Scientific Method as a Tool for Improving the Quality of Value Judgments with Particular Concern for the Black Predicament in the U.S.

Mack H. Jones, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus, Clark Atlanta University

Abstract

[The] sharp distinction between questions of fact and questions of value has led to widespread acceptance of the view that social scientists must choose between being scientific practitioners and passionate advocates. Generally speaking, conservative elements who are comfortable with the status quo have assumed the mantle of the former while the more progressive or radical scholars have accepted the latter role. Thus, we have a simplistic dichotomy of social scientists with one group arguing that they are scientific and value free and the other arguing that to be scientific is to be irrelevant and that the essence of relevant scholarship is commitment and advocacy. The fact of the matter is that the dichotomy itself is the thing which is most irrelevant; and while both sides find succor and comfort in identifying with their particular group and in taking potshots at the perceived adversary; and while progressive and radical scholars who accept the oppressed as their clientele take particular delight in lampooning the “scientism” of status quo apologist mainstream social scientists, it is the cause of the oppressed which suffers the most from this dichotomy.

Keywords: scientific method; value judgments; philosophy of science; social science theories, black social science

I

In our weak moments we may wonder about the merit of Hume’s celebrated contribution to the philosophy of science; for even though Hume was categorically correct in distinguishing between questions of fact and questions of value and in arguing that normative choices cannot be deduced from facts, the sharp distinction between the two kinds of questions has served to obfuscate, in the minds of many, the relationship between facts scientifically gathered, aggregated and analyzed and normative choices. Such obfuscation in turn, has led to a form of anti-intellectual know-nothingism predicated upon the assumption that normative choices are individual preferences not amenable to objective interpersonal assessment. The logical corollary
of this assumption is the notion that everybody’s opinion or normative choice is equal to
everybody else’s and that therefore questions of value are matters of only one’s personal taste.

If one accepts such normative anarchism, social scientists qua social scientists and
scientific methods of inquiry have no particular role to play in structuring value choices. We are
simply faced with a garden of competing value judgements with no basis for distinguishing
wheat from chaff or sense from nonsense.

Further, this sharp distinction between questions of fact and questions of value has led to
widespread acceptance of the view that social scientists must choose between being scientific
practitioners and passionate advocates. Generally speaking, conservative elements who are
comfortable with the status quo have assumed the mantle of the former while the more
progressive or radical scholars have accepted the latter role. Thus, we have a simplistic
dichotomy of social scientists with one group arguing that they are scientific and value free and
the other arguing that to be scientific is to be irrelevant and that the essence of relevant
scholarship is commitment and advocacy. The fact of the matter is that the dichotomy itself is
the thing which is most irrelevant; and while both sides find succor and comfort in identifying
with their particular group and in taking potshots at the perceived adversary; and while
progressive and radical scholars who accept the oppressed as their clientele take particular
delight in lampooning the “scientism” of status quo apologist mainstream social scientists, it is
the cause of the oppressed which suffers the most from this dichotomy. For in depreciating the
need for, indeed, the possibility of, scientifically arrived at propositions the radical scholar who
sees himself solely as an advocate undermines any claim of special competence that he or she
might have and corollarily any reason why his or her proclaimed clientele should listen to him or
her any more than to any other pied piper on the loose. More importantly, the acceptance of this
facile dichotomy of the role of social scientists and the concomitant acceptance of the
depreciation of scientific methods of inquiry often leads radical scholars to rely on assertions as
opposed to arguments in their efforts to explain and predict. Qualitative distinctions can be made
by analyzing their logical consistency and the extent to which the components of the argument
are consistent with the empirical reality with which they purport to deal. Arguments are subject
to scientific interpersonal verification. Assertions are a different matter. They are not stated in a
form amenable to verification; they are simply ex cathedra. To question them is heresy. When
explanations are based upon assertions as opposed to arguments, the quest for knowledge – the
claim to know – degenerates into obscurantism. Under such conditions the quality of a claim to
know is not assessed in terms of its isomorphism with empirical reality but rather the quality of
an individual is assessed in terms of his identification with ex cathedra assertions. Individuals
are sorted out among the washed and the unwashed and given the awards appertaining thereunto.

II

At this point it may be judicious to return to the argument with which this essay began
est I impose upon your patience lose your interest. I set out to demonstrate how methods of
scientific inquiry can enhance the quality of value judgments with particular reference to the
black predicament in the United States. The foregoing brief detour was necessary to set the tone
for the argument which follows.

The dichotomizing of the role of social scientists has not been without consequence for
the black community and its struggle for liberation. During the last half decade or so, many
young black social scientists, doubtlessly moved by arguments such as the ones found in Cruse’s
Crisis of the Negro Intellectual,¹ have become acutely aware of the extent to which their training

in white social science departments by “scientifically oriented” white professors has alienated them from the struggle of their people. By reflex action, to atone for their sins and reduce the Crusian crisis, many black intellectuals renounced scientific inquiry while rushing pell-mell to place their academic talents at the disposal of those trying to make qualitative distinctions among competing goals and strategies extant in the black community. However, having dismissed scientific inquiry as either impossible or as a tool of the status quo, their efforts have generally taken the form of assertions as opposed to arguments. Avant garde black social scientists have competed with polemicists for breezy descriptions of complex phenomena, and the roles of the two, polemicist and scholar, have become indistinguishable. This is tragic. The polemicist has a particular role to play in the struggle. It is his responsibility to put together emotionally laden arguments which put the struggle in the foremost favorable light and which can be used to organize and stimulate people for action. Polemicist may be excused for overstating an argument, playing down nuances, or even resorting to card stacking or an occasional half-truth.

On the other hand social the scientist qua social scientist, as Vince Harding\(^2\) and Ralph Ellison\(^3\) have so eloquently stated, must be about the truth with all its complexities and contradictions. It is the social scientist’s task to reduce that element of reality with which we are concerned to intellectually manageable proportions without compromising its empirical truth. The only way to do that is by following the time honed and time honored canons of scientific inquiry. This is not to say that social scientists should not be advocates or polemicists; but rather it is to argue that there are distinct differences between the two kinds of intellectual activity and that these distinctions must always be kept in mind; and further it is to argue that as social scientists qua social scientists, our role is to present the truth in a scientific manner. After we have presented

---

\(^2\) Vincent Harding, “The Vocation of the Black Scholar and the Struggles of the Black Community” (forthcoming)

the truth we should then become advocates and activists in the direction the truth leads. If we do not proceed in such a manner, we do a disservice to our people for we encourage the substitution of mysticism for serious analysis. And we facilitate the development of strategies based upon myths and misleading propaganda. Such policies, are of course, doomed to failure. The bankruptcy of integrationism as a strategy and the decimation of the Black Panther Party are cases in point.

Of course, most normative choices or value judgments are based upon common sense information. Questions of right and wrong, correct or incorrect are usually resolved by referring to such information. However, there are occasions when such information is inadequate for making the decisions which must be made. One good indication that the limits of common sense knowledge have been reached is when the plurality of reasonable, honest, and intelligent people who share a common worldview believe that diametrically opposed paths or strategies will get them to a commonly agreed upon goal. Another indication that the limits of common sense information has been reached would be a situation in which future outcomes predicted by a certain intervention strategy fail repeatedly to materialize. The black predicament in the United States qualifies on both accounts. Presently Amiri Baraka and the Congress of African People oriented nationalists, Roy Wilkins and NAACP integrationists, Roy Innis and CORE pluralists, the black capitalists, Jesse Jackson, the Panthers, The Nation of Islam ad nauseam, all claim to have the most promising solution for ameliorating the black condition. These competing strategies cannot be of equal worth. Some of them run counter to each other. Qualitative distinctions among them can and must be made – in terms of logically consistent scientific propositions not as *ex cathedra* assertions. In short, we can narrow the number of competing
alternative solutions by employing the canons of scientific inquiry. Black social scientists should and must take the lead in this inexpendable undertaking.

Before attempting to demonstrate how the scientific method may be used to enhance the quality of value judgments, it may be useful to pause and ask why is it that so many serious and committed social scientists have been willing to accept this perverted interpretation of their role as social scientist qua social scientist and the utility of scientific inquiry. The answer, I suspect, is connected in some way with two things: (1) black social scientist’s uneasiness over his/her objective class status in American society, and (2) the failure to come to terms with some important questions regarding the philosophy of science.

On the first score, many of the serious socially committed black social scientists are a bit uneasy if not embarrassed by their with their middle class status and the salutary treatment and deference it affords them as compared to the treatment and deference given black rank and file. This feeling often manifests itself in self-effacing posturing by black academics who tend to romanticize the character and contribution of the masses and to raise common sense explanations to the level of scripture. The fact of the matter is, as Nagel has pointed out, systematic scientific inquiry begins where common sense leaves off (or runs out). Common sense knowledge constitutes the base upon which scientific knowledge builds.

Such posturing however is not only not convincing but borders on dishonesty. For if one is convinced of the abundant wisdom of the masses in the form of common sense, one should quickly desert the cloistered corridors of academia and report to the nearest hiring hall, church or neighborhood joint; and one should similarly discontinue advanced study and systematic inquiry inasmuch as common sense explanations are strewn indiscriminately among the ecology and

available to all passersby and may be gathered without the sacrifice of paying tuition, submitting to dull lectures, or reading turgid treatises. Since these scholars voluntarily choose to pay such penance, we may be excused for not taking their fawning self-effacing gestures seriously.

The other matter, a failure to come to terms with important questions regarding the philosophy of science is serious and deserves special attention, for it is this failure which has obscured the fact that while the scientific method is only one of several important phases in systematic inquiry it is the crucial phase, for it is the scientific method which facilitates the maximization of certainty in our attempts to deal with problems growing out of our subjective or normative considerations.

Most social scientists are socialized into their particular disciplines without ever raising the important questions to which the philosophy of science speaks, viz., what is the purpose of inquiry? How and why are frames of reference constructed? How and why do academic disciplines develop? How are concepts formed? Propositions derived? Theories developed? To be sure, most students are required to suffer through a “methods” course, but such courses usually serve simply to qualify the recruit for admission to the cathedral.

When these important philosophical questions are addressed, several things become clear. The first is that the purpose of inquiry is to allow people to anticipate future events and to develop strategies to maximize our control over them.\(^5\)

This means that social science inquiry is idiosyncratic to the people being served. Every significant researchable problem occurs within a web of thought or network growing out of a people’s anticipation and control needs. This web includes first of all, a people’s worldview which, among other things, answers the questions: Who are we? Where did we come from?

\(^5\) The argument which follows is generally influenced by that found in Eugene Meehan’s *Value Judgment and Social Science*, (Homewood, Illinois: 1969).
How did we get here? Where do we wish to go? What alternative strategies have been tried and what results were obtained and why? Who are our friends and enemies? Closely connected with the worldview is the second part of the web, a set of normative assumptions which summarizes a people’s perception of the nature of the good life and the political, economic and cultural forms necessary for its realization. Academic disciplines develop within the context of these two.

The establishment of academic disciplines then is a normative purposeful exercise; the content of which is determined by a people’s worldview and normative assumptions. It is the process by which it is determined what facts from the universe of facts should be selected and aggregated for study. The content of the disciplines is determined by the third dimension of the web, the frame of reference. The latter serves as the lens through which we perceive the experiential world. The frame of reference structures the rules for reducing ineffable pure fact to described fact, the rules of concept formation, as it were, and gives rise to the major concepts, propositions, and theories; which in turn prescribe which questions are considered legitimate areas of study.

All of the foregoing processes, it should be noted, are subjective and grow out of the history and culture of the people being served. It is only after these processes have unfolded that the scientific method comes into play. The scientific method is the sum of rules for gathering and presenting interpersonal information in fashion amenable to validation. These rules are objective and applicable to all systematic inquiry, ideology notwithstanding.

I am aware of the argument that the scientific method is irredeemably bound to materialistic Western culture and places undue emphasis on rank empiricism. However, I am in no way inhibited by that admonition for two reasons. First of all, the scientific method, especially in the context of verification, is nothing more than a set of rules for uncovering,
organizing and presenting information in a fashion which would be convincing to skeptics. This practice is of course timeless and universal. To be sure, there have always been elements in all societies which would have others accept their assertions simply because “I said so.” Religious and other unenlightened cults are based upon such blind acceptance. Intelligent people without regard to culture however, prefer assertions or claims to know be presented in a fashion which allows for disproof. Indeed even when we make common sense arguments the assumption is that the predictions implied by the propositions may be validated by referring to empirical phenomena. The scientific method simply introduces greater precision and minimizes error while strengthening the element of certainty.

My second reason for discounting the argument that the scientific method is unduly deferential toward empiricism is that social scientist’s primary concern should be matters empirical. Matters of metaphysical essence should be left to philosophers and preachers. They are much more adept in circumventing the wise words of Stevie Wonder regarding the perils of believing in things which are not understood.

Thus our problem with American social science lies not with the scientific method but rather with the normatively determined “problems” to which the method will be applied. This point may be dramatized by focusing briefly on the process of concept formation. A concept is simply a word to which a meaning has been assigned; the word is meant to stand for, and evoke in the mind of persons being communicated with, some regularity which we perceive to exist empirically. Yet prior to the assignment of concepts the world of pure fact is an unintelligible seamless web of energy expending happenings and phenomena in a state of stasis. One’s perspective imposes order and gives meaning to the world of pure fact. As someone said a fact is
nothing more than a particular ordering of reality in terms of theoretical interest. That is to say that the reduction of the pure fact world to described fact is a highly subjective process governed by a people’s anticipation and control needs.

Thus the problem with white social science lies not so much with its lack of objectivity or its unscientific character, though both may be valid criticisms, but the fact that the anticipation and control needs of white society as defined by the ruling elite leads social scientists to organize the world of pure fact around categories which are trivial in light of the anticipation and control needs of the black community. For example, Moynihan, Banfield, et. al serve the interests of their clientele quite well.

This fundamental point, in spite of its obviousness, has eluded black academics on both the left and the right. On the right persons such as Martin Kilson seem to think that the rules which white academia follows in reducing pure fact to described fact are part of the scientific method and consequently see neither the need for, nor the possibility of, developing a perspective to impose order on the world of pure fact consistent with black anticipation needs.

On the left, progressive black social scientists who clearly understand the inappropriateness of white social science have not shown equal clarity on how we move toward building the new social science. Lerone Bennett’s call for a “new frame of reference which transcends the limit of white concepts” and for creating “a new pool of clarifying concepts which will permit us to see and handle our own reality has not been answered. Instead of returning to the world of pure fact and using our own anticipation and control needs to decide what regularities from among the infinite number of regularities out there should be extracted out for analysis, we have simply engaged in word games by suggesting new labels for regularities which

---

7 See Challenge of Blackness, Black Paper No. 1, Institute of Black World, Atlanta, Georgia, 1970.
white scholarship identified as being consequential. We debate the Moynihan’s around their reduction of pure fact. For example, Preston Wilcox, Ronald Walters, and Abdul Alkalimat⁸ all seem to think changing labels, i.e. substituting words neocolonialism for tokenism, freedom for equality, Negro-removal for urban renewal, etc., represents important changes in concept formation.

The important question, of course, is to what empirical regularities do the labels refer. Substituting new labels for the same regularities changes nothing. Analysis is still based upon white reduction of the world of pure fact to described fact.

Failure to understand this can lead to a questionable black radical scholarship. My favorite example of this is dramatized by what I call Robert Staples’ “Rooster Theory of the Black Male.” In trying to forge a response to the notion of the “emasculating” of the black male Staples argues that:

The difference between black men and white men in sexual response may be explained by realizing that for white men sex has to be fitted into time not devoted to building technological society, whereas for black men it is a natural function, a way of life. An example of this is that white men when confronted with their woman’s state of sexual readiness may say business first, pleasure later. The black male when shown the black woman’s state of sexual readiness manages to take care of both the business and the pleasure task. If one task is left unfinished, it is unlikely that the black woman is left wanting.⁹

Sure this statement is an absurdity, but such absurdities always result when we take someone else’s reduction of pure fact and try to “get a better deal” from the analysis. Had Staples begun with his own reduction of pure fact I doubt he would have found it important to discuss the difference between black men and white men in sexual response.

---


Value judgments, like any other explanation, consists of three essential elements (1) a description of an empirical situation (factual base), (2) a prediction of future developments, and (3) a statement of operations which must occur or be performed (intervention strategy) if the future developments are to occur as predicted. An explanation says based upon what we already know, we can expect X to occur providing A,B,C,…N are done. The structure of a value judgment is no different except for the fact that the predicted or desired result is selected first then a determination is made (of the proper intervention strategy) as to what operations must occur or be performed to insure realization the predicted future. The quality of an explanation is determined by the accuracy of the description or factual base and the logical consistency of the argument which connects the intervention strategy with the factual base on the one hand, and with the predicted future on the other. Explanation says given the regularities which have been observed over time (and discussed in the factual base) if we alter the environment (intervention strategy) in a particular way we can expect Y (normative choice) to occur. Once the argument is stated in this way its utility becomes subject to interpersonal assessment. Whether or not the description is accurate becomes an empirical question which can be resolved by scientific inquiry; whether or not the suggested alterations in the environment are likely to yield the predicted future becomes a problem of logical consistency which can also be dealt with through procedures of scientific inquiry. Let us return to the question of the black predicament. Whenever a group or individual give their view of the optimum strategy for liberation, it carries with it a description of the black predicament (factual base) and a definition of liberation along with an argument as to why their proposed liberation strategy will lead logically from the prescribed reality to the desired future. Of course, all of this is usually stated in an unsystematic
common sense fashion. Perhaps one should not expect Roy Wilkins, Amiri Baraka, or Huey Newton to do more. However until their arguments are stated in a fashion that makes them amenable to reasoned criticism, we cannot separate sense from nonsense.

This is where social scientists come in. It is our responsibility to convert the positions of the various factions into propositions which lend themselves to disproof. Let me hasten to point out that this is not an argument for uninvolved social scientists who eschew practice while engaging in antiseptic theorizing. Social scientists if they are to be creative must be immersed in social problem situations, but their contributions as social scientists should be measured in terms of their ability to clarify social reality so that the masses and their leaders can make more intelligent choices among competing alternatives. We would begin by examining the description of reality upon which a particular group bases its analysis. Once that description is examined thoroughly and broken down into relevant propositional statements, the validity of these propositions can be determined by applying them to the empirical reality with which the purport to deal. The description of, say, the NAACP, Panthers, Congress of African People, etc., cannot all be correct or accurate. The extent to which a description is accurate is again, an empirical question amenable to scientific inquiry.

The descriptive or factual base from which competing groups proceed may be clarified by discerning its answers to the following questions:

1. What is its Weltanschauung or worldview?
2. How does it describe the political history of blacks in the U.S.?
   a. Importance of economic factors.
   b. Importance of racial factors.
   c. Importance of cultural factors.
3. What does it say about the nature of political power in the U.S.?
   a. Relationship between formal and informal political structures and its implications for black life.
   b. Relationship between government and business and its implications for black life.
c. Locus of political decisionmaking.

4. What does it say about the nature of economic power in the U.S.?
   a. How are economic decisions made and in whose interests?
   b. What are the most crucial economic decisions?
   c. Who makes crucial economic decisions and under what conditions?

5. What is the pattern of wealth distribution in the U.S.?
   a. What is the percentage of national wealth going to various social classes?
   b. What percentage of national income takes the form of transfer payments?
   c. What is the distribution of transfer payments by social class and race?
   d. What would be the systematic implications of altering these patterns?

6. What is the present level and scope of black political power in the U.S.?

Once the group’s position on the above and other related questions, (which are meant to be suggestive and not exhaustive) is clarified, we can move to evaluate its intervention strategy in terms of its internal consistency and its logical consistency with its descriptive base. We would need to assess both the long run and the short run strategies of the group in terms of the following, inter alia:

1. Political Strategies
   a. What is its position on the role of, and recruiting and maintaining mass support?
   b. What is its position on of, recruitment, accountability, and circulation of leadership?
   c. What is its position on coalitions? With whom?
   d. What is its position and practice regarding participation in electoral politics?

2. Economic Strategy
   a. What is to be done regarding unemployment and underemployment of black workers?
   b. What is its position on the role of the state in providing social welfare services?
   c. What is its long run perception of the good economic life?

3. Cultural Strategies
   a. What is the nature of its propaganda?
   b. To whom is it addressed?
   c. Does it have a cultural apparatus? By whom is it supported?

When we have clarified the descriptive base and the strategies of a particular faction we can juxtapose them with the faction’s stated goals and make at least a tentative determination of the probability that a given intervention strategy will yield the predicted results. For example, Bayard Rustin’s argument that a black labor coalition will yield certain payoffs toward the
realization of black goals is a probability statement subject to empirical clarification. The same can be said regarding intervention strategies of the Panthers, Nation of Islam, and other groups.

Of course the paramount question – the question of the good life or the ideal future we would like to see, be it integration into the American capitalist order, an independent black nation here or elsewhere, revolution and an ecumenical socialist state or whatever cannot be determined by scientific analysis. One simply has to make a choice; however scientific analysis can shed light on the question by indicating the likelihood that a particular intervention strategy is or is not likely to get one there.

IV

Finally, before we can begin to use scientific analysis to make qualitative distinctions among the various factions and individuals competing for public support, considerable preparatory work in the area of concept formation will be necessary. Presently there are no commonly agreed upon definitions, not even common sense ones, of the major concepts which are used in describing the black predicament and offering solutions. It is an elementary point that useful dialogue/debate can occur only if there is a common vocabulary. Nonetheless, heated debate about the nature and direction of the struggle has been and continues to be waged with vague and ambiguous concepts. Such debates, more often than not, tend to be circular as opposed to cumulative, primarily because the antagonists never know if they have real disagreements or when evidence presented by one party or the other is sufficient to disprove or validate a particular argument.

Just to make that point at issue here, what are the accepted definitions of the following concepts: integration, nationalism, cultural nationalist, black middle class, petty bourgeois, revolutionary nationalist, or Pan-Africanism? None of these concepts has been defined with
sufficient clarity to facilitate serious dialogue among contending forces. Instead they are all used as in house condensation symbols provoking uncritical obeisance among true believers and equally uncritical negative responses among adversaries.

Adherents to deterministic (which is to say tautological?) explanations, particularly Marxists, may take exception to my call for the use of scientific analysis beginning with serious attention to concept formation. They might argue with some justification that their analysis is based upon a set of concepts which have been honed across time and cultures and are acknowledged to have universal validity. Moreover, Marxists are fond of debunking social science concepts as non-contentian petty bourgeois abstractions with little or no empirical utility. Anticipating such a response, let me say here and now that in spite of their pretensions toward scientific analysis, black Marxists have done little to introduce clarity to the debate about, or to the struggle itself.

Rather than taking the traditional Marxist concepts and giving them the particular content which would surface from a natural historical description of black life in the United States and then using concepts so constructed in propositions about political existence in the United States, Marxists have resorted to foreign analogies in their efforts to explain. In the process, scientifically developed Marxian concepts are reduced to non-contentian slogans which may arouse or induce acquiescence – depending upon the disposition of the listener – but which do little to facilitate enlightened discussion. For example, to what extent have concepts such as class, proletariat, petty bourgeois, surplus-value, alienation, exploitation, profits, colonialism, neo-colonialism, etc. been used to develop insightful propositions about contemporary black

---

10 Arguing by analogy is probably the most serious intellectual error for it allows one to use both the logical consistency and the raw data of one situation to validate a proposition which may be not at all isomorphic to the matter being discussed. How many factual errors have we made by relying on analogies from the U.S.S.R., Cuba, Algeria, or China?
existence. Very little I am afraid. The seminal works of the late Oliver Cox remain a lonely crowd.

To summarize, until we begin to define terms clearly and precisely and include operational definitions to link our concepts to the empirical phenomena which they purport to represent, we are doomed to wander in the well beaten circular, non-cumulative path of civil rights frustration with our peregrination marked only by instant yet unrewarding conversion to the newest ideology.

**Bibliography**


Harding, Vincent. “The Vocation of the Black Scholar and the Struggles of the Black Community” (forthcoming)


---