, 1899, p. 6; January 11, 1899, p. 4.
⁴January 19, 1899, p. 4.
Health Commissioner at Santiago, that the Cubans of the province absolutely refused to work for sitios -- they wanted cash. The question of money payment caused a great disturbance for a few weeks until finally a compromise was reached.5

The most difficult problem was that of the Cuban military force. The soldiers wanted money and refused to work without it. General Maximo Gomez, the Commander-in-chief of the Insurgent Army placed himself in the position of an active ally of the United States government in the work of the reconstruction of Cuba. He was willing to accept $3,000,000 tendered by this government and disband the army. This publication thought that it was fortunate that President McKinley had commissioned Mr. Porter to seek General Gomez and to arrange terms which would lead the Cubans to accept the objects of American occupation.6

It seemed that General Gomez was acting without authority in making terms with the United States. As a result the Cuban military Assembly in a public session, March 11, 1899, impeached the General and removed him from his command of the army. They declared that $3,000,000 was insufficient and that they had not accepted the proposition. Gomez accepted his fate stating that he was willing to retire and be relieved of his great political

5January 23, 1899, p. 2; January 29, 1899, p. 2.
6February 3, 1899, p. 2. The Constitution comments: "... at least General Gomez accepts the situation and will aid in the rehabilitation of the island of Cuba. It must be confessed that our government had advanced dangerously close upon the line of anarchy in dealing with the Cuban people. From first to last in the operation against the Spaniards, Cuban authority has been totally ignored. ... except when General Wood took office in Santiago and began to call in the aid of Cubans that the American presence began to be tolerable. ... General Shafter was disposed to prod every Cuban with a bayonet and to regard himself as being supreme in all things."
obligations. 7

General Brooks's announcement that he would still advise with the old leader brought him hearty congratulations from the Atlanta paper. It declared that under the management of General Gomez, the Spanish power had been paralyzed in Cuba; that under him freedom had been made possible, and the revolutionists led to success. The men fighting Gomez were making themselves ridiculous in the eyes of the world. An endorsement of their conduct would be the very highest proof of the fact that the Cubans were not ready for self-government. "If Cuban freedom does not materialize under the plan of General Gomez it will never see the light of day." Everything pointed to the continued leadership of Gomez and the discomfiture of the men who were... the enemies of himself and their country as well. 8

Gomez announced his intentions to start for his home declaring that he was "tired of the jangle with the assembly"; that the people were ungrateful and did not appreciate what the United States government with his assistance was doing for them. This was the conclusion of a man who without any hope of reward had given the best years of his life to winning liberty for the Cubans. His entire career was involved in these principles for which he had fought. "Liberty -- political freedom -- self-government" -- these had been his ideals, and to these he had "devoted his life; and now, near the close of a stormy career, he has begun to lose confidence in the people for whom he has sacrificed the ease and comforts of his home in San Domingo." 9

The Constitution stated that this commotion disgusted Gomez and showed clearly that the Cubans were not prepared for independence which the United States stood ready to give them. They were not familiar at all with

7 March 12, 1899, p. 3; March 13, 1899, p. 2.
8 March 14, 1899, p. 4.
9 April 1, 1899, p. 4.
the methods that must be adopted for self-government. That, however, was not the fault of the Cubans — it was their misfortune. Nevertheless, it was a fact which the Americans ignored. General Gomez seemed to be the only man in Cuba, apart from the Americans, capable of perceiving the real nature of the problems with which the Cubans had to deal, and he seemed to be one of the few leaders connected with the Cuban revolution/Neither attempted nor desired to improve his prospects politically or socially.

It is useless to say that the corrupting and degrading influence of the Spanish rule did not leave its marks on the people who had been its victims; and, though both the Cubans and the Filipinos were goaded into revolution, it was clear that only a very few, if any, of the men among them had been moved by any sober political freedom, or had had any idea of liberty before them. Gomez, it should be remembered, was not a Cuban, but a citizen of Santo Domingo. General Garcia, who was a Cuban and a man of fine intelligence, was one of the few Cubans who really understood the meaning of political freedom. But, the Cubans themselves had small idea of it.

The situation proved that the time had not arrived for the Americans to consider terms of withdrawal from Cuba. The Constitution definitely advocated teaching the Cubans an "object lesson" in free government so that they could be prepared to conduct their own affairs after the pattern and example exhibited before them by the American government. It further stated that to withdraw at this time would be to turn the people over to a state of political chaos and governmental corruption worse than that inaugurated and carried out by the Spaniards. In all events, the United States had no choice in the matter.

10 The Constitution’s attitude toward General Maximo Gomez is inconsistent. Gomez is highly praised here and denounced two years later by the Atlanta paper.
11 April 1, 1899, p. 4.
She had pledged herself to refer the government and conditions of Cuba — and then turn the island over to the Cubans.\textsuperscript{12}

A prominent feature of Spanish rule was the unspeakable corruption of the officials from the highest to the lowest. Millions of funds were misappropriated every year. There was not an official in Cuba who was not open to bribery and who did not levy blackmail in some form or other. There was no secrecy about it; no attempt to hide it. It was an old custom, habit, an unwritten law. The Cubans had come to regard this conduct as a matter of course, which would have to be disciplined before they could be trusted to govern themselves. The Americans had too much confidence in American methods as applied to other people, stated the \textit{Constitution}, and it was not the fault of the Cubans that they could not appreciate these methods. It was true that the Cubans would have to realize that these problems existed and they would have to understand that every citizen was compelled to make compromises when he consented to a government of any kind whatever. The fact that the American authorities entered upon their duties with a delicacy that had been misunderstood was no error of the Cubans, but was the result of the cruel treatment they had received from the Spaniards.\textsuperscript{13}

The Cuban assembly and the Cuban army were composed of a body of men whose numerical strength was unknown to the Americans. The Cuban people themselves were in sympathy with Gomes, but the Cubans whom the Americans had elevated to office, and the assembly which Gomes created, opposed him. The question was asked, "What will be the end of it all?", but only time would show.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} April 1, 1899, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{13} April 2, 1899, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}
On April 4, 1899 the Cuban military Assembly voted to disband the army and dissolve it. General Fernandi Freyre, president of the military assembly, took leave of the army vehemently proclaiming the freedom and independence of the island. 15

At this point in Cuban affairs the Constitution paused to make observations on events in the United States. It commented on the complaint made in business quarters over American trade with Cuba. The cause of the disturbance was the unsatisfactory state of commerce. The uncertainty of this government's policy in relation to Cuba heightened this agitation. "Does anybody outside of the White House know what is to be?" was constantly demanded. This precariousness as to the length of occupation tended to promote restlessness among Americans as well as Cubans. So far as Congress could pledge anything, it had pledged independence to the Cubans — ultimate independence. But the government must have had some policy in respect to Cuba and it should have been announced. If the American government had proposed to manage temporarily the affairs of an alien people its policy should have been the best it could offer. 16

The Havana press announced on April 6, 1899 that General Gomez would take up his programme of solidifying the Cuban people into a party that should without ceasing, urge the United States to withdraw from the island. It was his purpose to make the people have but one desire and thought — that of having independence and absolute separation from the United States. His theory was that the Cubans who previously had thought of him merely as an "adroit guerrilla chief" would now be prepared to regard him as a political leader; and that a few days more would probably see him in command of the

15 April 5, 1899, p. 4.
16 April 6, 1899, p. 4.
army again. If General Gomez were reinstated it would be of great service to the United States in the disbursement of the $3,000,000, but his political programmes meant the keeping up of agitation and disturbance in the minds of the people and the weakening of American authority by producing the impression that everything done by the Americans was temporary and might sooner or later be overturned. American observers protested against such agitation as extremely harmful to the industrial revival and the restoration of Cuban credit. Some persons in high authority thought the United States government might have had trouble with him. At least his attitude had been consistent regarding Cuban independence and he was still working toward that end. 

If Gomez had been judged by his actions and utterances, he would not have seemed the dangerous factor in Cuba that some of "our esteemed contemporaries would make him out to be." He made no protest when the Cuban assembly deposed him. On the contrary he simply remarked to an old friend that he was just beginning to analyze the Cuban politician and was anxious to retire to his home. When the Cuban generals appointed Gomez to represent them in negotiations with the United States military authorities in Cuba, he accepted this trust after having stated to his friends that the Cubans must recognize the fact that the only power today in Cuba is the power of those who intervened and . . . for the present, thoughts of independent Cuban government can be no more than dreams." This attitude by Gomez toward the 'intervening power' caused a lively controversy among politicians and even among his friends in Havana. La Discusion and El Reconcndrado treated him as an ally of the United States and referred to him as a 'traitor to the cause of Cuban independence.' La Lucha and La Patria, however, viewed him as a consistent leader.

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17 April 7, 1899, p. 1.
18 April 8, 1899, p. 1. The Cuban generals met April 7, and officially decided to reinstate General Maximo Gomez as commander-in-chief. They also appointed an executive board of three generals to assist in distributing the $3,000,000.00.
of the Cuban people. 19

One correspondent seemed to think that the future of Cuba would probably be influenced by Madame de Céspedes whose salon was visited by the best known men of the entire island. Madame de Céspedes was the widow of the first president of Cuba during the Ten Years' War. It had been asserted that the first president of Cuba would be Carlos de Céspedes, son of the war president. At one time Gomez was considered for this office, but after the wrangle with the assembly the idea was abandoned. The party of Gomez believed that it was none too early to begin a movement in behalf of Carlos de Céspedes as president of the republic since the American occupation would end before summer "probably by April, 1900." 20

Colonel Juan Gualberto Gomez, a Negro, and a member of the assembly's executive committee, along with other speakers denounced General M. Gomez as a traitor to Cuba in having yielded to the intervening powers, "Los Yankees." He had made one of the best speeches January 30 at the memorial celebration for Jose Marti — 'counseling firmness, concord and determination' as a means to gain the courted independence. Now, he arose again in the cause of Cuban freedom. Only one voice arose in protest against the assertions he made and that was Senor Fidel Pieria, the editor of El Independiente, who stated "that the Cubans would most speedily gain independence by cooperating with the Americans" than if they adopted a separate course. 21

The United States felt bound to see Cuba safely established. If the Cubans had been mature enough to set up and maintain an orderly government, free from the traditions of civil and military tyranny under which they have lived so long, they would not have thanked us for making laws for them.

19 April 17, 1899, p. 4; April 29, 1899, p. 4.
20 May 4, 1899, p. 21.
21 May 6, 1899, p. 1.
The Constitution stated that it had never taken any stock in the sensational reports from Cuba in regard to the character of the inhabitants and its conservatism in the matter had been simply borne out by the testimony of all the commanders from Kent to Wood who had been brought directly in contact with the Cubans. The right to be free and the ability to set up a peaceful and an orderly government bore small relations to each other. One was a principle, the other took hold of concrete facts. It was no discredit to any race, subjected to oppression for years to admit that it lacked some of the qualities necessary to self-government. "Government" was "not a matter of sentiment" but... ..."a terribly practical thing. The right of self-government and the ability to govern" was "not the result of a heaven-sent inspiration."  

The question arose as to whether the Cubans at this juncture were capable of setting up a government of their own; a government which unlike those of other Latin-American states would not be a "prey to faction and the resort of discord." This question grew out of the complaint of a correspondent in Havana that the American government had left the Spanish judicial system undisturbed. "We can control the sanitary measures of Cuban towns, and we can establish military laws insuring peace and good order; but," the Constitution stated, "We cannot, unless the Cubans demand annexation, make civil laws for them. That would be the veriest mockery of self-government." The public sentiment among the classes in Cuba that would have to bear the burdens and responsibilities of self-government was rapidly growing in favor of annexation, and this was the cheapest and most feasible plan under which the Cubans might enjoy the blessings of Independence.  

The ever present army situation cropped up again. A message
from Havana, May 13, 1899 revealed Brooke's annoyance at the conduct of General Gomez. The old insurgent leader showed decided indifference now regarding the money question. The money had not been distributed and the Cubans refused to give up their arms. Dissatisfaction was expressed everywhere that the Cuban soldiers should surrender their arms before receiving their share of the $5,000,000. Rumors to the effect that the General planned to lead a violent anti-American party so as to reinstate himself had been scattered over the entire island. On May 15, Gomez withdrew his services.

On May 16, Gomez issued a manifesto. Having reviewed his part in the negotiations with Brooke and spoken of his love for Cuba, he advised the army to return to their homes with the amounts of money offered by Americans. He also counseled patience which would be an additional proof of their heroism. The Havana newspapers were decidedly abusive. The Americans were condemned as further separation of the island from the United States was predicted. Gomez disappointed Brooke in this outburst. He had promised to advise disbandment of the army, but had failed to do so.

The manifesto was unsatisfactory to the military administration because of its failure to disband the army. The Cuban soldiers kept the arms and refused the American money. General Brooke and Gomez again went over the decree for payment for the last time. The old General was now satisfied. One element of the army was not at all pleased with the United States for requiring a surrender of arms.

Only seven Cubans were paid as a result of the first day's distribution. The anti-Gomez and anti-American elements were cheerful thinking

24 May 14, 1899, p. 3; May 16, 1899, p. 1; May 19, 1899, p. 1.
25 May 20, 1899, p. 2; May 23, 1899, p. 1.
the Americans were baffled and angry. The Cubans laughed at the "American
gold", but the next day the applicants increased. Some persons called to
be paid whose names were not on the roll, showing the inaccuracy of the
records. 26 Finally the backbone of the opposition to the United States
was broken with the appearance of the Cuban officers offering their ser-
VICES to divide the funds. 27

General Wood, governor of Santiago, in his official report of the
affairs in his province remarked that conditions were different there from
those in other parts of the island. There was a perfect understanding between
the Americans and the Cubans; and peace and prosperity, comparatively speaking,
had taken the place of the troublesome conditions found after the Spanish
evacuation. Of all the men given places of responsibility Wood had been most
successful. He stated that neither beggars, brigands, nor men with arms were
in his province. General Wood's solution of the Cuban problems was work! It
was about time "some other generals down there followed the Wood plan" the
Constitution commented and concluded that "it should be adopted without delay
by the others in authority." 28

On June 12, 1899 the city of Havana adopted General M. Gómez as
her son. The ceremony was regarded as a high honor by all Cubans. The same
honor had been bestowed upon such men as Martí, the elder de Cespedes, Calixto
Garcia and Antonio Maceo. "Gómez like every other man had made several mis-
takes." He had occasionally "adopted a course which brought disinterestedness
and purity of purpose trenchantly into question." He had even strained friend-
ship to the breaking point, but he had never been accused of deliberate dupli-
city. He had also proved himself "powerful in those qualities of leadership

26 May 28, 1899, p. 2; May 29, 1899, p. 2.
28 June 10, 1899, p. 6.
and unselfishness "which constituted the "true and lasting patriot." For all these reasons, and all others equally apparent, the Constitution congratulated the United States, Cuba and the old warrior himself on "this new proof of devotion and appreciation." 29

On July 2, the *Dos Republicas*, a radical journal in Havana, always a bitter opponent of the American administration and a violent enemy of the annexation sentiment, announced its disapproval of the form which the American intervention had assumed. "We have protested" it declared, and "always shall protest against President McKinley's dictatorial system. We are tired as ever of an undefined policy and we continue to insist upon that absolute independence for which the youth of the island have been sacrificed these many generations." Juan Gualberto Gomez affirmed the same principles: "I am now as I always have been a separatist, and I still demand the separation that I asked for before the war, not only separation from Spain, but from any and all other nations. People only begin a revolution when this is absolutely necessary to life and progress. If superior forces deter them before their object is attained there is merely the question of delay." He further exclaimed that the revolution would inevitably return. "The destiny of Cuba is only independence" and "we should give due thanks to the Americans, whose progress and power inspire our administration, but this does not mean that we should resign ourselves to a tutelage to be exercised over us." 30

The Constitution stated that there was a color problem in the United States "built upon the mistaken attitude of the weaker race" and that "its continuance would be to their disadvantage. History teaches that

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29 June 14, 1899, p. 4.
30 July 19, 1899, p. 2. A revolutionary party had been established with headquarters in Havana, with the object of inciting the Cubans throughout the entire country. The party had agents in every large city and also a junta in Mexico.
the colored race cannot stand up in competition with the white race and live." The basis of harmony must not be sought in competition, but in cooperation. "Those who knew the negro [sic] least would prompt him into rivalry with his white neighbor and bring down upon his head disaster..."

There had been a recent crisis because the Negro "was on the wrong side." How to get out of it was hinted at in a letter by Professor Booker T. Washington to a friend in North Carolina. In this letter Washington asked the question "Why the negro [sic] in the South should continue to oppose the southern white man in his politics? Is not this the source of nearly all our trouble?... Why is it the negro [sic] in Cuba has surpassed us in settling his race problems? Is it not because the negro [sic] in Cuba has made the white man's interest in Cuba identical with his own?" This situation outlined by Washington was true. There was no race issue in Cuba "because the negroes [sic] there" had "not felt it their duty to antagonise the white race."

The correspondent of a New Haven paper urged the United States government to turn that island and Porto Rico over to the Negroes. According to the correspondent, Cuba and Porto Rico would be excellent places of abode for millions of our Southern Negroes. The Constitution disagreed. It called the correspondent "premature and on the wrong line." The annexation of Cuba had not yet been decided upon and the example of Hayti should warn the United States not to africanize these bits of territory at our doors. Cuba and Porto Rico under Negro rule would "relapse into barbarism" and the "yellow jack" would conduct an aggressive campaign. Moreover, "we must think of the commercial" and industrial possibilities of these countries.

31 April 9, 1899, p. 16.
32 April 9, 1899, p. 16.
under favorable conditions. It would have been folly to turn them over to a people who would in the next half century wipe out every industrial and commercial feature and return to the primitive mode of life of their ancestors, depending upon nature for their food, shelter and clothing, if they decide to wear any." This was indeed a very "unpopular suggestion" because Hayti was bad enough without reproducing its conditions nearer home. "Our negroes [sic] show no desire to go to the West Indies. They cannot be driven there, and it might be difficult to induce them to go." At this time, however, such a scheme was visionary and hardly worth discussing. 33

A leading Cuban merchant who claimed to be well posted on Cuban affairs said that "universal suffrage in Cuba would mean a black republic in the near future, and ... the only means of preventing it will be the incorporation of the island as a possession of the United States as a state, territory, or colony, leading to American immigration, intermarriage, the enrichment of insular blood and the improvement of the population." In his judgment Cuba was doomed to become another Hayti. The Cubans who would no longer have "the fresh blood of the Spanish immigration to draw on" would gradually grow fewer, while the blacks would thrive and increase at a rapid rate. He declared that even in the first election the blacks would dominate and carry everything if they knew their strength. And so it seemed that the Negro was an important factor in the Cuban situation. 34

The American occupation in Cuba was troubled by the Cuban army. The sanitation problem, financial system and general reconstruction had been started on a clear road, but the Cuban army refused to disband until they had received payment for their services. General Maximo Gomez through negotiations

33 August 7, 1899, p. 4.
34 August 7, 1899, p. 2.
with American military authorities had agreed to divide among the soldiers $3,000,000. This caused a great disturbance in the Cuban military assembly which later was settled and the soldiers were paid. Gomez was denounced as a traitor on many occasions and a hero on others. In spite of his inconsistency in stating at one time that Cuba was not ready for independence, and at another time declaring his love for Cuba and his willingness to die to give her independence, Gomez was never removed from the high place he held in many Cuban hearts.

The Cubans now restless for independence were beginning to cry out. The newspapers were their representatives and published their sentiments for the benefit of the American government. Meanwhile, the internal improvements were continuing to advance, especially under the careful eye of General Wood in Santiago.
CHAPTER III

President McKinley's census proclamation had been received in various ways by the Havana newspapers. *La Isla* published nothing, evidently waiting to see what the others would say first. *La Discusión* had only a cartoon representing the effects of the proclamation on the different factions. The party of independence was smiling, the party advocating a protectorate was assuming a studious air, while the annexationists were sad. The proclamation was not clear and seemed more significant for what it did not say. Commenting upon the absence of the words, 'Cuba is and by right ought to be free and independent,' which were in the proclamation of April, 1898, *El Diario de la Marina* remarked that the absence was accentuated by the fact that the American newspapers called attention to the substitution of the phrase 'efficient system of government.' That phrase according to *El Diario* was the same used by Senor Canovas del Castillo in the Spanish Cortes in 1897 when speaking of the Cuban problem. The same promise had been given to Cuba now that had formerly been given to Porto Rico and the Philippines, both of which were American colonies. *El Nuevo País* observed that 'We do not see what relation the taking of the census bears to the Cuban republic. The census is certainly the basis on which to construct a state, which being constructed may show its worthlessness thus putting off indefinitely the days of independence.'

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1 *Atlanta Constitution*, September 1, 1899, p. 2.
That Cuba had many of the requirements of self-government which necessarily preceded independence, was believed by the Constitution. When the proclamation was first made known, all elements were apparently satisfied. Now only the Cuban office-holders supported it. Those who favored independence said that President McKinley should have made some declaration regarding absolute independence for Cuba. Those who favored a protectorate considered that the Proclamation had not offered adequate guarantees to property-owners and investors. And the annexationists asserted that the proclamation told literally nothing respecting McKinley’s purpose and that no one was any wiser regarding the future of the island. The Malecontents objected to the Proclamation on general principles. 2

The question of the future control of the island had received a good deal of attention. The Constitution was confident that the United States was bound to recognize the independence of the island as soon as its people were prepared to exercise it. There were some who thought annexation would be the ultimate and the best remedy for the people, this publication continued. But there was yet no consensus of public opinion among the Cubans as to their future. The chief property owners and business men wanted the American troops to remain and desired annexation to the United States. Others wanted an independent government immediately while large numbers of the natives had no positive opinions concerning their future. 3

Reports from Havana stated that much unrest arose from the formation of political parties. Quintin Bandera was the leader of a new party in the province of Havana. Other leaders were organizing a Negro party in the eastern provinces. Juan Gualberto Gomez had threatened to form

2September 2, 1899, p. 4; September 4, 1899, p. 2.
3October 1, 1899, p. 16. These were the conclusions of General Fitzhugh Lee who, according to the Constitution, “knows as much about Cuba and the Cubans as anybody.”
a third Havana party, and this menace resulted in a union between the Cuban National League and the Cuban National party. The newspapers gave much space to this newly-founded Negro party which could have seriously affected the future of the island.  

Many Cubans had thought that General M. Gómez would be elected president in the event the Americans declared Cuba independent. Because of this the old revolutionary element clung to the new party and opposed the old soldier in the administration of affairs. Juan Gualberto Gómez denounced General Maximo Gómez as a tyrant and asserted that the people of Cuba could not endure the injustice which would certainly prevail under his administration.  

The Ecope of Havana believed it a part of "Manifest Destiny" for Cuba to be annexed to the United States. The Constitution had assumed that the general view of the Americans had been the same to a certain extent. It commented upon the keep appreciation of liberty among the Latin race. But, it continued, "the Latin races had not been able to realize their own conception of liberty and the rights of man. However, the American government would faithfully carry out the pledge when the moment seemed favorable."  

With this in view, some persons resented the appointment of General Leonard Wood as military governor, because they considered his  

4 September 11, 1899, p. 2.  
5 September 18, 1899, p. 6. The Havana correspondent said that Juan Gualberto Gómez would rely on the colored vote to support him. And whenever he referred to the men who fought for Cuban independence he meant the Negro, "who undoubtedly constituted the greater part of the army."  
6 November 27, 1899, p. 4.
administration of affairs so wise and humane that it would increase the
movement for annexation. General Wood had closed his eyes to every
consideration save the welfare and the best interests of the Cubans. He
gave to them a new side of America and Americans as a result. In this
manner he did more to arouse sentiment in favor of annexation, the
Constitution stated, than all the military officials put together.7

Jos: Ohi sio, the special correspondent of the Constitution
at Washington, kept this publication well informed of events relating to
Cuba. In his report of January 15, 1800 he informed the Constitution
that the Republicans had paved the way for the annexation of Cuba. They
had reached the conclusion that there was no use in delaying the movement
as a result of the suggestion made by Senator Aldrich of Rhode Island.
To secure this end the Committee on Cuban Affairs was determined to visit
Cuba for the purpose of understanding conditions before working out a plan.
The Republican leaders realized the necessity of seeing that the Teller
resolution promising independence, was technically, at least, carried out.
They proposed to give Cuba nominal independence for the purpose of affect-
ing annexation. Jos: Ohi further stated that some senators had tried to
prevent McKinley from pledging independence in his message to Congress.
Now that it had been done they contended that the pledge had been made to
"conform with international law", that this government had to declare
disinterested motives in taking up the fight of the Cubans. Others argued
that before the president could execute the commands of Congress, Spain
had declared war on the United States, thus forcing the Americans to invade
Spanish territory.8 This, they claimed, virtually absolved this government

7 Ibid., On December 15, 1899 Wood relieved Major General John Brooke in
command in Cuba. In addition to his duty of division commander, he was
military governor of the island as is stated above.
8 January 15, 1800, p. 1. This was a very weak argument for those
Republicans who presented it.
from its premises to the Cubans. But to prevent criticism the pledge would be made good until the Cubans themselves demanded annexation to the United States.

The Mobile Register asked the Constitution if she really desired that the "Mongrel Cuban population [be] admitted en bloc to American citizenship." The Constitution replied that it had been advocating the annexation of Cuba with the consent of the Cubans as soon as that consent could be honorably obtained. "The esteemed Register does not need, therefore, to doubt our position. We want Cuba, and the question how to deal with its 'mongrel population' would be considered later. The Constitution further stated: "We have Porto Rico and yet its people are not citizens of the United States, but . . . designated by act of Congress as simply citizens of Porto Rico." It would not be amiss to call to the attention of their contemporaries that the Negro population "of all shades of color is but 22 per cent. . . which we are informed is a much lower percentage than that of the negro sic element among the 1,828,697 inhabitants of Alabama."10

Among the many reasons for the Constitution's desire for the annexation of Cuba were those of "a permanent peace between the two countries, the reduction of our quasi-protectorate relation toward the island to one of absolute and efficient right, the spreading of prosperity, education, a vital civilization and free government among the Cubans, and finally the great economic benefits of free trade between the countries upon the same terms as now obtains between the states and territories of

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9 January 15, 1900, p. 1. It was alleged that the European bondholders were waiting for a chance to enforce from Cuba payment of the bonds issued by Spain the minute this government released her; and the United States could prevent this by annexing Cuba.

10 January 12, 1902, p. 16.
the Union." Our advocacy, said the Constitution, of annexation "has less of local selfishness in it than of desire to see... Alabama and Mobile, especially, benefited by the accession... Annexation would, we believe, increase the commerce and make Mobile one of the largest beneficiaries of the free entry of Cuban sugars and tobaccos... For her sake, then," this publication contended, "we answer the query of her leading journal with a most emphatic affirmative.

On the other hand Dr. W. W. Landrum who had only recently returned from Cuba reported that the Cubans craved absolute independence. Because this was well known in Havana, the Americans were bitter against the Cubans. "I should not be frank," Dr. Landrum continued, "if I did not admit I admired their zeal if not their discretion. The contention of Cuba for independence was not unnatural and should not be ridiculed or stigmatized." Therefore, Landrum made a plea to his compatriots that Cuba should be absolutely independent as soon as she proved worthy of freedom.

The Constitution maintained that the future would take care of Cuba in such a way as to bring her into the Union, and when she did come in she would enter as Texas -- of her own free will. The St. Louis Globe-Democrat commented on the position of the Constitution. It argued that as Americans we would have more rational liberty and infinitely more prosperity if annexation of Cuba existed. That was why the South and West overwhelmingly desired it. Senator Morgan of Alabama proposed that some sort of inducement should be given for Cuba's admission to the Union as a state. Of course, she would have to remain in a condition of tutelage for a few years necessary in passing from a territory into statehood. But

11 January 12, 1902, p. 16.
12 January 22, 1900, p. 8.
this delay had its dangers in that Cuba might be stripped of its resources before her entrance. However, the Cuban problem would be no more difficult than was that of Idaho and Montana.

The Constitution hoped that in time the Cubans would see the advantage of annexation. With a governor for the island, with Congressmen and Senators in Washington, with the right to participate in the election of the President of the United States, "surely Cuba could attain her highest degree of prosperity." Until that time there should be no reciprocity in our trade relations. The St. Louis Globe continued to harp upon the folly of the Cubans in not asking for annexation to the United States. It did not understand why the Cubans did not desire annexation. The Constitution did not disagree because it was convinced that eventually Cubans would, but at their own insistence. "How, would the Republican party consent to take Cuba in as an equal state of the Union," asked the Constitution? "If they fear to break down the Dingley wall 20 per cent. for her help, would they be willing to remove it altogether for the sake of her company, with her free sugar and tobacco added? We think not, and we would advise Cuba to remember 'the gift-bearing Greeks' when they approach her in the form of American republicans."

The Washington Post did not feel authorized to answer the Constitution's query whether or not the Republican party would consent to take Cuba in as an equal state of the Union, but it admitted, the Constitution stated, that the question was profoundly interesting and said concerning

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13 May 15, 1901, p. 6; January 20, 1900, p. 4.
14 December 23, 1901, p. 4; December 28, 1901, p. 4.
15 March 28, 1902, p. 4. On July 8, 1901, the Constitution had declared emphatically that it favored reciprocity "up to the point when it does not conflict with the principle of American protective tariff."
it: "Insular statehood is a rather serious matter. It will probably be granted to Cuba at some future time [when], she gets ready. And she cannot be ready until... she is Americanized. If Americans emigrate to Cuba and American capital develops her resources she will eventually become an American state..." The Constitution declared that those were its sentiments exactly. Therefore, the best way to accomplish the Americanization was to remove the tariff barriers and allow free intercourse in commerce between the two countries. It further declared: "...We do not want Cuba as a starving territory, but as a full-blown, well-fed, radiant sister, fitted to shine in our galaxy of states." 16

The Constitution said the only intervening question was the method by which the union was to be brought about. What the United States should do was plain. Cuba needed life-supporting trade relations and they should be given by this government generously and not grudgingly. We should treat her as a sister and do all she asked and benefit ourselves more than we would help her. The Constitution concluded that Cuba would never voluntarily and gladly come into the union upon any terms that did not assure her statehood, and that the "majority of people would not desire her as a possession upon any less terms." 17

The Constitution had always said that Cuba, by her natural situation belonged to the United States as a part of our naval and trade

16April 15, 1902, p. 6. "Most of us in this country have laborred under the impression that the population of Cuba was largely made up of negroes [sic] and mixed breeds; but from the figures... it appears that this... notion is wholly erroneous. Out of 1,572,797 persons inhabiting the island in 1899, the official returns show that 1,068,467 were whites and 520,300 negroes [sic] and mixed breeds. This proportion," the Constitution contended, "should... call forth relief on the part of those who are looking upon Cuba with references to... future statehood in the American Union."

17April 13, 1902, p. 10; November 5, 1902, p. 6. The Columbus Enquirer-Gazette carried an article on Cuban annexation, stating that "Americanism would be of great advantage to Cuba in many ways."
defenses, and that this government would never consent that Cuba be under the control of any enemy government. The South in the old days wanted to annex Cuba, but was charged with inciting slavery. There was no slavery now, and the South was still as anxious to annex Cuba as it had been fifty years ago. The Cuban leaders might not see the great advantage at the present time, but they would in time, the Constitution had predicted.

And so it was that some Cubans did demand annexation to this country around January 1, 1902 when the Platt Amendment was being forced on them, according to the Constitution. "No relief [was] open to the Cubans save annexation." In dealing with Cuba the American government had to make a choice -- reciprocity or annexation. "If we chase reciprocity and granted Cuba the rates needed to make her sugar and tobacco crops profitable to her in our markets, we will thereby furnish to her the essential thing that will make her autonomy possible and so postpone indefinitely the question of annexation. So...if we decide that we want Cuba as a possession...our policy will be to deny reciprocity, enforce the Dingley rates to the last...and starve the islanders into unconditional and speedy surrender." This, the Constitution declared was the problem of the Republican party. The president, supported by Wood, favored the former policy. They did not want Cuba annexed. Why General Wood manifested this opposition was not plain to members of his party. The president, influenced by Wood, preferred granting the rights of reciprocity to Cuba because he felt that the policy of annexation would "hurt the inhabitants of this country." The fact that Cuba wanted a commercial union moved some persons to state that "we should make a counter proposition and invite her to a

18 January 20, 1900, p. 4; May 18, 1901, p. 6.
19 January 1, 1902, p. 6.
20 January 9, 1902, p. 6.
political union. They stated that there was no force involved in an
invitation extended in this way.

As the day approached when Cuba was to assume her status as an
independent nation the difficulties of her problems began to obtrude them-
selves. The fiduciary affairs of the island since 1899 had been under the
care of the American military officers. It was certain, stated the
Constitution, that when independence was gained stable conditions would
cease. Revolution would soon break out and cause intervention by the
American government. This could be remedied forever in only one way —
and that way was through annexation.

The Havana newspapers declared that McKinley should make some
declarations regarding the absolute independence of the island. They
wanted to know how he stood in reference to their future. The Constitu-
tion felt that the United States was bound to recognize Cuban independence
as a matter of honor, yet it believed that the Republicans who were in
power favored annexation. The property-owners and business men in Cuba
were strong advocates of American protection, but they were few compared
with Cuban patriots. Political parties had been found under the leader-
ship of Juan Gualberto Gomez and General Maximo Gomez. At this time Wood
had been appointed military governor of the island. It was stated that he
and McKinley had no sympathy with the annexationists because such a union
would be disastrous from many sides.

Southern newspapers questioned each others' views in reference
to the annexation of Cuba. The Constitution felt that annexation would
bring peace and better commercial relations which the Cubans desired. It

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21 April 15, 1902, p. 5.
22 May 5, 1902, p. 4.
hoped that the Cubans would see the advantages of annexation and would ask for admission to the union. The only problem of annexation, the Atlanta paper stated, was the method to be used in bringing Cuba into the union.
CHAPTER IV

Colonel Frank M. Gardenhiri, a citizen of Chattanooga returned from Havana predicting an uprising on the day of the municipal elections. Under a recent order the qualifications for voting were ability to read and write and the ownership of $250 worth of property. Since the regulation almost excluded the average run of natives, many of them promised trouble if they were not allowed to vote in the election. 1

General Gomez now advocated the independence of Cuba. 2 He declared that the treaty of Paris should be made the starting point toward Cuban independence. 3 As a result of his new position the Cuban National Party circulated leaflets asking Gomez not to abandon Cuba in the last stages of her struggle for independence. 4

The Cuban commission formed an electoral system which was instantly rejected by the Secretary of War. He would have approved one making the United States responsible for the laws of Cuba; but the Cubans

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1 March 5, 1900, p. 1.
2 It is not clear why Gomez changed his attitude. The change may have resulted from the new regulations.
3 April 9, 1900, p. 2. At this same time Senor Arriante, manager of Commerces of Havana stated that the Cuban planters should unite in their fight for independence, and remember that they had powerful allies in the sugar refineries of the United States who were anxious to have good sugar. The cost of production of sugar in Cuba was lower than that in the United States and manufacturers would have to support them to insure their trade.
4 April 27, 1900, p. 1. Senator Mason of Illinois had introduced a resolution in Congress for the withdrawal of American troops from Cuba and for the surrender of the island to the people by the following fourth of July. He agreed that the shortest way for the Cubans to learn self-government was to begin the practice as soon as possible. It was clear to him as to everybody else, the Constitution remarked, that the Republican administration did not intend to turn the island over to the Cubans at any early date.
wanted to run their own government. The Constitution stated that the "professional republicans carpet-baggers had been wanting to reconstruct some unfortunate region and had chosen Cuba," and only the South knew what fate awaited the Cubans. Not only were they at the mercy of these "carpet-baggers" but they had had thrust upon them laws which were exceedingly obnoxious. It was the sincere belief of this paper that Cuba would become "a part of this great republic," yet it feared the date would be postponed by the indiscretions of Republican military government. In view of that possibility the strong Cuban plank in the Democratic platform was a matter of time.

McKinley and General Woold agreed upon September 15, 1901 as the date for holding the elections in Cuba for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. It was hoped that the Constitutional Convention could be as early as October 15 because it was evident that any constitution would be scrutinized by the American government before it would be allowed to operate. S. L. Beekwith, the Atlanta correspondent in Cuba, wrote of the excitement over the convention by the Cubans. The election was supposed to require a different registration from that of the past campaign so that all might participate. The convention upon assembling would proceed to study the different forms of Republican government. Great satisfaction was manifested by the Cubans at the prospect of self-government, but the matter was not without some opposition.

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5 April 28, 1900, p. 12. Hines Rivera begged the Cuban political parties to join in a simultaneous campaign to convince the American government that they were one in their efforts toward independence.

6 July 9, 1900, p. 4.

7 July 21, 1900, p. 1; July 22, 1900, p. 2. It was thought that thirty-five members would probably compose the Constitutional Convention. Twenty-five of these were to be selected by popular vote, and the others would be chosen by these twenty-five.

8 July 22, 1900, p. 2. On June of this same year, men of the business and
The Constitution was never better pleased than when engaged in enlightening the darkness of its contemporaries. The Journal of Albany, New York in one of its issues commented on this paper's belief that "the destiny of Cuba is to be a part of the great republic." The Journal wanted to know how this paper reconciled its belief with its support of the Bryanites platform. "Could anything be more imperialistic," it asked, "than the belief of the anti-imperialistic Constitution that Cuba, to which the United States pledged independence, is destined to become a part of the United States?" The Constitution answered the Journal by stating that it had consistently protested against "forcible" dominion over any part of the globe, and called attention to the fact that the pledge of independence was made under Democratic influence in Congress, which sought recognition for the government. But having failed in the larger purpose the Democrats forced the smaller one — the pledge. The Constitution further declared that if the same pledge had been made to the Philippines, war would have ceased there. "Expansion is the democratic doctrine not through greed for empire, but for the extension of constitutional liberty." That the Cubans, impelled by the necessities of the case and the benefits to be derived from connection with the United States, would seek admission into the Union the Constitution was fully convinced. Here was their market and they would naturally seek the closest possible relation with it. When Cuba desired annexation she would come into the union. The Constitution concluded that expansion was Democratic and imperialism was Republican.

"The dividing line is plain enough, whether the Journal sees it that way or not." 9

9 Professional class called upon General Wood stating that it was too soon to grant independence. They argued that all the candidates in the election were politicians, but it was evident that they wanted protection of their financial interests under American control.

9 July 24, 1900, p. 4.
The New York Advertiser displayed incredulity with respect to the United States carrying out her pledge to Cuba. It continued that there was no justification for the act of sincerity that this government was supposed to be preparing. The Constitution did not believe the administration was keen to carry out the pledge. And if the official announcement in regard to a constitutional convention for Cuba meant no more than McKinley's official declaration in regard to necessity of free trade for Porto Rico, it certainly did not amount to much. The editorial page questioned the sincerity of the administration, alleging that the American people had every reason to be suspicious of it. The next election, it believed, would postpone Cuban independence for many years if a Republican was elected. 10

The Globe-Democrat of St. Louis fairly gloated over the supposition that the Republican administration really intended to live up to its pledge to the Cubans. But the St. Louis publication looked forward to the time when the Cubans would urge and demand annexation to this country. The Constitution was certain that the Cubans had understood the McKinley Administration since it had robbed them and made them victims of an idiot that only civil marriage should be legal. They should learn even more if McKinley was re-elected. "Why should McKinley", it queried, "or to be more precise, Hamma — hold the sword over a people on whom independence is to be bestowed? Does anybody understand it?" 11

The Constitution honestly attempted to justify the Cubans' desire and right of independence by comparing the situation with the French intervention during the American revolution. Had the Frenchmen insisted upon

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10 July 28, 1900, p. 4.
11 August 8, 1900, p. 4.
the "galling and irritating conditions" that had been imposed on Cuba, considerable trouble would have ensued. But the Frenchmen, continued the Atlanta paper, withdrew their forces and left "the Americans the sole responsibility of framing and organizing their own government." They never so much as hinted that the Americans were obligated to them and yet it was impossible to pick up a Republican organ without finding some reference to the "obligations which the Cubans owed to the United States." The affairs of Cuba were not in the hands of Congress, but under the president's control assisted by the war department. The Constitution further believed that the Cubans would have little voice in the framing and ratification of their constitution and that "independence would be a sham!" The program gave no signs of independence. The Republicans were merely reproducing in Cuba the system of reconstruction they had attempted in the South after the Civil War. 12 Not that it would criticize General Wood, the Constitution made clear, for he would conduct the Cubans to an independence, but "he [was] not the master" and would not be "responsible for the jugglery that [would] end in embittering the Cubans." 13

The Republican newspapers cried out loudly because the Cubans showed a timorous desire to frame their own government. It was no secret, stated the editorial page, that these Cuban leaders had won the ill-will of the Republicans because they had insisted that American trusts would not be allowed to gobble up everything on the island. Meanwhile, the

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12 August 28, 1900, p. 6. A Cuban named Verona favored the Republican administration, but the explanation popped out that he was holding an office under the war department and drawing a salary. And so it is the same old story said the Constitution: "Wherever you find a carpet-bagger there you will find her room-mate, the scalawag; one is the product of the other."

13 Ibid.
Republican Senate Committee on Cuban Affairs was engaged in suppressing the scandals which had "disgraced the American name." Senator Bacon of Georgia had spoken in the Senate on the postal frauds as early as May, demanding an investigation. Senator Platt had admitted that the frauds had caused great humiliation among every patriotic American, but nothing had been done in any direction to correct them. Bacon again in September introduced into the Senate resolutions to investigate the frauds. The Constitution heartily agreed with him that this step should be taken in order that all the Americans would not have to suffer for this misdeed. Since no newspapers exploited Spanish official corruption more than those of the United States, the disceptions had to be investigated. "Exploit the Cuban scandal! Run down the criminals who have dishonored the flag. Restore the American good name" were the loud sentiments of the Constitution.

It was gathered from Havana reports that the people were not responding to the opportunity to register and it was difficult to understand their indifference to the Constitutional Convention. The hypothesis, not without foundation, was that the Cubans were satisfied with their conditions. The politicians and press were trying every means to induce the people to register, but their efforts were fruitless. A great outcry existed because the United States would supervise the Constitution when it was formed. Three or four Cubans had protested against the right of the American government to interfere in the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention stating that "the time had come for the intervention

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14 May 17, 1900, p. 1; May 24, 1900, p. 1.
15 September 10, 1900, p. 4
of the United States to cease and the joint resolutions to be fulfilled."  

The Cuban Constitutional Convention began November 5, 1900.

That this was proof of that the Democratic principles could not be defeated, the Constitution was convinced. The Cubans had elected their delegates and were now ready to lay the foundation for complete independence. S. L. Beckwith, the Atlanta correspondent in Cuba, reported that the question of the future relations between the United States and Cuba caused much discussion among the Cubans. One idea was that United States troops would remain after Cuba was independent to protect the life and property of American citizens. Likewise, the United States, having brought the Cuban treasury up to the proper basis would control it, preventing the island from negotiating loans from foreign powers except upon approval of the American government.

The session of the Constitutional Convention on November 16, was as predicted, a stormy one, since there had been a great many fraudulent practices of the National party in the election of September 15. The first man to speak was Juan Gualberto Gomez. According to Beckwith he was a "man distinctly negro [sic], but one of the brightest men in that body." He was the "Don Juan" whom La Lucha tried to expose to ridicule, but all of its insinuations never pierced his "impenetrable coolness." He took the standpoint of a patriot and demanded that the election frauds be corrected in "the interest of the purity of the ballot." He further declared "that the delegates could not afford to pass the frauds without a

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16 September 1, 1900, p. 1; February 25, 1901, p. 6. Cienfuegos, the ex-president of the Cuban revolutionary government, had been protesting in the United States against the Constitutional Convention and the manner in which it had been called; but, it was reported that he did not represent any great number of people. It was the ambition of the Senor to become president of independent Cuba — and he stated that the time would come when all Cubans would fight Americans.

17 November 15, 1900, p. 12.
rigid investigation"; and that he spoke in the interest of no man. The point was the necessity of showing that such fraudulent ballots would not be admitted, and to forever put an end to those high in authority from robbing the people of their right of suffrage. He stated that he had taken up the matter against the advice of his friends who were afraid he would be accused of arguing in favor of Rivera as against Zayas. But in that contest he had no interest. The greatest frauds had been committed and he sought to have the injustice corrected. Juan Gualberto Gomes contended that at least the election should have been honest when high officials and six representatives of the American government were on the ballot.

The American government appeared to have wanted all parties represented in the Convention, but their agents prevented this by fraud. The victory of the National party was due to this fraud. Some of the delegates were not even residents of the provinces they represented on the floor of the Convention. Juan G. Gomes stated that in Santiago de las Vegas the election was held on the 15th day of September, the day appointed, but that the voting had been done before that time. He ridiculed the statements written on many ballots, ballots that were supposedly done by clerks for some ignorant voters. "If this was true", he questioned, "how was it that all were written in the same handwriting for two precincts twenty miles apart?" He ended his speech by appealing for justice and honesty, but, said Beckwith, "he rather astonished some of us by stating that he would rather cheat one elector than the whole country."

Senor Portundo, from Santiago, answered Juan G. Gomes by speaking

18
November 20, 1900, p. 4.
in favor of adopting the report, although he admitted that there had been frauds. There were many bitter speeches between Sanguilly and Giberya and Giberya and Zayas. The members of the convention accused each other of political treachery and bad faith. Giberya delivered a great speech attacking those persons responsible for the election frauds. He complained many of the deceptions committed. When he finished, Sanguilly astonished everyone by speaking against the adoption of the report. The Convention then adjourned after being in session for eleven days without doing anything.

The "Assemble Constituyente Cubana" was now a permanent organization with Senor Capote as president. This was a decided victory for the Republicans led by Juan Gualberto Gomes. The Nationalists had supported Eduardo Tamayo, but he had been defeated. Capote filled the vacancy left by Senor Llorenti, retiring temporary president.

At one session of the convention Rius Rivera formulated an idea that only native born Cubans could be eligible for the presidency. This proposal was warmly contested because the adoption of such a measure would exclude General Maximo Gomez. However, Gomez in November had declared that he would accept no office. This caused joy to be expressed by the anti-Gomes group, but he was still the hero of another element.

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19 November 20, 1900, p. 4; November 25, 1900, p. 13. After being in session for fourteen days the Convention still had accomplished nothing. General Rius Rivera said that they were moving slowly, but would adopt a constitution before adjourning permanently.

20 December 2, 1900, p. 14. Capote had been chairman of the Yaya Convention which drafted the first Cuban Constitution. He had also been appointed Secretary of State under the American military government.

21 November 9, 1900, p. 4. The Constitution believed that the duties of Gomez for the past twenty years had been of such a nature as to disqualify him civil status; and his good sense in recognizing that fact was impressive.
The Convention continued their work and hoped to complete the Cuban Constitution before the congress of the United States adjourned.

To return to American concern, the Constitution felt that the Cuban question had reached an acute stage. The Boston Herald, an independent organ, thought it better that the Cubans attempt self-government with our blessings rather than be prevented by measures that would turn their respect of us into distrust and hatred. It further warned the American government that "if we insist upon such control prematurely, we shall have another dependency filled with discontent and the spirit of revolt."

The Baltimore American, a Republican organ stated that "insistence upon a protectorate would be suicidal, impeaching this nation before the world and necessitating a deliberate disregard of a solemn promise."

There was but one way to regulate our relations with Cuba and that was to declare Cuba free and independent, the Baltimore paper concluded.

The Philadelphia Times, a Democratic paper, believed that the new idea about Cuba seemed to be exactly in line with the British policy in South Africa. That was, if the Boers left off fighting they would be allowed a qualified independence under British suzerainty with the understanding that everything they did was subject to British approval. This did not satisfy the Boers and would not satisfy the Cubans.

The United States had declared that Cuba was and by right should...

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22 It is interesting to note that universal suffrage had been voted by a large majority of the members of the convention.

23 The business interests were suffering severe shocks from rumors that the United States would soon release the island.

24 February 4, 1901, p. 4. The fact that an extra congress might have been needed let loose a floodgate of arguments.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.
be free and independent. If this declaration had been merely recognition
of the independence of Cuba, to which we had contributed nothing, then,
declared the Constitution we would have neither the right nor the opinion
to express Cuba's internal policy. But, the declaration brought war
which cost us both men and money, and placed a foreign people upon our
hands. The United States so far had done her duty in establishing a
stable government on the island — and could be depended upon to continue
in that course. Soon the Cuban Constitution would be completed and for-
warded to this country. "We have broken no promises [and] . . . are making
all necessary haste to fulfill the pledge." The Constitution asserted
that "Government is not of one day, but one of time, and we should be in
no undue haste about the performances of a very important duty."27

The Cuban question was recognized as the great one of the near
future and required delicate handling.28 The New York Press in its view
on the supposed presidential plan, stated that "We have certainly followed
a course nicely calculated to reduce Cuba to the status of a subjugated
province by hook or crook. . . . He [i.e., the president] would like to
make it easier for the poor people, but. . . . he must. . . . get two naval
stations, the control of the debt and foreign relations as security for
the rent or turn the tenants out" — which was nothing short of forcible
annexation. The Constitution thoroughly indignant at this supposition
of the New York Press cried out that if we did "we [were] either the

27 February 4, 1901, p. 4.
28 February 7, 1901, p. 4. The Constitution was convinced that the
Republicans were trying to avoid the Cuban question as long as
they dared, and that if they could induce the president to change
his mind about an extra session, they would delay the whole busi-
ness until the regular session the following December.
most unblushing, thieving hypocrites," or the most "ruthless coterie of bungling amateurs the world politics ever held record of." 29

The Cuban Constitutional Convention had progressed to the point of appointing a committee to draw up plans defining the relations to exist between Cuba and the United States. 30 The Cuban constitution had been submitted by the Central Committee to the Convention on January 21, 1901, and was signed by the members on February 15. Senor Cisneros created a sensation by refusing to sign it. He stated that Cuba was now independent and he could see no reason for sending the constitution to the United States for acceptance. He felt that the United States had no right to pass on it and maintained that view in spite of the arguments of other delegates. 31

The special committee on relations with the United States, after a short delay, instructed its Secretary, Juan Gualberto Gomez, to draw up a proposition and submit it to the committee for consideration. This proposition was to deal with the issue in three leading divisions:

(1) That Cuba should not be made the base of war operations against the United States
(2) That the commercial treaty with the United States should embody as far as possible free trade between the two countries, and (3) That no foreign treaties should be made jeopardizing the independence of Cuba.

The Cuban Constitutional Convention had thus made attempts to

29February 11, 1901, p. 4.
30February 12, 1901, p. 1; February 14, 1901, p. 1. Senores Desquesada, Tamayo, Juan Gualberto Gomez, Hillaudemas and Silva were appointed members of the Committee on Relations.
General Rivierra objected to the control. He felt that they should be decided upon after the Cuban constitution had been adopted. He declared that if the United States were allowed coaling stations in Cuba and permitted to control their foreign relations, there would be no features of independence left.
31February 23, 1901, p. 1.
32Ibid.
define the relations to exist between the two governments. But none of
the proposals were acceptable to the United States. A statement of those
relations was attempted by Secretary Root in a letter to General Wood on
February 9, 1901. He had suggested that the Cuban constitution contain
certain vital clauses such as: permission for this government to inter-
vene to maintain order; that Cuba should not make treaties that granted
special privileges to foreign countries which affected her independendc;
and that naval stations should be offered to her benefactor. This well-
known letter elaborated the points already made by Secretary Root in a
previous letter to John Hay January 11, 1901. It is because of this fact
that friends of Secretary Root claimed for him the authorship of the Platt
Amendment. Platt declared that the original draft was his. This might
have/technically true, said one authority, but even back of this was the
mind that first conceived the principles. And that mind was unquestionably
Root's. The authorship of the various provisions of the Amendment was
a matter of controversy. Another authority gave to Root the credit for
formulating the future relationship of Cuba to United States -- stating
that he wished to make it certain that no foreign power other than the
United States should interfere with the destiny of Cuba -- and that he
had submitted the proposals later embodied in the Platt amendment to the
Cuban Constitutional Convention -- but the Cubans rejected it. To
these, counter proposals were made, thus dragging the negotiations along.

33 Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt A Biography (New York, 1931),
pp. 297-298.
34 Alfred L. P. Demis, Adventures in American Diplomacy (New York, 1920)
p. 263.
35 Louis A. Coolidge, An Old-fashioned Senator -- Orville H. Platt of
Connecticut The Story of a Life Unselfishly Devoted to Public
36 Demis, op. cit. p. 268.
37 Samuel Flagg Demis, A Diplomatic History of the United States
It was believed also that the proposals had originated with General James H. Wilson who in 1899 was in command of one of the departments of Cuba and who in a report made in the summer of that year substantially stated every proposition embodied in the Platt Amendment—except the requirement that the definition of our relations be included in the Cuban Constitution.

Meanwhile, the presidential election had come and gone. The Constitution had carried extensive news articles campaigning for Bryan, but seemed resigned to McKinley's victory. McKinley had stated in his inaugural address that "we become sponsors for the pacification of the island, and we remain accountable to the Cubans, as less than to our own country and people." He had further stated that "Our enfranchisement of the people will not be completed until free Cuba shall be a reality, not in name, a perfect entity; not a hasty experiment bearing within itself the elements of failure." With this in view the president was anxious to conclude the Cuban matter before Congress adjourned on March 4. Consequently, the Platt Amendment was introduced as a rider to the Army Appropriation Bill.

The Platt Amendment provided that the United States would leave the government and control of the island of Cuba to its people as soon as they would include in their constitution the following terms:

I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military

39 James D. Richardson, comp., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (New York, 1918), IX, 6466.
40 Dennis, op. cit., p. 283.
purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.

II. That said government shall not assume or contract any public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of government shall be inadequate.

III. That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba.

IV. That all the acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.

V. That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island.

VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereof being left to future adjustment by treaty.

VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

VIII. That by way of further assurance the government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.41

The Cubans were enraged by this action of the American government and threatened to dissolve the convention. They declared that their suggestions had been ignored; and that the United States intended to do what it pleased with Cuba. Juan Gualberto Gomez, although radically opposed to the amendment, stated that he did not believe it was the final decision of the United States. He thought that the convention should

discuss the amendment and return it to General Wood and possibly McKinley would have an extra session in hope of compromise. The Cuban Constitution had these clauses in relation to the United States:

1. The government of Cuba would not make a treaty agreement with any foreign power which might compromise the independence of Cuba or which might permit any power colonization for naval or military purposes — any foothold or right over any portion of Cuba.

2. The Government would not permit its territory to be used as a base of operation against the United States or against any foreign nation.

3. The Government of Cuba accepted the treaty of Paris, in which were affirmed the rights of Cuba to the extent of the obligations indicated, and those that international law imposed for the protection of life and property.

4. Cuba recognized as legally valid all acts of the military government during the period of occupation, and also the Foraker Amendment and the existing laws of the country.

5. The governments of the United States and Cuba should regulate their commercial relations by means of a treaty based on reciprocity.

There were some matters in the American demands which were not treated in these clauses of the Cuban Constitution. Objections were made in the preamble to the demand for naval stations on the ground that Cuba was willing to comply with American demands by not making any treaties with foreign powers; not permitting its territory to be used as a base of operation against any powers; by accepting the Treaty of Paris and its obligations; and by recognizing the validity of all acts of the military government in Cuba during the American period of occupation. However, she was not willing to consent to American intervention to preserve peace, life and property. There were conflicting views over the Isle of Pines and the naval stations were a matter of

42 March 6, 1901, p. 2.
43 Chapman, op. cit., p. 106. In 1898 the Foraker Law was passed by Congress to the effect that no franchises should be granted during the occupation of the United States in Cuba so that the island would not be exploited by capitalists.
severe controversy. These were Cuba's chief objections to the Platt Amendment.

In the Committee on Relations to which was referred the Platt Amendment there were three radicals, Silva, Villanendo [sic], and Juan G. Gomez; and two conservatives, Tamayo and Cuesada [sic]. Gomez was "in favor of shedding blood — anybody's blood — rather than yield to the tyrannical exactions of the Yankees."45

If the Cubans were sensible they would see that they had nothing to lose and everything to gain by accepting the Platt Amendment, said the Constitution. It was true they would yield some of their sovereignty and independence, but that loss was only sentimental. They should remember, the Atlanta paper continued that they were founding a republic under exceptional circumstances and were in great need of American aid and protection. They had neither army nor navy with which to protect themselves. They had no financial resources — in short, this country offered to fight their battles for them in the future as they had done in the past. The Cubans had every reason of self-interest to welcome the guardianship of the United States. "Can't the Cubans see on what side their bread is buttered?"46

General Sanguilly, a member of the Cuban Constitutional Convention, was at the outset radically opposed to the acceptance of the Platt Amendment, but now he advocated accepting the proposals. The Constitution congratulated him upon his "good sense" and felt that things would be all right in Cuba now — the problem would solve itself. It might be necessary, however, for this government to make some slight concessions in order to

45 March 9, 1901, p. 1; March 15, 1901, p. 4.
46 March 9, 1901, p. 6.
win over all the radical elements. Congress had purposely put the American demand into the word 'substantially' instead of 'ultimatum' for the express purpose of giving the president some latitude in negotiating with the Cubans. The Constitution further stated that the conditions laid down in the Platt Amendment were "so eminently right and just and [furnished] such assurance of sound government that we have never doubted their endorsement by the conservative elements in Cuba. .."

Beckwith reported that Sanguilly had contradicted himself again in a recent interview. Now he said that prominent members of the Republican party protested against the Amendment and it would not be proper for him to take the contrary position. This seemed very peculiar, Beckwith continued, when the Republican party in the province of Santiago, which was represented by Sanguilly and Juan G. Gomez, came out in favor of the Amendment and had instructed the two delegates to vote for it. Gomez refused to resign from the convention and acted entirely in opposition to the will of his constituents.

The uncertainty over the action of the Cuban Constitutional Convention gave rise to much unfavorable comment of the Teller Resolution. It seemed popular to denounce this declaration as an uncleared-for piece of sentimentality and to criticize the Senate for its adoption. But, the Constitution declared, "It was not an unwise or unnecessary bit of sentiment" -- the declaration was made for American protection. And the United States had asked nothing in return for the friendly aid, therefore "...

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47 March 23, 1901, p. 6; March 26, 1901, p. 6.
48 March 31, 1901, p. 19. It was Beckwith's belief that the Convention would finally vote in favor of the Amendment. Sixteen of the thirty-one delegates had already signified their determination to vote for it. The coaling stations, intervention and the Isle of Pines were the points of contention among the delegates.
the conditions should be accepted by the Cubans."

But the Cuban Constitutional Convention rejected the Platt Amendment on April 12, 1901 by a vote of 18 to 10.49 It opposed the amendment because of the terms of the clauses — especially II, VI, and VII. A committee of five was sent to Washington to negotiate. The Constitution thought that a better understanding would be reached as a result of these negotiations. Properly handled, the Cubans would submit to the views of McKinley who, the Constitution stated, was a "born diplomatist and diplomacy was very essential."50

The Constitution published an article written by ex-Secretary of State Olney of Massachusetts borrowed from the New York Sun. The Constitution pointed out that Olney was right in his expression "... the acquisition of Cuba by the United States as a fact accomplished is inaccurate. But the objection is technical and the expression conveys the substantial truth notwithstanding a resolution of Congress..." but, he was wrong in declaring the Teller Resolution was "ill-advised" and futile at passage. It was true that viewed in the present knowledge, the resolution was a mistake, since it proved unnecessary and served to delay the results, but it was equally true that when it was framed everybody considered it wise. The Senate adopted it for defense of this government's action at a time when defense was advisable in order to give no government the excuse to say that the United States was going to war so as to acquire Cuba. The Constitution continued by stating that nothing in the demands of Congress conflicted with the spirit of the Teller resolution, and that as soon as the Cubans realised this, they would doubtless acquiesce.51

49 April 11, 1901, p. 6; Dennis, op. cit., p. 266, says that on April 6, 1901 the Platt Amendment was defeated in the Convention by a vote of 24 to 2.
50 April 15, 1901, p. 4. This is rather surprising coming from the Constitution which had been so strictly opposed to "McKinleyism."
51 April 20, 1901, p. 4.
General Wood believed that the acceptance of the Amendment was a matter of a short time. He seemed even more optimistic, said the Constitution since his conferences with the Secretary of War. Some Cubans began to feel they were fighting a lost cause. Señor Valluende believed there was no use objecting to the inevitable. "It is either annexation or a republic with the amendment, and I prefer the latter," he stated. That the Señor preferred a republic rather than annexation disturbed the Constitution: "The time is sure to come when all other thoughtful Cubans will see [that] annexation will ultimately come . . . [and] when Cuba becomes a part of the United States there will necessarily follow that freedom of trade with the present states" which would mean so much to her material prosperity. "There is no higher type of independence. . . [than that which] her people will enjoy when Cuba is admitted to this sisterhood of states" but, the Constitution declared, "the proposition to annex must first come from Cuba. . . ."

Finally, on May 28, 1901, the Cuban Convention voted in favor of the Platt Amendment 15 to 14. The provisions of the Amendment became a part of the Cuban Constitution. It was provided that the Cuban Constitution should set forth "substantially" these provisions. The Cuban interpretation seemed to differ from that of the American in translating the provisions. When the Cuban Constitution was presented to the

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52 May 8, 1901, p. 1. It was inevitable, said the Constitution, that the tariff would be a stumbling block in the negotiations, for it was difficult to make the Republican tariff policy conform to the party's policy of expansion.

53 April 28, 1901, p. 13. The New York Press stated that the best sugar manufacturing interests in America settled the tropical and colonial questions. It prohibited the annexation of Cuba to the United States. If the Republican policy resulted in the stateshood of Cuba, it would involve freedom of trade, and this would be fought by the best sugar people and also the cane sugar people of Louisiana. Therefore, the best thing for the Cubans was to accept the Platt Amendment and become an independent government.

54 May 31, 1901, p. 4; June 1, 1901, p. 1; June 8, 1901, p. 1.
American government, it was rejected. McKinley and the Cabinet said that the Cubans had not complied with their terms and that the American government insisted on unconditional acceptance of the Amendment. Also, that the troops would remain on the island until it was accepted.

The Cubans refused to reconsider their former vote on the Amendment then, but on June 12, accepted it by a vote of 16 to 11. General Wood communicated the news to Elihu Root who said "It means the independence of Cuba and all that is best and freest in Cuba will be backed by all that is best in the United States." 55

The Constitution believed the acceptance of the amendment to be the "most important event of the year." It meant that Cuba would have an opportunity for independence such as has never before been vouchsafed to a weak people." 56 On December 31 the election would be held to choose electors for president, vice president, and other governmental officials. On February 24, 1902 the electors were to select the permanent officers of the island. General Wood thought that the island would be delivered to the Cubans by May. The Constitution commented on this belief of General Wood: "Nearly five hundred million dollars spent, many lives sacrificed, much suffering endured and we are to hand over Cuba to the Cubans so that they may make the doubtful experiment of governing themselves. The promise was made that this should be done, a promise that looked well and sounded all right at the outset, but that greatly complicates the situation now..." 57

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54 May 31, 1901, p. 4; June 1, 1901, p. 1; June 8, 1901, p. 1.
56 June 14, p. 4; June 25, 1901, p. 6.
57 June 14, 1901, p. 4; June 25, 1901, p. 6. Beckwith reported that things were "smoldering in Cuba" while on the "surface general quietude prevailed. There was, however, considerable venom but it was harmless."
Theodore Roosevelt, president of the United States since McKinley's death, stated that Cuba would start as her own mistress with "our heartiest greetings and good wishes." General Wood would see to the adoption of the new constitution and the elections which would soon occur in an orderly fashion. The anti-American crowd was anxious that nothing justify the continuance of American occupation and control in Cuba beyond the inauguration of the Cuban government. The electoral scheme and laws practically dictated by the American authorities were not acceptable to the radical "Cuban Libre" element. "The disfranchisement of large numbers of ignorant and revolutionary natives, principally negroes [sic], and the enfranchisement of... unnaturalized Spaniards are things the radicals will never peaceably accept," said the Constitution. Moreover, they are openly the enemies of any submission... to the terms of the Platt Amendment" which would make permanent Anglo-Saxon methods in the administration of Tomas Estrada Palma was elected president it would be to the advantage of the pro-American and annexation parties. But it was evident that he would be opposed by the "reactionaries." The

58 December 2, 1901, p. 4; December 4, 1901, p. 5.
59 December 8, 1901, p. 6.
60 December 7, 1901, p. 6. Emilio Nunez, Civil Governor of Havana, in an article for the Atlanta paper wrote that "the negroes [sic] are of a higher grade of intelligence and are considered as being more nearly on a footing with the whites than are most of the negroes [sic] of [the]... United States." They fought "for independence with as much sturdiness as any."
61 August 26, 1901, p. 4. The Constitution had been convinced at this early date that Palma would be the first president of the new republic. This Atlanta paper also believed that with Cuba in the hands of an observant man, aware of American friendliness and broadminded enough to admit the logic of events, Cuba could be left to the influence of time. Palma seemed to have these qualifications and could be depended upon to make the best out of the situation.
adherents of Bartolome Masso and their leaders would suspect Palma of playing into the hands of the United States. Masso, "an old man and a turbulent spirit," hated everything American and had a strong supporter in Juan Gualberto Gomez, "the most influential, subtle, and dangerous negro sic in Cuba. This Masso-Gomez group demonstrated the futility of peaceful self-government in Cuba," stated the Constitution; it would result in anarchy which would mean "American annexation — peaceful, if the Cubans [would] forcibly, if we must." 62

In the coming elections, according to Emilio Nunez, three parties were formed — the National, Republican and Democratic. 63 The National party, the strongest numerically, was made up of Cubans who demanded absolute independence. Their platform was practically the same as that of the Republicans, in fact, the two parties were almost one. The difference was that the leaders and not the policies had been opposed. General Gomez was the leader of the National party. He had refused the candidacy for president several times, thus leaving Palma as the choice of the National party. They were both good friends and high in the esteem of the Cubans. In some parts of the island an understanding existed between the Republicans and the Democrats in favor of Masso — which might be called an Anti-Platt party said Nunez.

62. December 6, 1901, p. 18. Juan G. Gomez hated the Americans and had refused to take office and help pacify the island. "The black men of Cuba would obey his call to revolt against any unwelcomed native government as readily as the clans of the Highlands answered the bugle blast of Rhoderick Dhu." He could lead them to any lengths of sedition and strife.

63. December 7, 1900, p. 6. The Republicans included a fraction of the patriots who fought in the war against Spain; the Democrats were survivors of the old autonomist party declaring allegiance to the mother country with the privilege of home rule. Spaniards and the old Spanish sympathizers largely comprised the Democratic organisation.
Maso declared that they did not intend to give up any portion of their independence or their sovereignty. The sympathizers of Maso were still urgent for revision of the Amendment, but the supporters of Palma were willing to drop the controversy until the final treaty.

The Constitution predicted a "speedy and certainly bloody ending" of the Cuban government. The "ignorance and idiosyncrasies of the masses, their racial and traditional misconception of the true nature of liberty [and] their...inherited resistance to authority..." were reasons given for this prophecy. Therefore, said the Constitution "We can see no escape for the Cubans from a bloody finale of their effort at independence. Internecine strife will come" and then "the obligations of the United States will force them to intervene." The Constitution represented the hostile attitude of the New York Press toward General Wood. It stated that "the ox-eyed daisy of the Oxnard sugar beet fields advocated turning the island over to the Cubans without the supervision of Wood." The offense of General Wood, in the eye of the New York Press, continued the Constitution was that he had recommended and supported the policy formulated for Cuba's industrial relief by McKinley and his successor, Roosevelt. In defense of Wood the Atlanta paper upheld the appointment of Wood "as the best thing ever done for the Cubans and stated that no man's name would ever shine with more glory."

Beckwith reported that conditions in Cuba were both "abnormal

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64 December 7, 1901, p. 6. Maso was well liked by all the native Cubans. He was the last president of the revolutionary party when the Spanish War began. He was the soldier more than the statesman, whereas Palma was the statesman more than the soldier. Nuñez thought Palma would be elected because of the support Gomes would offer.

65 Ibid.

66 March 11, 1902, p. 6.
The Constitution again raised the question whether or not the Cubans would be able to manage their government successfully. The Cuban leaders seemed to think they could, but the Atlanta paper doubted their ability. Then, too, what they did might not please an American state. Therefore, we cannot judge their proceedings. But "they will learn," said the Constitution, "that their best independence and largest prosperity are to be found only in annexation to this great republic."\(^7\)

General Fitzhugh Lee had wondered if Palma would dare undertake the presidency of Cuba after having been so long away from the island, and was openly opposed by a powerful junta of revolutionary leaders. The Constitution considered it very significant that General Masso had given his adhesion to the presidency of Palma in Cuba.\(^7\) The coming inauguration moved the Atlanta paper to say that "it [would] be claimed ... that we have put the new nation in leading strings by the imposition of the Platt requirements -- but those who know the Cuban people would understand the ... necessity and wisdom of those requisitions...."\(^7\)

On May 20, 1902, the "birth of the new republic" was begun. The central figures were Wood and Palma.\(^7\) The actual transfer of the control of Cuba occurred exactly at noon, Havana time, which was 12:30 P.M., Washington time. Congress met and proclaimed the Constitution and the appendix. General Wood immediately embarked on the Brooklyn for the United States. Palma cabled Roosevelt the profound gratitude of the Cubans. Meanwhile, Secretary Hay dispatched cables to every capital

\(^{70}\) March 27, 1902, p. 6.

\(^{71}\) April 6, 1901, p. 18; May 1, 1902, p. 6. Masso had already started a programme to demand pensions for the soldiers amounting to $80,000,000.

\(^{72}\) May 19, 1902, p. 4.

\(^{73}\) May 21, 1902, p. 1.
and anomalous," since it had not occurred to the Cubans that they
expected to inaugurate as their first president an American citizen,
Estrado Palma. 67 It was surprising that the revolutionary party and the
Mazziniasts had not used this weapon. It was true that applications were
made daily for citizenship, but they were all turned down because there
was no authority in Cuba vested with that right. One of the main clauses
of the Cuban Constitution read that "only a citizen of Cuba by birth, or
naturalization, is eligible to the presidency." Palma was born in Cuba,
but had renounced his citizenship. Thus, said Beckwith, the proposed
Constitution "is violated in the first act of sovereignty exercised by
the people, and the first magistrate of the land seconds the act."
However, it was generally believed that the first of May or the second of
June, at the latest, the Cuban flag would replace the American flag. 68

On March 25, Secretary of War Root, ordered Wood to provide for
the inauguration on May 20 for the government elected by the people of
Cuba; and when that was completed to leave the government and control of
it to the people. After the withdrawal of American troops and the temporary
retention of artillery men, the order directed Wood to convene the congress
elected by the people. Eight hundred men of the coast artillery were to
remain in Cuba. Root also instructed Secretary Hay to arrange for diplomatic
representation of the United States in Cuba. 69

67. March 24, 1902, p. 6. It was stated that he had renounced his
allegiance to the United States in view of his election. Yet, he must
be a citizen somewhere, and citizenship was illegal in Cuba until the
new government was in operation, according to Beckwith.

68. March 24, 1902, p. 4. But, stated Beckwith, Cuba would not be left
entirely without protection. The Colombia Barracks would not be dis-
mantled and doubtless would continue a permanent military post.

69. March 26, 1902, p. 2.
to prove that the United States had redeemed its pledge. 74

"Our flag is down but the Cuban flag cannot remain up if the
government of Cuba, by their own trickery, are unable to live upon the fruits
of their labor." 75 This, the Constitution remained to the end — doubtful
of the ability of the Cubans to govern themselves.

McKinley and Wood had agreed upon September 15, 1900 as the date
for holding the elections in Cuba for the Constitutional Convention. In
spite of Cuban objections to American supervision the election took place
September 15, 1900. In the Constitutional Convention which met November
16, 1900, Juan Gualberto Gomez denounced the reports presented exposing
enormous frauds. Many bitter speeches ensued between the conservatives
and the radicals. The future relations between Cuba and the United States
gave rise to some of the most bitter debates. The Cuban Constitutional
Convention appointed a special Committee on Relations to draw up plans
with the American government. On January 21, 1901 the Cuban Constitution
had been submitted by the Central Committee and signed February 15, 1901.
The Committee on Relations instructed its secretary, Juan Gualberto Gomez,
to draw up proposals naming the leading issues to be dealt with, and sub-
mit them to the committee for consideration. Attempts were made by the
Cubans to define their relation with the United States. Root wrote Wood
suggesting the relations which should exist between the two countries;
his suggestions were later embodied in the Platt Amendment. The Cubans,
headed by Juan Gualberto Gomez, were enraged at the terms of the amendment.
On April 12, 1901 the Cuban Constitutional Convention rejected the Platt
Amendment by a vote of 18 to 10. By May 28, however, the amendment was

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74 May 21, 1902, pp. 1, 3.
75 May 22, 1902, p. 6.
accepted with certain modifications by the Cubans. The United States rejected the amendments. On June 12, 1901 Cuba finally accepted the Platt Amendment without modification. Elections were then held to elect the president of Cuba under the supervision of General Wood. Tomás Estrada Palma was elected president.

The Constitution felt that Cuba's destiny was to become a part of the United States, not as a result of "forcible annexation", but by an invitation extended to the Cubans. The Atlanta paper declared that independence would be disastrous for the Cubans because they lacked the ability to govern themselves; and because they would be a "chronic nuisance" to the United States who would have to intervene to correct whatever evil might arise. The flag was down, but for how long, asked the Constitution?
CONCLUSION

The Spanish officials turned Cuba over to the American authorities on January 1, 1899. After the American occupation had stabilized the government on the island, the Cubans began to demand fulfillment of the Teller Resolution. The islanders demanded that American intervention should be terminated and cried out for absolute independence.

Juan Gualberto Gomez, a powerful Negro, was one of the main opponents of the American policy. He was a great orator, member of the Cuban Constitutional Convention and secretary of the Cuban Committee on Relations to negotiate terms with the United States. His influence was a definite force throughout the period following Spanish dismissal. He disapproved any type of American supervision — having a distinct distaste for everything American.

The Constitution stated in September, 1899 that Cuba had many requirements of self-government necessary to precede independence, and was confident that the United States would recognize independence as soon as the Cubans were prepared to exercise it. By November, 1899 the idea that Cuba was destined to become a part of this country was advocated by the Epoch expressing the same sentiments as the Constitution. The Southern newspapers in America questioned each other on the subject of annexation and the racial problem it would certainly involve. The Constitution was willing to annex Cuba with the consent of the islanders as soon as possible. It felt that this act would bring permanent peace and increase commerce, with consequent advantages to both countries. But, it firmly stated, Cuba must come into the Union of her own free will — not with "forcible annexation." The Atlanta daily hoped that the Cubans
could see the opportunities which annexation would bring.

The Constitution constantly attacked the Republican administration and its policy — referring to them as "professional republican carpet-baggers." Only the South knew the fate that awaited a people under their supervision, the Atlanta paper had declared.

It asked the Republican press whether it would agree to annex Cuba as an equal state of the Union, believing it against their platform. The Constitution was positive that annexation was the ultimate fate of Cuba although it not enter upon any other terms except those of equal statehood. According to the journal some Cubans demanded annexation around the first of the year 1902, but it is probable that the majority of the islanders were in accord with Senor Valluendo who preferred the Platt Amendment and quasi-independence to annexation.

The Platt Amendment, imposed on the Cubans with the grant of independence, caused a great uproar in Cuba. It limited their powers so conclusively that she was no more than a protectorate of the American government. The Cuban Constitutional Convention rejected the Platt Amendment on April 12, 1901. On May 28 the Cubans accepted the Amendment making some changes, but these were refused by the United States. Finally, after much negotiating and compromising the Amendment was accepted on June 12, 1901. It remained a source of discontent among the Cubans, but they had no alternative acceptable to the United States.

The Constitution in February, 1901 stated that Cuba had a right to her independence, but the United States also was justified in her intervention because of the great expense incurred to establish a stable government on the island. After the passage of the Platt Amendment it thought the Cubans should accept it as the only sensible act. The Cubans did accept it as stated above, but only under compulsion.
Tomas Estrada Palma was elected president of the new Republic.

The Constitution approved him because of his friendliness for this government. But, in spite of the faith that the Atlanta daily had in Palma's ability to govern, it predicted that stable conditions would cease to exist in Cuba without American supervision -- that revolution would be inevitable and would result in renewed intervention. To the end the Constitution had no faith in the Cubans to govern themselves. The only remedy forever, she declared, was annexation to this "Great Republic."
The Cuban Constitution had three clauses in relation to the United States:

1. Cuba would not make a treaty with any foreign power which might compromise the independence of Cuba, or which might permit any power colonization for naval or military purposes — any foothold or right over any portion of said island.

2. The government would not permit its territory to be used as a base of operation against the United States or against any other foreign nation.

3. Cuba accepted the treaty of Paris, in which were affirmed the rights of Cuba to the extent of the obligations indicated, and these that international law imposed for the protection of life and property.

4. Cuba recognized as legally valid all acts of the military government during the period of occupation, and also the Foraker Amendment and the laws existing in the country.

5. The governments of the United States and Cuba should regulate their commercial relations by means of a treaty based on reciprocity.

The United States relations with Cuba in the Platt Amendment had these clauses:

1. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.

2. That said government shall not assume or control any public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking fund provisions for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of government shall be inadequate.

3. That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba.

4. That all the acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.
5. That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island.

6. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereof being left to future adjustment by treaty.

7. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

8. That by way of further assurance the government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Atlanta Constitution (January 1899 - June 1902). Atlanta, Georgia.

Invaluable material reprinted from the Havana press — also interesting news articles and editorial comments on the Cuban situation.


Since Hunter Miller ed., Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, Washington, 1931 - , at present goes to only 1943, it was necessary to use Malloy.


Polk's views on expansion


Based largely on the private papers and the diary of Fish that have never been published.


Contains much previously unpublished material.


A clear-cut statement of the origin of the Monroe Doctrine. It is the best source on this document based on extensive research.

Very convenient and useful to all who have to consult these documents.


A personal biography of Hay revealed through his private letters and letters of his official friends.


Easily accessible and of ready reference.

SECONDARY SOURCES

A. Magazine Articles


A very good treatment of this phase of the Spanish-American War.


A valuable study of Germany's policy during the Spanish-American War, based on Die Grosse Politik.

B. Pamphlet


C. Biographies


The title indicates a highly eulogistic evaluation.


Based on Hay's private papers and the archives of the United States State Department.
A full documented biography. The last phase of his career is not complete — only twenty-five pages are devoted to the war and the controversies.

D. General Works


The best diplomatic history of the United States.


A good history of diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain.


A political history of Cuba after the Spanish-American War.


A very good brief study of the United States in World Politics.


A carefully documented diplomatic history of the United States making use of the State Department archives and of the Hay and Roosevelt papers.


This volume is a study of the background and progress of the failure of Soule's mission — a very good analysis of the "Ostend Manifesto."


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A standard work until publication of Bemis's *Diplomatic History*.


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